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L E D R A R Y
SUMMARY
This thesis deals with the legal reform of secured credit law regimes. Particularly, it 
considers to what extent the modernisation of secured credit laws could be achieved 
through approximation of law methods. Although, a justification of secured lending 
continues to be a topic of debate amongst economic scholars, the case for the 
modernisation and approximation of secured credit law regimes is now clearly 
established and now represents a general consensus amongst academics and 
commercial actors. The archaism and divergences of national secured credit law 
regimes have become too cumbersome and inadequate to meet the requirements of 
modem commerce. Accordingly, the question is addressed of whether the 
modernisation of secured credit law regimes could be successful using 
approximation of law methods such as legal transplantation, legal harmonisation and 
legal unification. A comparative law approach is retained in the thesis in order to 
assess whether a modernisation using approximation of law methods could be 
successful. Fundamental divergences are identified between the law of personal 
property in Civilian jurisdictions such as France and Common Law jurisdictions such 
as England. It is argued that secured credit law regimes are well entrenched in ‘legal 
culture’ which constitutes one of the major obstacles to the successful modernisation 
of secured credit law regimes in the light of an approximation of law. It is thus 
further questioned whether the modernisation of secured credit could occur outside 
the framework of the state. The recognition of an independent legal framework to 
regulate secured transactions can however be challenged as not being entirely 
feasible nor desirable.
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CHAPTER ONE
IN PURSUIT OF A RATIONALE FOR SECURED CREDIT 
INTRODUCTION
The pursuit of the basis of a coherent rationale for secured credit has been at the 
heart of major debates, particularly within the economic literature. Economic 
scholars and academics challenged the institution of secured credit using the 
economic analysis of the law. Essentially, it is argued that the rationale for secured 
credit will be established if  one can show that the gains from issuing security will 
exceed the costs. Other scholars departed from this methodology and opted for a 
much more radical position according to which secured credit, or at least the priority 
system, should be eradicated. In support of their recommendation, it is argued that 
secured credit would unfairly redistribute wealth from unsecured creditors to the 
debtor itself and to other secured creditors. Nonetheless, recent empirical evidence 
tends to show substantial inconsistencies with the theories exposed within this quest 
to find a rationale for secured credit. Thus, and at a time where legal reforms in the 
field of secured credit are rising, it is to be observed that the debate still remains 
inconclusive. In this study, it will be attempted to resolve the debate and determine 
whether a justification of the institution of secured credit can be established. It will 
be further examined whether the growing importance of the economic analysis in the 
law making process should dictate the substance of secured credit law regimes. In 
effect, the emergence of recent financial and economic literature in the field 
introduced a new debate on the use of the economic analysis as a method to assess 
national secured credit law regimes.
The creation of a security provides protection to the creditors against the debtor’s 
default. The primary function of a security is thus to reduce credit risks for creditors 
by providing priority over other creditors in the event o f the debtor’s insolvency1. 
The granting of priority constitutes the principal purpose of secured credit with any
1 Goode, R. M., Legal Problems o f  Credit and Security, (3rd ed. 2003), at p. 1.
1
jurisdictions which have implemented a type of secured credit law regime. For 
instance, Civilian jurisdictions such as France recognise the priority o f the first in 
time creditor pursuing the famous Latin adage of ‘prior tempore, potior jure ’ . 
Similarly, the American Article 9 of the UCC provides a similar rule embodied in the 
‘first to file’ principle which respects the first in time, first in right principle . While 
the principle is well established within secured credit law regimes, its desirability is 
the subject of an ongoing theoretical debate4. The problem is that the priority granted 
to secured creditors derogates to the pari passu principle, which is defined as a 
principle o f equality and constitutes a central theme of any legislations on 
insolvency5. Hence, it became necessary to question why the legislator introduced 
such a system based on the distributive justice logic together with a system based on
2 The principle o f first in time, first in right” is embodied in Article 2424 of the French Civil code and 
provides that: “[w]here several registrations are required on the same day as to the same immovable 
that which is required by virtue o f the instrument of title bearing the remotest date shall be deemed of 
prior rank, whatever the order resulting from the register provided for in Article 2453 may be.”
3 Article 9 UCC, Part 3.
4 Jackson, T.H., Et al. “Secured Financing and Priorities Among Creditors” (1979) 88 Yale Law 
Journal, at p. 1143; Schwartz, A. “Security Interests and Bankruptcy Priorities: A Review o f Current 
Theories” (1981) 10 Journal o f  Legal Studies, at p. 1; Levmore, S. “Monitors and Freeriders in 
Commercial and Corporate Settings” (1982) 92 Yale Law Journal, at p. 49; Schwartz, A. “The 
Continuing Puzzle o f Secured Debt” (1984) 37 Vanderbilt Law Review, at p. 1051; White, JJ. 
“Efficiency Justifications for Personal Property Security” (1984) 37 Vanderbilt Law Review, at p. 473; 
Buckley, F.H. “The Bankruptcy Priority Puzzle” (1986) 72 Virginia Law Review, at p. 1393; Scott, 
R.E. “A Relational Theory o f Secured Financing” (1986) 86 Columbia Law Review, at p. 901; 
Shupack, P.M. “Solving the Puzzle o f Secured Transactions” (1989) 41 Rutgers Law Review, at p. 
1067; Triantis, G.G. “Secured Debt Under Conditions o f Imperfect Information” (1992) 21 Journal o f  
Legal Studies, at p. 225; Picker, R.C. “Security Interests, Misbehavior, and Common Pools” (1992) 59 
University o f  Chicago Law Review, at p. 645; Adler, B.E. “An Equity-Agency Solution to the 
Bankruptcy Priority Puzzle” (1993) 22 Journal o f Legal Studies, at p. 73; Schwartz, A. “Taking the 
Analysis o f Security Seriously” (1994) 80 Virginia Law Review, at p. 2073; Triantis, G.G. “A Free- 
Cash-Flow Theory o f Secured Debt and Creditor Priorities” (1994) 80 Virginia Law Review, at p. 
2155; LoPucki, L.M. “The Unsecured Creditor's Bargain” (1994) 80 Virginia Law Review, at p. 1887; 
Steven L. H., Et al. “A Property-Based Theory of Security Interests: Taking Debtors' Choices 
Seriously” (1994) 80 Virginia Law Review, at p. 2021; Kanda, H., Et al. “Explaining Creditor 
Priorities” (1994) 80 Virginia Law Review, at p. 2103; Hudson, J. “The Case Against Secured 
Lending” (1995) 15 International Review o f  Law and Economics, at p. 47; Arye, L., Et al. “The 
Uneasy Case for the Priority o f Secured Credit in Bankruptcy” (1996) 105 Yale Law Journal, at p. 
857; Baird, B. “The Importance o f Priority” (1997) 82 Cornell Law Review, at p. 1420; Schwarcz, 
S.L. “The Easy Case for the Priority o f Secured Claims in Bankruptcy” (1997) 47 Duke Law Journal, 
at p. 425; Schwartz, A. “Priority Contracts and Priority in Bankruptcy” (1997) 82 Cornell Law 
Review, at p. 1396 ; Warren, E. “Making Policy With Imperfect Information: The Article 9 Full 
Priority Debates” (1997) 82 Cornell Law Review, at p. 1373; Scott, R. “The Truth About Secured 
Financing” (1997) 82 Cornell Law. Review, at p. 1436; Arye, L., Et al. “The Uneasy Case for the 
Priority of Secured Credit in Bankruptcy: Further Thoughts and a Reply to Critics”(1997) 82 Cornell 
Law Review, at p. 1279; Mann, R.J. “Explaining the Pattern of Secured Credit” (1997) 110 Harvard 
Law Review, atp.625; Harris, S.H., Et al. “ Measuring The Social Costs And Benefits And Identifying 
The Victims O f Subordinating Security Interests In Bankruptcy” (1997) 82 Cornell Law Review, at p. 
1349; Carlson, D.G. “ Secured Lending as a Zero-Sum Game” (1998) 19 Cardozo Law Review, at 
p.1635.
5 In England, this principle is embodied in Section 107 of the Insolvency act 1986.
2
the pari passu principle. In other words, the question emerged to determine whether 
the difference of treatment o f creditors generated by the creation of a security could 
be justified. To this question, proponents of the redistributive theories answered in 
the negative6. The priority system could not be justified because it would unfairly 
redistribute wealth from unsecured creditors to the debtor itself and secured 
creditors. However, and as it will be evidenced later in this analysis, recent empirical 
research would tend to contradict the arguments derived from the redistributive 
theories. The second aspect of the creditor’s prerogative corresponds to the notion of 
control. The asset given as security for a loan will confer exclusive control to the 
secured creditor over that asset. Upon the debtor’s insolvency, the asset will be 
liquidated to the benefit of the secured creditor. Particularly, it is arguable that 
borrowers would have greater incentives to repay their secured creditors before 
becoming insolvent if  the asset given as security is strategically essential to the 
functioning of the debtor’s business. In addition, creditors with a broader security 
will also enjoy a certain degree of influence over the debtor’s business. This is 
particularly true where the creditor has obtained a security over a large amount o f the
n
debtor’s assets such as with the floating charge in England .
Finding a coherent justification for secured credit is not an easy task. It is generally 
argued that secured lending would enable firms to borrow more easily and would
Q
enable creditors to issue loans they would otherwise decline . From the debtor’s 
perspective, it is arguable that secured lending would promote access to credit at 
lower costs. Further, modem legislations on secured credit generally entitle 
borrowers to use a large range of assets such as tangible, intangible, and even future 
assets to secure their debts, which considerably enlarge the pool of assets available 
for financing. For creditors, the grant of security reduces their risks in the event of 
the debtor’s default. Secured credit significantly enhances the probabilities of 
recovery for creditors. Accordingly, it is often assumed that creditors would reduce 
their interest rates and costs when lending on a secured basis.
6 See e.g., LoPucki op. cit. fn. 4.
7 See e.g., Mokal, RJ. "The Floating Charge -  An Elegy" (2006) bepress Legal Series, Working 
Paper 1380, at p. 6, available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3 86040 (last 
checked 22/04/2010).
8 Schwartz "Security Interests and Bankruptcy Priorities: A Review o f Current Theories" op. cit. fn. 
4.
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There are of course a plethora of other reasons and justifications for issuing a 
security that will be considered in this study. Notwithstanding the widespread use of 
secured credit within commercial transactions, there are some situations where 
creditors will still choose to lend on an unsecured basis. This would suggest that in 
some situations, creditors would not always consider secured lending as an attractive 
financing tool. Thus, what explains that some creditors will choose to lend on a 
secured basis and others on an unsecured one? How can we justify the institution of 
secured credit? In light of these questions, legal scholars and academics challenged 
the raison d ’etre o f the institution of secured credit using the economic analysis of 
the law.
According to the economic literature, the desirability of recognising secured credit 
law regimes could only be established if one can show that the gains from issuing a 
security will exceed the costs. It is explained that:
“[efficiency of secured transactions will be demonstrated by creating a model 
showing that the availability of security enables debtors to increase wealth by an 
amount greater than is lost by others as a result of these transactions.”9
This is the so called Kaldor-Hicks efficiency criterion10. The question has strongly 
been discussed and debated in the United States under the auspices of Article 9 of the 
UCC11. In the light o f this debate, economists challenged legal academics and 
lawyers to justify secured lending using the economic analysis of the law. Further to 
these theories based on economic efficiencies, other analysis also developed against 
the institution of secured credit promoting arguments based on the unfairness of the 
priority system towards unsecured creditors, particularly, towards non-adjusting or 
involuntary unsecured creditors. The theories developed by economists have 
however extensively been criticised as not corresponding to the reality of commercial 
activities. In effect, recent empirical research tends to contradict theoretical
9 Ibid.
10 Kaldor, N. “Welfare Propositions of Economics and Interpersonal Comparisons o f Utility” (1939) 
49 The Economic Journal, at p. 549; Hicks, J.R. “The Valuation o f the Social Income” (1940) 7 
Economica, at p. 105, and “The Foundation o f Welfare Economics” (1939) 49 The Economic Journal, 
at p. 696. In order to demonstrate the efficiency of secured transactions, the Kaldor-Hicks criterion 
requires the demonstration that the gains obtained by secured creditors exceed the loss o f unsecured 
ones.
11 See bibliography on secured credit above at fn. 4.
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arguments and tends to show that secured credit law regimes are desirable as social
1 9benefits are likely to outweigh social costs .
The inability to establish a general theory of secured credit using the economic 
analysis of the law further questions the relevance of the use o f this method within 
the pursuit o f a rationale for secured credit. Particularly, the uncertain use o f the 
economic analysis to account for the institution of secured credit begs the question of 
the use of economics as a norm for challenging the substance o f the law and policy 
choices. Following substantial modernisation efforts and legal reforms in the field of 
secured credit at national and international level, a financial literature has recently 
emerged assessing the quality o f national business legislations using the economic 
analysis of the law. This assessment method has largely been criticised and its 
adequacy put under extensive scrutiny. Thus, the question is not solely to determine 
whether the economic efficiency of the institution o f secured credit needs to be 
proven but also whether the economic analysis should dictate the content and 
substance of secured credit law regimes. In this respect, the theories of secured credit 
will first be analysed in subsequent developments. The question o f the use o f the 
Law and Economics as a new norm for challenging the law will then be considered.
THE PUZZLE OF SECURED CREDIT: CURRENT THEORIES
Resolving the ‘puzzle of secured credit’13 is not an easy task. A myriad of theories 
have been advanced in an attempt to justify the institution o f secured credit, 
particularly within the Law and Economics literature. The first wave o f theories 
mainly emerged from the Law and Economics movement which attempted to prove
12 On this point see Davydenko, S. A., Et al. “Do Bankruptcy Codes Matter? A Study o f Defaults in 
France, Germany and the UK” (2006) EFA 2005 Moscow Meetings Paper, ECGI - Finance Working 
Paper No. 89/2005, WFA 2005 Portland Meetings Paper, AFA 2005 Philadelphia Meetings Paper, 
available at SSRN: http://ssm.com/abstract=647861 (last checked 22/04/2010); Booth, J.R., Et al. 
“Loan Collateral Decisions and Corporate Borrowing Costs” (2006) 38 Journal o f  Money, Credit and 
Banking, at p. 67; Benmelech, E., Et al. “Collateral Pricing” (2007) Working Paper, Harvard 
University Department o f  Economics/MIT Sloan School o f  Management, available at 
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=l 106600 (last checked 22/04/2010); Listokin, Y.J. 
“Is Secured Debt Used to Redistribute Value from Tort Claimants in Bankruptcy? An Empirical 
Analysis” (2008) 57 Duke Law Journal, at p. 1037 and Armour, J. “The Law and Economics Debate 
About Secured Lending: Lessons for European Lawmaking?”(2008) 5 European Company and 
Financial Law Review , available at http://ssm.com/abstract=l 118030 (last checked 22/04/2010).
13 Schwartz op. cit. fn. 8.
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that secured lending could theoretically be economically efficient14. These theories 
use the economic analysis to challenge the efficiency of the law by attempting to 
predict the effects of the legal rules in question. Essentially, academics, referring to 
the Kaldor-Hicks criterion15, attempted to determine whether the gains obtained from 
secured transactions would exceed the losses. In order to determine whether the costs 
o f issuing secured debts would exceed the losses, the economic literature makes a 
series of assumptions that have severely been criticised as not representing the 
reality. Theories based on the economic analysis generally derive their analysis from 
the Modigliani and Miller irrelevance theorem according to which the issuance of 
secured credit would amount to a zero sum game in perfect markets16. In effect, the 
early literature posits that the operation of secured credit would generally be seen as 
value neutral “... if capital markets are perfect, information is perfect, all actors have
17homogeneous expectations, bankruptcy costs are zero, and no taxes exist ...” By 
relaxing the assumptions of the perfect markets, a justification of secured credit 
would become possible by showing that the gains obtained from the issuance of 
secured credit would outweigh the loss borne by unsecured creditors. A second
ISschool of thought, also known as the Sympathetic Legal Scholars departed from the 
Law and Economics movement. This second wave of theories based on the 
‘exploitation hypothesis’ provides that wealth would be unfairly transferred from 
non-adjusting and involuntarily creditors to debtors and other secured creditors19. 
Although, redistributive theories appeared to create substantial threats to the 
institution o f secured credit, empirical evidence tends to show that these theories are 
difficult to sustain.
14 Carlson, D. G. "On the Efficiency o f Secured Lending" (1994) 80(8) Virginia Law Review, at p. 
2179.
15 See above fn. 10.
16 See Modigliani, F., Et al. “The Cost o f Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment” 
(1958) 48 American Economic Review, at p. 261; Miller, M.H. “Debt and Taxes” (1977) 32 Journal o f  
Finance, at p. 261; Modigliani, F., Et al. “Corporate Income Taxes and the Cost o f Capital: A 
Correction” (1963) 53 American Economic Review, at p. 433. The reference to the Modigliani and 
Miller irrelevance theorem to justify secured credit can be found in Schwartz “The Continuing Puzzle 
o f Secured Debt” op. cit. fn. 4, at pp. 1052-55 and pp. 1066-68.
17 Jackson, T.H., Et al. “Vacuum of Fact or Vacuous Theory: A Reply to Professor Kripke” (1985) 
133(5) The University o f  Pennsylvania Law Review, at p. 987.
18 McCormack, G., Secured Credit under English and American Law, (2004) at p. 22.
19 For an overview o f the exploitation hypothesis arguments, see Symposium reported at 82 Cornell 
Law Review (1997).
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The first point of this analysis will thus focus on some of the major theories that have 
challenged the economic efficiency of secured credit. The second point of this 
analysis will aim to provide an analysis of the redistributive theories and of the 
objections and counter arguments that have been raised against them.
The theories measuring the economic efficiency of secured credit
The first theory that challenged the economic efficiency of secured lending appeared 
in 1979 with Jackson and Kronman who developed a theory based on a monitoring 
costs explanation20. It was then followed by an Article o f Schwartz in 1981, where
91the author challenged academics to ‘solve the puzzle of secured debts’ . Following 
this study, academics attempted to develop other theories, using the economic 
analysis of the law, in order to prove the efficacy of secured lending22. The next 
developments will therefore focus on some of the major theories and arguments that 
have been advanced to challenge the economic efficiency o f secured credit.
The monitoring costs explanation
A theory based on a monitoring costs explanation was developed by Jackson and
9^Kronman to justify the effectiveness of secured lending. According to the 
demonstration, the creation of a security would reduce the monitoring costs for all 
creditors24, thus rendering the operation of secured credit economically efficient. The 
theory posits that the creation of a security lowers the risks for creditors in the event 
o f the debtor’s default. Thus, the use of the debtor’s asset as security for the loan
9 ^would reduce the monitoring costs . Indeed, by concentrating its attention on the 
asset securing the loan, the creditor would not need to monitor all o f the assets of the 
debtor. By opposition, it is arguable that unsecured creditors would need to incur 
higher costs for their loan because of higher requirements in their monitoring tasks26.
20 Jackson, T. H., Et al., op. cit. fn. 4, at p. 1143.
21 Schwartz, op. cit. fn. 8.
22 See bibliography on secured credit above, fn. 4.
23 Jackson, T. H., Et al., op. cit. fn. 4, at p. 1143.
24 Ibid. at pp. 1158-64.
25 Ibid. at p. 1153.
26 Schwartz, op. cit. fn. 8.
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By monitoring specific assets, secured creditors would diminish their monitoring 
responsibilities and, consequently, save time and money over the credit transaction 
costs. As a result, it is argued that the creditor who lends on a secured basis would 
charge lower interest rates than if  the loan was not secured. Hence, it is concluded 
that:
"... the rule permitting debtors to encumber their assets by private agreement is 
therefore justifiable as a cost saving device that makes it easier and cheaper for the
97debtor’s creditor to do what they would do in any case.”
It is however arguable that if  the issuance of secured credit may lower the transaction 
costs, unsecured creditors may increase their interest rates in response to the increase 
in risks. To this objection, it is argued that the increase in costs charged by unsecured 
creditors would still be inferior to the reduction in costs offered by secured creditors. 
For example, consider creditor A and creditor B who have lent $100 each to a debtor. 
Creditor A decides to lend on a secured basis with an interest rate of $5 and 
monitoring costs o f $1. Creditor B, taking into account the prior interest of creditor 
A, also decides to lend secured with an interest rate of $9 and monitoring costs of $4. 
The total debtor’s costs for his $200 loan are $19. If creditor A decides to lend 
unsecured, the risks of non repayment are higher and therefore decides to charge a 
higher interest rate of $7 and monitoring costs of $3. Creditor B will charge similar 
costs for the loan. In this situation, the total costs for the two loans reach $20. Thus, 
the debtor would be better off borrowing the funds on a secured basis.
The recognition that this scenario could support an explanation based on the 
monitoring costs is questionable. In effect, this analysis could not constitute the basis 
for a viable theory of secured lending. This scenario may justify the effectiveness of 
secured credit on this particular instance but could not constitute the basis for a 
general theory of secured lending. This example used as an illustration of the 
monitoring costs explanation is based on assumptions that might not correspond to 
the reality. The economic analysis often assumes that interest rates will be reduced if 
creditors lend on a secured basis. However, empirical evidence has shown that on 
certain instances, it will be more beneficial for the parties to opt for unsecured
27 Jackson, T. H., Et al. op. cit. fn. 4, at p. 1157.
credit28. For example, creditors and debtors might opt for an unsecured loan when the 
credit constitutes a small credit loan repayable in the normal course o f the debtor’s 
business.
Further critics were addressed to an explanation based on the monitoring costs 
explanation29. It is argued that lending on a secured basis might lower the secured 
creditors’ monitoring costs but, adversely, may increase them for unsecured 
creditors. In effect, the granting of a security will generally increase the risks for
30unsecured creditors who will accordingly increase their monitoring responsibilities . 
Consequently, it is argued that the "... debtor’s total interest bill is ... unaffected by 
the existence of security”31. Nevertheless, it is admitted that the viability of the 
monitoring costs explanation could be plausible in one situation . Following Article 
§ 9-306 (2) of the UCC, a “... security interest continues in collateral notwithstanding 
sale, exchange or other disposition thereof unless the disposition was authorized by 
the secured party in the security agreement or otherwise, and also continues in any 
identifiable proceeds including collections received by the debtor.” According to this 
disposition, the issuance of secured credit would prevent misbehaving debtors from 
reselling or substituting some of their assets after a loan is made which would benefit 
all creditors.
The issuance of a security would deter purchasers from buying assets from 
misbehaving debtors and would consequently reduce risks for secured and unsecured 
creditors. It is argued that in this situation, the monitoring costs incurred by secured 
creditors would be reduced without a corresponding increase from unsecured ones. 
The increased monitoring costs incurred by unsecured creditors would still be less 
that the monitoring costs incurred by secured creditors. Unsecured creditors would 
rely on the monitoring efforts of secured creditors. Nevertheless, it is admitted that 
the validity of this analysis would only be conceivable in respect o f long term loans
IT
as assets substitution would appear more unlikely in relation to short term loans .
28 On this point, see Armour op. cit. fn. 12 and Davydenko, S.A., Et al. op. cit. fn. 12, at p. 565.
29 See e.g., Schwartz op. cit. fn. 8.
30 Ibid. at p. 9.
31 Ibid. at p. 7.
32 Schwartz, op. cit. fn. 8, at p. 11.
33 Ibid. at p. 12.
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Notwithstanding the recognition of the viability of the theory in this particular 
context, it is to be concluded that a theory based on the monitoring costs explanation 
is difficult to sustain as it only managed to justify a limited types o f secured 
transactions.
The signalling theory
The signalling theory posits that secured lending would constitute a signal to other 
prospects creditors that the debtor is a ‘better risk’ than others. Secured lending 
would inform creditors about the risk level of debtors. The theory assumes that the 
cost o f issuing debts is greater on a secured basis for debtors. Accordingly, high risks 
debtors would not opt to issue secured debts if the costs of doing so, that is the risk of 
losing their assets, would exceed the advantage o f obtaining lower interest rates. 
Accordingly, it is exposed that:
“[f]irms have an incentive to issue secured debt as a way of sorting themselves out 
by risk class if  creditors take the existence and level of secured debt as indicia of 
firm profitability. Creditors may hold such beliefs because secured debt is more 
costly for firms to issue when their projects are of low quality. Further, profit 
maximizing firms have an incentive to signal in a way that confirms creditors’ beliefs 
about the relationship between the existence and the level of security and the 
prospects of firms.”34
In other words, in an imperfect information credit market, the issuance of secured 
debt would act as a signal showing the debtor’s creditworthiness which would in turn 
reduce the screening costs o f other potential creditors. Pertaining to the theory, only 
creditworthy debtors would issue secured debts. This conclusion becomes 
questionable in light of the examination of empirical evidence. In effect, empirical 
research tends to show that secured debts is often granted by small and young 
companies which are often categorised as being less creditworthy .
34 Ibid. at p. 17.
35 On this point, see e.g., Berger, A.N., Et al. “Collateral, Loan Quality, and Bank Risk” (1990) 25 
Journal o f  Monetary Economics, at p. 21; Chen, S.S., Et al. “Further Evidence on the Determinants of 
Secured Versus Unsecured Loans” (1998) 25 Journal o f Business and Finance and Accounting, at p. 
371; Lasfer, M.A. “Debt Structure, Agency Costs and Firm’s Size: An Empirical 
Investigation”(2000), Working Paper, City University Business School available at 
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.15.201 l&rep=repl&type=pdf (last checked 
22/04/2010) and Armour op. cit. fn. 12.
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An empirical investigation run by Lasfer confirmed that:
“[t]he reported results show that secured debt is negatively related to firm size; small 
firms hold more than three times secured debt than do larger companies.”
The signalling theory has been further challenged as not providing a satisfactory 
explanation for the institution of secured credit37. It is argued that the use o f secured 
lending as a signal might be uncertain unless firms assess the risks in a similar way. 
To illustrate this objection, consider that firm A and firm B are identical with same 
financing projects. On one hand, Firm A wishes to keep the costs o f its credit low 
and decides to take a security accordingly. On the other hand, Firm B is willing to 
take higher risks and decides to issue a broader security than A. Although Firm A 
and B are identical, their dissimilar attitudes towards risks have led to the issuance of 
a doubtful signal that does not reflect the reality. The occurrence of this potential 
scenario would significantly undermine the recognition o f an explanation based on 
the signalling theory to justify secured credit. The impossibility to discern high risk 
from low risks debtors’ thus raises the question o f the effectiveness of recognising 
secured credit as a signal.
In order for the signalling theory to be effective, that is to only signal creditworthy 
debtors, the costs of issuing secured debt should exceed the advantage of obtaining 
lower interest rates for high risks firms. In this situation, only low risk debtors would 
signal, and their signal would consequently show creditworthiness. In this context, 
the signal could assist creditors to screen creditworthy firms which would
o  o
significantly reduce the costs . The problem is that the theory assumes that it is more 
costly for debtors to borrow on a secured basis as they may lose the asset offered as 
collateral upon default. It further assumes that the cost o f issuing secured debt would 
be higher for high risks debtors as the risk of losing their assets is greater. Following 
these assumptions, only low risk debtors would issue secured debt because they 
believe that their likeliness of default is low. This signal would suggest 
creditworthiness to other creditors. High risks debtors would not issue secured debt 
because of the costs represented by the risk of losing the assets would be higher than 
the low interest rates offered if they were borrowing on a secured basis.
36 Lasfer ibid. at p. 5.
37 Schwartz op. cit. fn. 8, at p. 14.
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It is arguable that, from the debtor’s point of view, borrowing on a secured or 
unsecured basis does not make any difference upon default. Creditors will seize the 
debtor’s assets in any case if  he becomes insolvent. For creditors, however, lending 
on a secured basis will ensure a repayment in priority and will offer them a certain 
degree of control over the debtor’s assets. In this perspective, it is arguable that 
borrowing on a secured basis should signal high risks debtors rather than 
creditworthiness39. Further, empirical evidence tends to show that younger and 
smaller firms are more likely to issue secured debts, despite being less creditworthy, 
than bigger companies which tend to be more creditworthy and which tend to borrow 
more frequently on an unsecured basis40. Again, and as for the monitoring costs 
explanation, it is to be concluded that the signalling theory fails to provide 
convincing grounds for a justification of the institution of secured credit. Parallel 
arguments can be found with the free riding theory41 and the relational theory42.
The free riding theory and the relational theory
The free riding theory suggests that the issuance of secured credit would solve the 
problems of under monitoring and over monitoring. Creditors all have the same fear 
that the debtor might misbehave. Therefore, one creditor should be allocated the task 
to monitor the debtor so that other creditors would not need to do so. They would 
follow the signal o f the secured creditor’s monitoring and free ride on his monitoring 
efforts. In order to compensate the secured creditor for the monitoring 
responsibilities and for the free riding situation, the secured creditor would be given 
priority over all other creditors43. The debtor would therefore benefit o f lower 
interest rates from other creditors as they would not need to incur monitoring costs. It 
is arguable however, that this situation would only be plausible if the secured 
creditor had a broad security such as the American floating lien or the English 
floating charge over all o f the debtor’s assets. In effect, a secured creditor with a 
security on a specific asset would only monitor this specific asset and would not 
monitor the general business ‘wealth.
39 Armour, op. cit. fn. 12, at p. 5.
40 Ibid. at p. 11. See also Chen op. cit. fn. 35.
41 Levmore, op. cit. fn. 4.
42 Scott "A Relational Theory of Secured Lending” op. cit. fn. 4.
43 Levmore, op. cit. fn. 4, at p. 57.
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The arguments developed in the free riding theory have been criticised. It is argued 
that in a world without security, the avoidance o f over monitoring or under 
monitoring could similarly be achieved by creditors. In the situation where there 
would be an under monitoring situation, it is explained that it is because it would not 
be in the interest of any creditor to monitor or, because there would be a lap of time 
during which there would be an incentive for any existing creditor to initiate 
monitoring44. The issuance of security may solve the problem of coordinating 
monitoring efforts by providing the secured creditor with some compensation. 
However, the free riding explanation cannot constitute a basis for a general theory of 
secured credit. In effect, the theory essentially works if monitoring is needed or if 
there’s a risk that the debtor misbehaves. It is arguable that the risk of asset 
substitution is unlikely to occur in relation to specific asset, such as with inventory, 
or in relation to assets peculiar to certain types o f businesses. The loss borne from 
reselling such assets may outweigh the benefits of the borrower being able to enter in 
riskier projects. In this situation, monitoring would not be needed.
It is further argued that the issuance of security would provide a guarantee of good 
behaviour from the debtor because of this bond between the floating lienee and the 
debtor. Scott recognises the validity of the ‘relational theory’ as a justification for the 
efficiency of secured lending. It is argued that a deeper analysis o f the relationship 
creditor-debtor will permit to better understand the parties’ objectives. Contractual 
agreements, in opposition to security agreements, would not permit creditors and 
debtors to achieve their mutually beneficial objectives45. It is recognised that both 
debtors and creditors have a common interest to see the business succeeds. However, 
it is often observed that in order to do so, the debtor might enter in riskier projects to 
maximise his profits. This type of misbehaviour is likely to go against all creditors’ 
interests. In the event of the debtor’s default, secured creditors will rely on their 
security to recover their capital. Therefore, the success or failure of the debtor’s 
business is of little interest for them. By opposition, unsecured creditors do not have 
any of the debtor’s assets to rely on upon insolvency and, therefore, essentially need 
to rely on the success of the debtor’s business in order to be repaid. It is argued that
44 Schwartz “The Continuing Puzzle of Secured Debt” op. cit. fn. 4, at p. 1058.
45 Scott op. cit. fn. 42, at p. 901.
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this divergence of interests between secured and unsecured creditors would disappear 
when secured creditors take a floating lien. Secured creditors, as part of their long 
credit relationship with their debtors, would expect to be paid from the wealth of the 
debtor’s ongoing business. The grant of secured credit would thus constitute a bond 
between debtor and creditor and a promise by the debtor not to misbehave by 
entering in riskier projects46.
According to the relational theory, a secured creditor with a floating lien and an 
unsecured creditor have both similar interests in seeing the debtor’s business 
succeeds. Naturally, the secured creditor should monitor the debtor’s behaviour. As 
unsecured creditors will gain from this monitoring, they will accept the priority 
accorded to secured creditors. The theory proposes two main functions of the 
relational security arrangement. First, the existence of the floating lien compels and 
influences the debtor’s decision making, which will in turn promote the success of 
the business. In effect the relational security arrangement involves the function of 
control which includes the task of monitoring the debtor’s misbehaviour47. By 
restricting their behaviour a priori, debtors could arguably increase their borrowing
• /I Ppotential a posteriori . Secondly, the relational theory provides that the arrangement 
would also include the commitment from the debtor that he will do everything he can 
to make the business successful49. By taking all o f the debtor’s assets ‘hostages’, the 
secured creditor can better control the debtor in the situation where he would default 
upon the agreement50.
It is further argued that the relational security arrangement provides two external 
benefits that would offset the increased risks imposed on unsecured creditors. First, it 
is assumed that the granting o f a security will generally increase the value of the 
debtor’s business51. Secondly, the secured creditor’s monitoring efforts will benefit 
other creditors by acting as a signal. These creditors will not need to incur 
monitoring costs. The creation of this long term relationship between the floating
46 Armour op. cit. fn. 12, at p. 6.
47 Scott op. cit. fn. 42, at p. 926.
48 Armour op. cit. fn. 12, at p. 6.
49 Scott op. cit. fn. 42, at p. 926.
50 Ibid. at p. 928.
51 Ibid. at p. 931.
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lienee and the debtor would create a bond. This would entitle the debtor to access 
credit a priori at lower interest rates and the opportunity to extent credit a posteriori 
by ensuring good behaviour to his creditors. Nevertheless, the relational theory has 
been the subject of criticisms52. It has been argued that the relational theory only 
manages to demonstrate the benefits of having a lead creditor. However, the
c  -j
existence of this lead creditor does not in itself justify secured lending . It was 
further suggested that the relational security theory was simply a variation o f the 
monitoring costs and of the free riding theories54. Likewise, a monitoring costs 
explanation is based on the benefits of obtaining a security on specific assets in order 
to discourage the debtor’s misbehaviour. Nevertheless, it has been suggested that 
such finding would only seem to be plausible in relation to long term loans and in 
relation to specific tangible assets such as equipments rather than inventory and 
account receivables.
Following the analysis of some of the theories advanced to justify the institution of 
secured credit, it is to be concluded that the signalling theory, the monitoring costs 
explanation and other explanations analysed in this paragraph did not manage to 
provide for a comprehensive account of secured credit. The recognition of a theory 
that would account for secured credit in general terms would therefore appear to be 
uncertain. The debate over the question of secured credit has not been conclusive 
within the early literature using the economic analysis o f the law. On the eve of the 
reform of Article 9 of the UCC in the United States, the debate reappeared. The 
revision o f Article 9 of the UCC presented the opportunity for many American 
scholars and academics to re-analyse and reassess the rationale behind a secured 
credit law regime. Even though there were many arguments advanced in favour of a 
reform of Article 9 of the UCC, American scholars needed to think about it deeper. 
Does the archaism and inefficiency of the law justify on its own a reform? A reform 
would confirm that the institution of secured credit is necessary and legitimate in 
modem economic life because it increases the capability o f the debtor to borrow.
52 See e.g., Shupack op. cit. fn. 4.
*  Ibid. at p. 1082.
54 Buckley op. cit. fn. 4.
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Beyond these questions over the rationale for reform of the law, it was important to 
focus on a more fundamental question: Why does the law permit secured lending in 
the first place? What is the validity and legitimacy of this outstanding institution? 
What explains that some creditors will choose to secure their debts and other will 
choose not to do so? Accordingly, a new wave of theories attempted to demonstrate 
the ineffectiveness of the institution of secured credit by showing that the issuance of 
secured credit would act to the detriment o f unsecured creditors. Redistributive 
theories posit that the issuance of secured debt would unfairly retransfer wealth from 
unsecured creditors to the debtor itself and secured creditors. LoPucki materialised 
the argument in an Article entitled the ‘Unsecured Creditor’s Bargain’55 which 
attempted to demonstrate that the issuance of secured credit would create economic 
inefficiencies, especially in relation to non-adjusting creditors. Hence, it is suggested 
that the priority system should be abolished56.
The redistributive theories
The theories developed from the exploitation hypothesis differ from the methodology 
adopted under the theories that used the economic analysis of the law. This current of 
thought does not use the economic analysis of the law but asserts that the issuance of 
secured credit would act to the detriment of other unsecured creditors whether 
voluntarily or involuntarily. Although, the arguments appear to constitute a 
substantial threat to the institution of secured credit, counter arguments based on 
empirical evidence would undermine the viability o f the exploitation hypothesis as it 
will now be examined.
A major threat to the institution o f  secured credit
The redistributive theories posit that the institution of secured credit would 
unjustifiably advantage secured creditors over voluntarily and involuntarily 
unsecured creditors. The issuance of secured debts would unfairly retransfer wealth 
from ‘non adjusting creditors’ to the debtor itself and secured creditors. This is what
55 Lopucki op. cit. fn. 4.
56 Ibid. at p. 1891.
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Lopucki refers to as the ‘secured creditor’s bargain’. By failing to ‘adjust’ unsecured 
creditors would bear the costs of the debtor’s low interest rates following the 
issuance of secured debts.
Involuntarily creditors, such as tort victims, are disadvantaged by the existence of 
secured creditors. As the debtor’s pool of asset is diminished, tort victims might not 
satisfy their compensation claims. Involuntarily unsecured creditors appear to be in 
effect bound to an agreement to which they did not consent in the first place. 
Voluntarily unsecured creditors are also loosing from secured credit because they do 
not get the necessary information to accurately evaluate the risks and their 
probability o f recovery. Ill-informed creditors would bear the costs of failing to 
adjust following the issuance of secured debts. Accordingly, it is argued that
cn
unsecured creditors would be subject to an entirely ‘fictitious bargain’ .
It is explained that because the institution of secured credit together with the priority 
of secured creditors over involuntarily unsecured creditors could not be justified by
CO
any theories, it should be eradicated . It is further suggested that involuntary 
creditors, such as tort victims, should in fact have priority over voluntary creditors 
whether secured or unsecured59. The theory opts for quite a drastic and radical 
position in relation to the institution of secured credit. Although, it is correctly 
reiterated that no theories have actually managed to recognise the economic 
efficiency of the institution of secured credit and of the priority system, these 
arguments should not be used to promote the eradication o f the priority system. In 
effect, the above analysis established that, in specific situations, the issuance of 
secured debts can be beneficial. Further, empirical research has generally shown that 
“... the legal institution of secured credit is, on the whole, socially beneficial, and that 
such benefits are likely to outweigh any associated social costs.”60Nonetheless, the 
theory concludes that security cannot be economically efficient because it benefits 
secured creditors to the detriment of other unsecured creditors. It is further argued 
that the institution of secured credit is not needed and that creditors who would opt
57 Ibid. at p. 1895.
5*Ibid. at p. 1963.
59 Ibid. at p. 1896.
60 Armour op. cit. fn. 12, at p. 1.
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for unsecured lending could obtain similar advantages as if they had opted for 
secured lending. It is explained that, on certain occasions, ‘sophisticated creditors’ 
would choose to lend on an unsecured basis without being a ‘mistake’61. In order to 
explain the ‘unsecured creditor’s bargain’, the author distinguishes between two 
types o f unsecured lending which will now be considered. It is first referred to asset- 
based unsecured lending which can achieve similar functions with similar advantages 
for creditors and debtors than with secured lending. A study on bankruptcy 
reorganisations of large, publicly held companies in the 1980’s carried out by 
Whitford and Lopucki62 found that unsecured lending was frequent with larger 
companies63. In the event of their insolvency, it was observed that unsecured 
creditors were still in the position to recover their credit, in view of the large size of 
the insolvent firm64.
In the same way as secured creditors would recover their credit following the 
exercise o f their priority in the debtor’s assets, asset-based unsecured lending would 
provide similar results by using “... the combination of negative covenant against 
competing debts and priorities, and active monitoring to prevent competing debts 
from arising.”65 Subsequent perfected security interests would still rank ahead of the 
unsecured debt notwithstanding the negative covenant. Nonetheless, it is recognised 
that the risk for a subsequent secured creditor to gain priority over the negative 
covenant was small in relation to large companies66. Accordingly, it is admitted that
61 Lopucki op. cit. fh. 4, at p. 1924.
62 Lopucki, L., Et al. “Patterns in the Bankruptcy Reorganization o f Large, Publicly Held Companies” 
(1993) 78 Cornell Law Review, at p. 597.
63 Lopucki explained that 55% of all lending by commercial banks is unsecured. The borrowers who 
receive asset-based unsecured loan tend to be the largest financially strongest companies. Lopucki op. 
cit. fn. 4, at p. 1925.
64 Ibid. See footnote 146: “... Among the 43 reorganizations of large, publicly held companies that 
Professor Whitford and I studied the liquidation o f Baldwin-United yielded 54 cents on the dollar for 
unsecured creditors. That distribution totaled $239 million, over $100 million o f which was paid in 
cash within three years after confirmation. Similarly, the liquidation o f White Motors yielded 61 cents 
on the dollar for unsecured creditors. That distribution totalled $174 million, over $100 million of 
which was paid in cash within six months after confirmation. In at least five cases in which the debtor 
did not liquidate, the liquidation value o f the assets exceeded the secured debt by a sufficient amount 
that it was clear beyond argument that unsecured creditors would have substantial recoveries in 
liquidation. See Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Bargaining Over Equity's Share in the 
Bankruptcy Reorganization o f Large, Publicly Held Companies, 139 U. Pa. L. Rev. 125, 171-72 
(1990) (quoting disclosure statements on projected recoveries in liquidation and explaining the 
context in which the projections were made).”
65 Ibid. at p. 1926.
66 Ibid. at p. 1926.
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a secured creditor who lends to small companies would be in a similar situation than 
a sophisticated unsecured creditor with a negative covenant who would lend to larger 
companies67. The ‘creditor’s bargain makes sense’68. In effect, such a model would 
provide similar advantages for creditors to the ones obtained under a security 
agreement. Nonetheless, the author admits that the sudden emergence of tort 
claimants might reduce the negative covenant lender’s hope o f repayment. In effect, 
as unsecured creditors,, they will be repaid pari passu upon the company’s 
insolvency. This situation would not occur with secured lending, which priority 
system enables secured creditors to rank ahead of torts claimants. In this situation, 
the sudden emergence of a large amount of tort claims would make unsecured 
creditors to switch to secured lending. Further, it is arguable that unsecured creditors 
do not have the same power of control over the debtor’s assets as secured creditors 
do. Thus, unsecured creditors would also bear the risk of the debtor’s misbehaving. 
This eventuality could also diminish negative covenant creditors’ expectations upon 
the debtor’s insolvency.
The second unsecured credit mechanism is referred to as ‘cash flow surfing’. When 
debtors have used all of their assets as collaterals, creditors will sometimes accept to 
extend credit facilities by accepting small unsecured loans in order to save the 
debtor’s business. Creditors are willing to lend on an unsecured basis because they 
believe in the strong incentives of the debtor to repay his debts. However, they will 
usually lend small credit over a small period of time. Unsecured creditors expect to 
be repaid in the ordinary course of the debtor’s business and before other secured 
creditors, as long as the debtor’s business remains wealthy. In this situation, 
unsecured creditors are not expecting to get repayment upon the debtor’s liquidation 
value. If the debtor fails to pay its unsecured creditors, this will constitute a signal to 
other creditors who might refuse to deal with the debtor in the future, and which 
could ultimately cause the failure of the debtor’s business69. In this respect, criticisms 
were addressed to Article 9 of the UCC filing system as it only serves the 
information needs of secured creditors and completely ignores cash flow surfers 
unsecured creditors needs. Cash flow surfing unsecured creditors should not be
67 Ibid. at p. 1927.
68 Ibid. at p. 1930.
69 Ibid. at p. 1941.
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bound to security agreements to which they are not parties. These unsecured
creditors should only be presumed to know or assume only what reasonable persons
similarly situated would know or assume70. Moreover, if secured creditors wish to
grant further secured credit to the debtor, they should ensure that their intentions are
accurately communicated to unsecured creditors71. To this end, it is argued that the
filing system embodied in Article 9 of the UCC should be amended. It is suggested
that once the information needed by unsecured creditors will be better
communicated, “... the unsecured creditor's bargain will cease to be a figment o f the
legal and economic imagination and will become a bargain in fact.”72 Despite a
powerful demonstration, Lopucki admits with resignation that:
“[w]e are rooting against security. But even as we dislike that harsh institution, we 
respect it. The debtor agreed to it expressly and the unsecured creditor did so 
implicitly. How could it be unfair?”73
The redistributive theories constitute a significant threat to the institution of secured 
credit. Nevertheless, the arguments analysed in this section have been actively 
criticised and contested, especially in the light of recent empirical researches as it 
will now be presented.
The uncertainty o f  the exploitation thesis
The fact that the issuance o f secured credit may create economic inefficiencies 
cannot suffice to support the idea of eradicating the institution of secured credit and 
the priority system. Inefficiencies may be produced when secured credit is issued but 
legal reformers will generally attempt to mitigate them through legal reforms. For 
example, insolvency law regime in England created a ring fenced funds for the 
repayment o f unsecured creditors in priority over other secured creditors74. Further, 
Section 386 and Schedule 6 o f the Insolvency Act 1986 set out the categories of 
preferential creditors which include, for instance, the remuneration of employees. In
70 Ibid. at p. 1963.
71 Ibid. at p. 1964.
12 Ibid. at p. 1965.
73 Ibid. at p. 1889.
74 Gullifer explains that: [t]he percentage is 50% of the first £10,000 and 20% o f any assets above that 
figure with a ceiling o f £600,000 for the prescribed part.” Gullifer, L. “The Reforms o f the Enterprise 
Act 2002 and the Floating Charge as a Security Device” (2008) 46 Canadian Business Law Journal, 
at p. 410. See also, The Insolvency Act 1986 (prescribed part) Order 2003 S.12003/2097.
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addition, it is arguable that larger businesses are likely to undertake insurance in 
order to cover their potential tort liabilities. This possibility would hinder the 
argument according to which larger companies are likely to issue secured credit so as 
to transfer wealth from involuntarily creditors to other secured creditors and the 
debtor itself. The suppression of the priority system, as suggested by Lopucki, would 
seem to be an extreme solution to solve the problem75. Moreover, as many authors 
have argued in the past, the eradication of the priority system would lead creditors
7 f iand debtors to find an alternative system of priority . The conclusion that the 
institution of secured credit together with the priority system should be eradicated, 
following potential inefficacies, is thus not sustainable.
It is further argued that if tort creditors had priority over secured creditors, they 
would have to impose the payment of risk premium on debtors in order to 
compensate creditors for their additional risks. This objection is acknowledged by 
Lopucki who suggested that a secured creditor insurance should be payable in
77advance by the debtor . This could impose extra costs and extra burden on the 
parties but it is argued that it would only be small. This insurance would cover the 
secured creditor against losses bom from tort claims. Nevertheless, it is to be 
admitted that the proposition according to which priority should be given to 
involuntarily unsecured creditors over secured creditors would fail. It is arguable that 
secured creditors and debtors would always find an equivalent system to favour the
70
payment of secured creditor before tort victims .
The exploitation hypothesis has particularly been challenged in an Article entitled 
“The Search for Someone to Save: A Defensive Case for the Priority o f Secured
Credit.”79 Although, the major threat to the institution of secured lending is
80recognised to be the arguments developed in the redistributive theories , the 
conclusions according to which the institution of secured credit together with the
75 Lopucki op. cit. fn. 4, at p. 1963.
76 Ibid.
11 Ibid. at p. 1906.
78 On this point see White op. cit. fn. 4.
79 Mokal, R.J. “The Search for Someone to Save: A Defensive Case for the Priority o f Secured Credit” 
(2002) 22(4) Oxford Journal o f  Legal Studies, at p. 687.
*°Ibid. at p. 690.
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priority system should be eradicated are rejected. Indeed, it is explained that the 
factors used in support o f the exploitation hypothesis can be challenged, particularly 
referring to arguments based on empirical data.
As explained in the above section, the redistributive theories posit that the issuance 
of secured credit would facilitate the exploitation of involuntary creditors, and 
creates economic inefficiency through its ability to retransfer insolvency value from 
non-adjusting to secured creditors and debtors. A similar wealth transfer would also 
be observed in relation to uninformed unsecured creditors who would fail to re adjust 
following the issuance o f secured debts. In respect o f involuntarily creditors such as 
tort victims, the theory posits that debtors would issue secured debts in order to 
redistribute wealth to the detriment of tort claimants. The argument was based on an
O I
empirical research on ‘the largest reorganization of the 1980’s’ which would tend to
confirm the assumption that larger companies are most likely to issue unsecured
debts than smaller companies. Indeed, following the LoPucki and Whitford study, it
was established that for two o f the companies considered in the study, more than two
third o f the unsecured debt was involuntary. It is further provided that:
“[i]n the United States, large, publicly traded firms tend not to borrow on a secured 
basis ... most commercial secured debt ... is issued by small- and medium-sized 
companies.”82
Additionally, it has been observed that “... the strongest companies in our economy 
ordinarily do not secure their debts” and that “[t]he reported results show that 
secured debt is negatively related to firm size; small firms hold more than three times 
secured debts than do larger companies.”
This assumption would seem to go against the core argument developed by the 
exploitation hypothesis that secured credit is used to transfer wealth from 
involuntarily unsecured creditors such as tort claimants to the debtor itself and 
secured creditors. Indeed, the empirical investigation referred to by Lopucki in order 
to support the argument was based on the largest reorganizations of the 1980’s. The
81 Lopucki, L., Et al. “Corporate Governance in the Bankruptcy Reorganization o f Large, Publicly 
Held Companies” (1993) 141(3) University o f  Pennsylvania Law Review, at p. 738.
82 Bebchuk, L.A. “The Uneasy Case for the Priority o f Secured Claims in Bankruptcy” (1996) 105 
Yale Law Journal, at pp. 859-860.
83 Mann op. cit. fn. 4.
84 Lasfer op. cit. fn. 35, at p. 5.
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restriction of the analysis to large companies would tend to suggest that they are
or
likely to incur more business interests and create more involuntarily debts . For 
example, reference is made to one company in particular, the Johns-Manville 
Corporation, which filed for reorganisation and had over two billion Dollars in 
Asbestos related person injury claims86. Following the exploitation hypothesis, such 
large companies should have the best incentive to issue secured debts so as to shift 
the costs onto unsecured creditors such as tort claimants. Yet, empirical 
investigations showed that larger companies issue little secured debt and often have
07
sufficient assets to meet their liabilities . Thus, it would seem difficult to support the 
argument according to which secured debt would be issued in order externalise 
involuntarily liabilities. It has been shown that large firms do not generally issue 
secured debts and thus, secured debts could not be used to externalise costs as they 
are not likely to happen.
If the exploitation of involuntarily creditors is unlikely to occur in respect of larger 
companies, the question emerged to determine whether the exploitation theory could 
still apply in the context of smaller firms which are, a contrario, more likely to issue
00 t  #
secured debt . In this respect, it can be argued that smaller firms may decide to issue 
secured debt in order to externalise their tort liabilities on involuntarily creditors. In 
order to do so, the debtor’s company would have to be liquidated. The costs of 
liquidation can be considerable for small businesses89. The debtor will have to 
determine whether the benefits obtained from liquidating the company, that is the 
benefits from the extemalisation of tort liabilities, would outweigh its costs such as 
those incurred from job losses, equity stake and other legal liabilities. This is unlikely 
to be the case. Indeed, it would be quite unusual for small companies to incur enough 
tort claims that would make the liquidation process wholly beneficial for the debtor. 
Small firms are not likely to be issuing considerable tort liabilities such as the ones 
generated by larger companies as mentioned above.
85 Mokal op. cit. fn. 79, at p. 694.
86 Lopucki op. cit. fn. 4, at p. 1906 (see footnote 81).
87 Mokal op. cit. fn. 79, at p. 696.
88 Ibid. at p. 697.
89 Ibid.
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In light of these arguments, it can be concluded that larger companies which incur 
substantial involuntarily debts do not appear to issue secured debts as a way to 
externalise these costs. Further, smaller companies which are generally more likely 
to issue secured debts would not do so as a way to externalise tort liabilities because 
the costs of liquidation are likely to exceed the benefits of externalising such costs. 
As a result, the exploitation thesis is difficult to sustain, particularly in light of these 
latest observations.
Further objections also substantially weakened the proposition according to which 
secured credit would unfairly prejudice other unsecured creditors such as ill informed 
or non adjusting creditors. The exploitation hypothesis further posits that some 
unsecured creditors would not react appropriately following the issuance o f secured 
debts by their debtor. They would fail to increase their interest rates accordingly 
because o f informational asymmetries90. As a result, these uninformed unsecured 
creditors would be exploited by secured creditors. Ill informed and ill equipped 
creditors would be exploited by failing to adjust their interest rates following the 
issuance o f secured debts. This argument can be challenged. It is arguable that the 
aptitude to deal with risk is not a function of secured credit law regimes. Whether 
secured or unsecured, creditors would have to assess the degree of likelihood o f the 
debtor’s default. Further, firms are now generally well advised by a wide range of 
professional agencies91. Ill informed unsecured creditors would eventually get the 
necessary information and raise their interest rates accordingly and failure to do so 
would force them out o f business92.
The argument could not be used to defeat the institution of secured credit. Indeed, it 
is arguable that ill equipped unsecured creditors would also face similar difficulties 
in a world without the existence of secured credit law regimes. Similar subsidy 
created by ill equipped creditors would benefit well equipped and adjusting 
unsecured creditors. The ability to deal with risk is not related to secured credit law 
regimes. Even if similar information would be provided to unsecured creditors, it is
90 Ibid.
91 Bank o f England “Finance for Small Firms: A Sixth Report” (January 1999) cited by Mokal ibid. at 
p. 704.
92 Mokal Ibid. at p. 706.
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likely that similar subsidy would still persist following the ignorance and inability of 
certain creditors to deal with risk. Further, the law generally ensures that commercial 
participants are given the possibility to enter in commercial activities o f their choice 
with their correlative risks. Commercial participants must face the consequences of 
their choices and this has nothing to do with the institution of secured credit. Other 
areas of law also involve similar situations for ill informed and ill equipped 
participants that cannot be imputed to the legal regime in question . Thus, the 
argument according to which secured credit would exploit involuntarily or 
uninformed creditors could not provide a rational basis in support of the eradication 
of the institution of secured credit. The issuance of secured credit is not used as a 
means to transfer wealth from involuntarily or non adjusting creditors to debtors and 
other secured creditors. On the contrary, it is now widely recognised that the priority 
of secured credit is universally value enhancing94.
The institution of secured credit generally contributes to the survival o f businesses, 
which is value enhancing for debtors and creditors. If  the recognition of a theory that 
could justify the institution of secured credit is uncertain, recent empirical research 
has evidenced situations where the issuance of secured credit will be beneficial. It is 
recognised that companies will borrow on a secured basis in two situations, which 
will now be considered. First, some companies will decide to borrow on a secured 
basis in order to reduce their risks o f becoming insolvent notwithstanding their 
ability to borrow on an unsecured basis. The issuance of secured debts will generally 
incur lower interest rates for them. Firms will opt to borrow on a secured basis only 
when the benefits of doing so would outweigh the costs. The lending decision will 
thus depend upon the circumstances of the case. Secondly, some firms will decide to 
borrow on a secured basis because they do not have the choice at all. The only option 
for this kind of companies is to borrow on a secured basis or not to obtain funds at 
all. The injection of new funds in this type of firms will often mean for them the 
difference between solvency and insolvency95. The issuance o f secured debts, on this
93 Mokal states that if the argument is that some business people cannot comprehend how security 
operates, can they understand and comply with tax and VAT, health and safety, consumer and 
environmental protection requirements, which are unlikely to be any less complicated?” ibid. at p. 
708.
94 Ibid. at p. 721.
95 Ibid. at p. 721.
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occasion, would also reinforce the probability o f repayment to unsecured creditors 
and increase the chance of survival of the business. All creditors, including 
involuntarily creditors are better off if  the company is kept afloat by issuing secured 
debts than if  it was made insolvent. Accordingly, the issuance of secured debt would 
be value enhancing for all. Nevertheless, and in view of the above arguments, it has 
to be concluded, similarly to Schwartz, that: “[t]he case for restricting the secured 
debt priority in bankruptcy has yet to be made.”96
Although the exploitation hypothesis can be challenged, it is to be acknowledged that 
in some specific factual contexts, the grant o f secured credit can lead to unfair wealth
07
transfers to voluntarily and involuntarily unsecured creditors . In order to mitigate 
the impact o f these inefficiencies resulting from the creation of security on 
voluntarily and involuntarily unsecured creditors, it is suggested that some 
improvements could be made through legal reforms. Unfair wealth transfers could be 
mitigated through the recognition of a better information system for unsecured 
creditors, at least for those who are in the position to adjust. For those unsecured 
creditors who cannot adjust, it is suggested a ‘fixed fraction rule’. The law could 
provide for a percentage of the debtor’s estate that would be reserved to unsecured 
creditors for repayment in priority of secured creditors. The recommendation is 
founded on considerations o f distributional justice and fairness rather than economic 
efficiency. In England, the Enterprise Act 2002 created this ring fenced fund for 
unsecured creditors following the abolition of the Crown preference98. Further, the 
law could provide for a system of insurance against tort liabilities. When non­
adjusting unsecured creditors can be identified within a group of creditors, it is 
proposed that they could be compensated through a system of insurance.
The recognition o f a theory that would account for the institution of secured credit is 
uncertain following the analysis o f the economic efficiencies theories and the 
exploitation hypothesis arguments. The arguments developed using the economic 
analysis o f the law did not manage to provide for a rationale of secured credit. The
96 Schwartz “Priority Contracts and Priority in Bankruptcy” op. cit. fn. 4, at p. 1398.
97 Finch, V. “Security, Insolvency and Risk: Who Pays the Price?” (1999) 62 Modem Law Review, at 
p. 644.
98 On this point, see e.g., Gullifer op. cit. fn. 74.
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exploitation hypothesis raised a significant threat to the institution o f secured credit 
by asserting that the issuance of secured debts may shift wealth from involuntarily 
creditors to secured creditors and the debtor himself. However, the recognition that 
economic inefficiencies may arise from the operation of secured credit is not enough 
to justify the abolishment of the priority system as it has been explained in this 
development.
Although economists did not manage to establish a theory justifying the existence of 
secured lending in general terms, it cannot be concluded that the institution of 
secured credit is economically inefficient. Economic inefficiencies, such as potential 
wealth transfer from non-adjusting unsecured creditors to debtors and secured 
creditors, can occur in specific contexts. However, these inefficiencies can be 
mitigated through law reforms as suggested above. The establishment o f a theory that 
would provide for a general account of the institution of secured credit is difficult to 
reach because it is an empirical question. The question of why people choose to lend 
on a secured basis will depend upon a wide array o f empirical data that cannot be 
translated in legal or economic theories. The answer to the question o f the pursuit of 
a rationale for secured credit will not rise from the Law and Economics theorems or 
from the exploitation hypothesis. Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that the power of 
the Law and Economics movement to interfere with the law making process has 
recently become significant, especially in the context of legal reforms in the field of 
secured credit". This situation, thus begs the question of the use of the economic 
analysis as a new norm for policy decision making. Should the Law and Economics 
dictate the substance of the law of secured credit?
99 See e.g. the Reports issued by the World Bank which assess and rank national laws according to 
their performances for facilitating business. The “Doing Business” World Bank Reports are available 
at http://www.doingbusiness.org/ (last checked 22/04/2010).
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THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS: A NEW CHALLENGE FOR THE LAW OF 
SECURED CREDIT
The analysis o f the theories did not provide for a satisfactory account of secured 
credit. The use of the economic analysis of the law to justify the institution of 
secured credit has particularly been criticised as not corresponding to the reality. 
Carslon states that:
“[In fact], it is easy to show that secured lending has at least the potential to create 
social good. Naturally, the global efficiency of secured lending cannot be known on 
an a priori basis. No mere contractual arrangement can be viewed as per se efficient. 
Contracts, by their very nature, involve externalities because they always foreclose 
other opportunities that might have been exploited. As a result, the social utility o f 
any given consensual arrangement - or any human institution - is always an empirical 
question.”100
Further criticisms were addressed to the theories. It is advocated that economic 
theories have developed “... in a vacuum of facts.” 101 It is argued that the 
unpersuasiveness of these theories essentially rests on the unrealistic assumptions 
made by economists to support their analysis. Accordingly, empirical research 
studies have since emerged which would tend to demonstrate that secured lending is 
generally beneficial. It is argued that the question of why people issue secured credit 
remains an empirical question and cannot be proved using the economic analysis o f 
the law. In addition, the lack of theories to justify the institution of secured credit did 
not prevent national legislations to recently enter into an era of reforms in the field of 
secured credit law. This would confirm that secured lending is a necessary and 
efficient tool of credit within the commercial community102. Further to national legal
100 Carlson op. cit. fn. 14.
101 Kripke, H. “Law and Economics: Measuring the economic efficiency of commercial law in a 
vacuum of fact” (1985) 133 University o f  Pennsylvania Law Review, at p. 929.
102 Some provinces o f Canada adopted Personal Property Security Acts modelled on the American 
Article 9 UCC. Ontario was the first Canadian province to adopt a PPSA modelled on Article 9 UCC. 
It was adopted in 1967 but the Act did not come into effect until 1973. See e.g., Ziegel, J. “The Draft 
Ontario Personal Property Security Act” (1966) 44 Canadian. Bar Review, at p. 104. New Zealand 
reformed its Personal Property Security Law with the enactment o f the Personal Property Security Act 
1999, available on www.ppsr.gov.nz (last checked 22/04/2010). PPSA 1999 was amended by the 
Personal Property Securities Amendment Act 2000 and the Personal Property Securities Act 2001. In 
England, a proposal for reform was also introduced. The Law Commission considered the need for 
reform with respect to company charges, and issued a Consultation Paper in June 2002 (Registration 
of Company Security Interests: Company Charges and Property other than Land , Law Commission 
Consultation Paper No 164), available at http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/closed_consultations.htm (last 
checked 22/04/2010). This was followed by a Consultative Report published in August 2004 
(Company Security Interests: A Consultative Report, Law Commission Consultative Report No 176),
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reforms, international initiatives in the field of secured credit law regimes also 
launched considerable modernisation legislative efforts103. Accordingly, a financial 
literature emerged at the international level assessing the quality o f national business 
legislations using the economic analysis of the law. The question o f whether the Law 
and Economics should be used as a norm for challenging the effectiveness of a 
particular national legislation on secured credit, thus, becomes important in light of 
this analysis on the modernisation of secured credit law regimes.
The use of the economic analysis to account for the institution of secured credit
The debate over the raison d ’etre o f secured credit remains largely inconclusive. 
Essentially, it has been argued that the theories based on an economic analysis of the 
law have failed “... because they contain implicit assumptions which make the 
theories implausible and unable to inform our understanding o f every day events.”104 
The theories have mainly derived from the perfect market assumptions, according to 
which, the issuance o f secured debts would amount to a zero sum-game. Following 
the eliminations of certain assumptions such as information symmetries, the case for 
the effectiveness of secured credit would emerged by showing how the gains from 
issuing secured debt would exceed the loss of other creditors. The main criticism 
addressed to the theories based on an economic analysis o f the law is that they are 
based on assumptions that are not reflective of the reality such as the assumptions of 
the ‘perfect market’. It is arguable that the question of the justification of secured 
credit essentially remains an empirical question. Further, In the light of recent
available at http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/closed_consultations. htm (last checked 22/04/2010). A final 
Report was published in 2005 (Company Security Interests, Law Commission Report No 296, Cm 
6654), available at http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/lc_reports.htm (last checked 22/04/2010). Finally, 
France also reformed its secured credit Law in 2006 with the Ordinance No 2006-346 du 23 Mars 
2006 art. 13 Journal Officiel du 24 Mars 2006.
103 See e.g. UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Secured Transactions available at 
http://www.uncitral.Org/pdf/english/texts/security-lg/e/09-82670_Ebook-Guide_09-04-10English.pdf 
(last checked 22/04/2010); the Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment (Cape 
Town, 2001); Protocol to the Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment on Matters 
Specific to Aircraft Equipment (Cape Town, 2001) and the Luxembourg Protocol to the Convention 
on International Interests in Mobile Equipment on Matters Specific to Railway Rolling Stock 
(Luxembourg, 2007) available at http://www.unidroit.org/english/conventions/c-main.htm (last 
checked 22/04/2010) and the EBRD Model Law on Secured Transactions available at 
http://www.ebrd.com/pubs/legal/secured.htm (last checked 22/04/2010).
104 Shupack op. cit. fn. 4, at p. 1071.
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pragmatic and empirical researches, it has now been extensively demonstrated that, 
secured credit would tend to be generally socially efficient105.
The theories developed from the economic analysis of the law such as the monitoring 
costs or the signalling theories have been criticised as not corresponding to the reality 
o f commercial activities. Essentially, the economic analysis of the law has been 
rejected as a method to justify the institution of secured credit. Particularly, it is 
argued that the methodology based on the Modigliani & Miller irrelevance theorem 
used by economic scholars is not adequate106. In effect, participants to the debate on 
the effectiveness o f secured credit founded their analysis on the Modigliani & Miller 
irrelevance theorem according to which in a perfect market, the issuance of secured 
debt would amount to a zero sum game. By relaxing the assumptions made, 
economists have attempted to determine the situations where the issuance of secured 
debts could be justified. Fundamentally, the economic analysis requires that a 
justification of secured credit should demonstrate how the advantages of issuing 
secured debts would exceed the loss of other creditors. Instead, it is suggested that a 
theory of secured lending should be based on conventional legal reasoning and on 
factual observations. It is further proposed that a justification of the institution of 
secured credit should follow the “... techniques that Robert Braucher [and he] applied 
as drafters of the present form of UCC Article 9” and with “... the kind of reasoning 
that [they] submitted to the Review Committee composed of practicing lawyers, 
judges, and academics o f an older generation.”107
It is explained that credit agreements have developed from the sale of goods as 
enacted in Section 2-507(1) o f the UCC which provides that “[t]ender of the goods is 
a condition of the buyer’s duty to pay.” At the beginning, conditional sales permitted 
the seller to retain title in the goods until the full purchase price was paid. Despite, 
the important evolution o f security mechanisms and Article 9 of the UCC, it is 
argued that the idea of allocating a favourable treatment to the seller in case of 
default has remained within the regulation of the security interest. Three main
105 Armour op. cit. fn. 12.
106 Kripke op. cit. fn. 101, at p. 932.
107 Ibid.
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explanations are proposed to justify the institution of secured credit as it will be now 
envisaged.
The granting of security would be justified because it substantially reduces risks 
faced by creditors. There is the risk that the debtor might get rid of certain assets by
1 nsselling them, using them for wages, general expenses or leave with them . The 
reduction in risks for secured creditors would accordingly reduce the overall costs 
incurred in the credit transaction. Schwartz and Jackson do not deny that secured 
lending reduces the creditor’s risks. However, it is objected that an efficiency theory 
should demonstrate how the advantages of issuing secured credit such as the 
reduction o f the secured creditor’s risks would exceed the loss incurred for other 
unsecured creditors such as the increase in risks109. Secondly, secured lending would 
be justified because it increases the value of the debtor’s firm. Consequently, 
unsecured creditors would not be disadvantaged by the issuance of a securitybecause 
it contributes to the general welfare of the debtor’s firm110. Thus, the assumption 
according to which the issuance of secured credit would amount to a zero sum game 
in a perfect market is rejected. Here again, economic scholars do not reject the 
assumption that secured lending will increase the debtor’s assets value. However, the 
theory should explain how secured lending may enhance the debtor’s wealth more 
that it would have been under an unsecured transaction111. The third reason 
advocated in favour o f secured lending is that without secured lending, it would not 
be possible for the debtor to obtain new assets112. Secured lending would thus 
become economically efficient because it permits the acquirement of new assets and 
increases the debtor’s welfare. Nevertheless, it has been objected that this argument
fails to distinguish between ‘acquiring the asset’ and the ‘way in which it is
11^acquired’ . It is further objected that secured lending involves restrictions for 
creditors and debtors such as filing requirements. For instance, the grant of priority to 
a creditor without appropriate filing would not be permitted pursuing Article 9 of the
108 Ibid. at p. 949.
109 Schwartz, A., Et al. “Vacuum o f Fact or Vacuous Theory: A Reply to Professor Kripke” (1985) 
133(5) University o f  Pennsylvania Law Review, at p. 993.
110 Kripke op. cit. fn. 101, at pp. 937-941.
111 Schwartz op. cit. fn. 109, at p. 994.
112 Kripke op. cit. fn. 101, at pp. 960-61.
113 Schwartz op. cit. fn. 109, at p. 997.
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UCC. It is further observed that the explanation according to which creditors would 
not finance the acquisition of new assets without a security could not justify the 
raison d ’etre o f secured lending unless it is shown that the institution o f secured 
credit is desirable in the first place114.
The demonstration does not pretend to provide an answer to the ‘puzzle’ o f secured 
lending but advocates that current theories remain unpersuasive because they are not 
based on the reality o f the commercial world. Accordingly, it is argued that a theory 
based on factual data would provide a better answer in the quest to find a rationale 
for secured credit. Proponents of the economic analysis do not find the arguments 
convincing and strongly reject a methodology based on factual data from the 
commercial world. Although, it has to be admitted that the question of the 
justification of secured credit remains an empirical question, a general theory of 
secured credit could not solely emerged from factual data. As Schwartz and Jackson 
concluded, “... operating in a vacuum of theory is a weak way to demonstrate that 
others have operated in a vacuum of fact.”115 At the most, empirical analysis will 
enable the justification o f secured credit in specific factual circumstances as much as 
economic theories have managed to demonstrate that in specific circumstances the 
issuance of secured credit can be economically efficient.
The institution of secured credit cannot be justified with abstract theories. It has to be 
submitted that there are extra rational reasons leading to the decision of lending and 
borrowing on a secured basis. In effect, it is difficult to establish a theory that would 
recognise in general term the effectiveness of the institution of secured credit. 
However, it is possible to determine in a specific context whether lending on a 
secured basis would lead to efficient results. The key question is to determine 
whether the gains obtained from granting a security, in specific circumstances, would 
outweigh the loss o f other unsecured creditors and outweigh other inefficiencies and 
distortions resulting from the issuance of the security. Accordingly, the answer will 
depend upon an array o f factual data that will be considered such as “... individual 
circumstances, the balance between sophisticated and non expert creditors, the
114 Ibid.
115 Ibid. at p. 1001.
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duration and size of loans, the types of companies seeking loans, the numbers of non 
adjusting creditors and the transaction costs involved in negotiating unsecured loans 
and contractual schemes of priority.”116The lack of theories that would justify in 
general terms the institution of security should not however lead to the decision of 
abolishing security. Abolishing the institution of security would leave all creditors on 
an equal step of repayment, pari passu, in relation to the distribution of assets. 
However, it is arguable that powerful lenders such as banks would always manage to 
reach similar contractual agreement with their debtors enabling them to a preferential 
repayment over unsecured creditors upon the debtor’s default.
It has been demonstrated that the recognition of a theory justifying secured credit is 
difficult to establish. In effect, the question of the justification o f secured credit will 
depend upon the factual data of a specific situation. The question, on this particular 
occasion will be to determine whether the gains obtained from issuing secured debts 
will outweigh the loss o f unsecured creditors. Although the economic analysis of the 
law did not manage to establish a theory of secured lending, recent empirical 
researches would tend to show that the institution o f security is generally 
beneficial117. The failure o f the economic analysis to recognise the economic 
efficiency of secured credit begs the question o f the relevance o f such method to 
assess the law. If secured credit cannot be apprehended in terms of economic 
efficiencies, the use of the economic analysis in the law making process also 
becomes questionable. Accordingly, the controversial use o f the economic analysis 
to assess the quality of national business legislations has launched a new debate in 
the financial literature as it will now be considered.
The economic analysis as new norm to challenge the law
The arguments and theories addressed above did not manage to provide for a 
satisfactory account of the institution of secured credit law using the economic 
analysis of the law. It is arguable that a justification of the institution of secured 
credit therefore remains an empirical question. In effect, an explanation of why
116 Finch, V., Corporate Insolvency Law: Perspectives and Principles, (2002), at p. 92.
117 See Armour op. cit. fn. 12.
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creditors and debtors will choose to lend on a secured basis will largely depend on 
pragmatic information about lenders and borrowers. For instance, it is arguable that 
if  they could lend and borrow on an unsecured basis then they would. Lending on a 
secured basis would seem to occur more frequently for smaller businesses in order to 
offer them easier access to credit. Big healthy company would not generally borrow 
on a secured basis. However, with the expansion of cross-border transactions and the 
dismantlement o f economic boundaries, other elements need to be added to the 
equation. In effect, it is arguable that the lack of information towards foreign 
companies and uncertainties of contractual enforcement at the international level 
would lead commercial actors to choose to lend on a secured basis. In that sense, 
secured credit law regimes would appear to be an essential tool to support and 
promote the growth of cross-border transactions.
The importance of secured credit law regimes has also been confirmed by recent 
legal reforms activities around the world. In effect, it is to be observed that national 
legislations have entered into an era of reforms in the field of secured credit law 
which would confirm that secured lending is a necessary and efficient tool of credit 
within the commercial community118. Accordingly, a financial literature has recently 
emerged at the international level assessing the quality of business legislations using 
the economic analysis o f the law. For instance the World Bank admits that Common 
Law jurisdictions would provide more effective commercial laws than within Civil 
Law jurisdictions.
The law as an instrument o f  economic dominance
Following the significant growth in cross-border transactions and the elimination of 
economic boundaries, legislations on secured credit became the object of intensive 
scrutiny as to their quality to promote trade and generally as to their quality to 
promote economic growth. Thus, a new question emerged as to whether the 
economic analysis o f the law should be used to challenge the quality of the law of 
secured credit. However, the use o f the economic analysis to dictate the content of
118 Kripke op. cit. fn. 101.
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secured credit law regimes and business law at large has highly been criticised in a 
context of legal reforms119.
Following the assumption that commercial law, particularly secured credit law, is 
essential for the development o f the Economy120, recent empirical researches have 
attempted to assess the quality o f national commercial laws and attempted to rank 
them accordingly. It became clear that the law now constitutes an essential 
instrument of economic growth. In the light o f the expansion of commercial 
transactions at the international level, a competition between the various legal 
systems arose, assimilating the law as an instrument o f economic dominance. 
Accordingly, a series of researches emerged assessing the friendliness of national 
legislations for ‘doing business’.
The question for legal reformers is not only to decide whether secured credit law 
regimes should be made available to creditors and debtors but to what extent secured 
credit law regimes should be amended. Following the ‘mapping’ of commercial laws, 
the question emerged of the use of the economic analysis as a norm to assess the 
quality of the law. Should the economic analysis dictate the substance of the law on 
secured credit and the policy choices to be made accordingly? In effect, there are 
substantial policy choices to be made in the regulation of secured credit law such as 
the extent to which debtors should be entitled to use their assets for security 
purposes, the extent to which secured creditors should be entitled to a preference of 
repayment over other unsecured or involuntarily creditors upon the debtor’s default, 
or the extent to which third parties should be informed of the creation o f property 
rights through public registration.
119 On this point, see, e.g. Fauvarque-Cosson, B., Et al. “Is Law an Economic Contest? French 
Reactions to the Doing Business World Bank Reports and Economic Analysis o f the Law” (2009) 57 
The American Journal o f Comparative Law, at p. 811; Michaels, R. “Comparative Law by Numbers? 
Legal Origins Thesis, Doing Business Reports, and the Silence o f Traditional Comparative Law” 
(2009) 57 The American Journal o f  Comparative Law, at p. 765; Milhaupt, C.J. “Beyond Legal 
Origin: Rethinking Law’s Relationship to the Economy -  Implications for Policy” (2009) 57 The 
American Journal o f Comparative Law, at p. 831.
120 Goode already highlighted that “[s]ecurity in Personal Property has become enormously important 
both within a country and in relation to cross-border transactions. Without an adequate legal regime 
for personal property security rights, it is almost impossible for a national economy to develop.” 
Goode, R.M. “Security in Cross-Border Transactions” (1998) 33 Texas International Law Journal, at 
p. 47.
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Each jurisdiction opts for different views on the problem. This set of questions is 
apprehended in the light o f different economic, political and legal background that 
will affect the outcome on the nature of each secured credit law regime121. The 
economic analysis solely apprehends the issue in the light of economic efficiencies, 
but it is arguable that the law of secured credit should also be apprehended in the 
light of other values. Particularly, it is important to highlight that the creation of a 
security involves a transfer of property rights and thus affect the community at large. 
In effect, security rights are enforceable erga omnes that is to say against the rest of 
the world. As such, it is important to consider the issue of balancing the interests of 
the person involved voluntarily or involuntarily in the operation of secured 
transactions.
The determination of the substance of secured credit transactions law regimes is a 
difficult question that cannot be solely driven by economic considerations. Secured 
credit law regimes are the expression of policy choices and the expression of social 
distributive justice made by the state. For example, the United States would appear to 
be more ‘pro-creditors’ by allowing the creation of a security interest on every 
possible class of assets. There are greater risks for debtors who might lose all of their 
assets but, ultimately, it will enhance the growth of the economy by expanding the 
pool of assets available to creditors and debtors in order to raise finance. Civil Law 
jurisdictions such as France would appear to be more ‘pro debtors’ within their 
legislations. France does not recognise a global security such as the American 
security interest or the English floating charge. Debtors cannot use all of their assets 
to raise finance. The risk taking is not entirely left to the discretion of creditors and 
debtors. Restrictions to access to credit can be seen as a ‘frein’ to the growth of the 
economy but could also be understood as safeguards to the protection of other actors, 
voluntarily and unvoluntarily involved in the process. Civil Law traditions are more 
humanistic in nature so that more consideration is given to the rights of the 
individual rather than to economic efficiencies122. Secured credit law regimes involve 
a question of balance that should not only be driven by economic imperatives.
121 See Wood, P.R., Maps o f  World Financial Law, (5th ed. 2005).
122 Fauvarque-Cosson op. cit. fn. 119, at p. 822.
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Legal origins thesis
Significant work in the ‘mapping’ of secured credit law regimes123 can be found with 
the reports o f the World Bank which rank nations according to the quality of their 
legislations to regulate commercial transactions. The economic analysis of the law 
largely prevails in the assessment of current national business law and secured credit 
laws. Especially, the financial literature produced a series o f empirical researches 
which essentially found its analysis on legal origin. Accordingly, it is claimed that 
the commercial law from Common Law jurisdictions would be more effective that 
commercial laws issued from Civil Law jurisdictions124.
The World Bank generally recognise that Common Law jurisdictions would provide 
better protection to creditors and would generally enable the use o f a wider range of 
assets for security purposes . For instance, PPSA jurisdictions, such as the US or 
Canada, allows for the creation of a global security also allowed in England with the 
floating charge. However, many academics doubt of the actual significance of 
establishing such a financial map and contest the methodology and criteria used to 
reach such conclusions126. For instance, the World Bank recognises that France now 
ranks in the 31st position with Singapore, New Zealand, China and the US occupying 
respectively first, second, third, and fourth position. Many criticisms were addressed 
on the methodology used and on the application of this methodology to jurisdictions 
belonging to the Civilian Tradition. The Association Henri Capitant published two
series of answers to the ‘Doing Business Reports’, one was the product of French
1 01academics and the other was produced by a wider range of other
123 Ibid.
124 Milhaupt op. cit. fn. 119, at p. 832.
125 On this point see e.g. the World Bank Report “Doing Business 2007” available at 
http://www.doingbusiness.org/Downloads/ (last checked 22/04/2010) and Djankov, S., Et al. “Private 
Credit in 129 Countries” (2007) 84 Journal o f  Financial Economics, at p. 299.
126 See, e.g. the responses addressed to the World Bank reports “Doing Business”, Siems, M. “Legal 
Origins-Reconciling Law & Finance and Comparative Law” (2007) 52 McGill Law Journal, at p. 55; 
Raynouard, A. “Is Law an Economic Contest? French Reactions to the Doing Business World Bank 
Reports and Economic Analysis o f the Law” (2009) 57(4) American Law Journal, at p. 811; Haravon, 
M. “Doing Business 2009: mesurer l'efficacite des faillites?”(2009) Recueil Dalloz, at p. 219.
127 Association Henri Capitant des amis de la culture juridique frangaise, “Les Droits de Tradition 
Civiliste en Question. A Propos des Rapports Doing Business” (2006) 3 Revue de Droit des Affaires.
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1 98jurisdictions both contesting the methodology used to assess the quality o f the law. 
Reactions to the publication of the World Bank Doing Business Reports should not 
be seen as an expression o f patriotism or chauvinism. Reactions to the Reports were 
also constructive for many jurisdictions. For instance, France considered some o f the 
critics addressed and engaged in efforts to improve the attractiveness o f French law
1 9Qwithin the international commercial scene . Nevertheless, in the present economic 
context, it is interesting to note that the recent financial crisis somehow highlighted 
the lacunae underlying the use of such a methodology and the uncertainties of 
recognising such index of the ‘best jurisdictions’ to invest. In this perspective, the 
question o f the legal transplantation of more efficient secured credit law regimes in 
jurisdictions that are in need of modernisation will be considered in Chapter Three. 
This analysis will particularly assess the desirability and feasibility o f the importation 
of the functional approach adopted in the American Article 9 UCC in jurisdictions of 
dissimilar legal cultures.
Finally, in an international context, it is arguable that such a mapping of commercial 
laws is not always reflective of the available legal instruments to ‘do business’. In 
effect, recent years have witnessed the emergence of international legal instruments 
to regulate international transactions. For instance, the Cape Town Convention on 
International Interests in mobile Equipment130has been ratified by 32 countries which
128 Jurisdictions included Belgium, Brasil, Bulgaria, Chile, Columbia, Spain, Greece, Guatemala, 
India, Italy, Lebanon, the State of Louisiana, Morocco, Mexico, Panama, the Netherlands, Puerto 
Rico, Quebec, Romania, Switzerland, Syria, Tunisia, and Vietnam. See Volume 2 Association Henri 
Capitant des amis de la culture juridique frangaise, “Les Droits de Tradition Civiliste en Question. A 
Propos des Rapports Doing Business” (2006) 3 Revue de Droit des Affaires.
129 Paris bar organised a conference in Washington in 2004 entitled: “The American and French Legal 
systems: Contrasting Approaches to Global Business”. In 2005, the Paris Bar organised another 
conference including members o f the French government and representatives from the World Bank 
and from other international institutions entitled “Paris-Place o f Law”. In 2006, France introduced a 
reform o f its secured credit law regime, simplifying the current regime (Ordonnance No 2006-346 du 
23 Mars 2006 art. 13 Journal Officiel du 24 Mars 2006). In 2007, France introduced the fiducie which 
can be assimilated to the common law trust (Loi n° 2007-211 du 19 fevrier 2007 instituant la fiducie). 
In 2009, a Research Group was appointed by the government presided by a lawyer, Maitre Jean- 
Michel Darrois, and delivered a Report on the legal profession to the French president. The Report 
recognises that “efficiency and legal efficacy have become major goals for our economy” Report is 
available from www.justice.gouv.fr/art_pix/rap_com_darrois_20090408.pdf. On this point see 
Fauvarque-Cosson op. cit. fn. 119, p. 817.
130Available at:
http://www.unidroit.org/english/conventions/mobile-equipment/main.htm (last checked 22/04/2010).
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include Common Law and Civil Law jurisdictions131. These international instruments 
will be analysed in succeeding chapters in greater depth.
The economic assessment of the law is important to take into account but does not 
provide a complete picture o f the quality of legislations. The regulation o f secured 
credit law regimes requires law reformers to achieve a balance between the different 
interests at stake which outcomes should not solely depend on economic 
considerations. This aspect of the modernisation of secured credit law regimes is a 
central theme of the thesis.
CONCLUSION
The pursuit o f a rationale for secured credit has been at the heart of vigorous debates, 
particularly within the Law and Economics movement as it has been exposed in this 
examination. However, these theories substantially lack persuasive evidence, 
essentially because they are based on assumptions which are not representative of the 
reality. Bowers explains, for instance, that:
“... in many cases, the resulting theories predict that debtors will do all or none of 
their borrowing on a secured basis, so that the validity o f the analysis is undermined 
by the empirical observation that firms tend to employ a mix o f secured and 
unsecured borrowing. Others suffer from a shortcoming o f scope. While they may 
explain certain special types of security devices, they do not justify other sorts of 
secured borrowing actually observed.” 1 2
Effectively, the theoretical literature only raises questions and suspicion toward a 
potential justification of secured lending, which cannot constitute a satisfactory 
rationale for the institution of secured credit. Following the analysis o f some of the 
major economic efficiency theories introduced to justify the institution o f secured 
credit such as the monitoring costs explanation or the signalling theory, it is to be 
concluded that a satisfactory account for secured credit has yet to be established as 
the theories have only managed to explain a limited range o f types of security. 
Further, this analysis demonstrated that, although redistributive theories constitute a 
significant threat to the institution of secured credit by asserting that the issuance of
131 http://www.unidroit.org/english/implement/i-2001-convention.pdf (last checked on 22/04/2010).
132 Bowers, J.W. “Whither What Hits the Fan? Murphy’s Law, Bankruptcy Theory, and the 
Elementary Economics o f Loss Distribution” (1991) 26 Georgia Law Review, at p. 60.
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secured debts may shift wealth from involuntarily creditors to secured creditors and 
the debtor itself, it has to be submitted that the argument becomes questionable in the 
light o f empirical evidence. Thus, the proposition according to which the institution 
of secured credit or at least the priority system should be eradicated becomes difficult 
to sustain.
The question of why people choose to lend on a secured basis will depend upon a 
wide array o f empirical data that cannot be translated in economic theories. It is to be 
concluded that the answer to the question of the pursuit of a rationale for secured 
credit will not rise from economics theorems. The search for a rationale for secured 
credit in general terms cannot be apprehended in the light of economic efficiencies, 
and, thus, a definite answer to the debate remains highly uncertain. The justification 
of secured lending remains an empirical question and, it has to be concluded that 
there are extra rational reasons leading to the decision of lending and borrowing on a 
secured basis.
The lack o f theoretical justifications does not mean that the institution o f secured 
credit should be eradicated as submitted by the proponents of the exploitation 
hypothesis. By no means, the economic analysis of secured credit succeeded in its 
quest to prove its inefficiency. Such a conclusion would indeed contradict the reality 
that most jurisdictions do recognise the institution of secured credit and have 
accordingly introduced a form of secured credit law regime. Nevertheless, it is to be 
recognised that economic inefficiencies, such as potential wealth transfer from non­
adjusting unsecured creditors to debtors and secured creditors, could occur in 
specific contexts.
Although the debate over the rationale o f the institution of secured credit remains 
inconclusive, the analysis should not remain vain. In an era of internationalisation 
and modernisation o f the law, the debate over the desirability and effectiveness of 
secured lending is essential to consider as part of this analysis on the modernisation 
of secured credit law regimes. In effect, the theories using the economic analysis of 
the law, offer important developments on policy issues that would need to be 
reviewed when considering legal changes in the field of secured credit law. For
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instance, one of the most difficult issues faced by legal reformers resides in the 
question of whether the law can achieve an appropriate and fair balance of interests 
between the different parties involved, especially towards unsecured creditors. 
Accordingly, many national secured credit law regimes confer a preferential 
treatment to certain categories of unsecured creditors. Other issues involve the 
question of the extent to which debtors should be permitted to use their assets for 
security purposes. For instance, Article 9 UCC provides a large scope o f coverage, 
including all categories of assets, including tangible and intangible. A similar broad 
security can be found with the floating charge in England. Civilian jurisdictions, such 
as France would appear to be more restrictive and introduced some safeguards 
limiting the use of the debtor’s assets for security purposes. Thus, the importance of 
the economic efficiency debate for secured credit would confirm the significance and 
influence of the Law and Economics movement to interfere with the law making 
process.
Following the significant expansion of cross-border transactions and the 
liberalisation of financial markets, national secured credit laws became the object of 
intensive scrutiny as to their quality to promote trade and generally as to their quality 
to promote economic growth. Accordingly, the economic analysis has generally been 
used to challenge the quality of the law of secured credit. However, it has been 
exposed that the use of the economic analysis in the mapping of national commercial 
laws has particularly been objected by a number o f jurisdictions, mainly by those 
belonging to the Civilian tradition. Although the value o f the economic analysis in 
the law making process can be enhancing, it is argued that the use of the economic 
analysis should not solely dictate the content of secured credit law regimes. The 
economic analysis is essential to take into account but does not provide a complete 
picture of the quality of legislations. The regulation of secured credit law regimes 
requires law reformers to achieve a balance between the different interests at stake 
which outcomes should not solely depend on economic considerations. The law is 
not an economic contest, and the noticeable quest to establish economically efficient 
legislations should not overlook other values.
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The lack o f theoretical justifications for the institution of secured credit should not 
lead legal reformers to consider its abolition. On the contrary, recent empirical 
evidence extensively showed that secured credit is on the whole socially beneficial. 
If the institution o f secured credit is desirable, its modernisation has recently become 
a paramount requirement. In effect, secured credit law regimes constitute the engine 
of economic growth. As Goode already highlighted:
“[sjecurity in Personal Property has become enormously important both within a 
country and in relation to cross-border transactions. Without an adequate legal 
regime for personal property security rights, it is almost impossible for a national 
economy to develop.”133
The recognition that access to credit, together with the establishment of effective 
financial institutions134 are fundamental to the development of the economy is a
t  ^c
position shared by many legal academics and does represent a general
133 Goode op. cit. fn. 120, at p. 47. See also the introductive comments in the UNCITRAL Legislative 
guide on Secured Transactions which provides that: “[i]t is well established, through studies 
conducted by such organizations as the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(IBRD), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) that one of the most effective means o f  
providing working capital to commercial enterprises is through secured credit.” UNCITRAL 
Legislative Guide on Secured Transactions op. cit. fn. 103, Introduction, Para. 4 at p. 1.
134 On this point see Umarji, M.R. “Role of Secured Transactions to Mobilise Credit and Need for 
Mobilizing the Law” (2007) M odem Law for Global Commerce, Congress to celebrate the fortieth 
annual session o f  UNCITRAL, Vienna 9-12 July 2007 where the author reiterates the purposes and 
objects o f the UNCITRAL legislative guide on Secured Transactions: “... The UNCITRAL 
Legislative Guide lists out purpose and objects of the Secured Transactions Law as under: (a) to 
promote secured credit; (b) to allow utilization o f the full value inherent in a broad range of assets to 
support credit in the widest possible array of secured transactions; (c) to enable parties to obtain 
security rights in a simple and efficient manner; (d) to provide for equal treatment o f diverse sources 
of credit and o f diverse forms o f secured transactions; (e) to validate security rights in assets that 
remain in the possession o f the grantor; (f) to enhance predictability and transparency with respect to 
rights serving security purposes by providing for registration of a notice in a general security rights 
registry; (g) to establish clear and predictable priority rules; (h) to facilitate enforcement of creditor’s 
rights in a predictable and efficient manner; (i) to balance the interests o f affected persons; (j) to 
recognize party autonomy; and (k) to harmonize secured transactions laws, including conflict-of-law 
rules.”
135 See for instance McCormack, G. op. cit. fn. 18, at p. 19 where the author explains that: “[t]he belief 
that a far-reaching and comprehensive law facilitating secured credit is an essential tool for economic 
development represents no only the view o f those advising on the transition process in Eastern Europe 
but also an international consensus generally .’’See also Drobnig, U. “Secured Credit in International 
Insolvency Proceedings” (1998) 33 Texas International Law Journal, at p.54, where the author 
concedes that “[t]he more advanced a market economy is, the greater the demand for credit and 
correspondingly, the greater the pressure on legislatures and courts to find ways effectively to use non 
possessory security interests.” Umarji, M.R further explains that “[i]t is now well established that 
credit growth can be achieved by introducing a modem secured transactions law which recognizes 
utilization o f the full value inherent in assets to obtain credit.” Umarji op. cit. fn. 134. Gopalan, S. 
states that “[tjhere is virtually a consensus in opinion that a modem secured credit law is a sine qua 
non for the availability and lowering o f the cost o f credit” in Transnational Commercial Law, (2004), 
at p.22. The Report o f the Secretary General of the UNCITRAL Draft Legislative Guide on Secured
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international consensus. In effect, numerous national law reforms and international
1 T7initiatives have now confirmed this postulate that commercial law should embrace 
efficient and modem secured credit law regimes.
In an era o f internationalisation, legal reforms have been confronted to new 
challenges. In effect, legal reforms would seem to have been driven by the 
requirement to accommodate the law to new commercial needs. An analysis o f the 
arguments that have driven legal reformers to modernise current secured credit law 
regimes will be considered in the next Chapter. Further, the following sections will 
seek to understand the meaning and core elements that should be part of a modem 
secured credit law regime.
Transactions (A/CN.9AVG.VIAVP.9) states that “... an effective and predictable legal framework had 
both short- and long-term macroeconomics benefits. In the short term, namely, when countries faced 
crises in their financial sector, an effective and predictable legal framework was necessary, in 
particular in terms of enforcement o f financial claims, to assist the banks and other financial 
institutions in controlling the deterioration of their claims through quick enforcement mechanisms and 
to facilitate corporate restructuring by providing a vehicle that would create incentives for interim 
financing. In the longer term, a flexible and effective legal framework for security rights could serve 
as a useful tool to increase economic growth, competitiveness and international trade could not be 
fostered, with enterprises being prevented from expanding to meet their full potential.” available at 
www.uncitral.org/en-index.htm> (last checked 22/04/2010).
136 Kripke op. cit. fn. 101.
137 Initiatives such as the UNCITRAL legislative Guide on Secured Transactions (2007), the 
UNIDROIT Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment and the Protocol to the 
Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment on Matters specific to Aircraft Equipment 
(2001) or the EBRD Model Law on Secured Transaction (1994) reflect some o f  the major attempts at 
the international level.
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CHAPTER TWO
SECURED TRANSACTIONS LAW REGIMES AND THE PHENOMENON 
OF MODERNISATION THROUGH APPROXIMATION OF LAW
INTRODUCTION
The above analysis concluded that the debate on secured credit did not manage to 
provide a satisfactory rationale. Such a conclusion should not, however, lead legal 
reformers to opt for the eradication of secured credit law regimes. It is now well 
accepted that secured credit law regimes are necessary to the growth of the economy. 
It is generally recognised that secured credit would permit borrowers to obtain better 
credit facilities to invest in profitable projects and would also reduce risks for 
creditors. These assumptions are largely supported by an emerging consensus on 
secured credit . If  secured credit law regimes are necessary for the good 
functioning o f the economy, it is arguable that access to credit should be promoted 
by providing modem, effective secured credit legislations that will enhance 
affordability, transparency and predictability within secured transactions.
The recognition that the facilitation and expansion of access to credit are conditio 
sine qua non for the growth o f the economy has driven legal reformers to modernise 
the laws of secured transactions accordingly across the globe. Essentially, a modem 
secured credit law regime should adapt to new commercial practices, promote the 
availability o f credit at low costs and should assure certainty and predictability to 
creditors in the event o f default by debtors139. A modem secured transaction law
138 See e.g., the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Secured Transactions reflects, to some extent this 
consensus on the purposes and role o f modem legislations on secured credit. See above fn. 134.
139 UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Secured Transactions provides in its introduction that: “[t]he 
key to the effectiveness o f secured credit is that it allows businesses to use the value inherent in their 
assets as a means o f reducing the creditor’s risk that it will not be paid. Risk is reduced because credit 
secured by assets gives creditors access to the assets as another source o f recovery in the event o f non­
payment o f  the secured obligation. As prospective creditors perceive that this risk is reduced in a 
proposed credit transaction, they are more likely to be willing to extend credit and to increase the 
amount or reduce the cost o f the credit they provide. A legal system that supports secured transactions 
is critical to reducing the perceived risks of transactions and promoting the availability o f secured 
credit generally. Secured credit is more readily available to businesses in States that have efficient and
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regime should further ensure the enforcement of security as against third party 
through appropriate registration mechanisms and should also ensure the 
establishment o f an effective priority system that will provide creditors with certainty 
and predictability140.
International organisations such as the EBRD141 or UNCITRAL142 greatly 
emphasised the need for modernisation and developed core principles in order to 
guide legal reformers in implementing modem secured transactions regimes. It is 
particularly interesting to refer to the core principles set out in the UNCITRAL 
Legislative Guide on Secured Transactions. In effect, these principles were drawn by 
a working group composed of all Member States o f the Commission, thus reflecting, 
to a certain extent, a consensus on what principles should govern a modem secured 
transactions law regime143. Accordingly, it is accepted that a modem legislation on 
secured transactions should promote low-cost credit by enhancing the availability of 
secured credit; allow debtors to use the full value inherent in their assets to support 
credit; enable parties to obtain security rights in a simple and efficient manner; 
provide for equal treatment o f diverse sources o f credit and o f diverse forms of 
secured transactions; validate non possessory security rights in all types of assets; 
enhance certainty and transparency by providing for registration of a notice in a 
general security rights registry; establish clear and predictable priority rules; 
facilitate efficient enforcement of creditor’s rights; allow parties maximum flexibility
effective laws that provide for consistent, predictable outcomes for secured creditors in the event of 
non-performance by debtors. On the other hand, in states where the absence o f such laws means that 
creditors perceive the risks associated with credit transactions to be high, the cost o f credit normally 
increases, as creditors require increased compensation to evaluate and assume the increased risk. In 
some States, the absence of an efficient and effective secured transactions regime or o f an insolvency 
law regime, under which security rights are recognized, has resulted in the virtual elimination o f credit 
for small and medium-sized commercial enterprises, as well as for consumers.’’UNCITRAL 
Legislative Guide on Secured Transactions op. cit. fn. 103, introduction, Paras. 5 and 6 at p. 2.
140 See generally the UNCITRAL colloquium “Modem Law for Global Commerce”, Congress to 
celebrate the fortieth annual session o f  UNCITRAL Vienna, 9-12 July 2007, available at 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/about/congress.html (last checked 22/04/2010).
141 See EBRD Core Principles for a Secured Transaction Law.
http://www.ebrd.com/country/sector/law/st/core/model/core.htm (last checked 22/04/2010).
142 UNCITRAL also identified key principles (see UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Secured 
Transactions, see above fn. 103, introduction, at Para. 46) and fundamental policies (at Para. 61) 
inherent to a modem secured transactions law regime.
143 UNCITRAL Working Group VI has been created and affected to work on the modernisation of 
secured credit law regimes.
See http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/commission/working_groups/6Security_Interests.html
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to negotiate the terms o f their security agreement; balance the interests of affected 
persons and harmonise secured transactions laws, including conflict-of-law rules144.
Further, it is important to emphasise that these core principles inherent to a modem 
secured credit law regime should also be achieved in light of social, scientific, 
economic and political changes. In effect, the modernisation of the law should also 
be contemplated in light of the emergence of new commercial needs such as those 
generated from the evolution in the nature of assets used for security purposes, the 
expansion o f transnational secured transactions, the evolution of information 
technologies or those generated from the shift of centrally planned economies to 
market economies. Many centrally planned economies have recently converted into 
market economies leading to the transfer of sovereign risks into entrepreneurial 
risks145. Consequently, security became a major and attractive financial tool for 
creditors, who used to rely on their government for finance. These new economies 
need to modernise their secured credit law regimes in order to meet the requirements 
of trade and of the economy in general. It is not a choice but a need for 
modernisation and, essentially, a need to approximate their law with the legislations 
of the countries they will mainly trade with.
The implementation of a modem legislation on secured credit needs to adapt to new 
economic and commercial practices. In relation to secured credit, new modem needs 
would include the possibility to create security over a broader range of assets. In 
effect, the development o f electronic commerce and information technologies led to 
the emergence o f new class of assets such as intellectual property rights which 
created significant complexities and uncertainties for secured credit law regimes146. 
Accordingly, a modem secured credit law regime should embrace new categories of 
assets in a knowledge economy context. Businesses significantly enhanced their 
borrowing capacity by using intellectual property assets for security purposes. In 
effect, the economic value of these assets largely increased and now, represents
144 UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Secured Transactions, see above fn. 103.
145 Goode, R.M. “Harmonised Modernisation of the Law Governing Secured Transactions: General- 
Sectorial Global-Regional” (2003) 8 Uniform Law Review, at p. 341.
146 Lipton, J. Security over Intangible Property, (2000), at p. 15.
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significant financial assets for firms and companies147. However, the use of 
intellectual property for security purposes has given rise to some difficulties and
148uncertainties within the current credit and security law system . The use of such 
class of assets created new challenges for the law o f secured credit such as the 
ascertainment of ownership, the delicate question of the valuation methods for 
intellectual property assets and most importantly the question o f the validity and 
enforcement of a security created in intellectual property assets.
The nature o f personal property assets used for finance has dramatically evolved in 
past decades, and thus requires law reformers to modernise the law of secured credit 
accordingly. Particularly, the following developments will emphasise that modem 
secured credit law regimes should embrace new categories of assets such as 
intellectual property rights. An illustration of the necessity to modernise the law will 
be exposed through a comparative analysis of the registration mechanisms of 
intellectual property security. Comparative analysis is used in this context, to 
emphasise the fact that the modernisation of secured credit is a worldwide 
phenomenon and not just specific to certain national jurisdictions or specific to 
certain legal traditions. A comparative analysis will be drawn between the 
registration mechanisms for security created in intellectual property assets in the U.S, 
England and France.
This study will further emphasise, that in light of a significant growth in cross-border 
transactions, it has become more and more difficult to justify a reform of secured 
credit law based on a modernisation rationale without including the element of 
intemationality. In effect, the internationalisation of commercial transactions 
corroborates the fact that national secured credit legislations are often inadequate. An 
interesting illustration of the inadequacy of national legislations in an international 
context can be found with the uncertain validity and enforcement o f a security 
created in mobile assets in foreign jurisdictions. It can become particularly 
problematic in respect of movable assets such as aircrafts, space assets or railway
147 Davies, I.R. “Secured Financing o f Intellectual Property Assets and the Reform of English 
Personal Property Security Law” (2006) 26 Oxford Journal o f  Legal Studies (3), at p. 559.
148 Krauthaus, P. A., Et al. “Securing Financing and Information Property Rights” (1988) High 
Technology Law Journal, at p. 195.
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rolling stocks. In this respect, the Cape Town Convention introduced a significant 
international framework to resolve the difficulties149. Further international initiatives 
with similar aims have also recently been introduced confirming the emergence o f a 
consensus on the question of the approximation of secured credit law regimes. For 
instance, the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Secured Transactions reiterates the 
need to modernise the law with the aim to achieve some degree o f approximation of 
laws among the different national secured credit law regimes150. This aspect is 
integrated to the core aims of a modem secured credit law regime in the UNCITRAL 
Legislative Guide151. In effect, the existing divergences among national secured 
credit law regimes do not facilitate the realisation of cross-border transactions at 
lower costs and at required high standard of certainty and security for contracting 
parties. The lack of coordination of secured credit law regimes could jeopardise the 
achievement of a successful modernisation of the law.
This study will thus attempt to understand the phenomenon of modernisation in 
secured transactions practices and assess the adequacy of their corresponding 
regulations. This examination does not intend to provide an exhaustive analysis of all 
secured credit law regimes lacunae but will attempt to provide an illustration of the 
modernisation phenomenon through the assessment of a particular feature of secured 
credit law regimes; the registration system. Particularly, the question of the validity 
and enforcement o f a security becomes challenging in respect of the recent 
emergence of new categories of assets such as intellectual property assets. As a 
result, the difficulties encountered by various national registration systems in respect 
of security created in intellectual property assets will be considered from a 
comparative perspective.
If a modernisation o f secured credit law regimes is desirable, especially in the light 
of an approximation of laws, the question emerged of whether such modernisation 
could be successfully achieved using approximation of law methods. This study will 
thus further consider the justifications that have forged the consensus on the 
approximation of secured credit law regimes and will also seek to identify and
149 See above fn. 139.
150 See above fn. 145.
151 Ibid.
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explain the different methods available to legal reformers to achieve a modernisation 
through approximation. The purpose of this final section is essentially to provide 
some conceptual definitions of the methods available to legal reformers to 
approximate and modernise secured credit law regimes. The approximation of law 
methods will, consecutively, be assessed in separate chapters as potential successful 
methods to modernise secured credit law regimes. If there is a strong case in support 
of the modernisation of secured credit law regimes as it will now be considered in the 
first part, the second part of this examination will introduce the question of whether 
approximation of law instruments could be used as legal methods to modernise and 
reform secured credit law regimes.
MODERN SECURED LENDING AND THE NEED FOR REFORM: A 
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY SECURITY 
REGISTRATION SYSTEMS.
Modem commercial practices have recently led legal reformers to assess the 
adequacy of their secured credit law regimes. Particularly, the emergence of new 
class of assets, following the scientific and technological advances, can pose 
significant problems for secured credit law regimes. Businesses significantly 
enhanced their borrowing capacity by using intangible such as intellectual property 
assets as collaterals152. Fundamentally, it is important to highlight that for many 
companies, intellectual property appears to be their primary source o f assets 
available for financing153. However, the use of this new class of assets has generated 
a legal conflict between an intellectual property regime which promotes the 
protection and reward of the intellectual property creator and the need for an 
appropriate secured credit law regime which should enhance and support security 
and efficiency for debtors and creditors154. An essential feature of secured credit law
152 On this point see, Davies, I.R. “Technology-Based Small Firms and the Commodification of 
Intellectual Property Rights” in De Lacy, J., Et al., The reform o f  UK Personal Property Law, (2010), 
at pp. 308-327.
153 Knopf, H.P. “Security Interests in Intellectual Property: An International Comparative 
Approach“(2001) Working Draft Paper, available at http://www.ulcc.ca/en/cls/security-interests.pdf 
(last checked 26/04/2010).
154 Krauthaus op. cit. fn. 148, at p. 559.
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regimes that pose some difficulties in respect of intellectual property security is the 
registration requirement155.
The registration o f a non possessory security often constitutes an imperative 
requirement for its validity and enforcement in many national laws. One of the 
fundamental functions o f the publication is to determine the ranking o f creditors 
upon the debtor’s insolvency. A registration system should be easy to use, costs 
effective, enhancing better information amongst creditors, and ascertaining the 
priority entitlements o f creditors. In respect of intellectual property assets, many 
jurisdictions have in place a dual registration, materialised in the co-existence of 
special registries for the publication of intellectual property rights, and a special 
registry for the publication of the security so created in intellectual property. This 
situation raises substantial difficulties for debtors and creditors who wish to create a 
security in intellectual property assets. The issue of determining which set of rules 
should govern priority disputes is essential, especially in presence of a dual 
registration system. Thus, the following developments will focus on the assessment 
of a specific feature of secured credit law regimes, the registration system of 
intellectual property security, in light of modem commercial practices.
Ultimately, this study will illustrate the phenomenon of modernisation in secured 
credit law regimes and will support the argument that modem legislations should 
also embrace new categories of assets. This analysis on the phenomenon of 
modernisation of secured credit adopts a comparative law approach which will 
confirm that this phenomenon is global and not peculiar to specific jurisdictions or 
legal traditions. The following developments will thus focus on the analysis of the 
registration systems for intellectual property security in different jurisdictions 
belonging to different legal traditions. Particular emphasis will be given to the 
registration system in the U.S, England and France.
155 The key feature, central to the law reform proposal in England was the question of the registration 
o f personal property security interest. References to the Law Commission law reform proposal are 
provided above at fn. 102.
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The registration mechanism for security interests in intellectual property assets 
in the United States.
Article 9 of the UCC adopts a functional approach to the regulation o f a unitary 
security device, the security interest. It encompasses large scope of coverage, 
including all categories of personal property, tangible and intangible and all types of 
parties156. One of the most interesting features of the Article 9 security interest lies in 
the fact that its scope is delimited according to the function served, so that the parties
1 57can freely apply the best suited structure to their transactions . Article 9 o f the UCC 
provides for a single functional system together with the recognition o f a single set of 
rules, a notice filing system and a first to file priority rules, applicable to the security 
interest. Article 9 of the UCC distinguishes between the enforcement of the security
1 5ftinterest as between the debtor and creditor through the process o f attachment and 
the enforcement of the security as against third parties through the process of 
perfection159 where the security is registered. Although, the code still provides for a 
mode of perfection through the debtor’s dispossession160, the notice filing is the 
recognised system under Article 9 in order to perfect security interests.
A financing statement has to be filed in a public centralised registry161 and only 
needs to provide for a small amount of information162. The registration of the 
security interest will provide priority to the lender upon the debtor’s insolvency 
following the first to file priority system. Furthermore, the information provided by 
the notice filing system enables other creditors to ascertain whether any of the 
debtor’s assets would already be subject to a prior interest. If  prospective creditors 
require additional information, further investigations can be obtained if necessary. 
Article §9-402 of the UCC provides that the financing statement should provide an
156 Sigman, H.C. “The Security Interest in the United States: A Unitary Functional Solution” in Ancel, 
M.E., Repenser le Droit des Suretes Mobiliere, (L.G.D.J, 2005), at p. 59.
157 Ibid. at p. 60.
158 §9-203(Part 2) UCC.
159§9-302 and §9- 401 to §9- 408 UCC (Part 4 on Filing).
160 §9-305 UCC.
161 §9-401 UCC.
162 Article §9-402 (1) provides that “... a financing statement is sufficient if  it gives the names o f the 
debtor and the secured party, is signed by the debtor, gives an address o f the secured party from which 
information concerning the security interest may be obtained, gives a mailing address o f the debtor 
and contains a statement indicating the types, or describing the items, o f  collateral.”
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address o f the secured creditor, from whom information could be acquired if needed.
However, this option is left to the discretion of the secured party who remains at
liberty to provide further information or not. As Grant Gilmore already highlighted:
“[tjhere is no reason why a secured party should be put to the cost and burden of 
preparing detailed statements of his affairs to satisfy the curiosity of officious inter­
meddlers, business competitors or the students editors of law reviews. On the other 
hand, whenever it is to a debtor’s interest to provide the information to potential 
sources o f credit, he is enabled to supply it.”
The notice filing system has proved to be a very convenient and flexible system. In 
effect, other advantageous aspects of the notice filing system include that where there 
is an ongoing financial or trading relationship between debtor and creditor, only one 
financing statement has to be filed. It is especially valuable with respect to security 
created over book debts or stock in trade164. Furthermore, a financing statement can 
be filed with respect to future advances and after acquired property165. Similarly, a 
financing statement that contains description of the collateral can be filed even if the 
security agreement is not yet in existence. However, even within most modernised 
secured credit law regimes such as the one embodied in Article 9 of the UCC, it has 
to be observed that legal gaps still remain. Although, this system has shown the great 
virtues o f a modem registration system by providing more certainty and simplicity to 
lenders and borrowers, the notice filing system still shows some legal gap embodied 
for instance in the issue o f the registration of security interests created in intellectual 
property assets as it will now be exposed.
In the United States, the law governing secured transactions law requires that the 
lender should file a financing statement in order to perfect his security interest. 
However, the Uniform Commercial Code also provides that:
"... the filing o f a financing statement is not necessary to perfect a security interest in 
property subject to a statute, regulation or treaty of the United States whose 
requirements for a security interest’s obtaining priority over the rights o f a lien 
creditor with respect to the property pre-empt Article 9-310(a).”166
163 Gilmore, G., Security Interests in Personal Property, (1965), at p. 472.
164 McCormack, G. “Notice Filing versus Transaction Filing -  A Comparison o f the English and U.S. 
Law o f Security Interests” (2002) Insolvency Lawyer, at p. 167.
165 §9-204 UCC.
166 §9-310(b) (3) and §9-311(a) (1) UCC.
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In the United States, Federal law regulates copyrights, trademarks and patents. 
Therefore, the question emerged whether creditors should perfect their security 
interests in intellectual property assets by filing a financing statement and, or, filing 
their security interests using the specific registers established for patents and 
trademarks.
In the absence of further clarifications from the legislation itself, the case law has 
generally laid guidelines with respect to the enforcement of security interests in
167intellectual property assets. The Lanham Act provides protection for trademarks 
but largely remains silent towards the means to perfect a security interest created in 
such intellectual property assets. Therefore, the question emerged whether the law 
governing security interests that is Article 9 of the UCC, was pre-empted by the
t  JCO ,
Lanham Act. In Re TR-3 Industries v Capital Bank , the Court established that a 
security interest in trademarks was valid even though no registration had been made 
within the United States Patent and Trademark Office (thereafter USPTO). Thus, the 
perfection o f a security interest in trademarks requires the filing of a financing 
statement following Article 9 o f the UCC.
Although a registration in the USPTO would not seem compulsory to perfect a 
security interest in trademarks, it will be required if creditors wish to protect their 
interests against any potential subsequent purchasers or mortgagees169. It would thus 
seem to be general practice to advise creditors to record their security interests in 
both registers so that subsequent purchasers or lenders will be put on notice of 
previous interests created in the intellectual property asset. In effect, the sole
167 Protection will be effective through a registration in the United States Patent and Trademark 
Office.
168 41 B.R. 128 (C.D. Cal. 1984). See also Roman Cleanser Company v. National Acceptance 
Company o f  America, 43 B.R. 940 (E.D. Mich. 1984) affd , 802 F.2d 207 (6th Cir. 1986) which 
provides that: “[t]he manner of perfecting a security interest in trademarks is governed by Article 9 
and not by the Lanham Act.”
169US Trademark Act, Section 1060(a)(4) provides that “[a]n assignment shall be void against any 
subsequent purchaser for valuable consideration without notice, unless the prescribed information 
reporting the assignment is recorded in the United States Patent and Trademark Office within 3 
months after the date o f the assignment or prior to the subsequent purchase”. The court held in Rhone- 
Poulenc Agro, S.A., v. DeKalb Genetics Corp, that a UCC State filing does not provide protection 
against a subsequent purchaser of patent rights. The court admitted that a good faith purchaser who 
has registered his notice in the USPTO will defeat a secured creditor who did not file his interest in 
the same register. See also Rhone-Poulenc Agro, S.A., v. DeKalb Genetics Corp., 284 F.3d 1323, 62 
U.S.P.Q.2d 1188 (Fed. Cir.2002).
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doctrine o f accession, the question remains of the degree of annexation required for 
the accession to take place. While the Commercial code has retained an ‘injurious 
removal test’, the Civil code provides that chattels attached to the principal good are 
to be treated prima facie  as accessions, unless it appears that the accessory is of 
greater value than the principal good.
The recognition o f the doctrine of accessio within the French Civil code has been 
accompanied by the allocation of a compensation for the owner of the incorporated 
goods. In effect, when a good, considered as an accessory, is integrated to another 
good, in a non irremediable way, Article 566 of the Civil code340 provides for a 
pecuniary compensation for the owner. Nevertheless, the code also makes provision 
for an exception to the doctrine of accession and entitles the owner o f the accessories 
to claim ownership to the goods in their original state under two conditions; the 
union o f the goods was made without the knowledge of the claimant and the asserted 
good has were much more valuable than the principal good341.
The Commercial code also integrated the doctrine of accession within its specific 
dispositions applicable to merchants and commercial transactions. Article L 624-16 
of the Commercial code342 and, more recently, Article 2370 of the Civil code343 
regulating retention o f title clauses, allow the owner for a right to claim the goods in 
their original states if  the accessories can be removed without causing substantial 
damage. Article L624-16 of the Commercial code only requires that the goods
340 Article 566 C.Civ. (Act no 60-464 o f  1 7 May 1960) provides that “[wjhere two things belonging to 
different masters, which have been so joined as to form one whole, are nevertheless separable, so that 
one may subsist without the other, the whole belongs to the master o f the thing which forms the main 
part, subject to the obligation o f paying to the other the value, appraised at the date of payment, o f the 
thing which has been joined.”
341 Article 567 and 568 C.Civ. provide that “[t]he part to which the other has been added for the use, 
ornamentation or completion o f the first only, is considered the principal one.” Article 568 provides 
that “[nevertheless, when the thing added is o f much more value than the principal thing and when it 
has been added without the knowledge o f the owner, he may ask that the thing added be separated, for 
the purpose o f being returned to him, even if the thing to which it has been added might be 
deteriorated thereby.”
342 L624-16 C.Com. provides that “[t]he claim to ownership of goods in their original state may be 
brought under the same conditions with respect to chattels that are incorporated into another chattel 
where the separation o f the goods can be effected without causing damage to them. The claim to 
ownership o f goods in their original state may also be brought with respect to fungible goods where 
goods o f the same nature and same quality are found in the hands of the debtor or any person holding 
them on his behalf.”
343 Article 2370 C.Civ. provides that “[t]he incorporation to another thing o f a thing whose title is 
retained is not a bar to the rights o f the creditor where those things may be separated without suffering 
damage.”
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specific copyrights registration could enable subsequent purchasers or mortgagee to 
get a valid title against previous interests as they would not have had been put on 
notice. This situation would give rise to additional monitoring costs from creditors 
who should, therefore, ensure that the copyright is registered in the US Copyright 
Office. The perfection of security interests in unregistered copyrights would, thus, 
appear to be quite unsettled and left to the discretion o f the courts to lay further 
guidance.
Although the notice filing system shows great advantages in its simplicity, 
convenience and costs, the virtues of the system are questionable when applied in the 
context of intellectual property assets. In effect, it has been observed that a dual 
registration will be required in respect of trademarks and patents if a creditor wants 
to perfect his security interest and gain protection against eventual subsequent 
purchasers. This dual recordation undoubtedly undermines the great simplicity and 
convenience of the notice filing system instituted under Article 9 UCC. This is why 
a modem legal regime should adapt to new commercial needs such as those 
generated from the creation of security in intellectual property assets which would in 
turn optimise the use of these assets for security purposes. Particularly, an 
appropriate legal regime should coordinate the current legal security framework 
together with an intellectual property rights regime176. In order to achieve this goal, a 
modernisation of current security law regimes appears inevitable.
It is arguable that a reform of the registration system modelled on the American 
notice filing would offer more transparency within secured transactions and would 
generally enhance commercial borrowings177. Nevertheless, it is to be observed that 
although the notice filing system substantially enhance access to credit for 
borrowers, there are still areas of the law which would need to be improved, 
especially in relation to the registration mechanism in relation to new class of assets 
used as collaterals such as intellectual property assets.
176 Krauthaus op. cit. fn. 148, at p. 559.
177 Company Law Steering Group, Final Report “Modem Company Law for a Competitive 
Economy”, July 2001, Para. 12.1. See also McCormack op. cit. fn. 164, at p. 166.
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The legal transplantation o f accessio in England
The Roman law doctrine of accessio is not only confined to Civil Law traditions and 
it is remarkable to also find some applications of this principle within Common Law 
jurisdictions. In England, an application of the concept of accessio and its legal 
regime can be found in the Law of Property Act 1925 which recognises the relevance 
o f the Latin maxim ‘quicquid plantatur solo, solo cedit According to the Law of 
Property Act, Section 205 (1) (ix), ‘land’ is defined as comprising ‘the surface, 
buildings or parts of buildings’ and more generally, anything that is affixed to the 
land would become part of the land346. As under French law, where a chattel is 
annexed to the land, a problem of ownership may arise. In this situation, it is 
fundamental to determine whether the chattels annexed to the land remains chattels 
or becomes fixtures. It will depend upon the degree of annexation required to 
become fixtures or upon the purpose of annexation.
These two tests have developed in order to determine whether the object remains a
chattel or has become fixture347. In relation to the degree of annexation, spinning
wheels affixed with bolts to the floor of a manufacturing plant were held to be
fixtures following Holland v. Hodgson348. In this case, Blackburn J  held that:
"... articles not otherwise attached to the land than by their own weight are not to be 
considered as part o f the land unless the circumstances are such as to show that they 
were intended to be part of the land ... and that on the contrary, an article which is 
affixed to the land even slightly is to be considered as part of the land, unless the 
circumstances are such as to show that it was intended all along to continue a 
chattel.”349
On the other hand, it has been held that heavy printing press machines placed on the 
floor without any particular form of attachment were fittings and not fixtures350. The 
second test is embodied in the ‘purpose of annexation’. Accordingly, if a chattel has 
been affixed to the land or building for a better enjoyment of the object as a chattel, 
then the object will remain a chattel. If, on the other hand, the chattel has been 
affixed for the more convenient use of the land or the building, the chattel will
346 Law o f Property Act 1925.
347 Chappelle, D., Land Law, (Pearson eds, 2008), at p. 30.
348 [1872] LR 7 CP 328.
349 Blackburn J  in Holland v. Hodgson [1872] LR 7 CP 328.
350 Hulme v. Brigham [1943] KB 152.
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Commission proposed a reform of the registration system for companies’ charges 
modelled on the notice filing system embodied in Article 9 UCC and issued a 
Consultation Paper dealing with the registration of company security interests which 
was followed by a Consultative Report on Company Security Interests and concluded 
with a final Report on Company Security Interests183. It is argued that a reform of the 
registration system modelled on the American notice filing would offer more 
transparency within secured transactions and would therefore, enhance commercial 
borrowings. This analysis will first consider the current regime governing the 
registration of a security created in intellectual property and will be followed by an 
analysis of the recent proposals for reform introduced by the Law Commission.
Current regime
As opposed to the American functional approach of a unique security interest, 
English secured credit law regime is founded on different legal instruments, such as
184‘mortgages’, ‘pledges’, ‘liens’, ‘charges’ and other specific legal mechanisms 
privileging a substantial rather than a functional approach. Nonetheless, this 
approach led to uncertainties and difficulties for firms wishing to use their 
intellectual property assets as collaterals. In effect, the pledge, described as “... the 
most powerful form of security interest known to English law”185 by Goode, is 
possessory in nature186. Intellectual property rights, being intangible by nature, would 
not be capable of any physical possession. The institution o f the pledge would 
therefore be irrelevant in the context of the use o f intellectual property assets for 
security purposes187. Similar conclusion has to be reached in relation to liens as they 
generally arise by operation of law and are also possessory in nature . Conversely, 
charges and mortgages are non-possessory security and, would therefore appear to be
M. Et. al. “How Far is Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code Exportable -  A Return to Sources”
(1996) 27 Canadian Business Law Journal, at p. 249; Mooney, C.W. “Exporting UCC Article 9 to an
International Convention: The Local Conundrum” (1996) 27 Canadian Business Law Journal, at p. 
278.
183 See above fn. 102.
184Krauthaus op. cit. fn. 148, at p. 195.
185 Goode, R.M., Commercial Law, (2nd ed. 1995), at p. 644.
186 Davies op. cit. fn. 147.
187 Lipton op. cit. fn. 146, at p. 22.
188 Law Commission Paper No 164, “Registration o f Security Interests: Company Charges and 
Property other than Land” (2002), N° 2.8. See above fn. 102.
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In the U.S., it would also appear that the injurious removal test is to be preferred361. 
A similar position has also been adopted in England where the case of Hendy Lennox 
(Industrial Engines) Ltd. v. Grahame Puttick Ltd.362 provides an interesting 
illustration of the application of the injurious removal test and of the doctrine of 
accessio applied in the reservation of title context. The case involved the sale of 
diesel engines which had been incorporated by the buyer into generating sets. Upon 
the buyer’s default, the seller sought to rely on the retention of title clause to recover 
the engines. The court held that the seller did not lose his title as the engines could be 
removed without serious injury or destruction of the principal asset. Hendy Lennox 
can be contrasted with Borden363, where the owner lost ownership to resin which had 
been irreversibly incorporated to chipboard or with Peachdart364, where the owner 
also lost ownership to leather which had been irreversibly incorporated to handbags.
The French case o f the 24th of March 2004365 can be contrasted with the English case 
of Hendy Lennox. In effect, it is interesting to note that the same injurious removal 
test was applied to determine whether the incorporation of goods into a main chattel 
could be recovered by the owner. Each case presents similar facts but it is arguable 
that the interpretation o f the legal rule differed. In effect, French judges may have 
decided otherwise in the Hendy Lennox case following their reasoning in relation to 
the digital remotes. If  there is an economic appreciation to be taken into account, it is 
arguable that the removal of the diesel engines could have in the same way 
jeopardised the survival of the main unit. Similarly, English judges may have 
decided otherwise in the French case, and allow for the recovery of the digital 
remotes by their owner. Although, it would have required substantial work to remove 
the remotes, it is arguable that they could have been materially removed from the
361 Guest provides that: “[t]his test is adopted by a leading American textbook, Blashfield’s 
Cyclopaedia o f  Automobile Law and Practice, which states that“ [u]nder the rule of accession, when 
attachments on a car can easily be distinguished and separated, no change of property takes place, 
providing the separation can be made without injury to the automobile.” It was also adopted in the 
Canadian case o f Goodrich Silvertown Stores v. McGuire Motors, Ltd. and in the New South Wales 
cases of Bergougnan v. British Motors, Ltd and (more obliquely) Lewis v. Andrews and Rowley Pty., 
Ltd. ” Ibid. at p. 508.
The Australian case Rendell v. Associated Finance Pty., Ltd. [1957] VR 604 and the New Zealand 
case of Thomas v. Robinson [1977] 1 NZLR 385, have also retained the injurious removal test. 
McCormack op. cit. fn. 355, at pp. 295-297.
362 See above fn. 357.
363 Ibid.
364 Ibid.
365 CCass Com., 24 Mars 2004, Moyrand es qual.c / SA Siemens, no. 01-10.280-F-D.
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Such registration is compulsory within both statutes for the protection of intellectual 
property rights, and could lead to major difficulties considering that the validity of a 
charge is also subordinated to the requirement of registration in the companies’ 
charges register195. In effect, if  a creditor registers his interest on the specialist 
intellectual property register and not on the companies’ charges register while 
another creditor registers later in time his interest on the companies charges register 
and not on the special intellectual property register, the latter will prime in priority 
upon the insolvency of the debtor. However, and as for the U.S., the sole registration 
o f the security interest over intellectual property assets in the company register might 
not be sufficient to fully protect the creditor’s interest, because such registration will 
not be enough to put on notice potential subsequent purchasers. Similarly to the U.S., 
a dual registration would therefore be required for both patents and trademarks, 
which obviously does not contribute to the promotion of an accurate simple and 
efficient registration system. This issue would not occur in relation to the creation of 
a security in intellectual property assets which are not subject to any special 
registration such as copyrights196. The Law Commission considered the potential 
problems that could arise from a dual registration and proposed a new scheme in its 
Final Report on Company security Interests. Particularly, the central question 
considered was to determine which register and which registration systems should 
govern priority disputes.
claiming to be affected by such a transaction, the prescribed particulars o f the transaction shall be 
entered in the register.
(2) The following are registrable transactions—  (a) an assignment o f a registered trade mark or any 
right in it; (b) the grant o f a licence under a registered trade mark; (c) the granting of any security 
interest (whether fixed or floating) over a registered trade mark or any right in or under it; (d) the 
making by personal representatives of an assent in relation to a registered trade mark or any right in or 
under it; (e) an order of a court or other competent authority transferring a registered trade mark or 
any right in or under it.
(3) Until an application has been made for registration of the prescribed particulars o f a registrable 
transaction—  (a) the transaction is ineffective as against a person acquiring a conflicting interest in or 
under the registered trade mark in ignorance of it, and (b) a person claiming to be a licensee by virtue 
o f the transaction does not have the protection o f section 30 or 31 (rights and remedies of licensee in 
relation to infringement).
195 Section 860(7)(i) o f the Companies Act 2006 requires registration o f a charge on intellectual 
property which included patents, trademarks, registered designs, copyright and design rights, as well 
as any licences in respect of any such rights.
196 Such as copyrights, database rights and original design rights in the UK (CDPA).
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jurisdictions that belong to different legal traditions. In effect, it would be captivating 
to determine whether the concept of the security interest and the functionalist 
approach to the regulation o f a unique security mechanism could be implemented in 
jurisdictions that belong to different jurisdictions.
It is to be reasserted that this analogy drawn with the concept of accessio is 
interesting to use, first, because it actually describes the legal transplant process and, 
most importantly because it constitutes a core principle of personal property law as 
much as the concept o f a unique security could constitute a core principle of personal 
property security law. The US adopted the concept of a unique security, the security 
interest, and its regulation can be found in Article 9 UCC. Accordingly, the analysis 
will not solely verify whether the idea of adopting a unique security could be 
recognised but, also, whether the entire legal regime adopted in the US could be 
implemented in jurisdictions of dissimilar traditions. As such, the analogy drawn 
with the concept of accessio will be, to some extent, stretched in the sense that the 
next section will further verify whether the entire regime enshrined in Article 9 could 
be transplanted in jurisdictions that belong to different legal traditions.
The next section will thus consider the question of whether a general concept of 
secured credit law, such as the concept of a unique security interest as enshrined in 
Article 9 UCC could be transplanted in jurisdictions of dissimilar legal cultures such 
as England and France.
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property statute that recognises a system to govern priorities in charges created over 
relevant intellectual property assets, that scheme should apply to deal with priorities
The decision of a creditor to grant a security over an intellectual property asset 
involves significant issues such as risk assessment, asset valuation and transaction 
costs. It is arguable that a dual registration would incur substantial costs for 
financiers. In relation to the implementation o f a notice filing system, it is 
questionable whether it would in practice effectively reduce the costs for creditors 
and debtors. It is arguable that financiers would opt for secured transactions in 
intellectual property assets if the costs of filing will not outweigh the advantages 
provided by the grant of a security with its priority for creditors. In effect, without 
the certainty of priority, creditors would increase their interest rates so as to
90Scompensate the risk of losing priority .
In the light of the Law Commission proposal to retain a double registration in 
relation to certain intellectual property assets, it is arguable that it could substantially 
increase the costs for creditors. The question is therefore to determine whether the 
costs of registration are balanced with the risk of losing priority or even with the risk 
of the extinguishment of the security206. Transactions costs can become more 
expensive because of the specificity of the filing process, especially if  there are 
errors in the registration of information or in the process itself207. Thus, the 
characteristic of simplicity of the notice filing system would be undermined in the 
context of intellectual property where a second registration in a specialist register 
would also be required.
From a broader perspective, it is arguable that the adoption o f a notice filing system 
into English law would further lead to some major policy issues. In effect, it is 
arguable that the adoption of an Article 9 type regime and its notice filing system 
would create a monopoly for the owner of a floating charge by entitling him to an
204 Ibid. at Para. 3.235.
205 See Chapter One.
206 Davies, I.R. “The Reform of English Personal Property Security Law: Functionalism and Article 9 
of the Uniform Commercial Code” (2004) 24(3) Legal Studies, at p. 295.
207 Law Commission Consultation Paper No 164, “Registration o f Security Interests: Company 
Charges and Property other than Land” (2002), Paras. 4.215-4.219. See Davies, ibid.
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countries with dissimilar legal cultures or ‘mentalites’ as described in Legrand’s 
theory on legal transplantation371.
The lack o f theories enabling a determination a priori of the feasibility of such legal 
transplantation has led the following developments to adopt a pragmatic analysis of 
its likelihood of success focusing on the potential obstacles that may arise in the 
process. To this end, this study will consider the feasibility of legal transplantation 
of Article 9 UCC in different jurisdictions from different legal cultures such as 
England for an illustration of the Common Law tradition and France for an 
illustration of the Civil Law tradition. The question of the potential exportability of 
Article 9 UCC is important in the present context of legal reform and approximation 
of secured credit laws but, the question of whether Article 9 UCC should be imported 
will also be considered within subsequent developments.
Legal transplantation of Article 9 UCC in England
England introduced a proposal for reform in 2002372 recommending the adoption of a 
uniform and functional regime for its secured credit law regime, including a notice 
filing and a first to file priority systems. The question o f whether an Article 9 type 
regime should be transplanted into English secured credit law has largely been 
debated within the legal doctrine . It has been argued that such a reform would not 
be cost-effective in the sense that current English secured credit law regime would 
already offer similar benefits as the global security enshrined in Article 9 UCC, 
especially with the floating charge374. Conversely, it has been argued that the 
functionalist approach of the unitary security interest together with a notice filing and 
first to file priority rules systems would provide more certainty and predictability 
within secured credit law in England.
371 Legrand op. cit. fn. 258, at p. 52.
372 The Law commission Consultation Paper on Registration o f Security Interests, No 164 (CP 164). 
2002 .
373 See above fn. 294.
374 Calnan explains that: “[t]he Law Commission’s imperative seems to introduce a US-style 
functional system as a wholesale replacement for our current system. On a cost-benefit analysis, this 
seems difficult to justify. The implementation costs will be very large, and it is difficult to see what 
material benefits will result from it” in Calnan op. cit. fn. 295, at p. 92.
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modernisation o f secured credit law regimes should also embrace a broader range of 
assets, particularly in an information age.
The registration of security created in intellectual property assets in France
The development o f intangible property has also recently become another valuable 
source of credit for many businesses in France. Thus, it became essential to also 
address the question of the adequacy of current registration o f security mechanism 
applied in the context of incorporeal property such as intellectual property assets. It 
has been exposed in the above development that the issue has deeply been analysed
91^in England, but also in France where the question was also considered at length .
Intellectual property assets are intangible by nature and are difficult to fit within a 
legal framework that was not primarily designed for them. In effect, it would seem 
anomalous for intellectual property assets to borrow a legal regime designed for the 
creation of securities on corporeal property. Therefore, it became evident that the law 
should provide for a specific coherent regime peculiar to the use of this range of 
assets for security purposes. However, the task is difficult considering the wide scope 
of different intellectual properties which already exist and which are continuing to 
emerge214. It is complex to identify an homogeneous and consistent category of 
intellectual property assets that would ease the creation o f a unique regime. That is 
why the French legislator mainly focused on the creation of special regimes intuitu 
rei, only applicable to certain category of personal property assets. For instance,
215France made provision for the charge created on cinematographic movies and the 
charge created on computer programs licences216. Each piece of legislation includes
213 Lisanti-Kalcynski C., Les Suretes Conventionnelles sur Meubles Incorporels, (These Montpellier, 
2001); Loiseau, G. “Le Nantissement de Films Cinematographiques” (2002) Droit & Patrimoine 
2002, n° 106, at p. 67 ; Gautier, P.Y., Propriete Litteraire et Artistique, (5th ed. 2004); Loiseau, G. 
“Biens Meubles par Determination de la Loi ou Meubles Incorporels” (2005) J.-Cl. Civil 2005, Art. 
527 to 532, Fasc. 20 ; Synvet, H. “Le Nantissement des Meubles Incorporels” (2005) Droit et 
Patrimoine 2005, n° 140, at p. 64; Martial, N., Droit des Suretes Reelles sur Proprietes 
Intellectuelles, (These Paris V. 2005); Stoufflet, J. “Le Nantissement de Meubles Incorporels” (2006) 
JCP G 2006, Supplement au n° 20, etude, at p. 5 ; Lisenti, C. “Quelques Remarques a Propos des 
Suretes sur les Meubles Incorporels dans l ’Ordonnance n°2006-346 du 23 Mars 2006” (2006) D. 
2006, Chron., at p. 2671.
214 Beyond the traditional categories o f intellectual property assets such as copyrights or patents, new 
categories have emerged such as domain names and database. Although, they are intellectual property 
assets, the legislator has established legal different regime for each o f them.
215 Nantissement des films cinematographiques. Loi du 22 Fevrier 1944.
216 Le nantissement du droit d ’exploitation des logiciels. Loi du 10 Mai 1994.
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obstacles that could arise from such a process. For example, such transplant could 
generate some difficulties in relation to the legal receptacle adopted. In effect, the 
secured credit law regime embodied in Article 9 is codified. However, most of the 
regulations on secured credit in England essentially emanates from judicial decision 
making which could prove to be incompatible with the form retained with Article 9 
UCC. The potential difficulty o f transplanting Article 9 UCC as a codified legal rule 
in England will thus be first considered.
One of the main questions raised within the proposal for reform in England was to 
determine whether the functionalist approach and the idea of a unique security 
interest could be compatible with the well entrenched principles governing English 
property law. For example, retention of title clauses are property-based security 
devices which are not recognised under Article 9 UCC. Thus, issues such as the 
question of whether to include and reconceptualise retention of title mechanism 
within this new regime was at stake and will be deeply reviewed within this 
analysis382. Further, the importation of Article 9 UCC and its functional approach 
would also require the reappraisal o f the floating charge. In this respect, this 
development suggests that this security device would already provide the advantages 
of the global security enshrined in Article 9 UCC, which would in turn question the 
success of legal transplantation as legal method for modernisation and law reform.
This section will first consider the difficulties that could arise from importing a legal 
rule in a codified instrument in England. This section will further consider the 
potential obstacles to the legal transplantation of Article 9 that could arise from the 
adoption of the functional approach. To this end, particular emphasis will be given to 
the very specific issue of whether non possessory security, such as retention of title 
clauses, should be included and reconceptualised. Beyond the analysis o f potential 
obstacles related to property rights, emphasis will be given to the impact o f such 
legal transplant on other fundamental security devices such as on the floating charge.
382 See Chapter Four.
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Special dispositions
The reform introduced by the law of 23rd March 2006 only recognises the use of 
intellectual property assets for security purposes but does not provide for a single 
regime regulating the creation of security in this new range of assets. Thus, their 
regulations remain scattered as the legislator failed to provide for a single and 
coherent legal regime for the use of intellectual property assets for security purposes.
The fragmentation of the dispositions relative to intellectual property security is 
source of complexity and uncertainty because current regulations differ from one 
type of intellectual property asset to another. Especially, the lack of one single 
registry for the creation of security in intellectual property has led to significant 
difficulties for the contracting parties and other potential creditors. France made
99 1provision for the security created on cinematographic movies and security created 
over computer programs licences . The former allows a production company to 
obtain finance in order to realise and commercialise a cinematographic movie. The 
security can affect all or part of the intellectual property asset or licences that the
99*5
company has on the movie or on some parts of it, actual or future . The security is 
registered on a public registry within the National Cinematographic Registry. The 
creditor is entitled to a preferential right over other secured and preferential creditors 
and a right to trace the collateral (droit de suite) in the hands o f third parties. Finally, 
the creditor is entitled to a direct right to the benefits made out of the exploitation of 
the movie, up to the value of the debt owed.
The security on licences of computer programs provides for similar formalities than 
the ones required by the former security with a registration made in the National 
Computer Programs Licences Registry. The law remains silent on issues relating to 
the valuation of such licences, especially, in the context o f computer programs, these
220 The applicable legal regime will have to be determined following the type o f intellectual property 
asset in question; i.e. the nature of the intellectual property asset will determine whether a special 
regime is applicable (enacted in the “nantissement des films cinematographiques”, Loi du 22 Fevrier 
1944. or in the “nantissement du droit d ’exploitation des logiciels”, Loi du 10 Mai 1994) or if  the 
general regime applies (Law 23rd March 2006).
221 See above at fn. 215.
222 See above at fn. 216.
223 Piette, G., Droit des Suretes, Suretes Personnelles, Suretes Reelles, (Ed. Gualino, 2006), at pp.
112-113.
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order to assess whether it could constitute a formal obstacle to the legal 
transplantation of Article 9 into English legislations. The French Civil code only 
contains general principles and general concepts rather than exhaustive and detailed 
regulations. The American Uniform Commercial Code does not seem to provide with 
general concepts but with a collection of different and detailed articles, each 
regulating an area o f commercial law384. Also, since most Civilian jurisdictions 
recognise the principle o f 6trios politico ,385, courts cannot make the law, as opposed 
to most Common Law jurisdictions where legal systems are mainly based on judge- 
made law. The adoption of a Civilian model code into Common Law jurisdictions 
could affect judges’ law making power and, in that sense could constitute a formal 
obstacle to the adoption o f commercial law reform in the shape of a code. However, 
under Civilian jurisdictions, judges are not deprived of any influence on the law as it 
will be their task to deduct from the general principles o f the codes the solution to the 
litigation. Naturally, judges will also need to interpret and construe the law, where it 
is necessary, but prior and higher courts decisions will not bind subsequent courts 
judgments and interpretation of the law386.
Consequently, the Uniform Commercial Code does not seem to coincide with the 
traditional definition of a code within Civilian jurisdictions as it mainly materialises 
in a collection of detailed legislations rather than in a single legislation embodying 
commercial law principles. In that sense, the question of the introduction of a 
‘Uniform Commercial Code’ into English law would not seem to constitute a 
significant obstacle to the success of a legal transplantation of the American model. 
Further, it is important to note that England already codified substantial parts of its 
commercial law387 enshrined in different statutory instruments that could easily be 
reassembled under a single legal instrument. The case for an English commercial law
384 The Uniform Commercial Code is divided is 9 articles each dealing with one specific area of  
commercial law. Article 1: General Provisions; Article 2: Sales; Article 2A: Leases; Article 3: 
Negotiable Instruments; Article 4: Bank Deposit; Article 4A: Fund Transfers; Article 5: Letters of 
Credit; Article 6: Bulk Transfers and Bulk Sales; Article 7: Warehouse Receipts, Bill o f Lading and 
other Document o f Title; Article 8: Investment Securities; Article 9: Secured Transactions.
385The principle o f the separation o f powers introduced by Montesquieu means that the State is 
divided into three branches with separate and independent powers; the judicial, legislature and 
executive.
386 Goode op. cit. fn. 383, at p. 136.
387 The Sale o f Goods Act 1979; the Hire Purchase Act 1964; Insolvency Act 1976 or the Companies 
Act 2006, are illustrations of the codification movement in England.
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use the economic value of his assets in normal course of business. The regulation of 
secured credit in respect of intangible property should not prevent the debtor to 
utilise the intellectual property asset. Moreover, a centralised registration system 
should be put into place so that the creditor would be conferred his preferential right 
and right to seize the asset upon the debtor’s insolvency.
The requirement of registration is quite easy to satisfy when the intellectual property 
asset is already subject to a registration requirement in a special registry. The 
registration of the security over intellectual property assets will be made in the same 
special registry. This is the case for patents, trademarks and, industrial drawings and 
designs which are all registered at the National Institute for Industrial Property . In 
respect of copyright and other intellectual property rights, there are not any 
registration requirements except where the law has enacted specific regulations such 
as for cinematographic movies227 or computer programs228.
Finally, if some intellectual property rights mentioned above are used for security 
purposes as part of the security created on business parts, a registration to the 
Commercial Tribunal will be also required. Although a registration procedure is 
provided for almost all intellectual property assets, there is not any centralised 
information that would contribute to the rationalisation and simplification of the law. 
Furthermore, it has to be highlighted that some intellectual property rights such as 
copyrights, are still unregulated for the purpose of creating a security. The reform 
introduced by the Law of 23rd March 2006 provides some guidance for all remaining 
unregulated intellectual property assets used as collateral and, provides that the 
regulations of the non possessory gage will be applicable in these instances.
General regime
Certain intellectual property assets have not been the subject o f any regulations if 
they are used for security purposes. Before the reform introduced by the law of 23rd 
March 2006, the possessory ‘gage’ was inadequate to regulate the use of intellectual 
property assets for security purposes. In effect, this 'gage' required a dispossession
226 Institut National de la Propriete Industrielle (INPI), http://www.inpi.fr/(last checked 26/04/2010).
227 National Cinematographic Registry (Registre public de la cinematographie et de I ’audiovisuel).
228 National Computer Programs Licences Registry (.Registre National Special des Logiciels).
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found in Welsh Development Agency v. Export Finance Co. Ltd. 391 where Dillon L.J. 
stated that:
“[i]n determining the legal categorization of an agreement the Court looks at the 
substance o f the transaction and not at the labels which the parties have chosen to put 
on them.”
The approach retained in England thus shows great divergence with the American 
functional approach. Under Article 9 UCC, the same rules apply to any transactions 
which intend to create a security interest. Article §9-102(1) (a) provides that:
“[e]xcept as otherwise provided in Section 9-104 on excluded transactions, this 
Article applies to any transaction (regardless of its form) which is intended to create 
a security interest in personal property or fixtures .. .”392
As a result, the question emerged of whether the adoption of the functional approach 
would constitute a formal obstacle to the legal transplantation o f Article 9 UCC into 
English law. Functionalism purports that all security interests serve an identical 
function, thus avoiding difficult issues and uncertainties posed by the current English 
formal and substantial approach, such as the ostensible ownership difficulty created 
by non possessory security interests393. However, the legal transplantation o f Article 
9 with its functional approach into English law could lead to substantial difficulties. 
It is arguable that the adoption o f the functional approach would involve significant 
transformation o f the baseline concepts of English commercial law, especially with 
respect to those enshrined in property law.
Inherent to the functional approach is the rejection of the concept o f title within the 
American secured credit law regime. The architects of Article 9 UCC did not retain 
the concept o f title and analysed it as being inefficient and too theoretical to fit 
within their secured credit law regime394. Therefore, the functional approach would 
impose an extensive simplification of security law regimes as it would not retain the 
fundamental distinction between property rights and priority rights which represent
391 [1992] BCC 270.
392 Bridge op. cit. fn. 182, at p. 197.
393 On the functionalist approach retained in Article 9, see Davies, “The Reform o f English Personal 
Property Security Law: Functionalism and Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code” op. cit. fn. 
294, at p. 295.
394 Llewellyn, K. “ Through Title to Contract and a Bit Beyond” (1938) 15 New York University Law 
Quarterly, at p. 159
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the Commercial Court where the debtor’s business is registered. The success of 
taking securities in intellectual property assets which are not the object o f a special 
regime will depend upon the trust people will have in this new regime. For now, it 
can only be regretted that the legislator did not take the opportunity to centralise all 
the different registers. This scattered registration systems certainly does not provide 
for certainty and security. A notice filing system inspired from Article 9 of the UCC 
would simplify and would provide more certainty to the actual regime. Nonetheless, 
and as it has been concluded with respect to the proposal for reform in England, a 
modernisation of the law modelled on the notice filing system becomes questionable 
in relation to the use o f intellectual property assets for security purposes. In effect, it 
has already been argued that a modernisation modelled on Article 9 UCC is not 
entirely satisfactory in an intellectual property context, particularly in respect of the 
registration requirements.
The nature of personal property has substantially evolved in recent years. The 
emergence of new class of assets such as intellectual property assets created new 
credit opportunities for businesses that the law cannot ignore any longer. In effect, it 
has to be concluded that a modem secured credit law regimes should embrace new 
categories of asset in a knowledge economy context. This comparative law analysis 
on the different registration mechanisms to validate and enforce security rights 
created in intellectual property assets demonstrated that in the light of the objectives 
of a modem legislation o f secured credit, substantial reform is currently needed. The 
need for secured credit laws to modernise by integrating new class of assets to their 
regimes has recently been confirmed by UNCITRAL which recently established a 
draft on secured transactions dealing with security rights in intellectual property .
Although a modernisation of the law is manifestly required in respect of the use of 
intellectual property assets used for security purposes, a reform modelled on Article 
9 UCC becomes questionable following the analysis of the American regime, in the
235 See above the paragraph on the registration mechanisms for security interests in intellectual 
property assets in the United States, from p. 52.
236 “Draft Supplement to the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Secured Transactions dealing with 
security rights in intellectual property” available at:
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/commission/working_groups/6Security_Interests.html (last
checked 26/04/2010).
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and should be subject to registration as they evidently perform the purpose of a
397security . It is argued that it would noticeably clarify the current legal position 
regarding retention o f title clauses in England. In effect, there have been some 
uncertainties and inconsistencies within the legal regime applicable to retention of 
title clauses that would need to be clarified within appropriate commercial law 
reform398.
Since the famous Romalpa399 case, the use of retention of title clauses has been 
prolific in commercial transactions. In effect, sellers are free to introduce retention of 
title clauses in the terms o f their contracts following the freedom of contract 
principle. Such a mechanism is allowed and regulated by Sections 17 and 19 of the 
Sale of Goods Act. According to Section 17, the property passes when the parties 
show the clear intention to do so. Section 19 provides that the seller can “... reserve 
the right o f disposal o f the goods until certain conditions are fulfilled ... 
notwithstanding the delivery o f the goods to the buyer ... the property in the goods 
does not pass to the buyer until the conditions imposed by the seller are fulfilled.” 
Therefore, the seller remains the owner of the goods and will be entitled to claim 
them back if  the buyer defaults. The legal transplantation of Article 9 UCC into 
English law would significantly reform these sections and, more generally, modify 
the Sale o f Goods Act 1979 which could ultimately lead to significant legal 
disturbances for commercial transactions.
Under retention o f title, the seller never transferred ownership. Upon the debtor’s 
default, the seller does not regain ownership but simply regains possession of the 
goods. If  the seller transfers ownership to the buyer, the security will be qualified as 
a charge, void if  not registered according to the Companies Act 2006400. It is indeed 
primordial for a creditor to register charges in order to be enforceable. A simple 
retention of title clause provides that ownership in the goods will not pass until the 
full purchase price is paid by the buyer. The clause will be qualified as an ‘all monies 
clause’ when title in the goods does not pass until all debts owed to the seller are
397 Law Commission Consultation Paper No. 164, at Para. 7.24.
398 For an analysis o f the regulation o f retention of title clauses in Europe, see Davies, I. R., Retention 
o f  Title Clauses in Sale o f  Goods Contracts in Europe, (1999).
399 Aluminium Industry Vaassen BVv. Romalpa Aluminium Ltd. [1976] 1 W LR676.
400 Companies Act 2006, ss. 860, 861 and 874.
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expose some of the main features of the Cape Town Convention as an illustration of 
a significant endeavour towards the modernisation and approximation of secured 
credit law regimes. Recent legislative activities at the international level have 
particularly confirmed the emergence of a growing consensus on the need to 
modernise secured credit law regimes in the light of an approximation of law. The 
next section will further consider the justifications that have forged this consensus on 
the approximation of secured credit law regimes. If the modernisation of secured 
credit law regime should be achieved in the light of an approximation of law, the 
final section will further introduce the question of whether such modernisation o f the 
law could successfully be achieved using approximation of law methods. At this 
stage, the analysis will only provide for some conceptual definitions of the 
approximation of law methods, which will, then be assessed in depth within 
subsequent chapters.
The Cape Town Convention
A modernisation of secured credit law regimes is not solely required because of the 
emergence of new class of assets but is also required because of a growing 
internationalisation of secured transaction practices. In effect, recent years have 
witnessed a significant growth in cross-border transactions which have generated an 
internationalisation o f secured transaction practices. In this respect, the creation o f a 
security at the international level can create uncertainties towards its validity and 
enforcement. An illustration o f these difficulties can be found with the creation of 
security in mobile equipments such as aircraft equipments, space assets or railway 
rolling stocks. The specificity of such assets is embodied in the fact that they are 
movable assets that are likely to move national boundaries and, therefore, be subject 
to different national legislations if used for credit purposes. Because o f the very 
nature of such assets, the issue concerned the recognition and enforcement in one 
state of a security interest created under the law of another state237.
237 Cuming, R.C.C. “Hot Issues in the Development o f the (Draft) Convention on International 
Interests in Mobile Equipment and the (Draft) Aircraft Equipment Protocol” (2000) 34 International 
Lawyer, at p. 1089.
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The position adopted under Article 9 UCC with the purchase money security 
interest409 therefore appeared tempting and convincing. The Law Commission 
suggested that retention o f title clauses should be treated as a security and should be 
included within the proposed regime for the adoption of a unique security device410. 
However, the recommendation of the Law Commission to introduce retention of title 
to the global security interest regime would impose registration, a notice filing 
requirement that has led to some controversies. The first part of this examination on 
retention of title clauses will thus consider whether the American purchase money 
security interest should and could be imported in England. The second part o f this 
examination on retention o f title clauses will consider the obstacles that could arise 
from the importation of the notice filing system.
The purchase money security interest
Article 9 UCC opts for a different approach to retention of title mechanism. In effect, 
the architects o f Article 9 did not believe that retention of title clauses could fall 
within the functional and unitary concept of the security interest and agreed that it 
was necessary to reconceptualise this mechanism411. They opted for the purchase 
money security interest that allows the seller to reserve a security interest rather than 
reserving title in the goods. In other words, the seller looses ownership o f the goods 
and is entitled to reserve a security interest instead. It is arguable that the legal 
transplantation of Article 9 with the purchase money security interest could 
substantially strengthen the position of the seller. Under Article 9, the seller with a 
properly registered purchase money security interest is entitled to a super priority 
over prior secured creditors and is also entitled to claim the proceeds o f resale412 and 
the manufactured goods413 which is not the legal position under the current English 
law. The Law Commission suggested that the purchase money security interest
409 Article §9-107 UCC provides that “[a] security interest is a “Purchase Money Security Interest” to 
the extent that it is (a) taken or retained by the seller of the collateral to secure all or part o f its price; 
or (b) taken by a person who by making advances or incurring an obligation gives value to enable the 
debtor to acquire rights in or the use o f collateral if such value in fact so used.”
410 Law Commission Consultation Paper No. 164, at Para. 7.24.
411 See McCormack, “Personal Property Law Reform in England and Canada” op. cit. fn. 294, at p. 
124.
412 Article §9-306 UCC.
413 Article §9-314 and §9-315 UCC.
122
some jurisdictions do not have any registration scheme available for filing within
243their secured credit law regimes. In order to deal with this issue, §9-307(c) UCC 
provides some guidelines on how to file security interests abroad244. An ‘equivalence 
test’ should be applied to foreign security law regimes which would check the 
availability o f a registration or filing system, priority requirements and the 
availability of information to searchers245. However, many European jurisdictions 
would not satisfy the equivalence test because most o f them do not provide a 
comprehensive registration scheme. For instance, England does not require 
registering simple retention of title clause. Similarly, France does not require the 
registration of any retention of title clauses246.
In reality, it appears that most Civilian and even Common Law jurisdictions would 
not have any comprehensive registration or filing system, especially in relation to 
property-based securities such as retention of title clauses. Thus, Article 9 UCC 
considered this possibility and also provides that if  the equivalence test is not met, 
§9-307(c) UCC deems the location o f the debtor in the District of Columbia. It is to 
be observed that the test established under §9-307(c) UCC can be difficult to satisfy 
and would involve substantial costs for the contracting parties who will have to 
search and examine the availability and the nature of foreign registration systems.
Non-U.S. Debtors: Applying U.C.C. § 9-307(c) [Rev] to Foreign Filing, Recording, and Registration 
Systems” (2006) 39(2) Uniform Commercial Code Law Journal, at p. 109.
242 Rosenberg explains that “[f]our reasons motivated the Study Committee to recommend this rule. 
First, intangible collateral has no location. A location-of-collateral rule would require a provision 
fixing a fictional location for intangibles. Second, collateral may be located in many jurisdictions, 
whereas each debtor has only one location (or perhaps one or two other candidates for its location). As 
a consequence, a debtor’s-location rule would likely result in fewer filings, thereby lowering the cost 
of credit. Third, a debtor’s-location rule probably would not need special provisions governing 
collateral in transit. Finally, because debtors are unlikely to change locations as frequently as does 
collateral, a debtor-based rule would likely reduce the costs o f  maintaining perfected status and the 
frequency with which certain difficult priority issues arise.” Rosenberg Ibid. at pp. 122-123.
243 §9-307 (c) provides that: “[limitation o f applicability o f subsection (b). Subsection (b) applies 
only if a debtor's residence, place o f business, or chief executive office, as applicable, is located in a 
jurisdiction whose law generally requires information concerning the existence o f a non possessory 
security interest to be made generally available in a filing, recording, or registration system as a 
condition or result o f the security interest's obtaining priority over the rights of a lien creditor with 
respect to the collateral. If subsection (b) does not apply, the debtor is located in the District o f  
Columbia.”
244 Rosenberg op.cit. fn. 241, at p. 109.
245 Ibid.
246 The law of 10th June 1994 introduced an optional publicity mechanism o f the contract o f sale 
affected by a retention o f title clause. If the creditor decides to publish the retention o f title clause, he 
will not need to introduce an ‘action en revendication’ but, an '‘action en restitution’. If the retention 
of title is published, article 2276 C.Civ cannot be invoked by the second time buyer.
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In addition, it has been argued that the purchase money security interest and its super 
priority would be economically efficient as it would allow the debtor to purchase 
further assets and, thus, significantly increase the pool of assets available for 
creditors419. However, this argument developed in favour of the American model can 
be objected. In effect, it allows the purchase of further assets which will eventually 
increase the general pool of assets of the debtor but, these new purchased assets, 
especially in relation to inventory, will only be available to the purchase money 
financier upon the debtor’s insolvency and, not to the general mass of other 
creditors420. Yet, the extension o f credit allowed by the purchase money security 
interest could boost the debtor’s economic situation, which would benefit primary 
financiers and avoid the business to engage on the path to insolvency. This would 
particularly be the case where the buyer makes the decision to purchase capital 
equipments, which use, will allow the debtor to swell his pool o f assets in different 
ways421.
A fundamental objection developed against the purchase money security interest 
relates to the justification of the super priority offered to the creditor. In effect, as 
Bridge highlighted:
“[t]he last passengers to board the Titanic did not get the first seats in the 
lifeboats.”422
How can the super priority offered to purchase money security lenders be justified? 
As mentioned above, it has been advanced that the purchase money security interest 
would permit the grant of an extension of credit for debtors that would not be 
possible without the existence o f such super priority. From a policy perspective, it 
would seem reasonable to recognise that a creditor, who increases the debtor’s pool 
o f assets by offering further credit facilities, should be entitled to a super priority 
over the specific asset he contributed to finance. However, non purchase money
423security lenders such as unvoluntarily creditors, as designated by Lopucki , also 
provide the debtor with credits and do not currently enjoy a super priority similar to
419 Gullifer op. cit. fn. 269.
420 It is arguable that the operation is neutral in effect.
421. Gullifer op. cit. fn. 269.
422 Bridge op. cit. fn. 182, at p. 205.
423 LoPucki, op. cit. fn. 4, at p. 1887.
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registry253that ensures the protection of creditors’ priority against subsequent 
registered security interests. Finally, the Convention provides for prompt and 
effective remedies for creditors upon the debtor’s default254 that will undoubtedly 
enhance and promote more certainty and security within the creation o f international 
security interests in mobile equipments. The creation of such an international 
instrument was fundamental to support modem commercial transactions. By 
providing a unique mechanism for the creation and enforcement o f an international 
security interest in high value mobile equipment, creditors are guaranteed more 
certainty and efficiency within their international transactions. The introduction of 
this international regime does not solely represent an illustration in support of the 
need to modernise secured credit law regimes; it is also an illustration of the 
phenomenon of modernisation through approximation of laws.
With the growth of cross-border transactions and the emergence of new market 
economies, legal reformers have been confronted to new challenges. Especially, the 
modernisation of secured credit law has been accompanied with the aim to move 
towards an approximation of secured credit law regimes. As the analysis above 
suggested, the move towards more uniformity in the law has recently become a 
major concern for the international commercial community and law reformers. The 
Cape Town Convention provides an essential international framework for 
international security in high value mobile equipments. Further international 
initiatives have also taken place aiming at the approximation o f secured credit law 
regimes. Initiatives such as the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Secured
253 See Chapter IV, article 16 o f the Cape Town Convention which provides that: “[a]n international 
registry shall be established for registration of: (a) international interests, prospective interests and 
registrable non-consensual rights and interests; (b) assignments and prospective assignments of  
international interests; (c) acquisitions of international interests by legal or contractual subrogations 
under the applicable law; (d) notices o f national interests; and (e) subordinations o f interests referred 
to in any o f the preceding sub-paragraphs.” See above at fn. 103.
254 Article 8 of the Cape Town Convention provides that “[i]n the event o f default as provided in 
Article 11, the chargee may, to the extent that the charger has at any time so agreed and subject to any 
declaration that may be made by a Contracting State under Article 54, exercise any one or more o f the 
following remedies: (a) take possession or control o f any object charged to it; (b) sell or grant a lease 
of any such object; (c) collect or receive any income or profits arising from the management or use of 
any such object.” It further provides that: “[t]he chargee may alternatively apply for a court order 
authorising or directing any o f the acts referred to in the preceding paragraph. 3. Any remedy set out 
in sub-paragraph (a), (b) or (c) or paragraph 1 or by Article 13 shall be exercised in a commercially 
reasonable manner. A remedy shall be deemed to be exercised in a commercially reasonable manner 
where it is exercised in conformity with a provision of the security agreement except where such a 
provision is manifestly unreasonable.”See above at fn. 103.
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filing system. Such registration could also pose substantial burdensome and 
impractical obligations for creditors and debtors.
Notice filing
Article 9 of the UCC distinguishes between the enforcement o f the security interest
4 9 7as between the debtor and creditor through the process of attachment and the 
enforcement o f the security as against third parties through the process of 
perfection428 where the security is registered. Although, the Code still provides for a 
mode o f perfection through the debtor’s dispossession, the notice filing is the 
recognised system under Article 9 in order to perfect security interests429. A 
financing statement has to be filed in a public centralised registry430 and only needs 
to provide for a small amount of information431.
The recommendations o f the Law Commission, suggesting the introduction of 
retention of title mechanism to the global security interest regime, would impose 
registration, a notice filing requirement on all types of retention of title mechanisms 
including simple and current account clauses. It is arguable that this requirement 
would weaken the position o f the seller as he would now need to conform to the 
notice filing requirement in relation to simple and current account clauses which is 
not the case under the current English law regime432. It is important to understand 
that what currently makes the retention of title mechanism attractive within most 
European legal regimes is especially this lack o f registration requirement. In effect, 
this formality is often seen as time and money consuming for sellers who only wish 
to pursue their business transactions as fast and as securely as possible.
427 §9-203(Part 2) UCC.
428§9-302 and §9- 401 to §9- 408 UCC (Part 4 on Filing).
429 See Chapter Two at pp. 51-55.
430 §9-401 UCC
431 Article §9-402 (1) UCC provides that “[a] financing statement is sufficient if  it gives the names of  
the debtor and the secured party, is signed by the debtor, gives an address o f the secured party from 
which information concerning the security interest may be obtained, gives a mailing address o f the 
debtor and contains a statement indicating the types, or describing the items, o f collateral.”
432 McCormack, ““Quasi Securities” and the Law Commission Consultation Paper on Security 
Interests -  A Brave New World” op. cit. fn. 294, at p. 80.
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aspiration to approximate secured credit law regimes . At one end of the spectrum, 
sceptical theorists see in the approximation of law process a form of disguised 
protectionism and national hegemony, and at the other end o f the spectrum, legal 
theorists encourage the achievement of an approximation of commercial laws 
because it would substantially reduce the costs of cross-border transactions and 
provide more certainty and clarity in the applicable law for the international business 
community as a whole259.Thus, it will be necessary to consider some of the 
arguments that have been advanced in favour of an approximation o f laws, and some 
of the arguments drawn against an approximation of commercial laws.
It is arguable that an approximation of commercial laws should be achieved so as to 
reduce transaction costs and increase legal certainty for the contracting parties. As 
Fox already highlighted:
“[disharmonies of law and procedures are costly and bothersome. As the world 
becomes increasingly interdependent the costs o f different rules of law and different 
procedures that apply to the same transaction mount. People begin to wish for 
harmonization in order to tidy up a messy world; they wish everyone would adopt 
the “ideal” standard, which is the one they like the best.”260
The ‘ideal’ standard that has often been recognised by the international community 
for the modernisation and approximation of secured credit law regimes is the 
American Article 9 of the UCC. It has been argued, on many occasions, that an 
approximation of secured credit law regimes in lines with the American regime 
would lead to more efficiency in the law261. However, the attainment of such an 
‘ideal’ has been accompanied with delicate issues concretised, for example, in the 
existing divergences amongst cultural legal traditions that would render
258 See for instance Boodman, M. “The Myth o f Harmonisation o f Laws” (1992) 39 The American 
Journal o f  Comparative Law, at p. 43; Legrand, P. “European Legal Systems are not Converging” 
(1996) 45 International Commercial Law Quarterly, at p. 52; Stephan, P.B. “The Futility of 
Unification and Harmonization in International Commercial Law” (1999) 39 Virginia Journal o f  
International Law, at p. 743 and Walt, S. “Novelty and the Risks of Uniform Sales Law” (1999) 39 
Virginia Journal o f  International Law, at p. 671.
259 Leebron, D.W. “Claims for Harmonization: A Theoretical Framework” (1996) 27 Canadian 
Business Law Journal, at p. 64.
260 Fox, E.M. “Harmonization o f Law and Procedures in a Globalized World: Why, What, and How?” 
(1991-1992) 60 Antitrust Law Journal, at p. 593.
261 Walt argued that: “[cjomparativists and law reformers tend to think that uniformity in international 
commercial law is a good thing. To them, a single set o f applicable rules is considered to be a 
worthwhile goal. One reason is that uniform rules promote efficiency. [...] However, uniformity is a 
mixed blessing and not an unqualified good.” Walt op. cit. fn. 258, at p. 671.
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Notwithstanding this potential increase in formalities for creditors, it is important to 
highlight that Article 9 attempts to keep the formal requirements to a minimum 
where possible. In the U.S., a seller can obtain a purchase money security interest in 
the goods themselves, in the proceeds and manufactured goods by simply filing a 
financing statement that will be valid for five years438. The same financing statement 
can cover several sales during the five years period so that the creditor does not have 
to register each contract of sale separately439. Further, the Uniform Commercial Code 
provides an exception to the registration requirement in relation to consumer goods. 
In effect, the Uniform Commercial Code concedes that purchase money security 
interests created on consumer goods should not be affected by the requirement of 
registration. Article §9-309(1) provides that a purchase money security interest in 
consumer goods is perfected solely upon attachment. Suppliers of consumer goods 
thus enjoy an automatic perfection. Considering the wide use of retention of title 
mechanisms within the commercial community, it can be argued that the imposition 
of such registration formality to simple retention of title clause could still be seen as 
burdensome in respect of certain types of assets such as, for example, materials 
supplied to a company440. Finally, it is important to highlight that in England, 
practitioners and the finance industry have shown some great hostility to the proposal 
of subjecting retention of title mechanisms to the notice filing441. Although one can 
identify strong arguments in favour of a notice filing system with respect to property- 
based security devices, the importation of such a scheme within English system 
could create significant obstacles to a successful legal transplantation of an Article 9 
type442.
438 Article § 9-403 UCC provides: “[w]hat Constitutes Filing; Duration of Filing; Effect o f Lapsed 
Filing; Duties o f Filing Officer. (2) Except as provided in subsection (6) a filed financing statement is 
effective for a period o f five years from the date o f filing. The effectiveness o f a filed financing 
statement lapses on the expiration o f the five year period unless a continuation statement is filed prior 
to the lapse. If a security interest perfected by filing exists at the time insolvency proceedings are 
commenced by or against the debtor, the security interest remains perfected until termination o f the 
insolvency proceedings and thereafter for a period o f sixty days or until expiration of the five year 
period, whichever occurs later. Upon lapse the security interest becomes unperfected, unless it is 
perfected without filing. If the security interest becomes unperfected upon lapse, it is deemed to have 
been unperfected as against a person who became a purchaser or lien creditor before lapse.”
439 McCormack, G., Registration o f  Company charges, (1994), at p. 159.
440 The Law Commission Consultative Report on Company Security Interests, N° 296, at Para 1.62.
441 Ibid. at Para. 1.61.
442 The question has been extensively debated in the symposium on Notice filing, in a symposium 
published in the Minesota Law Review (1995).
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negotiations, drafting and enforcing commercial contracts, translation costs, search 
and information costs265. One crucial aspect of the transaction for traders is to find 
the best legal system that will provide them with security, certainty at cheaper cost. It 
is arguable that the implementation of modem and more uniform secured credit law 
regimes would reduce the costs of credit at domestic and international level.
It is further explained that within the ‘jurisdictional interface’, difficult interaction 
and communication would occur between commercial participants in the absence of 
an approximation of laws266. An approximation of laws would enable the commercial 
community to communicate and interact with reference to the same legal language at 
the international level. Of course, conflict of law rules already help in providing 
more certainties for traders at the international level in the way they can now 
ascertain the applicable law. However, previous developments demonstrated that the 
reference to the lex situs in the context of secured transactions is not always 
adequate. Further, the conflict of law rules does not eliminate all the costs. Creditors 
are not guaranteed that their security will be valid and enforceable within the national 
applicable law. Thus, contractual parties will generally spend substantial time and 
money in translation work and in searching and analysing the commercial law of a 
particular foreign jurisdiction if it appears to be the applicable law to the case. Thus, 
an approximation of secured credit law regimes would reduce these costs imposed on 
contracting parties and would provide more certainty with respect to the applicable 
law.
Approximation of laws has not solely been justified based on a costs-benefits 
rationale; it has also been justified because of the values it would ascertain such as 
fairness and transparency within international transactions267. In effect, it is often 
contended that different legal rules could lead to the production of unfair results
'J f .Q
towards certain participants . In the field of secured credit law regimes, this
265 Schmidtchen, D., Et al. “Conflict o f Law Rules and International Trade, A Transaction Costs 
Approach” (2004) Discussion Paper published by the Center for the Study of Law and Economics, 
available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=545763 (last checked 26/04/2010).
266 Leebron explains that: “[o]ne of the most important function o f harmonization is to enable 
participants or systems from different jurisdictions to interact or communicate” Leebron op. cit. fn. 
259, at p. 75.
267 Ibid. at pp. 84- 89.
268 Ibid. at p. 84.
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seem that the sub-buyer would not be able to claim the protection instituted under 
Section 25 SGA as he would not longer be able to prove his good faith. This would 
obviously depend on whether such registration would provide constructive notice of 
the existence o f the encumbered asset to the purchaser.
The question o f the potential legal transplantation of Article 9 UCC into English law 
is fundamental in the present context of commercial law reform. However, the above 
analysis showed that the importance of ownership and title within English secured 
credit law regime may constitute a major obstacle to the successful legal 
transplantation o f Article 9. Although the functional approach regulating a global 
security interest would provide more certainty and would avoid many difficulties, 
such an approach would substantially shake the fundamental baseline property law 
concepts well entrenched in England. Furthermore, it is important to bear in mind 
that such a reform would generate substantial costs that need to be outweighed with 
the gains of adopting an Article 9 type regime. Beyond, these delicate issues related 
to property law, it would appear that the real obstacle to the implementation of an 
Article 9 type regime would lie with the fundamental issue of the floating charge.
Previous developments on retention of title are fundamental to the debate on the 
transferability o f Article 9 UCC into English secured credit law. However, retention 
of title mechanisms are property-based securities and are confined to the sale o f 
goods contracts. Beyond the conflict existing between the adoption of a functionalist 
approach with the unitary security interest and the preservation of property rights and 
ownership within secured credit law regimes, one can identify substantial difficulties 
with regards to certain security devices, such as the well-known technique of the 
floating charge. It is arguable that the floating charge, as global security, would 
already offer a similar mechanism than the one instituted under Article 9 UCC.
This argument would substantially undermine the success of the legal transplantation 
of Article 9 UCC as legal method to modernise secured credit law in England. If  the 
legal transplantation o f Article 9 may not be successful as legal method to modernise 
English secured credit law, particularly in light of the analysis of the treatment o f the 
floating charge, it is submitted that the implementation of such a regime may prove
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importantly feasible in a context of law reforms272. There is always the risk, linked to 
the recognition of a single legal rule to be applied at the international level, that 
uniformity might increase the production of inefficient rules which could ultimately 
swell the costs imposed on contracting parties273. Especially, the question of the 
efficiency of the law as international standards comes to light. The risk being that an 
approximation of secured credit law regimes, following a unique model, could 
ultimately produce inefficiencies within the law. Secondly, the recognition of 
uniform rules could still lead to substantial divergences following divergences in 
their implementation and interpretation within national laws, thus leaving the 
establishment of uniform rules unproductive and fruitless. These difficulties will be 
extensively exposed throughout subsequent analysis. Finally, it can be advanced that 
even if a nation was to implement the new uniform law conformably, commercial 
participants, lacking information and familiarity with the new law, could be deterred 
from applying it which could, again lead to inefficiencies in the adoption of a 
uniform legal rule274. This is, o f course, a possible difficulty that could be 
experienced by model laws or legislative guides at the international level which run 
the risk of remaining dead letter if  they were lacking national adherence. The 
question of the use of international conventions, model laws, and other legal 
unification instruments, as legal method to modernise secured credit law regimes will 
be considered at greater length in Chapter Five.
In light o f these potential difficulties, it has been argued that a competition of legal 
regimes would be more advantageous for contracting parties than uniform laws as it
s y n c
would enable them to opt for the most suitable law to govern their contract . These 
arguments identified against the achievement of an approximation of laws only 
constitute a sample of objections that mainly emanate from a minority. As David 
already highlighted:
“[f]rom the standpoint of legal practice, some international unification of law bearing 
on the rules of conflict of laws or on rules of substantive law applicable to 
international legal relations is ... desirable. This is universally recognized today, and
272 See on this point Stephan op. cit. fn. 258; Leebron, D.W. “Lying Down with Procrustes: An 
Analyis of Harmonization Claims” 27 Canadian Business Law Journal, at p. 63 and Boodman op. cit. 
fn. 258.
273 Walt op. cit. fn. 258, at p. 672.
274 Walt op.cit. fn. 258, at p. 673.
275 Ibid.
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"I certainly think that if  a charge has the three characteristics that I am about to 
mention it is a floating charge. (1) If it is a charge on a class of assets o f a company 
present and future; (2) if  that class is one which, in the ordinary course of the 
business o f the company, would be changing from time to time; and (3) if  you find 
that by the charge it is contemplated that, until some further step is taken by or on 
behalf o f those interested in the charge, the company may carry on its business in the 
ordinary way as far as concerns the particular class of assets I am dealing with."450
Accordingly, under English law, it is possible for a creditor to obtain a global 
security over a companies’ fund o f assets, including present and future assets. The 
great advantage o f the floating charge is that it allows a company to provide its 
creditor with a security and to continue to deal with the charged assets in the course 
of business without the lender’s consent and until crystallisation which 
predominantly happens when a receiver or liquidator is appointed 45 \  This includes 
selling the charged assets to third parties without encumbered legal title and, granting 
subsequent fixed charges which will rank ahead of the initial floating charge452.
The characterisation o f the floating charge is not always straightforward and has 
consequently been the subject of much court consideration over the years. 
Particularly, the question emerged whether a security created over present and future 
book debts paid into a company’s current account with a bank was a fixed or a 
floating charge. In Westminster pic  v. Spectrum Plus Limited & Ors453, the House of 
Lords decided that such a security had to be floating because the bank did not have 
enough control over the account to completely block it which, if  it did, would have 
enable the creation of a fixed charge. The House of Lords explained that the decisive 
criterion for the characterisation o f a charge as being floating was thus the freedom 
of the chargor to use the charged assets which included, under the circumstances of 
the case, the proceeds of the debts and the debts themselves. By allowing the debtor 
to freely deal with the charged assets, the charge had to be qualified as a floating
450 Yorkshire Woolcombers Association [1903] 2Ch 284, at 295.
451 Crystallisation can also occur upon ‘ceasing to do business’, ‘enforcing the security’ or upon the 
occurrence o f a particular event agreed in a clause (automatic crystallisation). See Wood op. cit. fn. 
447, at p. 204.
452 Wheatley v. Silkstone andHaigh Moor Coal Co (1885) 29 Ch D 715.
453 [2005] UKHL 41.
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Methodological challenges
With the international proliferation of legal relations, the achievement o f an 
approximation of laws is at the heart of legal activities at the national and 
international level, particularly in the field of secured credit law regimes. It has been 
evidenced in the analysis above that the modernisation o f secured transactions law 
regimes has become necessary following the emergence o f new commercial needs. It 
is further supported that such modernisation should occur in the light of an 
approximation of secured credit law regimes. This willingness to operate an 
approximation of laws is not a new phenomenon in our legal history. The Romans 
already aimed to create such ius commune and succeeded in their quest to establish 
this single harmonised body of laws. In effect, this ius commune, which now 
constitutes the legal heritage of most Civilian jurisdictions, was taught amongst all 
European universities enabling lawyers to talk an identical language of law and, 
therefore, facilitating international legal exchanges . Following the recognition that 
secured credit law regimes should be reformed in the light o f an approximation of 
laws, the question emerged whether approximation of law methods could be used to 
modernise secured credit law regimes. Accordingly, the subsequent chapters will 
essentially aim at determining how and to what extent the modernisation of the law 
of secured credit could be successful using approximation o f law methods.
The conceptual discussion in this section develops a methodological structure that 
will guide the thesis into the analysis of legal reforms through approximation of law 
methods. The idea of an approximation of laws can encompass a wide range of 
different techniques and methods that aim to achieve different degree of 
approximation of laws. Each approximation of law method will be assessed in order 
to determine whether a successful modernisation of secured credit law regimes could 
be, if at all, reached. Before considering each of these methods in depth, it is 
necessary to identify and briefly define them.
Approximation of law methods can be divided in three main categories which are 
legal transplantation, legal harmonisation and legal unification. First, legal reformers
278 David op. cit. fn. 276, at p. 13.
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pursuing Section 860 of the Companies Act 2006. The Court then considered 
whether this security was floating or fixed. It was reaffirmed that:
"... the essential element in determining the difference between a fixed and a floating 
charge is the chargor’s ability without the chargee’s consent to control and manage 
the charged assets. That ability is present in this case.”458
Thus, it was concluded that the trust created for the purpose of security had to be 
characterised as being a floating charge which was, under the circumstances o f the 
case, void for lack o f registration.
This case is also interesting in the way that it may suggest a way to avoid the 
compliance with certain formalities requirements if  the charge in question could 
qualify as a financial collateral arrangement which, according to the Financial 
Collateral Arrangements Regulations 2003, exempts the arrangement from the 
registration requirements459 under the Companies Act 2006. The Regulations enable 
the creation o f a security over financial collateral which can include cash460 and 
financial instruments461. The security can include a floating charge but in order to 
qualify as a security financial collateral arrangement, the collateral must be “... in the 
possession or under the control of the collateral-taker or a person acting on his 
behalf.”462The question raised in the Gray case was thus to determine whether the 
account in question was in the possession or control of the collateral-taker (G-T-P) 
within the meaning o f the Regulations.
Difficulties arose as to the definitions of “possession” and “control” as these 
remained undefined in the Regulations. However, the Court considered that “control” 
had to refer to “real legal control” rather than “administrative control”. Accordingly, 
it has been clarified that “... the collateral taker must be able to prevent the collateral 
provider from using or dissipating the assets in the ordinary course o f business.”463 In
458 See Para 31 [2005] [2010] EWHC 1772.
459 See Para 4(4) o f  the Regulations.
460 See Article 2(1) (d) Financial Collateral arrangements Directive 2002. For e.g. cash includes 
monies credited to an account.
461 See Article 2(1) (e) “financial instruments" would include shares bonds and other forms o f debt 
instruments and any other securities.
462 See Para 3 o f the Regulations.
463 See Para 54 [2010] EWHC 1772
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Different methods for reaching an approximation of secured credit law regimes have 
been identified in this section. Thus, it will now be fundamental to test these methods 
in order to determine whether they could successfully be used as legal methods to 
modernise secured credit law regimes. In succeeding Chapters, It will be thus 
attempted to determine whether legal transplantation (Chapter Three), legal 
harmonisation (Chapter Four) and legal unification (Chapter Five) could be used as 
legal methods to modernise secured credit law regimes. Comparative law will 
constitute an essential legal tool in the assessment o f whether approximation of law 
methods could successfully be used to modernise secured credit law regimes. 
Different jurisdictions belong to different legal families, which involve different 
legal cultures and values, and which have adopted different policy choices. These 
differences could generate substantial incompatibilities within approximation of 
secured credit law endeavours. Comparative law constitutes an essential legal tool in 
the drafting of new legislations and in assisting the convergence o f commercial laws. 
Goode accounts, for instance, that:
“ [t]he first major comparative law analysis in England was driven by the 
requirements of trade. This was Leone Levi’s great four-volume treatise published 
between 1850 and 1852 comparing the mercantile laws o f the United Kingdom with 
those of no fewer than sixty other countries, together with the Institutes of 
Justinian.”281
This analysis will thus use comparative law as main tool to assess whether 
approximation of law methods could be used to modernise secured credit law 
regimes. Particularly, specific emphasis will be given to jurisdictions which belong 
to different legal traditions, such as the Common Law tradition and the Civil Law 
tradition.
CONCLUSION
It is now well accepted that secured credit law regimes are necessary to the growth of 
the economy and this assumption is largely supported by an emerging consensus on 
secured credit. Accordingly, it is argued that the promotion of credit can be enhanced 
if  secured credit law regimes are modernised in the light o f an approximation o f law.
281 In Goode, R.M., Et al., Transnational Commercial Law, (OUP, 2007), at p. 156.
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To the difference o f most Common Law jurisdictions, Article 9 UCC only 
recognised fixed security interests and never recognised the concept of the floating
468charge. This position was endorsed by the well-known case of Benedict v. Ratner 
where the court recognised the impossibility for the debtor to create a security 
interest over goods which are not yet in existence. Only fixed charges were 
recognised as being valid under the American security law regime. A fixed charge 
attaches the assets at the time of its creation and does not allow the debtor to freely 
dispose of the charged assets during the ordinary course of business without his 
creditor’s consent. Nevertheless this position has been attenuated. Articles §9-204 
and §9-205 UCC469 now permit the creditor to perfect a security interest over after 
acquired property, including present and future assets and, allow the parties to agree 
that the company should be entitled to deal with the assets in the ordinary course of 
business. Hence, the technique enshrined in Article 9 has been analysed as ‘a fixed 
charge coupled with a licence to deal’470. Since Article 9 UCC opted for a notice 
filing and a first to file priority rules system, the sole recognition of fixed charges 
provides for clarity and certainty. In effect, all perfected security interests will act in 
the same way which will in return contribute to the ascertainment of the parties’ 
rights at all times471. As long as the security interest is adequately perfected, any
4 7 9subsequent security interests will rank behind it upon the debtor’s insolvency .
468 The Court considered in Benedict v. Ratner that debtors should not be able to use all o f their 
personal assets for security purposes. In effect, it was argued that some assets should be left 
unencumbered for the payment o f unsecured creditors. Benedict v. Ratner (1925) 268 US 354.
469 Article § 9-204 UCC provides that “[a]fter-Acquired Property; Future Advances - .(1) Except as 
provided in subsection (2), a security agreement may provide that any or all obligations covered by 
the security agreement are to be secured by after-acquired collateral. (2) No security interest attaches 
under an after-acquired property clause to consumer goods other than accessions (Section 9-314) 
when given as additional security unless the debtor acquires rights in them within ten days after the 
secured party gives value. (3) Obligations covered by a security agreement may include future 
advances or other value whether or not the advances or value are given pursuant to commitment 
(subsection (1) o f Section 9-105).” § 9-205 UCC provides that: “[u]se or Disposition o f Collateral 
Without Accounting Permissible. A security interest is not invalid or fraudulent against creditors by 
reason o f liberty in the debtor to use, commingle or dispose o f all or part of the collateral (including 
returned or repossessed goods) or to collect or compromise accounts or chattel paper, or to accept the 
return o f goods or make repossessions, or to use, commingle or dispose of proceeds, or by reason of 
the failure o f the secured party to require the debtor to account for proceeds or replace collateral. This 
section does not relax the requirements of possession where perfection o f a security interest depends 
upon possession o f  the collateral by the secured party or by a bailee.”
470 McCormack, “The Law Commission Consultative Report on Company Security Interests: An 
Irreverent Riposte” op. cit. fn. 294, at p. 297.
471 Gullifer, L. “Will the Law Commission Sink the Floating Charge?” (2003) Lloyd’s Maritime and 
Commercial Law Quarterly, at p. 125.
472 The purchase money security interest still ranks ahead whatever the time o f its perfection.
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marginal objections. Accordingly, the question emerged whether approximation of 
law methods could successfully be used to modernise secured credit law regimes.
The idea of an approximation of laws can encompass a wide range of different 
techniques and methods that aim to achieve different degree o f approximation of 
laws. Legal transplantation, legal harmonisation and legal unification will be thus 
analysed and assessed as potential successful methods to modernise secured credit 
law regimes. These techniques offer different degrees o f approximation; legal 
unification being the most complete form by creating a unique supra national legal 
rule. Accordingly, it will be essential to determine to what extent approximation of 
secured credit law regimes is feasible and to what extent these methods could 
successfully modernise secured credit law regimes. The following developments will 
aim at determining the feasibility of an approximation of law using each of the 
methods earlier identified. Accordingly, legal transplantation will be dealt with in 
Chapter Three, legal harmonisation in Chapter Four and legal unification in Chapter 
Five.
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As the floating charge does perform similar functions as the ones offered under the 
security interest o f Article 9, the adoption of such a scheme would become 
questionable in England. In effect, it is arguable that the adoption of such a scheme 
would involve the unnecessary replacement of the floating charge with a fixed 
charge which would ultimately perform a similar objective and, would also involve 
substantial and costly legislative reform of the current secured credit law regime in 
England479. In that sense, the existence of the floating charge could constitute a 
substantial obstacle to the legal transplantation of Article 9 UCC into English law480.
Nevertheless, the legal transplantation of Article 9 UCC into English law would 
modernise the insolvency law regime by providing more certainty and predictability 
to creditors. Indeed, lenders would no longer need to insert negative pledge clauses 
in order to protect their interests as subsequent secured creditors would no longer 
have priority over them481. In addition, it is important to highlight that the 
advantageous effects of the floating charge have significantly decreased over the
A Q 'y
years for creditors in England . The list o f preferential creditors ranking in priority
AO*>
over the floating chargee, such as employees claims and the Crown , has 
considerably increased and has significantly weakened the position of the floating 
chargee upon the debtor’s insolvency484. Moreover, the uncertain distinction between
479 Law Commission Consultative Report No 176. Para 2.60: provides that “[s]ome uncertainty 
remains over the exact effect o f the scheme, because the distinction between fixed and floating 
charges is o f importance in the legislation relating to insolvency. Policy issues relating to insolvency 
are issues for the Government rather than the Law Commission: our brief does not include insolvency. 
However, it is clear that if  the scheme we provisionally propose were to be implemented, a good deal 
o f consequential amendment would be needed to the current insolvency legislation.”
480 Beyond the issues related to priorities which are part of insolvency regimes, it could be argued that 
the transplantation o f article 9 should not be needed as the floating charge performs similar functions.
481 Under Article 9 UCC, purchase money security lenders still enjoy a super priority over floating 
lien holders which can only be avoided through the inclusion of negative pledge clauses.
482 Gullifer op. cit. fn. 74, at p. 399.
483 The Enterprise Act 2002 abolished the Crown preference to the benefit o f the creation o f a ring- 
fenced fund.
484 Gullifer explains that: “[a]s long ago as 1897, priority over a floating chargee (but not a fixed 
chargee) was given to some preferential creaditor. Initially, this class comprised largely the employees 
o f the company on the grounds that floating charges were typically over raw materials and 
manufactured goods o f the company. Since the company benefited from the efforts o f the workforce, 
it was therefore unfair that a secured creditor should have priority over the employees’ claims, but the 
class also included the Crown in relation to various taxes. Thus, by 2001, the following preferential 
creditors had priority over the floating chargee: sums due from the company to the Inland Revenue in 
respect o f deductions o f income tax that were made or should have been made from employees’ pay, 
VAT and other customs duties payable by the company, contributions in relation to National 
Insurance and occupational pensions, employees remuneration and other statutory payment due to 
employees.” Gullifer, op. cit. fn. 74, at p. 400.
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of consent within a notion of ‘prestige’”285. Further, and as part o f this consensual 
pattern of legal transplantation, it could also be solicited because it would be 
‘economically efficient’ for the importing entity to do so, as suggested by the World 
Bank in its ‘Doing Business’ Reports referring, for instance, to the American secured 
credit law model . Notably, many international entities believe that Article 9 UCC 
is an adequate legislation to regulate secured transactions and, thus, believe that the 
legal transplantation of Article 9 should be used as legal method to modernise 
secured credit legislations in other jurisdictions . Accordingly, the question 
emerged to determine whether legal transplantation could be used as successful 
method to modernise and approximate secured credit law regimes.
This analysis on whether legal transplantation could successfully be used as legal 
method to modernise and approximate secured credit law regimes will be introduced 
with an analysis of the current literature on legal transplants. It is fundamental to 
understand the concept of legal transplantation and determine whether legal theories 
have managed to assess, in abstract terms, the potential success o f such process as 
legal method for law reform. This examination will thus attempt to understand the 
concept of legal transplantation and verify whether the corresponding literature 
managed to establish a theory that could determine a priori the success of a specific 
legal transplant.
Various examples of legal transplantation can be found with Roman law which 
concepts and principles have been imported in the law of many jurisdictions which 
do not always belong to the same legal tradition. For example, the Roman law 
doctrine o f accessio has been imported in various jurisdictions that belong to 
different legal background. The Roman concept of accessio belongs to the Roman 
law of property and especially relates to the acquisitive modes o f property rights. The 
doctrine provides that any accessories annexed to a principal chattel will become the
285 Mattei, U. “A Theory o f Imperial Law: A Study on U.S. Hegemony and the Latin Resistance” 
(2003) 10 Indiana Journal o f  Global Legal Studies, at p. 385.
286 The World Bank Doing Business Reports are available from 
http://www.doingbusiness.org/DOWNLOADS/ (last checked 26/04/2010).
287 See for instance, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) which 
published a Model Law on Secured Transactions modelled on Article 9 UCC in 1994, or the 
UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Secured Transactions which also adopts the functional approach of 
Article 9 UCC. See above fn. 103.
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It is not surprising to see that the majority of cases490 revolve around the fundamental 
question of the characterisation o f the charge as floating or fixed491. The solution 
appears to be particularly uncertain in relation to charges created over book debts. 
The recent case o f Spectrum492 is a flagrant illustration of the current difficulties 
underlying the uncertainties related to the characterisation of the charge. In this case, 
the court had to determine whether a charge created over book debts was a fixed or a 
floating charge. The characterisation of the charge was the key issue in the way it 
was determinant o f the rights of the parties in question. If the charge was analysed as 
being a fixed charge, the bank was entitled to the proceeds o f the book debts in 
priority over other Spectrum’s preferential creditors. The court held that the charge in 
question had to be qualified as floating despite the fact that the parties described it as 
being a fixed charge in their original agreement. The charge created over book debts 
had to be qualified as being floating because the bank did not have sufficient control 
over the account to create a blocked account which would have led to the recognition 
o f a fixed charge. Therefore, Spectrum’s preferential creditors were entitled to the 
book debt proceeds in priority over the bank despite the characterisation by the 
parties that the charge was fixed rather than floating.
This decision overturned the renowned case of Siebe Gorman & Co. Ltd. v. Barclays 
Bank Ltd. 495where the court held that a charge created over book debts was 
characterised as fixed if the debtor was required to pay the proceeds in a separate 
bank account held with the same bank and, if the parties characterised the charge as 
being fixed in the agreement494. In Spectrum Plus (Re)495, the House of Lords
490 For example see, Quicksorts (South and West) Ltd. v. Katz (No2) [2004] EWHC 2443, [2005] BCC 
138, ChD; Ashborder BV v. Green Gas Power Ltd. [2004] EWHC 1517, [2005] BCC 634, ChD; 
Arthur D Little Ltd. (in administration) v. Ableco Finance LLC [2002] EWHC 701, [2003] Ch 217, 
ChD; Agnew v. IRC  [2001] UKPC 28, [2001] , 2 AC 710; Smith v. Bridgend CBC [2001] UKHL 58, 
[2002] 1 AC 336; Re Cosslett (contractors) Ltd. [1998] Ch 495, CA; Royal Trust Bank v. National 
Westminster Bank Pic [1996] BCC 613, CA; Re New Bullas Trading Ltd. [1994] 1 BCLC 485, CA; 
Re Cimex Tissues Ltd. [1994] BCC 626, ChD; Re GE Tunbridge Ltd. [1994] BCC 563, ChD; William 
Gaskell Group v. Highley [1994] 1 BCLC 197, ChD; Re CCG International Enterprises Ltd. [1993] 
BCC 580, ChD; Re Atlantic Computer Systems Pic [1992] Ch 505, CA; Re Atlantic Medical Ltd. 
[1992] BCC 653, ChD; Re Croftbell Ltd. [1990] BCLC 844, ChD; Ex p  Copp [1989] BCLC 13, Ch; 
Re Permanent Houses (Holdings) Ltd. (1989) 5 BCC 151, ChD; Re Brightlife Ltd. [1987] 1 BCLC 
485, ChD; Re Armagh Shoes Ltd. [1984] BCLC 405, ChD; Re Bond Worth Ltd. [1980] 1 Ch 228, Ch; 
Siebe Gorman & Co Ltd. v. Barclays Bank Ltd. [1979] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 142, ChD.
491 Goode op. cit. fn. 478.
492 Re Spectrum Plus Ltd  [2005] UKHL 41, [2005] 2 AC 680.
493 [1979] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 142.
494 Gullifer op. cit. fn. 74, at p. 422.
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Article 9 UCC has successfully been transplanted uniformly amongst all States of 
America. In this respect, it is arguable that the legal transplantation of Article 9 has 
been successful as legal method to modernise and approximate secured credit law 
regimes in the U.S. Following the assumption that Article 9 UCC would constitute 
an adequate model to import in jurisdictions eager to modernise their secured credit 
law regimes, this study will consider whether legal transplantation of Article 9 UCC 
could successfully be used as legal method to modernise and approximate secured 
credit law regimes in other jurisdictions. This examination will particularly focus on 
European jurisdictions because many of them recently reformed or introduced 
proposal for reform of their secured credit law regimes .
In light of this eagerness to modernise secured credit law regimes, this study will 
attempt to determine whether the legal transplantation of Article 9 UCC could be 
successful. This analysis on legal transplants will not consider the feasibility and 
likelihood of success of legal transplantation of Article 9 UCC in every European 
jurisdiction; rather it will provide a detailed analysis on the feasibility of such legal 
transplant in France and England which are representatives of a sample of European 
jurisdictions that belong to different legal traditions. Particularly, this study will 
attempt to determine whether the functional approach preserved in Article 9 of the 
UCC and the idea of a unique security could be retained as a common core principle 
of secured credit law regimes in France and England.
The question of whether an Article 9 type regime could be transplanted into English 
secured credit law has largely been debated within the legal doctrine294. It has been
293 France reformed its secured credit law regime with the Ordinance o f 23rd March 2006: 
‘Ordonnance du 23 mars 2006 relative aux suretes’. On the French secured credit law reform, see, 
Simler, P.H. “La reforme du droit des suretes - Un Livre IV nouveau du Code civil” (2006) JCP  2006, 
ed. G, n° 13, 29 mars 2006, I 124. England also introduced a proposal for reform in 2002 (Law 
Commission Consultation Paper No 164). Legal reforms have also occurred in Central and Eastern 
Europe. On this point see Dahan, F. “Law Reform in Central and Eastern Europe: The 
‘Transplantation’ of Secured Transactions Law” (2000) 2 European Journal o f  Law Reform, at p. 369.
294 On this point see, Davies, I.R. “The Reform of Personal Property Security Law: Can Article 9 of 
the US Uniform Commercial Code be a Precedent” (1988) 37 International Comparative Law 
Quarterly, at p. 465; Bridge op. cit. fn. 182; McCormack, G. “Personal Property Security Law Reform 
in England and Canada” (2002) Journal o f  Business Law, at p. 113; McCormack, G. “Quasi-Securities 
and the Law Commission Consultation Paper on Security Interests -  A Brave New World” (2003) 
Lloyd’s Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly, at p. 80; McCormack, G. “Reforming the Law of 
Security Interests: National and International Perspectives” (2003) Singapore Journal o f  Legal 
Studies, at p. 1; McCormack, G. “The Priority o f Secured Credit: An Anglo-American Perspective”
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Notwithstanding these disadvantages mainly associated to the current insolvency law 
priority regime, it is important to bear in mind that the floating charge remains from 
a ‘technical’ point of view a very flexible and valuable security device, extensively 
used by the commercial practice and well enshrined in the Common Law tradition 
and in the case law. In practice, it has been argued that lenders would not opt for the 
floating charge to ensure their priority but for the control that the security device 
offers499. As it has been precisely highlighted by a distinguished academic, “[t]he 
fixed charge for priority; the floating charge for control”500. Priority should not be 
seen as the sole valuable attribute of security501. It is argued that the floating charge
S09would amount to a ‘residual management displacement’ which would only be 
beneficial if coupled with fixed charges. A security entitles the creditor to monitor 
the debtor’s assets before default and provides the creditor with control rights of the
C A T
company by allowing him to appoint a receiver upon the debtor default . However,
499 Mokal, R.J. “Liquidations Expenses and Floating Charges-The Separate Funds Fallacy” (2004) 
L loyd’s Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly, at p. 399 where the author explains that “ ... while 
floating charges may result in some recoveries in some minute proportion of insolvencies, the 
dominant reason for their inclusion in a vast proportion of debentures that create security interests in 
not to ensure these rare and trivial recoveries. From the creditor’s point of view, recoveries by virtue 
of the priority o f the floating charge, if  and when they happen, are unpredictable windfalls. So it is not 
surprising that, generally, floating charges are coupled with fixed ones. The two perform different 
roles, and it is the fixed one upon which the creditor relies to provide him with priority (and 
encumbrance and the ability to carry out a risk assessment). This reasoning also allows us to 
understand that “lightweight” charges are not special type of floating charge, but simply instances 
where the true nature o f all floating charges is particularly obvious, viz, that it is relied upon for 
reasons that have nothing to do with securing priority.”
500 Westbrook, J. “The Control o f Wealth in Bankruptcy” (2004) 82 Texas Law Review, at p. 795.
501 Ibid. at p. 806 and see Mokal op.cit. fn. 499, at p. 397.
502 Mokal explains that: “[t]he floating charge plays a distinctive role as a residual management 
displacement device which can only be effective if coupled with an appropriate set o f fixed security 
that enables its holder to gather information about the competence of the debtor’s managers and to 
control their incentives to misbehave. The floating charge allows the debtor free use o f its circulating 
assets while its management is doing well, and when the management fails, it crystallises to divest 
them o f control even over these assets. At this time, it also contributes to controlling the motivation 
costs o f other creditors by discouraging them from rushing to enforce their claims against circulating 
assets or threatening to do so, and by ensuring the unity of the debtor’s estate under the receiver’s 
control even after the onset o f winding-up.” Mokal op. cit. fn. 7.
503 See Armour, J., Et al. “ Rethinking Receivership” (2001) 21 Oxford Journal o f  Legal Studies, at p. 
90 where the author states: “[i]t is conceptually possible to imagine a legal system in which a ‘floating 
charge’ offers its holder only control rights and no benefits in terms o f priority.” See also Franks, J., 
Et al. “The Cycle o f Corporate Distress, Rescue and Dissolution: A Study of Small and Medium Size 
UK Companies” (2000) IFA Working Paper 306, at p. 6 available at 
http://facultyresearch.london.edu/docs/306.pdf (last checked 26/04/2010), where the author states that: 
“[t]he crucial feature o f the floating charge is that it grants the holder the right to take control o f the 
firm in the event o f default, through he appointment of an Administrative Receiver. Control o f the 
firm allows discretion over whether to realize the assets by selling the firm as a going concern or 
liquidating it. These control rights can considerably influence the size of the proceeds accruing to the 
creditor.”
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The experience of other Civilian jurisdictions, notably Quebec, will be fundamental 
to this analysis on the legal transplantation of Article 9 in France. The debate on 
legal transplantation occurred in Quebec because of the economic necessity to be in 
line with secured credit law regimes of North American jurisdictions. Accordingly, 
Quebec reformed its secured credit law in 1994 with the introduction of a new Civil 
Code297 which adopted a unitary concept o f security over movables and real estate; 
the hypothec. Even though Quebec adopted a uniform approach with the concept of 
‘hypothec’, they did not include property-based securities such as retention of title in 
this unique regime. Further, beyond the terminological and conceptual difficulties 
faced by legal reformers to transplant Article 9 in Quebec, cultural obstacles such as 
the willingness to preserve legal culture also played a large part. Accordingly, and in 
light of the emergence of recent literature on the importance and significance of legal
90Sculture , a successful legal transplantation of an unfamiliar concept such as the 
security interest would also appear to be difficult in France.
The first part of this analysis will thus review the literature on legal transplantation 
and will attempt to determine whether it could theoretically constitute a successful 
method for legal reform in the light of an approximation of laws. The second part 
will consider the question of the feasibility and likelihood of success of legal 
transplantation of Article 9 UCC as legal method to modernise and approximate 
French and English secured credit law regimes.
CONCEPTUALISATION OF LEGAL TRANSPLANTATION AS LEGAL 
METHOD OF LAW REFORM
This section will fundamentally attempt to analyse some o f the main arguments and 
theories advanced within the legal transplantation literature. These theories can be 
classified along a large spectrum of arguments where at one end, it is argued that 
legal transplantation would simply be impossible following substantial differences in
297 Civil code o f Quebec is available at
www2.publicationsduquebec.gouv.qc.ca/dynamicSearch/telecharge.php?type=2&file=/CCQ/CCQ_A. 
html (last checked 26/04/2010).
298 See above Chapter One, at pp. 37-39.
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introduced substantial reforms in relation to the priority of preferential creditors over 
the floating chargee. One of the reforms introduced by the Act was the abolition of 
the Crown preference over the floating charge to the benefit o f the creation of a ring-
C 1 -J
fenced fund reserved for unsecured creditors. The creation of such ring fenced 
fund was created in order to prevent floating charge holders from benefiting from a 
windfall payment following the abolition of the Crown preference514.
As a result, a fraction of the company assets subject to the floating charge is now 
reserved in priority for unsecured creditors515. It has been analysed from empirical 
studies that the creation o f such a ring-fenced fund to the benefit o f unsecured 
creditors would not achieve significant changes for this category of creditors upon 
the debtor’s insolvency516. Moreover, section 176(A) (2) of the Insolvency Act 1986, 
which provides for the preferential payment of unsecured creditors from the ring- 
fenced fund, can be excluded under certain circumstances if the liquidator, 
administrator or receiver believes that the cost of distributing the fund to unsecured 
creditors “would be disproportionate to the benefits” or if  the liquidator, 
administrator or receiver applies to the court for an order to disapply Section 176(A) 
(2) on the same grounds517.
company available for payment o f general creditors does not include any amount made available 
under section 176A(2)(a); (b) the reference to claims to property comprised in or subject to a floating 
charge is to the claims o f -  (i) the holders o f debentures secured by, or holders of, the floating charge, 
and (ii) any preferential creditors entitled to be paid out of that property to them. (3) Provision may be 
made by rules restricting the application o f subsection (1), in such circumstances as may be prescribed 
, to expenses authorised or approved -  (a) by the holders of debentures secured by, or holders of, the 
floating charge and by any preferential creditors entitled to be paid in priority to them, or (b) by the 
court. (4) References in this section to the expenses of the winding up are to all expenses properly 
incurred in the winding up, including the remuneration of the liquidator.”
513 The creation o f a ring-fenced fund has already been suggested in a recommendation made by the 
Cork Committee in 1982 which suggested that 10% of the proceeds of the assets subject to the 
floating charge should be reserved to unsecured creditors. See Goode, R.M., Principles o f  Corporate 
Insolvency Law, (2005), at p. 165.
514 However, the allocation o f a prescribed part to unsecured creditors only applies to floating charges 
created after the 15th September 2003. Lenders who have taken a floating charge before this date will 
be entitled to this windfall. On this point, see Armour, J. “Should We Redistribute in Insolvency” 
(2006) in Getzler, J., Et al., Company Charges Spectrum and Beyond, (OUP, 2006), at p. 201.
515 The Insolvency Act 1986 provides that the percentage is 50% of the first £10,000 and 20% of any 
assets above that figure with a ceiling of £600,000 for the prescribed part. On this point see Gullifer, 
op. cit. fn. 74, at p. 410. See the Insolvency Act 1986 (prescribed part) Order 2003 S.I 2003/2097.
516 On this point see Gullifer ibid. at pp. 410-412.
517 The case o f Re Hydroserve Ltd. is the first case where the court has disapplied SI 76 (A) (2) and 
considered that making the fund available for unsecured creditors would have been disproportionate to 
the benefits. Re Hydroserve Ltd. [2007] ALL ER (D) 184 Chancery Division.
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Watson300 or Kahn-Freund301 have developed challenging theories on the viability of 
legal transplantation. Areas of disagreements vary from the possibility of legal 
transplantation itself to the likelihood of success of a specific legal transplant.
One of the major difficulties arises from the determinants that have to be taken into 
account for obtaining a successful legal transplant. In effect, the question of the 
viability and success of legal transplantation is delicate. What are the relevant criteria 
for a successful legal transplantation? To what extent is the law transferable between 
jurisdictions that belong to different legal traditions, different legal cultures, and 
different political or economical values? Are these components fundamental to the 
viability and success of legal transplantation? Measuring the success and viability of 
legal transplantation is not an easy task. One of the main arguments developed 
against the viability of legal transplantation is that legal transplant would not be 
possible unless the transferable law was shaped to fit local legal tradition or legal 
culture303. Thus, it is often argued that legal tradition, legal culture or more generally 
‘local environment’304 would be part of the relevant and fundamental criteria to
1AC
consider in the assessment of the viability and success of legal transplantation . 
Thus, the examination of the literature on legal transplantation will first consider the 
theories that have focus on cultural criteria to be met for legal transplants to be, if  at 
all, successful. The second part of this examination will focus on the theories that 
recognise the viability of legal transplantation notwithstanding different cultural 
backgrounds o f recipients’ entities.
Review, at p. 44; Kahn-Freund, O. “On Uses and Misuses o f Comparative Law” (1998) 37 Modern 
Law Review, at p. 7; Teubner, G. “Legal Irritants: Good Faith in British Law or How Unifying Law 
Ends Up in New Divergences” (1998) 61 Modern Law Review, at p .ll;  Berkowitz, D. Et al. 
“Economic development, Legality, and the transplant effect” (2003) 47(1) European Economic 
Review, at p. 165; Small, R.G. “Towards a Theory o f Contextual Transplants” (2005) 19 Emory 
International Law Review, at p. 1431; Gillepsie op. cit. fn. 283.
300 Watson op. cit. fn. 282, fn. 284, and fn. 299.
301 Kahn Freund op. cit. fn. 299.
302 Heim op. cit. fn. 299, at p. 189.
303 Montesquieu op. cit. fn. 299.
304 Ibid.
305 See for e.g., Berkowitz op. cit. fn. 299.
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As part o f this study on the floating charge, it is interesting to take on board the 
experiences of other Common Law jurisdictions which have successfully 
transplanted Article 9 UCC and accordingly opted for the abolishment o f the floating 
charge. Thus, and to conclude on the floating charge, the subsequent paragraph will 
particularly consider the experience of some of the Canadian provinces in 
transplanting Article 9.
The transfer o f Article 9 UCC reform experiences to other Common Law 
jurisdictions and the fate o f the floating charge
The Common Law jurisdictions of New Zealand and some provinces o f Canada 
reformed their secured credit law modelled on Article 9 UCC and opted for the 
abolition o f the floating charge. Under New Zealand legislations, creditors can obtain 
a security interest in a company’s fund of assets, presents and futures, while allowing 
the debtor to freely use the charged assets in the ordinary course o f business. This 
security device is a fixed charge and not a floating charge520 which shows great 
coherence with the functional approach of the global security instituted under Article 
9 UCC.
The case o f Canada is interesting with respect to the floating charge. Ontario was the 
first Canadian province to adopt an Article 9 type regime within its secured credit
521law . As Common Law jurisdiction, and indeed very close to the English legal 
culture, the floating charge was well established among commercial participants. It 
is therefore not surprising that the transplantation of Article 9 into a legal regime that 
already had the floating charge led to some significant difficulties. At first, Ontario 
opted to keep the floating charge apart from the general scope of its secured credit
9^9law regime . Shortly after, the Personal Property Security Amendment introduced 
in 1981523 permitted creditors to register a floating charge in the PPSA registry524. 
The coexistence o f two systems underlying the floating charge led to a myriad of
520 Personal Property Securities Act 1999.
521 Ontario adopted its PPSA in 1967 but the Act did not come into effect until 1973. See Ziegel, J. 
“The Draft Ontario Personal Property Security Act” (1966) 44 Canadian Bar Review, at p. 104.
522 Revised Statute o f Ontario, Chapter 375, s. 3(1) (c).
523 Section 66 a. o f the Personal Property Security Amendment Act, S.O. 1981, c.2, s.l.
524 Wood op. cit. fn. 447, at p. 217.
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• 311success and viability of legal transplants would be much more uncertain . 
Therefore, a wide spectrum of hypotheses is recognised where at one end, legal 
transplantation would be almost automatically successful and where at the other end, 
legal transplantation would be less likely to succeed. It is explained that where the 
law is deeply entrenched in a specific jurisdiction’s legal institutions and legal 
system, it would seem difficult to consider the feasibility for successful legal 
transplants. That is where the argument rejoins the analysis developed by 
Montesquieu. In effect, while this theory recognises that the environmental factors 
can constitute some barriers to the success of legal transplantation, it is argued that 
the political factor has become the true obstacle to such a process .
Further theories developed against the desirability and feasibility of legal 
transplantation as legal method to modernise and approximate legal regimes314. 
Notably, it is argued that the mechanism enshrined in the expression ‘legal 
transplant’ is misleading and that it should be more accurate to refer to it as ‘legal 
irritants’315. In effect, foreign legal rule so transplanted would drastically affect 
domestic legal system and ‘irritates law’s binding arrangements’316. Therefore, the 
question would not be to determine whether a foreign legal rule could be integrated 
or rejected but to determine how the new system will be absorbed into national legal 
system and to determine how and to what extent the domestic legal rule will have to 
be modified following such legal transplantation317. Following this assumption, the
311 Ibid. at p. 5.
3n Ibid. at pp. 8-10.
m Ibid. at pp. 8-12. Kahn Freund states for instance that: “... the twentieth century has witnessed the 
development of urbanization, industrialization and communications which has led to “a process of 
economic, social and cultural assimilation or integration among the developed countries (and also the 
dominant classes o f the developing countries).” Thus, it is essential to take into account the political 
differences that exist between communists and capitalists nations, between dictatorships and 
democracies, between presidential and parliamentary regimes or from the role played by pressure 
groups “in the making and maintenance of legal institutions.”
314 Teubner op. cit. fn. 299, at p. 11.
315 Teubner explains that: “[w]hen a foreign rule is imposed on a domestic culture, I submit, 
something else is happening. It is not transplanted into another organism, rather it works as a 
fundamental irritation which triggers a whole series of new and unexpected events. It irritates, o f 
course, the minds and emotions o f tradition-bound lawyers; but in deeper sense, - and this is the core 
of my thesis -  it irritates law’s ‘binding arrangements’.'''Ibid. at p. 12.
316 Ibid.
317 Teubner explained that legal transplants are ‘legal irritants’. In the context o f the legal 
transplantation o f the concept o f good faith into English Contract law, following the adoption of 
European Consumer Protection Directive 1994, the author considers the consequences o f such a 
transplant and states: “... what kind of transformations of meaning will the term undergo, how will its
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The Law Commission in England shared the same views and did not think that the 
floating charge should be abolished within an eventual reform of English personal 
property security law. Instead, it is recommended that the floating charge should be 
kept and integrated to the general law reform proposal529. The preservation o f the 
floating charge would seem to be a better option than its total abolition, considering 
its advantages, flexibility and popularity within the commercial community. 
However, the example o f the Canadian province o f Ontario also showed the great 
difficulties associated with the adoption of a global security modelled on Article 9 
UCC together with the preservation o f the floating charge.
Following this analysis on the likelihood of success of the legal transplantation of 
Article 9 UCC into English secured credit law regime, important formal and 
technical obstacles have been identified. Especially, the adoption of the functional 
approach to the regulation o f securities seems to constitute a major barrier to a 
successful legal transplantation. In effect, the adoption of the functional approach 
would involve significant difficulties in relation to the preservation of property-based 
securities such as retention o f title clauses and specific security devices such as the 
floating charge.
529 Law Commission Report on Company Security Interests No. 296, at Para 3.164 which provides 
that: “[r]esponses to our proposals to change the distinction between fixed and floating charges were 
particularly difficult to analyse. First, it has been hard to gauge whether there is a real opposition to 
our proposals when correctly understood. The floating charge is viewed as enormously important. 
Some respondents appeared to think that we were suggesting that it should no longer be possible to 
create floating charges. That was not at all our intention. The scheme proposed was designed to enable 
fixed and floating charges to be superseded by a new single form o f charge that would be more 
flexible and give the lender better protection. We believe that in terms o f the law o f security there is a 
good case for this change.” Para 3.171 further provides that: “[w]e believe there is a good case for 
including in our scheme the provisions that would remove the distinction between fixed and floating 
charges. We also think an adequate substitute test is available to determine which assets preferential 
creditors and the unsecured creditors fund should have priority over.”Para 3.172 states that: 
“[hjowever, we recognize that insolvency law has undergone significant changes in recent years, and 
that there is great unwillingness to see further changes in the immediate future. To maintain it means 
that the scheme will have to be more complex than we would like. It means that lenders will have to 
continue to use a ‘cocktail’ o f fixed and floating charges when under the more radical approach 
advocated in the CR [Consultative Report, Law Consultation Paper No 176] a single charge would 
have sufficed. However it does not make the scheme unworkable or prevent it being a substantial 
improvement on the current law.” Finally, Para 3.173 explains that: “[i]n the light o f this, we have 
decided not to recommend at present the changes proposed in the CR that would have had the result of 
removing the distinction between the fixed and the floating charge. The proposed rules should be 
considered again when insolvency law is next reviewed.”
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An illustration of the above argument is provided through examples dealing with 
apparently simple concepts such as ‘good faith’324 or ‘fault’ which could effectively 
•involve substantial difficulties in the transplant process. If legal reformers were to 
transfer these concepts from one jurisdiction to another, the specificity and 
methodology of the recipient jurisdiction could limit the success of the legal 
transplant. For example, the concept o f fault constitutes the basis for the 
establishment of delictual and tortious liability in most European jurisdictions. 
However, different jurisdictions may understand the concept of fault differently from 
one another. The concept of fault is very flexible and it is not surprising that different 
jurisdictions might adopt different approach towards this notion. One legal system 
might opt for the establishment of a strict liability through the doctrine of 
‘presumptive fault’. A contrario, one legal system might opt for a less severe liability 
regime and might require the claimant to prove the existence o f a grave fault from 
the defendant. Therefore, when foreign legal rules are transplanted, the recipient 
country will implement the legislation according to its own specific legal context
325which will consequently affect and modify the original borrowed legal rule . 
Ultimately, it is argued that this process shows the illusory character of legal 
transplantation as legal method for reform and by way of consequence, its 
unfeasibility. As it is concluded, the legal transplantation of a legal rule or legal 
concept also involves the transplantation of a legal culture and legal mentalite.
These theories challenge the feasibility of legal transplantation because of the 
differences of legal cultures between the donor and recipient legal systems. In this 
perspective, it is arguable that the legal transplantation of a secured credit law regime 
in jurisdictions of different legal traditions and different legal, economic or political 
background could generate substantial obstacles. Other academics argued that legal 
transplantation is feasible. In support o f this argument, it is observable that the law 
largely developed through legal transplantation, many of which happened between 
entities that had nothing in common. An illustration of this phenomenon can be
324 Teubner considers that the transplantation of certain concepts such a “good faith” could lead to 
substantial complexities within the recipient country’s legal rule. Especially, he refers to the legal 
transplantation o f the concept of good faith into English Contract law following the adoption of  
European Consumer Protection Directive 1994, the author considers that such transplant will lead to 
substantial complexities and will act as legal irritants to the domestic legal rule. See above, fn. 317.
325 Harlow op. cit. fn. 322.
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Before the enactment of the ordinance, the Commission Grimaldi, affected to the task 
o f reforming the law532, considered Article 9 of the UCC and had to determine 
whether it should reshape French secured credit law according to the American 
model. In other words, reformers had to determine whether they should opt for a 
single security device modelled on Article 9 or keep the traditional French system 
characterised by a multitude o f security mechanisms, including property-based 
security . The question emerged to determine whether the legal transplantation of 
Article 9 could successfully modernise French secured credit law. The Commission 
considered that it would have been a mistake to transplant rules from a different legal 
context such as the ones enacted in Article 9 UCC into the French legal system. 
Especially, it was emphasised that the transplantation of Article 9 could not be 
envisaged without a reform of insolvency law and a reform of fundamental baseline 
concepts of property law.
It is generally recognised that the Common Law background o f Article 9 UCC would 
constitute an obstacle in itself to the successful legal transplantation o f such regime 
in Civilian jurisdictions such as France. Yet, the Civilian jurisdiction o f Quebec 
adopted a similar regime to the one enshrined in Article 9 o f the UCC. Quebec 
reformed its secured credit law with the introduction o f a new Civil code in 1994534. 
In order to be in line with other North American countries, Quebec adopted a unitary 
concept of security over movables and real estate; the hypothec. Even though Quebec 
adopted a uniform approach with the concept of hypothec, they did not include 
‘quasi securities’ or property-based securities such as retention of title. This 
separation has been the object o f many discussion and controversies535 in Quebec. In
532 The Minister o f Justice gave the task to reform the French law o f  security to the Commission 
Grimaldi in September 2003.
533 Crocq, P. “La Reforme des Suretes Mobilieres” in Picod, Y., Et al., Le Droit des Suretes a, 
I ’Epreuve des Reformes, (2006).
534 Text available at www2.publications-du quebec.gouv.qc.ca/home.php# (last checked 26/04/2010).
535 The minister o f Justice stated: “[a]insi, le code n’a pas retenu la presomption d’hypotheque dont 
l’effet aurait ete d assimiler a une hypotheque toute convention qui procurait au creancier un avantage 
dans la realisation de sa creance. L’introduction d’une telle presomption risquait d aller a l ’encontre de 
la conception civiliste du droit des obligations et des suretes. Elle aurait entraine egalement une 
incertitude juridique considerable en raison des litiges que ne manquerait pas de soulever la difficulty 
de qualifier certaines conventions... La solution retenue a considere plutot a apporter, dans d’autres 
dispositions du code, un temperament aux difficultes denoncees relativement aux conventions qui 
procurent au creancier un avantage sur les autres creanciers.” Commentaires du Ministre de la Justice 
(Quebec : Ministere de la Justice, Les Publications du Quebec, 1993), (The “Minister’s Commentary”) 
at p. 1654.
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into their own legal systems330. Moreover, these successful legal transplants did 
occur at a time where social, economic, geographical and political context highly 
differed from the donor to recipients countries331.
Legal transplantation should be understood as the transfer o f an idea of the foreign 
legal rule332. If the ‘idea’ of the foreign legal rule appears to be a good idea, legal 
reformers should extensively analyse the idea as enshrined in the foreign legal rule
333and consider whether this idea could fit within their domestic legal system . 
Although the structure of the recipient country is not considered as being relevant; it 
is conceded that the transplant of the idea of the foreign legal rule may differ once 
transferred in the recipient country334. Following this latest remark, the success o f the 
legal transplant becomes questionable. If the reception of the legal rule differs 
amongst the various recipient jurisdictions, it may lead to new divergences which 
could ultimately challenge the success itself of a specific legal transplant and 
undermine the use of legal transplantation as legal method to achieve an 
approximation of laws .
Following the examination o f some of the arguments advanced within the literature 
on legal transplantation, the recognition of a comprehensive theory that could predict 
the success of a specific legal transplant would appear to be uncertain. In order to 
verify some of the arguments advanced within the literature on legal transplantation, 
the next development will consider a specific case study dealing with the legal 
transplantation of a specific legal concept into the laws of jurisdictions that belong to 
different legal traditions. It is important to consider the phenomenon o f legal 
transplantation in the context of recipient entities that belong to different legal
220Ibid. at p. 313.
331 Watson naturally questions “[h]ow otherwise could one explain the use made o f Roman law by 
fifth-century Germanic tribes, the acceptance of so much Roman law dating from different periods 
and different political circumstances in the Middle Ages and later by so many diverse States in 
Western Europe, in monarchies, oligarchies and republics alike.” Watson op. cit. fn. 326, at p. 80.
332 Watson explains that: “...legal rules, in addition to being part o f the social structure, also operate 
on the level o f ideas.” Watson op. cit. fn. 327, at p. 315.
333 McDonough op.cit. fn. 299, at p. 508.
334 Watson questions: ““[d]o legal rules reflect a society’s desires, needs and aspirations?” The answer 
which is ordinarily given or is just assumed is positive though minor qualifications are usually urged.
... With transmission or the passing of time modifications may well occur, but frequently the 
alterations in the rules have only limited significance.” Watson op. cit. fn. 327, at p. 313.
335 See the above arguments and the culturalist theories, and especially the explanation provided by 
Teubner and the implementation o f the concept of good faith at fn. 317 and fn. 324. ,
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will also be considered in light of the potential implementation of a global security 
and its functional approach. This section argues that the adoption of the functional 
approach and its security interest in France is unlikely, especially in light of recent 
reforms that would seem to reinforce and expand the use of property-based security 
devices, particularly through the institution of the fiducie.
Thus, this section will first consider the terminological obstacles that could occur 
from the legal transplantation of Article 9 in France and will further consider the 
obstacles that could occur from the adoption o f the functionalist approach and from 
the adoption o f the global security interest.
Terminological obstacles
coo
The appointed entity for the revision o f the Civil code in Quebec appeared to be 
quite hostile, in a first time, to the transplantation of an Article 9 type regime and 
raised significant objections in that direction. First, the Committee identified some 
terminological problems that are not irremediable but worth mentioning. It has been 
argued that the Uniform Commercial Code was not strictly speaking a code but 
rather a collection o f disparate laws contained in a single legal instrument539which 
could be difficult to transplant in a Civilian jurisdiction such as Quebec. As it has 
previously been pointed out, the concept of codification differs within Civilian and 
Common Law jurisdictions. In effect, Civil Law jurisdictions such as France opted 
for a codification o f its law but only in the form of general principles in order to fit 
with the deductive logic used by legal practitioners and courts. This approach to 
codification is substantially different from the American approach which code only 
materialises detailed and distinct laws. This approach could constitute a formal 
obstacle to the legal transplantation o f Article 9 if it was to be integrated into the 
French Commercial code.
Furthermore, the Committee for the reform of the Civil code in Quebec also found 
that the style, content and structure of the code were very complex and unclear.
538 Comite des Suretes de I ’Office de Revision du Code Civil de la Province de Quebec.
539 Carron, Y. “L’Article 9 du Code Uniforme de Commerce peut-il etre Exporte? Point de Vue d’un 
Juriste Quebecois” (1969) in Ziegel, J., Et al., Aspect o f  Comparative Commercial Law, (1969), at p. 
374 also cited in Riffard, J.F., Le Security Interest ou L ’Approche Fonctionnelle et Unitaire des 
Suretes Mobilieres, Contribution a une Rationalisation du Droit Frangais, (LGDJ 1996).
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the way it is absorbed by each recipient country may lead to substantial divergences 
amongst them. Accordingly, the importation of the principle o f accessio could lead 
to the implementation of different legal regimes. Such eventuality would challenge 
the success itself o f the legal transplant. Thus, it will be interesting to see how the 
concept of accessio has been absorbed in jurisdictions from different legal traditions. 
In order to test the theories, the next development will examine the legal 
transplantation of the Roman law doctrine of accessio through a comparative 
analysis of its incorporation into French and English property law, which 
jurisdictions belong to different legal traditions.
The legal transplantation o f  accessio in France
In France, the concept of accessio is embodied in Article 546 o f the Civil code which 
provides that ownership of a thing, either movable or immovable, gives a right to 
everything it produces and to what is accessorily united to it, either naturally or 
artificially. That right is called the right of accession. Thus, it is through union or 
production that this extension of property rights operates. ‘Production’ is used to 
designate the natural or cultural fruits and revenues produced by the land. These
338products will become the property of the owner’s of the land by way o f accession . 
Accession through union or incorporation relates to everything that unites or 
incorporates itself to the main or principal chattel. The owner of the ‘principal ’ will 
become the owner of the accessories by way o f accession. Accession through 
incorporation or union covers numerous situations and is, therefore, meticulously 
detailed in the Civil code in its Articles 551 to 577339. Although the Civil code 
provides for some considerable guidance with respect to the application o f the
338 On the theory of accessio, refer to Articles 547 to 550 C.Civ. For example, Article 547 C.Civ. 
provides that “[n]atural or cultural fruit o f the land; Revenues; Increase in stock, belong to the owner 
by right of accession.” Article 548 C.Civ. (Act no 60-464 o f  17 May 1960) provides that “... the fruits 
produced by a thing belong to the owner only on condition that he repays the costs o f ploughing, 
works and seeds incurred by third parties and whose value must be assessed at the date of repayment.” 
Article 549 C.Civ. (Act no 60-464 o f  17 May 1960) provides that “[a] mere possessor makes fruits his 
own only where he possesses in good faith. If not, he is bound to restore the products with the thing to 
the owner who claims it; where the said products are not found in kind, their value must be appraised 
at the date o f repayment.” Article 550 C.Civ. provides that “[a] possessor is in good faith where he 
possesses as owner, under an instrument o f transfer of whose defects he does not know. He ceases to 
be in good faith from the time those defects are known to him.”
339 Article 551 C.Civ. provides that “[ejverything which unites and incorporates itself with a thing 
belongs to the owner, according to the rules hereafter laid down.”
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transplantation o f Article 9 UCC in French law. Furthermore, and as it has lengthily 
been demonstrated within the above analysis on the legal transplantation of Article 9 
in England, the adoption of a global security modelled on the security interest would 
lead to significant difficulties in relation to property-based securities such as 
retention of title clauses. In support of the preservation of property-based securities, 
France recently expanded its list by introducing the fiducie. The expansion of 
property-based security mechanisms within French secured credit law regime would 
thus tend to depart from the approach retained in Article 9. As part of this study on 
the potential viability o f the legal transplantation of Article 9 UCC in France, it will 
be interesting to take on board the experience of other Civil Law jurisdictions which 
have transplanted Article 9 UCC such as Quebec which law reforms experience will 
be considered. Ultimately, this section suggests that the legal transplantation of 
Article 9 UCC as legal method to modernise French secured credit law may be 
unlikely to succeed, in light of conceptual incompatibilities and particularly 
fundamental cultural incompatibilities.
The concept o f ‘real right’ and the ‘security interest’
As it has already been explained, a security over movables is analysed as being an 
accessory of the real right543. A security provides the creditor with an ‘accessory real 
right’ on the property given as collateral. The debtor remains the owner of the asset 
and his property right is qualified as principal real right, usually embracing the 
traditional attributions of ‘usus \  fructus’ and ‘abusus,544. The direct consequence of 
such an analysis is that the security will be subject to the same outcome as the debt 
itself. Would the debt be extinguished, the security would also disappear.
This qualification o f ‘real right’ has important legal effects for creditors. First, the 
creditor is entitled to a ‘droit de preference’545allowing him to a priority on the 
collateral given as security if the debtor becomes insolvent. Secondly, the creditor is
543 Piette op. cit. fn. 233.
544 ‘ Usus ’ designates the right to use the property; fructus ’ designates the right to collect the “fruits”, 
i.e. the benefits o f the property; and ‘abusus ’ designates the right to destroy and alienates the property.
545 Preferential right.
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entitled to a ‘droit de suite,5A6which permits him to seize the asset in the hand of 
third parties if  the debtor defaults.
The analysis of the legal nature of a ‘security’ has important implications for the 
question of the potential transplantation of an Article 9 type regime in France. As it 
has already been mentioned in the introduction, its scope of coverage is large and 
includes any kind of movables, corporal and incorporeal property. Thus, any 
personal property assets, debts or shares can be used as collateral for security 
purposes. The collateral can embrace a universality of assets, or can even include the 
proceeds obtained from the sale of the collateral547. The list is not exhaustive and 
only illustrates the global character of the ‘security interest’. Thus, it could be 
difficult to conceive the analysis and notion of real right in relation to certain types of 
assets, covered in Article 9, such as incorporeal property. The difficulty comes from 
the idea that a real right can only be in relation to an existing and determined 
movable548. Therefore, it could be ‘maladroit ’ to define a potential global security, 
including such a wide range of types of property, as a real right549.
The notion of real right associated to the concept o f security within Civilian 
jurisdictions has always led to substantial theoretical debates. Particularly, the limits 
of a security law regime based on the notion of real right in respect of security 
created in intellectual property assets have already been highlighted in Chapter Two. 
Again, it would seem difficult to demonstrate the existence of a real right in respect 
of incorporeal property. Despite the fact that incorporeal property is insusceptible of 
physical appropriation, it has to be highlighted that the owner o f such property still 
has a right ‘de facto ’ over the asset, an authority similar to the one offered under 
physical possession550. Thus, it has been argued that the intangible character of the
546 Right to follow the assets in the hands o f third parties.
547 §9-306 (3) UCC provides that if the collateral (purchase money security interest) is sold the
security interest continues in the proceeds if  they can still be identifiable.
548 In effect, one can possess property and hold a right but it is difficult to see how one could
materially possess a right.
549 Brierley, J. “Le Droit des Biens dans le Nouveau Code civil du Quebec” (1995) 47(1) Revue 
Internationale de Droit Compare, at p. 40.
550 Cabrillac, M., Et al., Droit des Suretes, (2007), at p. 377.
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asset used as collateral would not compromise the principle of real right associated to 
the notion o f security551.
Quebec had to deal with this issue when they reformed its secured credit law regime, 
and introduced the concept of the ‘hypothec’ modelled on the American security 
interest. Surprisingly, the hypothec is still defined as a real right notwithstanding
f f i
the critics expressed following the analysis of such a notion . The definition seems 
to retain the creditor’s preferential right and the right to ‘follow the property into 
whosever hands it may be’. Rather than keeping the idea o f real right with its ‘Droit 
de preference’ and ‘Droit de suite", it would have been more appropriate to simply 
refer to the creditor’s hypothec ‘enforceable right’ against third parties554. In effect, 
considering the broadened scope of the hypothec, the real character of the creditor’s 
right does not seem to be any longer relevant. Thus, it is argued that the new 
hypothec, embracing such a new large range of assets, dictated the new content and 
object o f property law in Quebec555.
One could legitimately question why legal reformers kept this materialist approach of 
the real right notion together with the transplant of this new global security, the 
hypothec. One o f the major justifications lies in the fact that Quebec is part of a 
strong legal culture which embraces legal concepts and notions that will be difficult 
to wipe away, especially in respect o f property law concepts. Also, it might be easier 
for the legal and commercial community to keep certain components which they are 
familiar with in order to facilitate the transition and reach a successful legal 
transplant556.
551 Pelissier, A., Possession etM eubles incorporels, (2003).
552 Article 2260 C.Civ. provides: “[a] hypothec is a real right on a movable or a immovable property 
made liable for the performance o f an obligation. It confers on the creditor the right to follow the 
property into whosever hands it may be, to take possession of it or to take it in payment, or to sell it or 
cause it to be sold and, in that case, to have a preference upon the proceeds o f the sale ranking as 
determined in this code” cited in Brierley op. cit. fn. 549, at p. 41.
553 The traditional and usual notion o f real right postulates that it cannot exist in every form o f goods, 
especially intangibles.
554 Brierley op. cit. fn. 549, at p. 41.
555 Ibid.
556 Ibid. at p. 42.
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The legal transplantation of Article 9 UCC in France would arguably lead to similar 
terminological issues. Article 9 does not recognise property rights but interests in 
property. Although, it is noticeable that the concept of real right may have lost some 
of its significance, especially following the reform introduced in France in 2006, the 
concept of security interest could not be imported without reforming the baseline 
concepts of French property law. French property law only recognises rights in 
property and not interests in property. Thus, and similarly to England, further 
difficulties could emerged in relation to property-based security such as the retention 
of title clause mechanisms. In effect, the importation o f the functional approach 
would involve a complete reconceptualisation of retention o f title clauses within 
French secured credit law regimes as it will be now envisaged.
The retention of title clause dilemma
The legal transplantation of Article 9 UCC would also have important implications in 
relation to property-based securities such as retention o f title clauses. As the above 
examination already highlighted, Article 9 of the UCC do not recognise retention of 
title clauses but recognise a similar mechanism relabelled as the purchase money 
security interest. The question of the potential legal transplantation of Article 9 UCC 
in French secured credit law would raise the issue of whether to include retention of 
title clauses in the unitary regime. In the light of this analysis on retention of title 
clauses, it is interesting to note that many of the arguments developed above on the 
exportability of Article 9 UCC in England could also be relevant under this section. 
In effect, France also retained a similar approach to retention o f title clauses by 
treating them as property-based security. In that sense, most o f the criticisms 
addressed previously to the feasibility of a successful legal transplantation of Article 
9 UCC into English law would also become pertinent for France. Retention of title 
clauses are very popular security device within the commercial community in France 
and it will be interesting to expose some of its main features. Despite the existence of 
some uncertainties faced by sellers, it is arguable that the legal transplantation of 
Article 9 as legal method to modernise the law would not be successful in France.
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For a long time, Civil Law jurisdictions did not conceive that property could be used 
as a security device557. Therefore, it is not surprising that the legal recognition of 
retention o f title clauses is only quite recent. Before 1980, French courts did not 
contest the validity in itself of the clause but they often condemned retention o f title
ffO
clauses in the case of the debtor’s insolvency . The retention of title clause implies 
that the seller’s goods are not transferred into the debtor’s pool of assets until full 
payment. Therefore, the seller remains the owner of the assets and can therefore 
claim them back in the situation of an insolvency proceeding against the debtor. 
Sellers, with a retention o f title clause, could therefore escape the ‘loi du dividende’, 
normally applied to other creditors within an insolvency proceeding559. This is the 
equivalent to the pari passu principle recognised under bankruptcy and insolvency 
laws in England.
The fact that property could not be used for security purposes was criticised and 
started to be contested within French local courts560. The French supreme court, Cour 
de Cassation finally condemned this solution in 1934561. The reasoning adopted was 
that the goods sold under a retention of title clause were part of the apparent562 
debtor’s pool o f assets and that sellers could not recover their assets sold to the 
insolvent buyer. The seller could only recover them if he had given notice before the 
opening o f the insolvency proceeding. The doctrine generally agreed to this new 
ruling and judges applied the law accordingly and very strictly563. This inevitably led 
to the quasi disappearance of the retention of title clause mechanism but not for long.
557 A security over movable property is analysed as being the accessory o f a real right. It would be 
difficult to consider how a property-based security could be qualified as an accessory of a real right.
558 Saint-Cene, M. “Retention o f title Clauses in France” (1999) in Davies op. cit. fn. 398, Chapter 
Five.
559 See e.g. Perochon, F., La Reserve de Propriete Dans la Vente de Meubles Corporels, (1988).
560See e.g. Bordeaux, 26th July 1899, D.P. 1901. 2. 152; Bourges, 17,h February 1902. D.P. 1902. 2. 
448; Rouen, 19th March 1931, J. Faill.1931. 231, Paris, 23rd May 1932, G.P. 1932. 2. 387; Caen, 29th 
June and Grenoble, 4th July 1932, G.P. 2. 843; Angers, 23rd November 1932, G.P. 1933. 1. 571; 
Limoges, 3rd March 1933 and Grenoble, 13th March 1933, G.P. 1933.2. 46; Nimes, 13th May, Lyon, 
29th May andRiom, 8th June 1933, G.P. 1933. 2 424.
561 Cour de Cassation, CCiv. 22nd October and 28th March 1934, D.P. 1934. 1. 151, n. J. Vandamme.
562 It is apparent for other creditors that the goods sold under a retention o f title clause are part o f the 
debtor’s pool o f asset. In fact, they do not have the knowledge of the existence o f such a clause. 
Therefore, when creditors lend money to the debtor, they legitimately think that the debtor’s assets 
will secure their credit. This is the theory of the “Apparente solvability” (apparent solvability o f the 
debtor or ‘false health’).
563 Perochon op. cit. fn. 559.
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The Law of 12th May 1980564, Loi Dubanchet, confirmed by the Law of 25th January 
1985, now recognises the action565 of the seller to recover his goods566 sold under 
retention of title clause in the context o f an insolvency procedure. With the 
introduction of the ‘action en revendication’, the creditor is now entitled to the 
recognition of his property right and to the recovery of his goods upon the debtor’s
tViinsolvency. This innovative legislation was followed by the Law of 10 June 1994 
which also constitutes a major step in the French legal history of retention of title 
clauses. This law reinforced the protection of the creditor’s interests by increasing his 
prerogatives567.
Finally, Article 13 of the Ordinance of 23rd March 2006568 integrated new 
regulations in relation to the retention of title clause now incorporated in the Civil 
code. The Ordinance provides a definition of the retention of title clause now 
enshrined in Article 2367 C.civ569. Also, the ordinance now establishes the 
conditions to be fulfilled in order to draft a valid retention o f title clause (Article 
2368 C.civ). Finally, the ordinance fixes the legal regime applicable to the different 
types o f retention o f title clauses (Articles 2369 and 2370 C.civ)510.
564 The Law o f 12th May 1980. Loi n°80-335 du 12 mai 1980 relative aux effets des clauses de reserve 
de propriete dans les contrats de vente.
565 The Law o f 25th January 1985. Loi n°85-98 du 25 janvier 1985 relative au redressement et a la 
liquidation judiciaires des entreprises.
566 The goods have to be in kind at the time of the insolvency proceedings opening in order to be 
entitiled to claim them back.
567 Two measures have been introduced with the Law 10th June 1984. First, the law has created an 
optional publicity mechanism o f the contract of sale affected by a retention o f title clause. If the 
creditor gave notice o f his contract of sale with a retention o f title clause, he will not need to introduce 
an ‘action en revendication ’ but only an ‘action en restitution ’ which is a much easier and quicker 
procedure. Secondly, the law allows the vendor to claim back incorporated goods subject to retention 
o f title if they can be removed without damage. This claim in kind can also be exercised over 
fungibles goods if  they are of the same type and same quality. Loi no 94-475 du 10 Juin 1994 relative 
a la prevention et au traitement des difficultes des entreprises.
568 Ordinance No 2006-346, 23rd March, 2006, Article 13 Journal Officiel du 24 Mars 2006.
569 Article 2367 C.Civ. now provides a definition of retention o f title clauses. It states that: 
“[o]wnership o f a property may be retained as security through a clause o f retention o f title which 
suspends the transferring effect o f a contract until payment in full o f the obligation which 
compensates for it. Ownership so retained is the accessory of the debt whose payment it secures.”
570 The ordinance o f the 23rd March 2006 now deals with the problem o f incorporation. Article 2370 
C.Civ. now provides that the incorporation o f a good subject to a retention o f title clause to another 
goods can still be claimed by the seller if it can be separated without damages.
Article 2371 C.Civ. deals with the right to surplus. It provides that if  the value o f the good recovered 
is higher than the original debt, the creditor will have to give the difference back to the debtor. Article 
2372 C.Civ. deals with the proceeds o f resale and provides that the creditor will be able to replace the 
position o f the buyer if the latest has sold the goods to a third party through the mechanism o f the 
subrogation. This mechanism will be only possible if  the third party has not yet paid the purchase
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Theses legal changes have certainly favour a substantial increase in the use of 
retention of title clauses within the commercial community but it is arguable that the 
law did not go far enough towards a successful modernisation of retention of title 
mechanism. As under English law, the recognition of retention of title clauses in 
France also creates the problem of ostensible ownership571 and also leads to 
important difficulties relating to the nature of the buyer’s and seller’s rights. Again, 
and as for the Common Law jurisdiction of England, the adoption o f an Article 9 
type regime would avoid these difficulties. Furthermore, it is recognised that the 
adoption of the American model would substantially expand the pool o f assets 
available to creditors by establishing the validity o f extended clauses with the 
purchase money security interest which is the not the case under the current French 
regime.
Reforming the law relative to security and specifically to retention of title is a 
delicate undertaking. As it has been previously explained within the analysis o f a 
potential transplant o f Article 9 in England, a reform modelled on the unitary 
security interest would involve substantial reform of the baseline concepts of 
property law in France. In effect, French law also distinguishes between property 
rights and priority rights which do not coincide with the current American functional 
approach. The difficulty lies with the fact that a property-based security such as the 
retention of title clause relates to sale of goods transactions and not to security 
transactions.
A reform modelled on Article 9 UCC would involve substantial legal and policy 
issues that will need to be tackled in a balanced approach. For instance, the delicate 
question of the good faith purchaser should be considered within a reform of security 
law. If  a bona fide  purchaser enters in possession of the goods originally sold under 
retention of title and if the buyer becomes insolvent, the question emerges whether
price to the buyer so he can pay it to the seller straight away. This implies that the seller had notice of 
the resale by the buyer. The same solution will be applied in the situation where the goods have been 
destroyed. The money from the insurance can be paid directly to the creditor through the system o f the 
subrogation.
571 The issue o f ostensible ownership has been partially solved thanks to the law 10th June 1994 which 
instituted an optional publicity mechanism for retention of title clauses. Such publicity would reward 
sellers by offering them a simplified action for the recovery o f their property upon the debtor’s 
insolvency (action en restitution).
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the asset should be returned to the original owner or whether the good faith purchaser 
should become the new owner572. Who should prevail? If a third party is buying 
goods in good faith from the insolvent buyer, the first time seller will not be able to 
recover his assets sold and secured under retention of title clause. In effect, according 
to Article 2276 of the French Civil Code, “/ e]n fa it de meubles, la possession vaut
c 7'»
titre” , the good faith purchaser will become the legal owner of the goods bought 
from the insolvent buyer. The seller will not recover the goods but will only be 
entitled to damages from the insolvent buyer. If the third party did not buy the goods 
in good faith574, the first time seller will be able to recover his goods in the hand of 
the bad faith purchaser.
This problem could have easily been solved with the creation o f a compulsory 
publicity and registration mechanism in relation to retention o f title clauses as in 
Article 9 of the UCC. Such a publicity mechanism would prevent third parties from 
using Article 2276 Civil code in their favour. In fact, how could third parties pretend 
to be in good faith if the retention of title clause was published? This publicity 
system was already suggested by the ‘Groupe GrimaldV515 but has not been kept in 
the ordinance of 23rd march 2006.
Another important limit to retention of title for creditors relates to extended retention 
of title clauses such as proceeds and manufactured clauses. If  the asset sold under 
retention of title has been resold or manufactured576, the creditor will not usually be 
able to recover his property upon the debtor’ insolvency577. One solution would have 
been to extend the scope of the retention of title as it has been done with the purchase 
money security interest under Article 9 of the UCC. In effect, according to the 
American model, if the debtor resells or manufactures the asset, the security interest
572 Piette op. cit. fn. 233.
573 “In matters o f movables, possession is equivalent to a title.”
574 i.e., with the knowledge that there was a retention o f title clause attached to the goods.
575 “ Groupe de Travail Relatif a la Reforme du Droit des Suretes, Rapport a Monsieur Dominique 
Perben, Garde des Sceaux, Ministre de la Justice”, 28th March 2005, 
http://droit.wester.ouisse.free.fr/textes/TD_suretes/rapport_grimaldi_28_mars_2005.pdf (last checked 
26/04/2010).
576 Goods can still be recovered if  they have been manufactured only if  the assets are still identifiable, 
i.e., if  the assets can be separated without damage. See above fn. 570.
577 Exceptions are provided in Articles 2370 and 2372 o f the Civil code. See above fn. 570.
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will continue in the transformed collateral578. However, the adoption of the purchase 
money security interest would involve the abandonment of ownership within the 
regulation o f French secured credit law regime. This would lead to significant 
practical and legal problems. Such a scheme would involve the abolishment, or at 
least involve substantial reform, of Article 1583 of the French Civil code which 
governs the transfer of property within the French sale of goods law579. The 
modification o f such Article would lead to substantial bouleversement within the 
commercial and economic life580. In this respect, the example of Germany is 
interesting to consider. In effect, Germany also recognises the validity of 
manufactured clauses under certain conditions. In principle, according to Article 950
581BGB , manufactured clauses are not valid unless the retention of title clause allows 
the buyer to manufacture the goods on behalf of the seller, thus, allowing the latest to 
retain title in the new asset . This position is interesting to consider in the way it 
aims to achieve similar goals than of the security interest by expanding the pool of 
assets available to creditors without interacting or modifying the rules of property 
law.
The adoption o f a similar regime validating extended retention of title clauses would 
however lead to substantial difficulties in France. If the seller is entitled to use his 
‘right to trace’ in relation to transformed goods, the question of the calculation of the 
added value to the original goods would come to light. Moreover, the adoption of the 
German model in relation to extended retention of title clauses would not solve the
578 The equivalent o f ‘extended retention o f title’ is regulated by Article § 9-306 1) UCC which 
provides that: "[pjroceeds" clauses are valid and the security interest continues in the proceeds. (3) 
The security interest in proceeds is a continuously perfected security interest if  the interest in the 
original collateral was perfected but it ceases to be a perfected security interest and becomes 
unperfected ten days after receipt o f the proceeds by the debtor. The security interest in the proceeds 
must be re registered within 10 days.”The equivalent of enlarged retention o f title is regulated by 
Article § 9-314 (Accessions) and 9-315 (Priority when goods are commingled or processed) UCC. 
The equivalent o f all monies retention o f title clause is regulated by § 9-204 UCC.
579Article 1583 C.Civ. provides that the sale is complete between the parties, and ownership is 
acquired as o f  right by the buyer with respect to the seller, as soon as the thing and the price have been 
agreed upon, although the thing has not yet been delivered or the price paid. It has been proposed a 
reform according to which transfer o f property should be subordinated to the payment o f the price. On 
this point: Mouly, C. “Faut-il Retarder le transfert de Propriete” (1995) JCP ed. C l 1995, supp. No 5.
580 Riffard op. cit. fn. 539, at p. 163.
581BGB §950, first Para.: "... who creates a new moveable by processing or transforming one or more 
raw materials, acquires property o f the new moveable, if  the value of the processing or transforming is 
not substantially below that o f the raw material."
582 Monti op. cit. fn. 419, at p. 869.
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issue o f the ostensible ownership, despite the establishment o f the optional publicity 
mechanism instituted by the law 10th June 1984. Thus, extending the scope of the 
retention of title mechanism would seem difficult to achieve considering the 
specificity of such a security device which relates to sale o f goods transactions. Legal 
reformers in France might have found a solution to an extended use of property- 
based securities inspired from the Anglo-American trust mechanism relabelled under 
the term offlducie. In effect, the law of 19th February 2007583 recently instituted the 
flducie under French law which introduced substantial modernisation to the French
c o  a
Civil code following its previous reform on security law .
The introduction o f the fiducie : the extension to the use of property-based securities
The fiducie is defined in Article 2011 C.civ. as a transaction whereby one or more 
settlors transfer assets, rights, or sureties, or a group o f assets, rights or sureties, 
present or future, to one or more trustees who, keeping them separated from their 
own patrimony, will act according to a specific purpose in the interest of one of more 
beneficiaries. Two types of fiducies are recognised under French law; the fiducie  
gestion ' and the fd u c ie  surete ’. The latest allows the debtor to transfer assets to the 
trustee in order to secure payment of a debt. If the settlor defaults, the creditor will be 
entitled to the flducie and the newly created patrimony will be attributed to him. On 
the other hand, if  the settlor honours his debt, the trustee will have to retrocede the 
assets accordingly. Since the Law on the Economic Modernisation of 5th August 
2008, the fiducie can be created by any individual or legal person585. However, it is 
recognised that this security device would lack the simplicity and flexibility 
recognised under the retention of title mechanism. The validity o f such security 
device is subject to registration in a special registry586and must be recorded in written
COT
with several burdensome and compulsory mentions .
583 Loi n° 2007-211 du 19 Fevrier 2007 instituant la fiducie (1) available from 
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000000821047&dateTexte= (last 
checked 26/04/2010).
584 Reform introduced with the Law o f 23rd March 2006.
585Under the original law o f 19th February 2007 introducing the fiducie in the Civil code, only legal 
persons were allowed to become trustees.
586 Article 2020 C.Civ.
587 Article 2018 C.Civ.
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The fiducie arrangement functions as a transfer of property with an affectation of the 
assets to a separated patrimony. This mechanism does not relate to sale of goods
coo
transactions but belongs to secured transactions . The fiducie uses ownership for 
security purposes with the exclusive aim to provide the creditor with a preferential 
payment upon the debtor’s default. The recognition of the fiducie has proved to 
introduce a significant modernisation within French secured lending legislation with 
a definite aim to harmonise its law with other jurisdictions. Nevertheless, the 
introduction o f the fiducie into the French law of security has been criticised and it is 
believed that its recognition would eventually lead to the quasi disappearance o f 
other security devices such as the traditional pledge. Ultimately, it is arguable that 
the security law system in France would essentially be founded on propertyrbased
COQ
security including the retention of title mechanism and the fiducie-surete’ .
Beyond these interesting recent legal reforms within French secured transactions law, 
it is important to emphasise that the legal reform of 2006 did not adopt the unitary 
concept of a global security590 nor the registration scheme recommended by the 
Groupe Grimaldi. It is arguable that the main obstacle to the successful legal 
transplantation o f Article 9 in France would lie with the significant place given to 
property rights together with the conservation and extension of property-based 
securities within its legislation on secured credit. In light of this analysis on the legal 
transplantation o f Article 9 UCC in France as legal method to modernise its secured 
credit law regime, it will be interesting to consider the case of Quebec where the 
legal transplantation of Article 9 was used to modernise and approximate the law. It 
is arguable that the experience o f Quebec to transplant an Article 9 type has not yet 
been totally successful. Particularly, it is interesting to highlight that Quebec adopted 
a global security device modelled on Article 9 but preserved property-based security 
such as the retention of title clause. Accordingly, it is arguable that the legal
588 Similar to the retention o f title mechanism, the fiducie uses ownership for security purposes. 
However, the fiducie does not belong to the category of sale o f goods transactions but still operates a 
transfer o f title for security purposes. Thus, as for the retention of title clauses, the fiducie is a 
property- based security device.
589 Riffard op. cit. fn. 539, at p. 163.
590 France did not adopt a global security modelled on Article 9 of the UCC. However, the reform has 
simplified the categorisation o f securities over movables property into four categories. Article 2329 
C.Civ. provides that securities over movables are; Prior charges over movables {Privileges), Charges 
over corporeal movables {Gages), Charges over incorporeal movables {Nantissements) and Retention 
o f title clauses {Clause de Reserve de Propriete).
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transplantation of Article 9 and its functional approach did not totally succeed in 
Quebec. Ultimately, this concluding section will argue that the legal transplantation 
of Article 9 would also face fundamental obstacles related to the cultural 
backgrounds in Civilian jurisdictions.
The legal transplantation o f  Article 9 UCC in Quebec: a mixed success
Since the reform made in 1999 in Quebec, the retention o f title must be published 
within fifteen days of its creation591 in order to be enforceable against third parties. 
However, Article 1749 Civil code of Quebec (CCQ thereafter) provides that if the 
contract of sale, subject to retention of title clause, is not published or published late, 
the seller has still the right to recover his property only if it is still in the hands of the 
original buyer. Therefore, the Civil code does not consider the publication to be a 
condition of validity of the clause but only a condition of enforceability against third 
parties which differ from the American position.
In the case Ouellet (Trustee o f f92, the debtor bought property from a seller with 
retention of title. After a few years, the buyer became bankrupt and a trustee in 
bankruptcy was appointed. The seller claimed his property back on the basis of the 
retention o f title clause. The trustee rejected the claim because the seller did not 
publish the retention of title at the time of the sale593. The legal question was to 
determine whether unpublished retention of title could be set up against the trustee in 
bankruptcy. The Superior Court and the Court of Appeal held that the seller could 
not recover his property and that an unpublished retention of title clause was not 
enforceable against the trustee in bankruptcy.
The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal on the basis that the property sold 
to the buyer, under a non published reservation of title, never became part of his pool 
of assets. Moreover, under the Article 1749 CCQ, the trustee in bankruptcy was not 
considered as a third person acquirer. Therefore, as the trustee in bankruptcy is only
591 The publication in the RPMRR (Register for Personal and Movable Real Rights) o f reservations of 
title is now compulsory since 1998. Failure to publish, results in the repossession of the goods by the 
buyer (only if  property is still in the hands of the first buyer (Article 1749 CCQ)).
592 Ouellet (Trustee oj), [2004] 3 SCR 348, 2004 SCC 64.
593 Article 1745 CCQ.
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vested with the rights and obligations of the bankrupt buyer, he could not reject the 
claim of the seller, still considered to be the owner of the goods594. This decision of 
the Canadian Supreme Court goes against the new disposition of the Civil code that 
requires quasi securities to be registered in order to be enforceable against third 
parties595. Although Quebec adopted a similar regime to the American Article 9 
UCC, it seems that retention o f title clauses have kept much of their original form 
and legal regime. Retention o f title clauses were not included in the general regime 
of the hypothec, and the registration requirements appear to be somehow quite 
artificial.
Beyond the formal and substantial limits that have been analysed above, other 
reasons can be advanced for the justification of this reluctance to adopt the American 
regime. Civilian jurisdictions are eager to preserve their legal culture. An integral 
legal transplantation of the American Article 9 could be seen as a threat to the 
conservation o f the Civilian legal identity. This movement to protect the diversity of 
legal cultures is an important component to take into account in the assessment o f the 
success of the legal transplantation of the American Article 9 UCC. This trend to 
protect legal cultural has already been discussed during the General Agreement o f  
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1993 under the doctrine o f ‘cultural exception’596.
Further, the World Bank recently published a series of Reports “Doing Business”597 
stating, for instance, that Civilian’s security law was inadequate to the Economic 
growth in general. The Association Henri Capitant598 published two volumes of 
answers to these reports599, refuting some incorrect data and criticising the
594 See. fn. 592.
595 Deschamps op. cit. fn. 537.
596 Gordon, P.H., Et al., The French Challenge: Adapting to Globalization, (2001), at p. 48.
597See the “Doing Business” Reports published by the World Bank: "Understanding regulation" 
(2004), "Removing obstacles to growth" (2005), “Creating jobs” (2006) and “how to reform” (2007) 
available at http://www.doingbusiness.org/ (last checked 26/04/2010).
598 Association Henri Capitant des Amis de la Culture Juridique Franfaise. See 
http://www.henricapitant.org/ (last checked 26/04/2010).
599 The first volume only provides the views and critics o f the French Group : “ Reponse de 
l ’Association Henri Capitant aux Rapports "Doing business" de la Banque Mondiale - Les droits de 
tradition civiliste en question », volume 1. The second volume provides for other views on the World 
Bank reports from 23 other civilian jurisdictions: “Reponse de l’Association Henri Capitant aux 
Rapports "Doing business" de la Banque Mondiale - Les droits de tradition civiliste en question, 
volume 2.” These volumes are available from
http://www.henricapitant.org/search/node/les%20droits%20de%20tradition (last checked 26/04/2010).
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controversial method o f analysis used by the authors, but mainly, trying to determine 
the advantages of Civil Law jurisdictions in an economic context.
The first volume of responses, in respect of those Reports ‘Doing Business’, strongly 
criticised the use of the economic analysis as a method to assess the adequacy of 
national commercial law and as a method to determine the easiness of doing business 
within different jurisdictions600. Furthermore, the response proceeds to a verification 
o f the pertinence of the data used and proceeds to a verification of the conclusions 
drawn by the World Bank. Particular emphasis was given on the structural and 
substantial advantages of the Civilian Law tradition to regulate economic 
activities601. The volume concludes that the law, whether part of the Civilian or the 
Common Law traditions, has got it own value and, consequently, should exclude its 
subordination to the economic analysis.
The willingness of the World Bank and other international entities602 to reduce the 
differences among the different legal systems’ fundamental legal values to a unique 
common denominator can be assimilated to the eternal quest o f ‘finding the lowest 
price at the lowest costs’. As it has been highlighted by the president of the 
Association Henri Capitant, ‘... Apres les Low Costs, la Low Cost Law?'603 The law 
should not only be generated through abstract equations and solely through the 
economic analysis. O f course, the economic analysis and promotion of economic 
growth are important to the elaboration of the commercial law but other essential 
values such as legal culture, political, social environment and other components also 
have their importance in the making of the law. Accordingly, proponents of the 
conservation of legal cultures argue that, since law is cultural and that there cannot 
be a universal culture, there cannot be and there should not be a universal law604.
600 See Chapter One at pp. 33-39.
601 Association Henri Capitant des Amis de la Culture Juridique Frangaise. “Les Droits de Tradition 
Civiliste en Question : A Propos des rapports Doing Business de la Banque Mondiale”. See above 
fii.127.
602 Endeavours for the approximation o f secured credit law regimes can be found with international 
initiatives such as UNCITRAL, EBRD, or UNIDROIT. See above fn. 104.
603 Association Henri Capitant des Amis de la Culture Juridique Franfaise, “Communique de presse : 
presentation officielle du volume 1 "Les droits de tradition civiliste en question" a la Caisse des 
Depots et Consignation, effectuee le 26 avril 2006.”
604 Ibid.
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The point made by the Association Henri Capitant is not to favour a certain legal 
culture to another but to determine whether one can provide for a rational 
justification for the adoption of a foreign legal system. The movement towards the 
protection of legal culture is particularly strong in Civil Law jurisdictions and would 
arguably constitute a significant obstacle to the successful legal transplantation of 
Article 9 UCC in France.
CONCLUSION
This analysis attempted to determine whether the legal transplantation o f Article 9 
UCC could be used as legal method to modernise and approximate secured credit law 
regimes in some European jurisdictions. Legal transplantation has been widely used 
as method for legal reforms, particularly during Roman times. An analysis of the 
literature on legal transplantation did not manage to provide for a general theory that 
could determine a priori the likeliness of success of a specific legal transplant. Some 
theories argue that a legal transplant could be successful because the legal rule can be 
integrated in a foreign legal system, no matter how. Other theories consider that legal 
culture would substantially undermine the success of legal transplantation. These 
theories further assert that the way the legal rule is integrated is part o f the 
assessment of a successful legal transplant. Accordingly, if the legal rule is integrated 
and subsequently differently applied in different recipient’s jurisdictions, the legal 
transplant would not be successful.
The case study dealing with the legal transplantation of the Roman law concept of 
accessio did not manage to confirm the arguments advanced in the theories. 
Although the Roman legal concept was successfully integrated in the laws of 
different entities such as France or England, the way it has been absorbed shows 
some divergences which could undermine the success of the legal transplant. Legal 
transplantation would fail as legal method to modernise the law in the light of an 
approximation of laws. Nevertheless, it is concluded that this core principle of the 
Roman law of property still, has been integrated in the law of different jurisdictions 
despite some divergences in its application. Similarly, it was considered whether the 
concept o f the security interest enshrined in Article 9 could be transplanted for law
reform purposes in jurisdictions from different legal backgrounds.
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Article 9 UCC was fundamental to consider because it has uniformly modernised the 
laws of every States in America. Accordingly, the question emerged whether the 
legal transplantation o f Article 9 UCC could similarly modernise and approximate 
secured credit law regimes in European jurisdictions. The analysis was restricted to 
England and France which are representatives of a sample o f jurisdictions that 
belong to different legal traditions. The examination o f the literature on legal 
transplantation did not provide a clear guidance on a determination a priori of the 
likelihood of success of such legal transplants. Thus, this analysis adopted a 
pragmatic approach by attempting to assess the feasibility and desirability of the 
legal transplantation of Article 9 UCC in English and French legal regimes.
It was showed that the legal transplantation of Article 9 UCC as legal method to 
modernise English secured credit law regime remains uncertain. Although, it is 
recognised that the adoption of a code as legal receptacle for legal reforms may only 
create a relative obstacle, it is further explained that the true obstacle to the legal 
transplantation of an Article 9 type in English secured credit law would lie with the 
functional approach retained in the legal rule. In effect, English law retained a 
substantial approach to the regulation of its secured credit law, so that each security 
device is regulated by a specific set of rules. This analysis demonstrated that the 
functional approach regulating a global security interest would substantially alter the 
fundamental baseline property law concepts well entrenched in English law. For 
example, the importation of the functional approach would remove the use of 
property security devices, such as retention of title mechanisms.
Most importantly, it was emphasised that the true obstacle to the successful legal 
transplantation of Article 9 as legal method to modernise secured credit law regime 
in England would lie with the existence of the floating charge. It is argued that the 
floating charge already offers similar benefits than the ones offered under the 
American security interest. In effect, similarly to the floating charge, the floating lien 
also enables the debtor to give a security on actual and future assets and use the 
charged assets in the normal course of business. The main difficulties identified in 
respect of the floating charge lie with the priority system which belongs to 
insolvency law regimes and not to secured credit law regimes. Thus, following an
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analysis of the floating charge, it is difficult to recognise a coherent rationale behind 
the importation of an Article 9 type regime as a means to modernise English secured 
credit law regime. This demonstration thus concluded that a successful legal 
transplantation of an Article 9 type regime into English secured credit law regime 
remains uncertain as a successful legal method to modernise the law.
It was further considered whether the legal transplantation of Article 9 could 
successfully be used as legal method to modernise secured credit law regime in 
France. To this end, the law reforms experience of Quebec, also part of the Civil Law 
tradition, was considered. Indeed, Quebec integrated, to a certain extent, Article 9 
UCC. It is argued that the experience of Quebec in transplanting Article 9 has not yet 
been totally successful. Although Quebec adopted a global security device modelled 
on Article 9, property-based security devices, such as the retention o f title clauses 
were preserved. Similarly, it is argued that the transplantation of the American model 
may also be uncertain in France in light o f substantial terminological 
incompatibilities and in light of the functional approach retained in Article 9. The 
main obstacle to the legal transplantation o f Article 9 in France would lie with the 
reconceptualisation o f retention o f title clauses, needed to successfully import the 
American regime. Further, since the introduction of the fiducie, it seems that French 
secured credit law regime now largely depends upon property-based security 
mechanisms rather than evolving towards a more functional approach and towards 
the adoption of the unitary security interest.
The experience of the Civilian jurisdiction of Quebec was fundamental to consider 
within this analysis on the transferability of the American model in France. In effect, 
the transplantation o f Article 9 in Quebec highlighted some of the difficulties related 
to property law concepts that French law could encounter in transplanting the 
American model. Further, such comparative analysis also highlighted that beyond the 
terminological and conceptual difficulties faced by legal reformers to transplant 
Article 9 in Quebec, cultural obstacles such as the willingness to preserve a specific 
legal culture would also play a large part. Accordingly, and in light of the emergence 
o f recent literature on the importance and significance o f legal culture, a successful 
legal transplantation o f an unfamiliar concept such as the security interest appears to
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be uncertain in France. It is thus arguable that if national laws and legal cultures are 
to be preserved, the quest for the modernisation and approximation of laws through 
legal transplantation would also become uncertain. Although, the endeavours to 
protect legal cultures are important, they should be balanced with the need to 
modernise and approximate legal regimes when needed. In this respect, it is 
explained that:
“[l]egal conservatism and a protectionist attitude towards “legal tradition” can, if  not 
appropriately managed, become major obstacles to successful reform.”605
It is further recognised that:
“[t]he protection of legal tradition and the integrity of the legal system are to be 
encouraged but they have to be balanced against the need of markets to move 
forward.”606
To conclude, the use of the legal transplantation of Article 9 UCC as legal method to 
modernise and approximate French and English secured credit law regimes is 
unlikely to be successful. Particularly, it was emphasised that legal culture can create 
significant obstacles, especially in jurisdictions that belong to the Civilian traditions. 
If  national legal identity can constitute a substantial obstacle to the success of certain 
legal transplants, a more accommodating legal method, such as legal harmonisation, 
may stand better chance to successfully modernise and approximate secured credit 
law regimes. Legal harmonisation involves the accommodation and reduction of 
national legal differences for law reform purposes. To the difference of legal 
transplantation, legal harmonisation does not involve the adoption of a foreign legal 
regime into the law of a recipient entity. Instead, legal harmonisation proceeds to the 
identification of legal differences and attempts to accommodate them for law reform 
purposes. The use of legal harmonisation as legal method to modernise and 
approximate secured credit law regimes will thus be considered in subsequent 
developments.
605 Dahan, F., Et al. “Legal Efficiency of Secured Transactions Reform: Bridging the Gap Between 
Economic analysis and Legal Reasoning” in Dahan, F., Et al., Secured Transactions Reform and 
Access to Credit, (2008), at p. 124.
606 Ibid. at p. 126.
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CHAPTER FOUR
HARMONISATION AND THE MODERNISATION OF SECURED CREDIT
LAW REGIMES
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, endeavours to harmonise secured credit law regimes have 
particularly been productive to support the growth o f regional economic markets. In 
effect, the recognition o f free movement of goods and services among certain 
jurisdictions led to the necessity to establish more harmonious commercial laws607. 
Significant examples o f harmonisation initiatives can be found within regional 
economic organisations such as the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA)608, the Mercado Comun Del Sur (MERCOSUR) 609 or the European Single 
Market610 where the necessity to recognise harmonious legal rules among Members
607 Rosett, A. “Unification, Harmonization, Restatement, Codification, and Reform in International 
Commercial Law” (1992) 40 American Journal o f  Comparative Law, at p. 685.
608 The North American Free Trade Agreement is a trade organisation comprising the United States, 
Canada and Mexico which was created in 1994. Harmonisation has essentially been supported by the 
United States o f America. Most provinces o f Canada adopted a personal property security law regime 
modelled on the Article 9 UCC. Mexico has not opted for a similar regime but it has been suggested 
that the adoption o f such regime would enhance trade and economic activities within NAFTA 
Member States. In this perspective, it would be more appropriate to talk about legal transplantation 
rather than harmonisation. Gopalan states for instance that: “... it would be safe to say that 
harmonization within the NAFTA context is “Americanization”” in Gopalan op. cit. fn. 135, at p. 138.
609 The Common Market o f the South is a regional trade agreement founded in 1991 by the Treaty o f  
Asuncion, later amended by the Treaty of Ouro Preto which purpose is to promote free trade and free 
movement o f goods. Members include Paraguay, Uruguay, Argentina and Brazil. Article 1 o f the 
Treaty o f  Asuncion provides that: “[t]he States Parties hereby decide to establish a common market, 
which shall be in place by 31 December 1994 and shall be called the "Common Market o f the 
Southern Cone" (MERCOSUR). This Common Market shall involve: The free movement o f goods, 
services and factors o f production between countries through, inter alia, the elimination o f customs 
duties and non-tariff restrictions on the movement of goods, and any other equivalent measures.” 
Furthermore, Article 25 o f the Treaty o f Ouro Preto provides that: “[t]he Joint Parliamentary 
Commission shall endeavour to speed up the corresponding internal procedures in the States Parties in 
order to ensure the prompt entry into force o f  the decisions taken by the Mercosur organs provided for 
in Article 2 o f this Protocol. Similarly, it shall assist with the harmonization o f legislations, as 
required to advance the integration process. When necessary, the Council shall request the Joint 
Parliamentary Commission to examine priority issues.”
610 Article 2 o f the Treaty establishing the European Community provides that: “[t]he Community 
shall have as its task, by establishing a common market and an economic and monetary union and by 
implementing common policies or activities referred to in Article 3 and 4, to promote throughout the 
community a harmonious, balanced and sustainable development o f economic activities, a high level 
o f employment and o f social protection, equality between men and women, sustainable and non- 
inflationary growth, a high degree o f competitiveness and convergence o f economic performance, a
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has proved to be a sine qua non condition to the successful development of 
economic activities. In this context, it is important to highlight that harmonisation is 
not only used to approximate legal regimes but is also used as legal method for law 
reform. Accordingly, the question of whether legal harmonisation could successfully 
be used as legal method to approximate and modernise secured credit law regimes 
will be addressed in this chapter.
Harmonisation can be broadly defined as a means to reduce and accommodate legal
differences amongst various national legal regimes. In this respect, harmonisation
can also be used as legal method for law reform. Zamora explains that:
“[hjarmonization does not entail the adoption of a single, model set o f rules, but 
instead implies a wide range of ways in which differences in legal concepts in 
different jurisdictions are accommodated. This accommodation can take place in 
many ways: by a process of law reform in one or more countries, reflecting 
influences beyond the jurisdiction’s borders; by the mediation of private law 
concepts adopted by parties caught between two legal systems; or by a myriad of 
other contact points between legal regimes, from academic writings, the conceits of 
law professors, to visit the government officials to neighboring countries.”611
Harmonisation is often associated with legal unification but this analysis clearly 
distinguishes between these two legal terms. While unification of law requires the 
establishment of a unique supra national legal rule, harmonisation o f law requires 
national legal reformers to amend their internal laws so as to reduce differences 
between their legal regimes. The function o f legal reform attributed to harmonisation 
is fundamental to this analysis. In effect, it is recognised that harmonisation and 
modernisation of the law should coincide. The harmonisation of secured credit laws 
should also come with the aim to reach a modem, efficient and predictable secured 
credit law regime as defined in Chapter Two. Accordingly, it is arguable that the use 
of legal harmonisation as legal method to modernise and approximate secured credit 
law regimes will be successful if  the accommodation o f differences amongst various 
national legislations can also lead to substantial modernisation o f the law. Such 
exercise would require considerable comparative law analysis o f the current 
differences underlying various national secured credit law regimes in order to
high level o f protection and improvement o f the quality of the environment, the raising o f the standard 
o f living and quality o f life, and economic and social cohesion and solidarity among Member States.”
611 Zamora, S. “NAFTA and the Harmonization o f Domestic Legal Systems: The Side Effects o f Free 
Trade” (1995) 12 Arizona Journal o f  International and Comparative Law, at p. 403.
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determine whether an accommodation is, if  at all, possible. Such a task would go 
beyond the scope o f this analysis. Thus, this examination will restrict its analysis to a 
specific case study on the harmonisation o f some aspects of secured credit law 
regimes in the European Union (thereafter, EU). Harmonisation of law will be 
considered in the context of the EU because this is one of the main methods used by 
European legislators to reform and approximate the law, especially through the use 
of European Directives. Directives have to be integrated into national laws through 
legal reforms. In this sense, Directives do achieve a reconciliation and 
accommodation of legal differences among Member States national legal regimes.
In the context of the EU, it is arguable that the harmonisation and modernisation of 
the law should be achieved so as to support the good functioning of the single 
market. If  the harmonisation o f secured credit law regimes is desirable in the EU, 
especially in light o f the requirements of the single market, the competence of the EU 
to legislate in the sphere of secured credit law regimes becomes questionable. In 
effect, the regulation of secured credit law regimes would involve substantial reform 
of contract law, property law and insolvency law which may restrict the extent to 
which the Community may interfere in the field of secured credit. Further, the 
regulation o f secured credit law regimes also involves delicate policy issues which 
outcomes may differ amongst the various European jurisdictions, and which 
outcomes may also be difficult to accommodate.
The EU already used harmonisation as legal method to attempt to approximate and 
modernise some aspects of secured credit law regimes in European Member States. 
The EU Directive on Late Payment attempted to harmonise retention of title 
clauses612but remained largely unsuccessful. The Directive only provides in its 
Article 4 that “Member States shall provide in conformity with the applicable 
national provisions designated by private international law that the seller retains title 
to goods until they are fully paid [...]”. Plainly, it only requires Member States to 
apply the relevant law according to their private international law, which they would 
do in any case. Accordingly, it is arguable that the Late Payment Directive did not
612 Directive 2000/35/EC o f the European Parliament and o f the Council o f 29th June 2000 on 
Combating Late Payment in Commercial Transactions, OJ L 200, 8.8.2000.
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succeed in introducing a uniform secured credit law regime. A more successful 
attempt has perhaps been achieved with the EU Financial Collateral Arrangements 
Directive6 l3which required Member States to introduce into their national laws 
financial collateral arrangements. The analysis o f the Directive falls outside the 
scope of the thesis but it is important to acknowledge this EU harmonisation attempt 
in the field o f secured credit. The Directive aimed at introducing a common legal 
framework for financial collateral arrangements by introducing effective rules which 
will contribute to the integration o f European financial markets and stimulate cross- 
border transactions and competitiveness.
The Directive adopts a different approach to the approximation o f certain aspects of 
national secured credit laws than the Late Payment Directive. The Directive adopts a 
more functional approach where the goals are set through the elaboration of a 
common set of rules rather than attempting to conciliate and accommodate 
differences. However, and as for the Late Payment Directive, the recognition of a 
common legal framework to the regulation o f financial collateral agreements did not 
totally succeed in providing a comprehensive approximation o f secured credit law 
regimes. These types of agreements are restricted in their scopes. In effect, it enables 
creditors to obtain a security right only in respect of specific types of assets. The 
Directive only covers financial collaterals in the form of cash or financial 
instruments615. Furthermore, parties to the financial collateral agreement are also 
restricted to public authorities; public sector bodies; central bank and a financial 
institution subject to prudential supervision616. The Directive also provides for an opt 
out clause in Article 1 (4)(b) which allows Member States to further restrict the scope 
of application of financial collateral arrangements. Finally, the Directive also 
required Member states to keep the formalities to a minimum which created some
613 Directive 2002/47/EC o f the European Parliament and of the Council o f 6 June 2002 on financial
collateral arrangements.
615 Article 2(1 )(d), “cash means money credited to an account in any currency, or similar claims for 
the repayment o f money cash as money market deposits” and article 2(1 )(e) “financial instruments" 
means shares in companies and other securities equivalent to shares in companies and bonds and other 
forms o f debt instruments if these are negotiable on the capital market, and any other securities which 
are normally dealt in and which give the right to acquire any such shares, bonds or other securities by 
subscription, purchase or exchange or which give rise to a cash settlement (excluding instruments of 
payment), including units in collective investment undertakings, money market instruments and 
claims relating to or rights in or in respect of any o f the foregoing”.
616 Article 1(2).
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difficulties for national legislations to comply and thus hampered to a certain extent
f\ 1 7the harmonisation o f the internal financial market .
Although, the EU already attempted to harmonise the law with the enactment o f the 
Directive on Late Payment618and the Financial Collateral Arrangements Directive619, 
it is questioned whether the EU could have gone further in modernising and 
approximating secured credit law regimes. The Late Payment Directive is 
particularly significant to consider for the purpose of this study on whether 
harmonisation could be successful as legal method to modernise secured credit law 
regimes in European jurisdictions. Accordingly, the question o f whether the 
harmonisation of secured credit law regimes, particularly retention of title clauses 
regulations, could be successful as legal method to modernise the law in European 
jurisdictions will be considered in this chapter.
To this end, this analysis will attempt to determine whether an accommodation of 
legal divergences on retention of title clauses can, if at all, be reached in the EU. The 
identification of current divergences amongst all EU jurisdictions would go beyond 
the scope of this analysis. Consequently, this analysis will be restricted, as for 
previous chapters, to a sample of European jurisdictions; France and England. These 
two jurisdictions are interesting to consider because they are representatives of 
different legal cultures within the EU. In both jurisdictions, retention of title clauses 
enable the seller to delay the passing of title upon the payment of the purchase price 
by the buyer. If simple retention o f title clauses are valid in both jurisdictions and are 
also accepted within the dispositions of the European Directive620, difficulties can 
arise where the insolvent buyer resells or manufactures the goods before payment. 
These eventualities create uncertainties for sellers who may not be able to enforce
their proprietary rights upon default. Retention of title clauses are property-based
• 621security devices which are mainly regulated through national property law . This
comparative law analysis will thus have to identify the legal differences that exist
617 The meaning o f the EU Financial Collateral Arrangement has recently been discussed in England, 
in light o f the floating charge in Gray v. G-T-P Group [2010] EWHC 1772.
618 See fn. 612.
619 See fn. 613.
620 See fn. 612.
621 See Chapter Three at pp. 118-130 and pp. 153-159.
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between baseline concepts of French and English property laws in order to determine 
whether a reconciliation is possible. Although both jurisdictions recognise the power 
of the seller to use of ownership for security purposes, there are substantial 
divergences in the definition and concept of ‘property’ itself that could be difficult to 
accommodate. This comparative analysis will further attempt to identify the 
differences underlying the regulations of the buyer’s and seller’s rights before 
payment so as to determine whether a reconciliation is, if at all, possible. Finally, this 
comparative analysis will consider the regulations underlying retention o f title 
clauses in light of the protection afforded to third parties, especially in light of the 
publication requirements and the Civilian concept o f the numerus clausus. 
Ultimately, this comparative analysis will permit to determine whether legal 
harmonisation would succeed in approximating and modernising the law underlying 
retention of title clauses in France and England.
The first part of this analysis will analyse some doctrinal aspects o f harmonisation as 
legal method to modernise secured credit laws in Europe and will be followed by an 
analysis on the harmonisation of retention of title clauses regulation in the EU. Such 
an analysis will ultimately attempt to determine whether the accommodation and 
reconciliation of specific aspects of secured credit law regimes in France and 
England could lead to a successful modernisation of the law.
DOCTRINAL ASPECTS OF HARMONISATION AS LEGAL METHOD TO 
MODERNISE SECURED CREDIT LAW IN THE EU
Although the expression ‘harmonisation’ is extensively used by academics and more 
generally by law reformers within the commercial law sphere, there is sometimes 
some confusion and divergences in the terminologies that the expression 
encompasses. For instance, legal harmonisation and legal unification are often used 
interchangeably in the legal literature. However, this analysis clearly distinguishes 
between these two terms. Therefore, it would be useful to instigate this 
demonstration with an analysis on the nature of harmonisation and with the 
identification of a working definition that will be retained throughout subsequent 
developments. This section will further seek to put harmonisation into context by
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analysing its use as legal method for law reform, particularly within regional 
economic organisations.
In recent years, one o f the motive forces towards legal harmonisation has been driven 
by the considerable enlargement of regional economic markets. The introduction 
already cited some o f the major harmonisation initiatives led by regional economic 
organisations such as NAFTA622, MERCOSUR623 or the European Single Market624. 
The case o f the EU is interesting to consider, as legal harmonisation is often used as 
legal method to approximate and modernise the law of Member States. In the context 
of secured financing, it is arguable that the lack o f harmonious secured credit law 
regimes among Members States could constitute substantial barriers to the 
development o f their economic activities. Adversely, it is also arguable that the 
preservation o f diversity in secured credit law regimes o f Member States could also 
promote economic activities by encouraging innovation and by providing a wider 
choice o f legal methods for structuring finance for international traders625. In the 
context o f the EU and in the light of the achievement of the Common Market, the 
question emerged whether harmonisation of secured credit laws would be desirable. 
Before considering the question o f the desirability of harmonisation in Europe, the 
next section will provide a definition of harmonisation that will be retained 
throughout this analysis.
Nature of harmonisation
f\ 9ASome academics consider harmonisation as a word with ‘considerable elasticity’ 
including, in its complete sense, an “... absolute uniformity of legislation among the 
adopting jurisdictions”627. The expression ‘harmonisation’ would therefore cover a
622 See fn. 608.
623 See fn. 609.
624 See fn. 610.
625 Mattei, U. “The issue o f European Civil Codification and Legal Scholarship: Biases, Strategies and 
Developments” (1998) 21 Hastings International and Comparative Law Review, at p. 883.
626 Ziegel, J. “Harmonization o f Private Laws in Federal Systems o f Government: Canada, the USA 
and Australia” (1997) in Cranston, R., Making Commercial Law: Essays in Honour or Roy Goode, 
(Oxford, 1997), at p. 133.
627 Ibid.
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large spectrum of legal methods628 with the objective to create and implement more 
uniform legal rules with different degree of approximation. At one end of the 
spectrum, harmonisation of laws would designate a mutual recognition o f similar 
legal concepts through national legal reforms without the need to impose any 
particular form or detailed legal rules. At the other end of the spectrum, 
harmonisation would also encompass a codification, a supra national legal instrument 
recognised by states, which would evidently require a greater degree of 
approximation and consensus among the signatory states.
This broad definition would therefore include unification of law projects where one 
single legal regime relative to a specific area of law is created and adopted by a 
number of different jurisdictions . In the context of secured credit laws, some 
attempts have already been made at the international level for the establishment and
zroA
recognition of uniform legislations . Unification of law instruments include for 
instance, international conventions such as the United Nations Convention on 
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods631, model laws such as the EBRD 
Model Law on Secured Transactions or, international legislative guides such as the 
UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Secured Transactions633. Unification of law, 
according to this definition, becomes the ultimate and most complete form of 
harmonisation. Indubitably, unification of laws as ultimate form of approximation is
628 Goode provides that “[t]here are at least nine methods by which harmonisation may be either 
effected or in some measure induced, namely: (1) a multilateral Convention without a Uniform Law as 
such; (2) a multilateral Convention embodying a Uniform Law; (3) a set o f bilateral Treaties; (4) 
Community legislation -  typically, a Directive; (5) a Model Law; (6) a codification of custom and 
usage promulgated by an international non-governmental organisation; (7) international trade terms 
promulgated by such an organisation; (8) model contracts and general contractual conditions; (9) 
restatements by scholars and other experts.” Goode op. cit. fn. 262, at p. 57.
629 See Goode, R.M. “A Credit Law For Europe” (1976) 23 International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly, at p. 247 where the author provides that: “[unification is, o f course, a much more complete 
process, since what emerges is a single code which -  given a method o f ensuring uniformity of 
interpretation -  is applied in all the states which adopt the uniform enactment. The difficulty of 
unification in practical terms is that it entails not merely a consensus on concepts but agreement on 
detailed drafting, and unless the area to be covered is reasonably narrow the project has little hope of 
being carried through the fruition.”
630 Chapter Five will consider the use o f unification as legal method to modernise and approximate 
secured credit law regimes.
631 United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale o f Goods, Vienna, 11 April 
1980.
632 European Bank’s Model Law on Secured Transactions 1994.
633 UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Secured Transactions available from www.uncitral.org.
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not an easy process and bears significant difficulties634, such as the risk that 
international conventions will never come into force because o f substantial 
incompatibilities with internal legislations, lack of interests from states or lack of 
time within the legislative timetable635. The use of international conventions as legal 
method to approximate and modernise secured credit law will be considered in 
greater depth in Chapter Five.
Others scholars retain a narrower conceptual approach and define harmonisation as a 
means to make "... the regulatory requirements or government policies o f different 
jurisdictions ... more similar.”636 In this sense, harmonisation o f laws would not 
include unification of law instruments but would only attempt to co-ordinate and 
approximate national laws through legal reforms637. Comparative law efforts are thus 
fundamental to the use of harmonisation as legal method for law reform, especially 
for the harmonisation of legal regimes that belong to different legal traditions. It is 
explained that:
“[ujnlike unification which contemplates the substitution of two or more legal 
systems with one single system, harmonisation of law arises exclusively in 
comparative law literature, and especially in conjunction with interjurisdictional, 
private transactions. Harmonisation seeks to ‘effect an approximation or co­
ordination of different legal provision or systems by eliminating major differences
/r-J Q /T O Q
and creating minimum requirements or standards.’ ”
It is further explained that harmonisation,
“... which looks beyond matters of legal technique, obviates much fruitless 
discussion and opens new possibilities for cooperation with countries having 
different legal structures. These possibilities are particularly important to attempts to
634 Ancel, M. “From the Unification of Law to its Harmonization” (1977) 51 Tulane Law Review, at p. 
108.
635 Goode, R.M. “International Restatement o f Contract and English Contract Law” (1997) Uniform 
Law Review, at p. 231.
636 Leebron op. cit. fn. 259, at p. 66. According to Hansson, “[hjarmonization ... is defined as the 
coordination o f economic policy actions and measures in order to reduce international differences in 
such actions.” Hansson, G., Harmonization and International Trade, (1950), at p. 1.
637 Zamora explains that harmonisation does not solely occur through legal reforms. It can also occur 
“... by the mediation o f private law concepts adopted by parties caught between two legal systems; or 
by a myriad o f other contact points between legal regimes, from academic writings, the conceits o f 
law professors, to visit the government officials to neighboring countries” in Zamora op. cit. fn. 611, 
at p. 403.
638 Kamba, W. “Comparative Law: A Theoretical Framework” (1974) 23 International Comparative 
Law Quarterly 485, at p. 501.
639 De Cruz, P., Comparative Law in a Changing World, (1999), at p. 24.
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harmonize the laws of countries with the Common law and those with the continental 
Roman system.”640
Harmonisation would thus appear to be much more flexible method for law reform 
that would allow for more possibilities and options to legal reformers towards the 
recognition of common legal solutions, especially in the context of jurisdictions that 
belong to different legal traditions.
Harmonisation and unification o f laws are thus considered as two distinct legal 
methods for law reform. Harmonisation is understood as a means to bring more 
similarities, accommodate legal differences amongst national legal regimes through 
national legal reforms. Harmonisation of secured credit laws would therefore require 
coordinating and approximating national laws o f different jurisdictions through 
national legal reforms. Comparative law analysis will thus constitute an essential tool 
in this study on the harmonisation of secured credit laws in Europe considering the 
co-existence of different legal regimes and legal traditions such as the Common Law 
and Civilian legal traditions. Harmonisation of law is considered in the context of the 
EU because this is one o f the main methods used by European legislator to reform 
and approximate the law, especially through the use o f European Directives as it will 
now be exposed. European Directives have to be integrated into national laws 
through legal reforms. In this sense, European Directives achieve a reconciliation and 
accommodation of differences among Member States legal regimes. The next section 
will attempt to put harmonisation into context by analysing its use as legal method 
for law reform, especially within regional economic organisations such as in the EU.
The use of harmonisation as legal method of secured credit law reform in the
EU
According to the definition retained above, harmonisation of secured credit law 
regimes would require the accommodation of a wide variety of differences among 
national legal concepts and rules through the process o f legal reforms. With the 
growth of regional economic organisations, harmonisation of laws has been
640 Ancel op. cit. fn. 634, at p. 108.
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commonly used as legal method for reform in order to promote and enhance 
economic activities within these regional free markets. Harmonisation therefore 
plays a considerable role in the development of economic activities, especially within 
the recent expansion o f regional economic organisations. Regional organisations 
such as NAFTA, MERCOSUR or the EU are very keen to promote the recognition of 
more harmonious legal regimes so as to facilitate and expand trade among Members 
States641. Accordingly, harmonisation has become a fundamental method o f law 
reform that may enable those who want to compete in a competitive market to keep 
the costs o f goods and services as low as they can.
In relation to secured transactions regimes, the growth of cross-border transactions 
generates the imposition o f higher interest rates on debtors mainly resulting from the 
uncertainties faced by creditors towards the validity and enforcement of their security 
rights at the international level. This situation could indubitably deter potential 
traders from dealing with certain jurisdictions, which could ultimately undermine the 
endeavours of regional economic markets to enhance their economic activities.
For instance, the U.S. and some provinces of Canada, Members States o f the North 
American Free Trade Agreement, have in place a similar personal property security 
law regime based on the recognition of a unique security interest together with a 
notice filing and a first to file priority systems. Mexico, also part o f the NAFTA 
Agreement does not recognise similar functional secured credit law regimes642. It has 
been argued that this situation could lead to difficulties in relation to the validity and
641 On this point see Abbott, F. “Regional Integration and the Environment: The Evolution o f Legal 
Regimes” (1992) 68 Chicago Kent Law Review, at p. 189; Delbriik, J. “Globalization o f Law, Politics, 
and Markets-Implications for Domestic Law-A European Perspective” (1993) 1 Indiana Journal o f  
Global Legal Studies, at p. 9; Zamora op. cit. fn. 611, at p. 402 where the author states: “[i]t is 
obvious that NAFTA has a harmonizing effect on North American law. As a free trade agreement, 
NAFTA sets forth common rules for international trade and other transnational economic activity that 
must be adhered to by the NAFTA Parties and it requires that national laws conform these rules. 
However, the implications o f NAFTA for harmonization o f Canadian, Mexican and U.S laws go far 
beyond the sphere o f international trade in goods. For one thing, the NAFTA Agreement includes 
several chapters that deal with non-trade issues. For instance, NAFTA chapters on foreign investments 
(Chapter 11), cross-border trade in services (Chapter 12), and trade in financial services (Chapter 14) 
deal with subjects that are only indirectly tied to merchandise trade, although they involve 
transnational legal problem.”
642 On this point see Wood, P., Maps o f  World Financial Law, (2008), at p. 119. See Figure 28: 
“Supermap: Global Security Interests considers that Mexican secured credit regime is limited on 
security.”
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enforcement of foreign security interests and, lead to difficulties in relation to the 
availability of secured finance for other Member States in the Latin jurisdiction643.
These difficulties have been highlighted following an empirical Study644 which 
included various scenarios involving secured credit law regimes o f NAFTA Member 
States. This study was led by Professors Cuming, Nelson and Kozolchyk, and 
showed that Mexico did not offer the same credit loans facilities as in Canada and the 
U.S. and, thus, did not contribute to the facilitation and expansion of international 
trade among NAFTA Members. In this perspective, the National Law Center for the 
Inter-American Free Trade launched the Secured Financing Project in 1995, in order 
to assist the harmonisation of secured credit laws among NAFTA Members645.
Beyond the harmonisation efforts, this study has also been the opportunity to provide 
a detailed review o f Mexico’s secured credit laws which proved to be extremely 
useful to lawyers and traders wishing to extent credit using personal property assets 
as collaterals in Mexico. Although this Study refers to harmonisation endeavours, the 
methods used for the achievement of the approximation o f secured credit law 
regimes within NAFTA countries would better correspond to legal transplantation 
than harmonisation. In effect, legal reforms in Canada and Mexico have mainly been 
the result of the adoption of the U.S. legal standards rather than a reform based on 
the coordination of NAFTA Member States legal regimes. This latest observation 
brought some authors to talk about an ‘Americanization’ rather than ‘harmonisation’ 
of secured credit laws646. Mexico reformed its law of secured transactions in 2000647
643 Cuming, R.C.C. “Inter-Jurisdictional Registration and Validity Issues”, available from 
www.natlaw.com/pubs/interjur.htm (last checked 26/04/2010) where the author states that: “[t]he 
economic integration that can be expected to increase dramatically under NAFTA will result in 
transborder secured financing arrangements and the movement into and out o f Mexico o f high-value 
goods subject to security interests. No doubt, the incidence o f problems associated with the 
recognition of foreign security interests will dramatically increase in the very near future.”
644 Boris, K., Et al. “Harmonization o f the Secured Financing Laws o f the NAFTA partners: Focus on 
Mexico, National Law Center for Inter- American Free Trade” (1998) available from 
www.natlaw.com (last checked 26/04/2010).
645 National Law Center for Inter-American Free Trade, “Harmonization o f the Secured Financing 
Laws of the NAFTA Partners: Focus on Mexico”(1995), available from 
http://www.natlaw.com/pubs/purchase/harm.htm (last checked 26/04/2010).
646 Gopalan explains for instance that: “[t]his would seem to suggest that convergence is motivated by 
U.S economic dominance. Concerns about American legal hegemony are perhaps inevitable given the 
regional dynamics. The great increase in trade resulting from a free trade agreement particularly 
between the U.S and Mexico has pushed the Mexican legal system to converge with that in the U.S. 
Given that both Mexico and Canada want to increase trading opportunities with their more powerful
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which extended the availability of credit but left many essential aspects of a modem 
legislation on secured credit unreformed648.
The example of NAFTA is interesting and analogically led this study to envisage the 
situation of the EU and the single market, where the dilemma of the harmonisation of 
secured credit laws also occurred. In Europe, the creation o f the Common Market by 
the Treaty establishing the European Community649also led to the question of 
whether common security law regimes should and could be achieved in Europe 
considering the wide variety o f legal systems.
As early as 1966, a group of experts directed by Segre led a study on the 
development of a European capital market650. The Report already highlighted the 
need for harmonious legal method for structuring secured lending and suggested the 
introduction of a European type of mortgage in order to ease the creation of the 
European Common Market651. The Report claims that:
“[t]he approximation or harmonization of the legal status of the real-estate sureties 
required in the Member States should be given priority. More flexible and less 
burdensome than the mortgage, the “land-charge deed” technique ... is an instrument 
which might usefully be adapted to the financing of building. And arrangements 
should be made so that mortgage or land-charge deed registrations can be expressed 
in currencies other than of the country of registration.”652
neighbor, the U.S can take a more indifferent approach to harmonization. Legal experts in the U.S 
have been more than willing to export their own laws to Canada and Mexico, and indeed the rest o f 
the world, often with a take-it-or-leave-it attitude resting on their own economic might. This is 
apparent by the fact that there is no evidence that U.S. law has gone to any lengths to undertake a 
harmonization that adopts principles from Canadian or Mexican Law. Accordingly, it would be safe to 
say that harmonization within the NAFTA context is “Americanization””. Gopalan op.cit. fn. 135, at 
p. 137.
647 Mexico, Ley General de Titulos y  operaciones de credito, 23rd May 2000.
648 On this point see De La Pena, N. “Challenges in Implementing Secured Transactions Reform in 
Latin America” in Dahan, F., Et al., Secured Transactions Reform and Access to Credit (2008), at p. 
243 where the author observed that: “... Mexico passed a new law on secured transactions in 2000, 
but this law left almost every key aspect of the framework for secured transactions unreformed. The 
new law expanded creation o f security interests, but continued the old internally inconsistent system 
o f priority o f claims in collateral, the poorly run state registration system, and introduced a very 
limited reform for enforcing security interests.”
649 Treaty establishing the European Community, Rome, 25 March 1957.
650 Segre Report, at p. 169 available at
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/emu_history/documentation/chapterl/19661130en382develeuro 
capitm_a.pdf (last checked 26/04/2010).
651 Van Erp, S.J.H.M. “Security Interests: A Secure Start for the Development o f European Property 
Law” (2008) Maastricht Faculty o f  law Working Paper No. 5, at p. 1.
652 Segre Report op. cit. fn. 650, at p. 169 and Van Erp op. cit. fn. 651, at p. 1.
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Following the recognition that the law regulating mortgages in Europe should be 
harmonised, the European Commission later focused on the harmonisation of 
security created on movable property and published a Report in 1972 on the law of 
property in the European Community led by Gravenhorst, Hartley and Lando653. The 
Report emphasised the need to reach an approximation o f property laws. It was 
obvious for the parties that the use of comparative law was the adequate approach to 
follow in order to assess the viability of harmonisation o f secured credit laws in 
Europe. However, it became also apparent that harmonisation of secured credit laws 
would involve substantial reform of the baselines concepts inherent to property law 
and, that considering the diversity in legal regimes among European jurisdictions; it 
would be an almost impossible task654. The difficulties o f importing a foreign legal 
regime in jurisdictions that belong to dissimilar legal cultures have already been 
extensively considered above655. In effect, it is arguable that the accommodation of 
differences between jurisdictions that belong to different legal traditions may create 
similar difficulties.
Unsurprisingly, there has been little attempt in the quest to establish common 
principles governing secured transactions in the EU. One illustration can be found 
with the Directive on Late Payment in Commercial Transactions656 which requires
653 Van Erp op. cit. fn. 651, at p. 2.
654 Van Erp states that :“[i]t becomes apparent that already more than 45 years ago it was clear that 
with regard to security interests on movables initiatives to unify at least the rules o f private 
international law were badly needed, but that any attempts to reach harmonisation were hampered by 
the existing legal diversity. However, unification or even harmonisation o f the substantive rule o f  
property law was out o f the question. No doubt it was considered to be too complicated and it was 
feared that finding common ground between Civil Law, Common Law, the Scandinavian legal 
traditions and the mixed legal systems would prove to be too cumbersome and most likely impossible. 
The main reason for this fear seems to have been that property law was considered to be a national 
system o f coherent choices, safeguarded by mandatory law while limiting the parties’ freedom to 
create new or give shape to existing property rights.” Van Erp op. cit. fn. 651, at p. 2. See also the 
introductory remarks made by Gravenhorst in his study on “The Law o f Property in the European 
Community”Studies, Competition -  Approximation o f legislation series No27, Brussels, December 
1972, at p.13. He states: “[a] description of the types of security on movables in the legal system o f  
different countries cannot be restricted to the portrayal in isolation o f individual legal concepts such 
as, say, retention o f title. In order to grasp the full economic and legal significance o f the different 
types o f security, it is necessary to have regard to the position they occupy in relation to the remainder 
o f the civil law system in question. Thus in the case o f contracts o f  sale, for example, the full 
implication o f retention o f title does not become apparent until one has at least glanced at the other 
legal relationships between seller and buyer.”
655 See Chapter Three.
656 Directive 2000/35/EC of the European Parliament and o f the Council o f 29th June 2000 on 
Combating Late Payment in Commercial Transactions, OJ L 200, 8.8.2000. Article 4 provides: “1. 
Member States shall provide in conformity with the applicable national provisions designated by
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enforcing and recognising the validity o f retention of title clauses in all Member 
States according to their private international law rules. It has been argued that the 
dispositions of the Directive did not go far enough towards the harmonisation of 
secured credit laws in Europe and that the dispositions relative to retention o f title 
clauses are in fact ‘devoid of much content’.657 Further attempts were made with the 
Insolvency Regulation658 in relation to retention of title clauses but, similarly, it 
remained largely unsatisfactory in light of harmonisation and modernisation efforts.
Similarly to NAFTA, the Treaty establishing the European Community creates a
Common Market in the EU. Article 100 of the EC Treaty provides:
“[t]he Council shall, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and 
after consulting the European Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee, 
issue directives for the approximation o f such laws, regulations or administrative 
provisions o f the Member States as directly affect the establishment or functioning of 
the common market.”
private international law that the seller retains title to goods until they are fully paid for if  a retention 
o f title clause has been expressly agreed between the buyer and the seller before the delivery of the 
goods. 2. Member States may adopt or retain provisions dealing with down payments already made by 
the debtor.”
657 McCormack states for instance that: “[t]he most straight-forward interpretation o f the relevant 
provisions would be to say that if  passing-of -property questions under a contract for the sale o f goods 
are governed by the law o f an EU member state, then the member state must recognise a simple 
retention-of-title clause contained in the contract of sale. It is possible, however, to interpret the 
reference to private international law in Article 4 in such a way as to deprive the provision of 
substantive meaning. O such a construction, if  the legal system invoked by the choice o f law rules in a 
forum member state does not recognise simple retention-of-title clause or requires observance of 
formalities for their enforcement, such as compliance with registration requirements, then the forum 
member state is not compelled to recognise the clause. The so called European rule would not be in 
accordance with the relevant national law whose application is dictated by the choice o f law rules. In 
the case o f an ordinary domestic sales contract governed by English law, then English law prevails 
over the European norm because English law is the governing law under the choice o f law rules 
whose effect has not been altered by the Directive. If this interpretation is correct, then the Late- 
Payment Directive is devoid o f much content because a retention-of-title could always be enforced 
according to the applicable law. If the governing law in a forum member state recognises retention-of- 
title, then, by that fact alone and without reference to the provisions o f any EU directive, retention of 
title should be recognise in that forum.” McCormack op. cit. fn. 18, at p. 206.
658 Council Regulation (EC) No 1346/2000 o f 29th May 2000, OJ L 160, 30.6.2000. Article 7 o f the 
Regulation provides: “1. The opening o f insolvency proceedings against the purchaser o f an asset 
shall not affect the seller's rights based on a reservation o f title where at the time o f the opening of 
proceedings the asset is situated within the territory of a Member State other than the State o f opening 
o f proceedings. 2. The opening o f insolvency proceedings against the seller o f an asset, after delivery 
o f the asset, shall not constitute grounds for rescinding or terminating the sale and shall not prevent 
the purchaser from acquiring title where at the time o f the opening o f proceedings the asset sold is 
situated within the territory o f a Member State other than the State o f the opening o f proceedings. 3. 
Paragraphs 1 and 2 shall not preclude actions for voidness, voidability or unenforceability as referred 
to in Article 4(2) (m).”
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Accordingly, it is arguable that the harmonisation of necessary national laws for the 
establishment and good functioning of the single market should be an ineluctable 
responsibility for the EU. In the present context of this study on the harmonisation of 
secured credit laws, this acknowledgment begs the essential question of whether 
secured credit laws directly affect the establishment or functioning of the Common 
Market. Arguably, secured financing affects the functioning and establishment of an 
economic market in the sense that divergences in secured credit law regimes could 
reduce the availability of credit in certain jurisdictions and could deter international 
traders from dealing with some jurisdictions where the recognition and enforcement 
of a security remains uncertain.
Harmonisation of secured credit law would enhance economic activities among 
Member States in providing more predictable and secured legal regimes for traders. 
Conversely, it could also be argued that diversity and competition between legal 
regimes would support and promote the good functioning of a common market by 
encouraging innovation and providing for a wider choice of structuring finance to 
traders. Thus, following the creation of the Common Market in Europe, the 
desirability and viability of harmonising secured credit laws in Europe have become 
timely questions. In the light of the Directive on Late Payments and the Insolvency 
Regulations, the question emerged of whether the EU could have gone further 
towards the harmonisation and modernisation of secured credit law regimes and, 
particularly, o f the regulations underlying retention of title clauses. In this respect, 
Kieninger, Von Wilmowsky and Rutgers ask:
“... whether European Law as such and in particular the four freedoms (freedom of 
goods, persons, services and capital) did not demand that recognition of foreign 
security interests was a duty under European law.”659
The next sections will thus consider whether the EU should and could harmonise the 
law of secured credit, especially in light of the good functioning of the Common 
Market. If there is a claim for the harmonisation o f European secured credit laws, the 
question of the competence of the European Union to legislate in this sphere of law 
also becomes paramount.
659 Van Erp op. cit. fn. 651, at p. 5.
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Regulatory competition vs, harmonisation in Europe
Diverse elements in support of the approximation of secured credit law regimes have 
already been recognised above660. Advantages such as ‘predictability’, ‘legal 
certainty’, Tower costs’ and Tower risks’ are illustrative of the main arguments 
advanced in support o f international harmonisation efforts. This section will 
therefore focus on the desirability of harmonisation of secured credit laws in Europe 
from a different perspective. Beyond the theoretical and economic arguments 
traditionally invoked, further aspects of harmonisation applied in the EU context 
come to light. Considering the wide range of different secured credit laws in the EU, 
it is arguable that more harmonious legislations would be desirable in the way it 
would promote the development of economic activities and enhance the growth of 
international trade within the Common Market. Conversely, it is also arguable that 
diversity in legal methods for structuring secured financing would enhance economic 
activities through regulatory competition. In this sense secured credit could be seen 
as a marketable product that would make national jurisdictions to compete with one 
another.
In the context o f the EU and in the light o f the achievement o f the Common Market, 
the question emerged o f whether the harmonisation of secured credit laws would be 
desirable or whether the diversity of legal regimes which allows for more innovation 
in secured credit and which allows for a wider choice for structuring finance, should 
be preserved661. In light o f the unfruitful attempts of the EU to harmonise secured 
credit laws662 and in light of the recent introduction of the Common Frame of 
Reference663, ‘optional toolbox’ for traders, the EU would appear to have opted for a
660 See Chapter Two, at pp. 76-82.
661 Sykes, A.O. “Regulatory Competition or Regulatory Harmonization? A Silly Question” (2000), 3 
Journal o f  International Economic Law, at p. 257.
662 See I.A.2. with respect to the Directive 2000/35/EC of the European Parliament and o f the Council 
o f 29th June 2000 on Combating Late Payment in Commercial Transactions, OJ L 200, 8.8.2000. See 
Article 4 on retention o f title clauses.
663 CFR prepared by the Study Group on a European Civil Code and the Research Group on EC 
Private Law. For more information, see www.law-net.eu (last checked 26/04/2010).
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competition of national legal systems rather than for the harmonisation of secured 
credit law regimes664.
In the context of secured transactions, the question is to determine whether the 
competition between secured credit law regimes would support the development and 
growth of economic activities within the Common Market better than with 
harmonious legislations. Diversity in national legal regimes would enable Member 
States to experiment and innovate in their quest to find efficient and predictable 
secured credit law regimes. In effect, it is arguable that the preservation of diversity 
in legal systems would allow legal reformers to provide for more innovation within 
secured credit law regimes and would also avoid the risk of enacting inefficient 
common legal regime through the process of harmonisation.
The idea of a competition between legal regimes has recently been reinforced with 
the proposal of a Common Frame of Reference in Europe which has been 
characterised as an optional toolbox, a 28th legal regimes that parties of European 
Member States could choose as governing law to regulate their transactions665. 
Ultimately, it is hoped that the best law may survive and may serve as basis for the
664 On the CFR, see for instance Beale, H. “The Nature and Purposes o f the Common Frame of  
Reference” (2008) II Juridica, at p. 10 where the author states: “[l]et me start by addressing one thing 
that the CFR is not intended to be a European civil code, or a single European contract law to replace 
the various national laws. Although the CFR appears as an optional “legal regime” for contractual 
parties, the purposes of the CFR ultimately have hopes to have an harmonizing effect. The purposes of 
the CFR are described in the first PECL article and the introduction and can be described as follows: 
“1. For parties to transnational contracts to adopt to govern their contract. Under current principles of 
private international law, the parties cannot adopt the Principles o f European Contract Law as a 
replacement for a national system, but they can agree to incorporate them into their contract. Given 
that, at least for business-to-business (so-called B2B) contracts, most national laws allow a large 
degree o f freedom o f contract and lay down few mandatory rules, the effect will be much the same. 2. 
For arbitrators to apply when the parties have agreed that the contract is to be governed by ‘general 
principles of law’, the lex mercatoria, or the like. 3. To serve as a model for courts and legislators 
faced with either filling in gaps in their national law or revising it to respond properly to new 
economic conditions. When the Principles o f European Contract Law were being finalised, members 
of the European Commission were very aware that the then-new democracies o f central Europe were 
busy reforming their civil codes. 4. To assist in creating further harmonising measures across Europe.” 
See also Reich who states that: “[competition between legal orders, instead o f centralized regulation 
-  this seemed to be the “new approach” of the EC harmonization process.” Reich, N. “Competition 
Between Legal Orders: A New Paradigm of EC Law?” (1992) 29 Common Market Law Review, at p. 
861.
665The Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR) prepared by the Study Group on a European Civil 
Code and the Research Group on EC Private Law has been published in February 2009. The CFR will 
also include a Book IX on Proprietary Security Rights in movable assets. See Eidenmuller, H., Et al. 
“The Common Frame o f Reference for European Private Law -  Policy Choices and Codification 
Problems” (2008) 28 Oxford Journal o f  Legal Studies 659, at p. 665.
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law o f the community666. In this perspective, the Common Frame of Reference is 
hoped to serve as model for legal reform across Member States legal regimes and 
eventually replace the law of current twenty seven legal regimes.
In respect of secured financing, it is questionable whether a competition between 
national secured credit regimes would achieve the aims of the single market. It could 
be argued that a competition o f legal regimes could end up in distorted and unfair 
competition towards legal regimes with lower legal standards. In effect, some 
jurisdictions might be deterred from investing in some Member States because their 
secured credit law regimes might offer lower standards. Jurisdictions with less 
efficient secured credit legislations may be less attractive to investors than other 
jurisdictions offering more modem legal regimes667.
The recognition of a competition between secured credit regimes would presuppose 
that a security so created in one jurisdiction is able to circulate in the whole 
community under the rules of the jurisdiction of origin. However, such a 
recommendation appears to be quite uncertain, especially in light of the traditional 
conflict o f law mles. As it has already been pointed out, the lex rei sitae is the 
traditional method for resolving conflict of laws issues in relation to cross-border 
secured transactions. It has been evidenced that this method is not always practical 
and effective for resolving conflict of laws issues668. For instance, the inadequacy
666 See Smits op. cit. fn. 262, at p. 2 where the author states: “I previously defended that the best way 
o f unification o f law in Europe would be through a competition of legal rules. In transplanting legal 
rules from one country to another on a “market of legal culture”, the best legal rule may survive. This 
does not automatically imply that any rules glorifies: in some instances, diversity o f law may be just 
as good as uniformity as long as there is a free movement o f legal rules, at least creating the possibility 
of legal change.”
667 Lando argued, in respect o f the harmonisation o f Contract law, that: “[t]he existing variety o f  
contract laws in Europe may be regarded as a non-tariff barrier to trade.” in Lando, O. “Optional or 
Mandatory Europeanisation o f  Contract Law” (2000) 8 European Review o f  Private Law, at p. 61.
668 See Chapter Two at pp. 71-76. See also Goode op. cit. fn. 120, at p. 49 where the author states that: 
“[t]he traditional method o f dealing with differences in the laws of separate legal systems is through 
conflict o f laws rules. ... There is, in fact, a fairly universal adoption o f the lex rei sitae as the conflict 
rule to govern security interests and other real rights, but this is too unsophisticated in that it fails to 
distinguish security over specific assets from universal security. It also fails to distinguish between the 
position o f a purchaser taking physical delivery of a tangible object -  therefore prima facie relying on 
the law o f the country where the object is located -  and a lender taking security over classes of 
tangible assets where physical inspection is impracticable and over intangible assets where it is 
impossible. The lex rei sitae is particularly unhelpful in relation to security over receivables and 
mobile equipment.”
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becomes evident in relation to security created over movable property669 or in 
relation to specific types of security interests which are not recognised in other
fJ lC ijurisdictions such as the floating charge in England . In effect, a security created in 
one jurisdiction might be subject to different validity requirements or might not even 
be recognised at all under particular national secured credit law regimes.
Although competition between legal orders preserves legal diversity and might 
promote innovation, there is the risk that it might distort competition among Member 
States. In effect, it is questionable whether jurisdictions with less efficient secured 
credit legislations could be less attractive to investors than other jurisdictions 
offering more modem secured credit laws. Following this remark, the case for the 
harmonisation of secured credit laws in Europe should also be promoted. If 
harmonisation of secured credit law is arguably desirable in the EU, the question of 
the competence of the EU to legislate in the sphere of secured credit comes to light.
The competence o f  the E U  to legislate in the sphere o f  secured credit law
According to the above development on the growth of regional economic free 
markets and its correlative need for harmonious legislations, it emerges from the 
understanding of Article 100 of the EC Treaty671, that the EU should be in the right 
position to demand for the harmonisation of secured credit laws in Europe if it can be 
showed to be a condition sine qua non to the establishment and functioning of the 
single market. It has been argued that the lack of efficient secured credit law regimes 
in some European jurisdictions might hinder the development of economic activities 
by restricting the availability of secured financing. In effect, some Member States 
might not recognise the validity of certain type of security which might create some 
difficulties towards their enforcements in foreign Member States.
669 See above Chapter Two, at pp. 71-76.
670 See above Chapter Three, at pp 130-135. Article 9 of the American Uniform Commercial Code 
only recognises fixed charge and does not recognise the floating charge. This solution has long been 
established in the United States o f America following the famous case Benedict v. Ratner (1925) 268 
US 354.
671 Article 100 of the EC Treaty
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In light of the four freedoms in the EU; free movement of goods, services, persons 
and capital as enacted in the EC Treaty, the question emerged of whether the EU 
would be under a duty to impose the recognition of foreign security interests in every
f\79Member States . Accordingly, it is explained that:
within the European Union (EU) a security interest, validly created in a Member 
State, is not really a “foreign” security interest anymore and should therefore be 
recognised in all other Member States.”
A security would be analysed as a product that should be marketable in every 
Member States. Following the renowned case Cassis de Dijon674, the European Court 
of Justice (thereafter, ECJ) recognised that a product produced in Europe should be 
marketable in all the other Member States so as to avoid any anti competitive
frjc
practices . On this occasion, the ECJ ruled that:
“[ojbstacles to movement within the Community resulting from disparities between 
the national laws relating to the marketing of the products in question must be 
accepted in so far as those provisions may be recognized as being necessary in order 
to satisfy mandatory requirements relating in particular to the effectiveness of fiscal 
supervision, the protection of public health, the fairness of commercial transactions 
and the defence of the consumer.”676
By analogy, it could also be argued that restrictions to the availability o f credit in 
some jurisdictions following a lack of efficient and harmonious legal rules could lead 
to some unfairness among international traders dealing in the European single 
market. If  the harmonisation of secured credit laws can be proved to be necessary for 
the development of the European single market pursuing Article 100 EC, it is 
arguable that the EU would be under a duty to act accordingly. Nevertheless, the
672 Van Erp op. cit. fn. 651, at p. 5.
673 Ibid.
674 ECJ 20 February [1979] ECR 648 available from: 
http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/smartapi/cgi/sga_doc?smartapi! celexplus !prod! CELEXnumdoc&lg=en&numdoc=6197 
8J0120 (last checked 26/04/2010).
675 Van Erp questions: “[s]hould security interests within the European Union be mutually recognised, 
irrespective o f whether such as security interest could be fitted into the national legal system? This 
may sound a far reaching conclusion, but in essence the argument is not really different from what can 
be found in the “Cassis de Dijon ” case in which the ECJ forbade the application o f a national rule that 
did not allow this liqueur to be marketed in a different Member State than in which it had been 
produced. Such an application was considered to be a measure having an effect equivalent to 
quantitative restrictions on imports, as meant in Article 30 EEC Treaty. What was produced in a 
Member State according to the rules o f that Member State should be marketable in all the other 
Member States. Then why not accept that a security interest, lawfully created in a Member State, 
should be recognised (“marketable”) in a different Member State?” Van Erp op. cit. fn. 651, at p. 5.
676 See above fn. 673.
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harmonisation of secured credit laws is not an easy task; this area of law is at the 
boundaries o f many other legal specialties such as property law, contract and 
insolvency law. In this context, the question of the competence of the EU to interfere 
with national property laws becomes questionable.
It has been argued that Article 95 EC677 could constitute a legitimate basis to 
recognise the competence of the Community to legislate in the field o f property law. 
Nonetheless, some limitations to the Community’s powers to act in the field of 
property law and secured credit can also be identified. Following the principle of 
subsidiarity defined in Article 5 EC and introduced by the Treaty o f Maastricht:
“[t]he Community shall act within the limits of the powers conferred upon it by this 
Treaty and of the objectives assigned to it therein. In the areas which do not fall 
within its exclusive jurisdiction, the Community shall take action, in accordance with 
the principle of subsidiarity, only if and insofar as the objectives o f the proposed 
action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can therefore, by 
reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by the 
Community.”
In this respect, it is doubtful whether Article 95 EC could be used as a basis for the 
harmonisation of the whole of property law in Europe. In effect, it would mean that 
the EU would, in effect, be able to regulate the internal market678. This eventuality
677Article 95/Article 100a - EC Treaty (Maastricht consolidated version). Article 95 provides that: 
“[b]y way o f derogation from Article 94 and save where otherwise provided in this Treaty, the 
following provisions shall apply for the achievement o f the objectives set out in Article 14. The 
Council shall, acting in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 251 and after consulting 
the Economic and Social Committee, adopt the measures for the approximation o f the provisions laid 
down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States which have as their object the 
establishment and functioning of the internal market.” See also Article 2 o f the Treaty establishing the 
European Community, which states that:“[t]he Community shall have as its task, by establishing a 
common market and an economic and monetary union and by implementing common policies or 
activities referred to in Articles 3 and 4, to promote throughout the Community a harmonious, 
balanced and sustainable development o f economic activities, a high level o f employment and of  
social protection, equality between men and women, sustainable and non-inflationary growth, a high 
degree o f competitiveness and convergence o f economic performance, a high level o f protection and 
improvement of the quality o f the environment, the raising of the standard o f living and quality o f  life, 
and economic and social cohesion and solidarity among Member States.”
678 Van Erp fn. 651, at p. 12 where the author argues that: “[ajrticle 295 EC should be taken into 
consideration. This article states, as we already saw, that the EC Treaty shall in no way prejudice the 
rules in Member States governing the system of property ownership. Although at first sight it seems 
that Article 295 has a large ambit, its effect has been limited in case-law developed by the ECJ. 
Reference can be made to the so-called “Golden Shares” cases. In these cases the Court had to decide 
on the compatibility with community law o f “national systems which grant the executive certain 
prerogatives to intervene in the share structure and in the management o f privatised enterprises in 
strategically important areas o f the economy.” The Court ruled that Article 295 EC "... merely 
signifies that each Member State may organise as it thinks fit the system o f  ownership o f  undertakings
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was already considered by the ECJ in the Tobacco judgement619where the Court 
stated in respect to Article 95 EC that:
“[t]o construe that article as meaning that it vests in the Community legislature a 
general power to regulate the internal market would not only be contrary to the 
express wording of the provisions cited above but would also be incompatible with 
the principle embodied in Article 3b of the EC Treaty (now Article 5 EC) that the 
powers o f the Community are limited to those specifically conferred on it.”680
Harmonisation of secured credit laws could therefore be possible if it appeared to be 
necessary to the functioning and establishment of the internal market and if it could 
be better achieved by the Community rather than by Member States.
The problem with the harmonisation of secured credit law regimes is that it is at the 
boundaries of many areas of laws. The harmonisation of secured credit laws in 
Europe would in fact involve substantial legal reforms of property law, contract law 
and even insolvency laws. In relation to the competence of the Community to
whilst at the same time respecting the fundamental freedoms enshrined in the Treaty. ” Article 295 EC 
does not mean that property law cannot be touched at all by European law.”
679 ECJ, 10 December 2002, Case C-491/01 The Queen and Secretary o f  State fo r  Health, ex parte: 
British American Tobacco (Investments) Ltd v. Imperial Tobacco Ltd. The relevant part of the 
judgment is as follows: “81 Article 100a (1) of the Treaty empowers the Council, acting in accordance 
with the procedure referred to in Article 189b (now, after amendment, Article 251 EC) and after 
consulting the Economic and Social Committee, to adopt measures for the approximation of the 
provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States which have as their 
object the establishment and functioning of the internal market.82. Under Article 3(c) o f the EC 
Treaty (now, after amendment, Article 3(1) (c) EC), the internal market is characterised by the 
abolition, as between Member States, o f all obstacles to the free movement of goods, persons, services 
and capital. Article 7a o f the EC Treaty (now, after amendment, Article 14 EC), which provides for 
the measures to be taken with a view to establishing the internal market, states in paragraph 2 that that 
market is to comprise an area without internal frontiers in which the free movement o f goods, persons, 
services and capital is ensured in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty.83. Those provisions, 
read together, make it clear that the measures referred to in Article 100a (1) of the Treaty are intended 
to improve the conditions for the establishment and functioning of the internal market. To construe 
that article as meaning that it vests in the Community legislature a general power to regulate the 
internal market would not only be contrary to the express wording of the provisions cited above but 
would also be incompatible with the principle embodied in Article 3b o f the EC Treaty (now Article 5 
EC) that the powers o f  the Community are limited to those specifically conferred on it.84. Moreover, 
a measure adopted on the basis o f Article 100a of the Treaty must genuinely have as its object the 
improvement o f the conditions for the establishment and functioning o f the internal market. If a mere 
finding o f disparities between national rules and of the abstract risk o f obstacles to the exercise of 
fundamental freedoms or o f distortions of competition liable to result there from were sufficient to 
justify the choice o f Article 100a as a legal basis, judicial review of compliance with the the proper 
legal basis might be rendered nugatory. The Court would then be prevented from discharging the 
function entrusted to it by Article 164 o f the EC Treaty (now Article 220 EC) o f ensuring that the law 
is observed in the interpretation and application of the Treaty.85. So, in considering whether Article 
100a was the proper legal basis, the Court must verify whether the measure whose validity is at issue 
in fact pursues the objectives stated by the Community legislature.”
680 ECJ, 10 December 2002, Case C-491/01, The Queen and Secretary o f State fo r  Health, ex parte: 
British American Tobacco (Investments) Ltd. v. Imperial Tobacco Ltd., at Para. 83.
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legislate in the sphere of property law, it is important to also mention Article 295 EC 
which restricts the powers o f the Community to intervene within national law of 
property ownership by providing that:
“[t]he Treaty shall in no way prejudices the rules in Member States governing the 
system of property ownership”.
However, the ECJ clarified the meaning of this disposition and explained that Article 
295 EC would not stop the Community from organising property law regimes in
/ O  1
Europe . Accordingly, it would appear possible in principle for the Community to 
achieve the harmonisation of secured credit laws, or at least of some aspects o f the 
law in Europe.
This section argued that the harmonisation of secured credit laws is largely desirable, 
especially in the light of the development and good functioning of the European 
Common Market. Also, it has been demonstrated that the EU would have 
competence to achieve the harmonisation of secured credit law, or at least in respect 
of targeted aspects of financial transactions. The question is now to determine the 
extent to which a modernisation of secured credit law using harmonisation as a legal 
method is feasible. Can harmonisation succeed in its quest to reconcile and 
accommodate differences among the European regimes o f secured credit, and also 
succeed in its modernisation endeavours?
As it has already been explained, legal harmonisation will be successful as legal 
method to modernise the law if  an accommodation of differences is, if  at all, feasible, 
and if it can also lead to substantial modernisation of secured credit law regimes as 
defined in Chapter Two. The EU already attempted to harmonise the law in respect 
of retention of title clauses with the EU Directive on Late Payments in Commercial 
Transactions . However, it has been suggested that the harmonisation and 
modernisation endeavours in relation to the regulation o f retention of title clauses
681 The ECJ had the occasion to limit the effects of this article in the so-called “Golden Shares” case, 
ECJ 4th June 2002, where the Court ruled that Article 295 “[...] merely signifies that each Member 
State may organise as it think fits the system o f ownership of undertakings whilst at the same time 
respecting the fundamental freedoms enshrined in the treaty.” Case cited in Van Erp, S.J.H.M. 
“European and National Property Law: Osmosis or Growing Antagonism?” (2006) Sixth Walter Van 
Gerven Lecture, Leuven Center for a Common Law of Europe, Ius Commune Research School, at p. 
12 .
682 See above fn. 611.
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remained limited. Accordingly, it will be further considered whether the 
harmonisation o f retention of title clauses could have gone further and whether 
harmonisation could also be successful in modernising the regulations underlying 
retention of title clauses in European jurisdictions. The next section will thus attempt 
to determine whether an accommodation of legal divergences can, if  at all, be 
reached within European regulations. The identification of current divergences 
amongst all EU jurisdictions would go beyond the scope of this analysis. 
Accordingly, this demonstration will restrict this analysis to a sample of European 
jurisdictions; France and England. The next section will thus assess whether 
harmonisation could be used as successful method to modernise the law regulating 
retention of title clauses in France and England.
EUROPEAN SECURED CREDIT LAW REGIMES: RETENTION OF TITLE 
CLAUSES AND HARMONISATION
Legal harmonisation will be successful as legal method to modernise the law if  an 
accommodation of differences is feasible, and if it can also lead to substantial 
modernisation o f the law. In relation to retention of title clauses, the questions will be 
addressed of whether an accommodation of European regulations underlying 
retention o f title clauses is, if at all, possible, and whether such endeavours could 
lead to substantial modernisation of the law. The identification o f current 
divergences amongst all EU jurisdictions would go beyond the scope o f this analysis. 
Consequently, this demonstration will restrict this comparative analysis on retention 
of title clauses to France and England.
Both jurisdictions retain a similar definition to this property-based security 
mechanism. Retention of title clause is the clause by which the seller retains title to 
the goods until payment is received. Upon the buyer’s default, property o f the goods 
will revert automatically to the seller and, thus, escape from the hands o f the
ARTliquidator . If  simple retention of title clauses are valid in both jurisdictions and
f i Q A
also accepted within the disposition of the European Directive , difficulties can
683 Monti op. cit. fn. 418, at p. 866.
684 Ibid.
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arise where the insolvent buyer resells or manufactures the goods before payment. 
These eventualities create uncertainties for sellers who may not be able to enforce 
their proprietary rights upon default. Particularly, it has already been emphasised that 
French and English regimes regulating retention o f title clauses should be 
modernised so as to provide more certainty and predictability for the commercial 
community685.
Various aspects of the laws regulating retention of title clauses in these jurisdictions 
will be identified so as to determine whether an accommodation of differences is, if 
at all possible. Retention of title clauses are property-based security devices which 
are mainly regulated through national property law. This comparative analysis will 
have to consider the differences that exist between baselines concepts o f property 
law in France and England. Although both jurisdictions recognise the power of the 
seller to use ownership for security purposes, there are substantial divergences in the 
definition and concept of ‘property’ itself that could be difficult to accommodate.
The accommodation of differences within national secured credit law is not an easy
task considering the complex and multifaceted nature of this area of law. In effect,
secured credit law is at the boundaries of many areas of laws such as contract law,
property law and insolvency law which render the task of harmonising the law very
complex, especially within jurisdictions that belong to different legal traditions. In
effect, secured credit law regimes cover a multitude of different legal aspects to
consider such as the regulation of parties’ rights and liabilities, validity requirements,
enforcement and priority system. As Goode already highlighted:
“[c]redit and security law involves in the first place regulation of the rights of the 
parties to a credit transaction: the monetary liabilities of the debtor before and after 
default; the extent to which the taking of security over present and future property is 
to be permitted; the requirement for attachment of a security interest so as to be 
effective between the parties, the secured party’s rights over the security vis-a-vis the 
debtor, and the procedure for enforcement of security. ... Then we have the problem 
of conflicting security interests. How are third parties to be made aware of the 
existence of the security interest? How priorities should be regulated between the
secured parties and the different classes of third parties into whose hands the security
»686may come.
685 See Chapter Three.
686 Goode fn. 635, at p. 248.
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In relation to retention of title clauses, the regulation of such security device would 
effectively imposes the recognition of specific rules towards the legal relationship 
between the parties to the transaction but also towards the enforcement methods and 
legal relationships with third parties. In effect, the creation of a security does not 
solely affect the contracting parties but can also affect a wide range of third parties. 
As it will be exposed later in this chapter, the universal character of property rights 
imply that these rights are enforceable erga omnes, which means that property rights 
are enforceable against everyone who might infringe them. Thus, the harmonisation 
of retention o f title clauses in Europe will require the comparative analysis of the 
rights and obligations of the parties to the agreement but also the analysis of the 
dispositions provided for the protection of third parties.
A comparative law approach will indubitably constitute the consistent approach to 
adopt within subsequent developments. In effect, comparative law is a fundamental 
tool used by European legislators to lead harmonisation endeavours. In effect, how 
could it be possible to accommodate differences if they are not identified in the first 
place? Thus, this development will first provide a comparative analysis on some 
aspects of property laws between France and England. Such an analysis will use 
specific references to property law terminologies peculiar to each legal tradition. 
Further, the next section will also provide a comparative analysis o f the current 
English and French regulations underlying the rights and obligations o f the parties to 
the agreement. Finally, a comparative analysis on the regulation of retention of title 
clauses would not be complete without the examination of the regulations underlying 
retention of title clauses in respect of third parties. Ultimately, this comparative 
analysis will enable the determination of whether the regulations underlying 
retention of title clauses in England and France could successfully be harmonised so 
as to achieve an approximation and modernisation o f the law.
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Comparative law aspects of property laws in France and England
Retention of title clauses are property-based security devices which are accepted and 
regulated in both jurisdictions. Thus, it is not surprising to find most of their 
regulations in property laws. That is why, this analysis on the harmonisation of 
retention of title clauses legal regimes will begin with a comparative law analysis of 
the baseline concepts enshrined in property laws o f France and England. These 
jurisdictions are interesting to consider because they are part o f different legal 
traditions which have generated different approaches toward property and associated 
concepts. Civilian systems such as France mainly developed from Roman law. 
Following the abolishment of feudal law, most continental Civil Law jurisdictions
f.o n
progressed towards systemic codifications . Common Law jurisdictions such as 
England evolved more autonomously without such an extensive recognition of 
Roman law into its legal principles. Common Law particularly developed from 
feudal law systems and mainly reposes on case law and precedent. It is recognised 
that:
“[t]he predominant dividing line in property law lies between common law and civil 
law jurisdictions. Civil systems derive their property law from Roman law; their 
property law covers movable and immovable objects alike. Civil systems often have 
systematic codification with abstract concepts. It is for the largest part mandatory 
law, and case law is relatively unimportant. Feudal law is of little influence. There is 
no equity and, therefore, no equitable ownership. Ownership and the strictly limited 
amount (numerus clausus) or real rights, like security rights, are key concepts”688.
This comparative analysis will first consider the concept of property in France and 
will then analyse the concept of property in England. Ultimately, this comparative 
analysis will provide fundamental guidance as to whether an accommodation of 
different property law concepts is, if  at all, feasible in some European jurisdictions.
687 For example, extensive codification occurred in France, Germany, Spain or in Switzerland. 
Napoleon promulgated the French Civil Code in 1804; the BGB (Biigerlishes Gesetzbuch) was 
promulgated in 1896 in Germany; the Spanish Civil Code was promulgated in 1889 and the Civil 
Code of Switzerland was promulgated in 1912.
688 Milo, J.M. “Retention of Title in European Business Transactions” (2003) 43 Washburn Law 
Journal, at p. 212.
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The Civilian Tradition and the absolute character o f  ownership
Civilian legal systems principally developed according to Roman legal concepts. 
Thus, it is logically expected that the modem Civilian definition of property also 
finds its roots in Roman law. Roman lawyers designated property by the term of
689‘dominium’ which is the right o f the Dominus or the Pater Familias . The 
dominium is defined in the Justinian Code as the right to use (usus) and the right to 
destroy or alienate a thing (abusus), within the limits of the law; 'jus utendi et 
abutendi re sua, quatenus iuris ratio patiturn,m . The terms ‘property’ or ‘property 
rights’ did not exist under Roman law as a developed legal doctrine but it is manifest 
from the definition of the ‘dominium ' that “ ... the Romans did possess the concept 
of property rights and individual rights in general.”691 For example, proprietary 
remedies such as the vindicatio already existed under Roman law and this remedy 
has been preserved in current French property law with the action en revendication.
The concept o f property as a right to use and destroy or alienate a thing has been kept 
throughout the Middle Ages and Modem History and is still representative of the 
definition retained in most Civilian legal traditions692. Although everyday language 
generally assimilates property to the thing that can be owned, the legal meaning of 
property within Civilian jurisdictions essentially refer to ‘ownership’ or right of 
property. Ownership is defined as a ‘sacred right’ in the French Civil code and is
689 The dominus is the right o f the head o f the family over his things. Gamsey explains that: “[i]n the 
Roman law o f persons, the male head o f the household (the pater familias) had ius and potestas over 
his dependents, whether children or slaves. The former were held under another’s ius {alieni iuris) the 
latter under his dominium.” Gamsey, P., Thinking About Property, From Antiquity to the Age o f  
Revolution, (2007), at p. 190.
690 Ibid. at p. 178.
691 Ibid. at p. 195.
692 Article 544 C.Civ. provides that: “[I]a propriete est le droit de jouir et disposer des choses de la 
maniere la plus absolue, pourvu qu'on n’en fasse pas un usage prohibe par les lois ou par les 
reglements. ” (Ownership is the right to enjoy and dispose o f things in the most absolute manner, 
provided they are not used in a way prohibited by statutes or regulations.) Article 348 Spanish Civil 
code provides that: u[l]a propiedad es el derecho de gozar y  disponer de una cosa, sin mas 
limitaciones que las establecidas en las leyes. El propietario tiene accidn contra el tenedor y  el 
poseedor de la cosa para reivindicarla.” (The property is the right to enjoy and dispose o f a thing 
without other limitations tan those established by law. the owner has an action against the holder and 
the possessor through the vindication.)
693 Ibid. Article 544 C.Civ.
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understood as a fundamental extension of individual liberties694. Indeed, Article 544 
of the French Civil code expresses a general theory relating to ownership by 
providing that:
“[ojwnership is the right to enjoy and dispose of things in the most absolute manner, 
provided they are not used in a way prohibited by law or regulations”695.
The absolute character of ownership is a key attribute in Civil Law traditions that is 
largely reflected in the prerogatives recognised to the owner. In effect, ownership is 
composed of three essential prerogatives which are the right to use (usus), enjoy 
(fructus) and alienate (abusus) the thing. It is important to mention that limits to the 
absolute character of ownership have been introduced in the law696 and in the case 
law. The famous French case Clement-Bayarcf91 is an illustration of the limits 
imposed on the absolute character of the property rights of the owner. In effect, this 
case was the first decision of the French Supreme Court that condemned an abuse of  
process698 in the exercise of the owner’s property rights.
Following the facts of the case, Mr. Coquerel installed on his property some sharp 
wooden frames with the aim to puncture his neighbour’s airships which were flying 
over his property during their take-offs and landings. The abuse o f  process theory is 
a jurisprudential creation which attempts to limit the absolute character o f ownership 
where it is used in a malicious way. Notwithstanding these limits, ownership remains 
a very powerful prerogative that was affirmed from the very moment the feudal 
regime was abolished with the Declaration of the Rights o f Man and of the Citizen 
proclaimed in 1789. Article 17 provides th a t:
“[l]a propriete etant un droit inviolable et sacre, nul ne peut en etre prive, si ce n'est 
lorsque la necessite publique, legalement constatee, l'exige evidemment, et sous la 
condition d'une juste et prealable indemnite."699
694 Decorps, J.P. "Le Droit de Propriete: Evolutions et Adaptations" (2001) available from 
www.cedroma.usj.edu.lb/pdf/drtsfond/decorps.pdf (last checked 26/04/2010).
695 See above Article 544 C.Civ. fn. 679.
696 The principle o f the numerus clausus constitutes a substantial limit to the absolute character of 
ownership as it will be later considered in this chapter.
697 Clement-Bayard, GAJC, l l thed., No 62, DP 1917.1.79.
698 Theorie de I ’abus de droit.
699 "The right of ownership is an inviolable and sacred right; one may not be deprived o f one's 
property, unless where public need, duly ascertained by law, clearly requires it, and subject to the 
condition that fair and prior compensation be made.”
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Other Civilian jurisdictions such as Germany700, State of Louisiana701 or Quebec702 
have also adopted a similar concept of ownership. Thus, the concept o f ownership 
appears to be one o f the most important legal concepts within Civilian legal
703systems . Notwithstanding the recognition and strong protection of ownership and 
property rights, these rights have been subjected to a number of limits embodied in 
the case law, as it has just been highlighted and in the law itself trough general 
principles such as the numerus clausus principle704.
Within Civilian jurisdictions, property is therefore defined by reference to the right 
o f property or ownership which is analysed as the most complete form of property 
right. Ownership is therefore a fundamental concept within Civilian property law 
which entitles one person to have an absolute, exclusive and perpetual right over the 
thing. Although ownership is absolute, it does not mean that two or more persons 
cannot own an asset in co-ownership or in joint ownership705. Further, other property 
rights or real rights are also recognised in France which can affect the exclusive 
character of ownership. Real rights directly concern rights on property (jus in re) as 
opposed to personal rights (jus in persona) which directly rest on the right to obtain a 
performance from someone. Rights in rem or real rights are divided in two 
categories. Principal real rights are to be distinguished from accessory real rights. 
Principal real rights include ownership understood as the real right in its fullest
706form . Principal real rights can also designate the rights of usus or
707fructus attributed separately. A real right will be qualified as an accessory real right 
when it relates to the creation of a security such as the pledge (gage) or hypothec. 
These rights are said to be the accessories of the debt owed to the creditor. This is 
why France has been generally quite hostile to the use of property-based securities
700 §903 BGB (German Civil code : BiXrgerliches Gesetzbuch)
701 CC 477 (Civil code o f Louisiana).
702 CCQ 947 (Civil code o f Quebec).
703 Milo, J.M. “Property Rights and Real Rights” in Smits, J.M., Et al., Elgar Encyclopedia o f  
Comparative Law, (2006), at p. 598.
704 See above fn. 695.
705 Co-ownership (Copropriete) is regulated under Article 664 C.Civ. and Article 664 C.Civ. Joint 
ownership (indivision) is regulated under Article 815 C.Civ.
706 The owner has got the three prerogatives: usus, fructus and abusus.
707 Usus and fructus are real rights which entitle the holder to use and get the benefits from the thing. 
Usus and fructus are often used to designate the property rights of the tenant of a rented house. He is 
entitled to use and enjoy the thing but he does not have the ownership o f the property, i.e. the abusus, 
so he cannot sell it.
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such as retention of title. Indeed, it is difficult to conceive how ownership could be 
relegated to the category of security which is analysed to be an ‘accessory to a real 
right’. The right of property, or ownership, is qualified as a principal real right 
whereas a security is qualified as an accessory real right. A real right entitles the 
holder to a right to follow the property in the hand of whomever it may be and, to a 
preferential right of repayment upon the debtor’s default.
The terminology used within Civilian jurisdictions to designate ‘non possessory 
security interest’708 would thus be ‘real security’ which entitles the holder to an 
accessory real right. This expression of ‘accessory real right’ is used to designate the 
property rights of a movable security’s holder, whereas ‘security interest’ is 
generally the preferred terminology used within Common Law jurisdictions such as 
in England and the United States. Although ownership is a key concept within 
Civilian jurisdictions, possession is often associated with this concept but has to be 
clearly distinguished. In everyday language, there is not any difference between 
possessing a thing and owning it. However, in legal terms, the notion of possession 
cannot be confused with ownership. Possession can be defined as the exercise of a de 
facto  power over a thing. The possesseur has an effective control over the thing as he 
materially possesses it. Although possession involves a relationship of a person with 
a thing, it does not confer the possesseur a real right. Possession is analysed as a de 
facto  situation in France which could nevertheless create legal effects if possession is 
legally recognised709.
Possession requires two sets o f conditions in order to create legal effects. Validity 
and enforcement requirements need to be established. First, possession requires the 
possesseur to use and enjoy a particular asset (corpus) and act as if  he was the real 
owner (animus). If the animus defaults, the expression ‘detenteur ’ will then be used 
to designate a person who is using and enjoying the thing, knowing that he or she is 
not the real owner. Secondly, possession will only be effective if  it shows certain 
qualities. Article 2261 C.civ. enumerates four conditions that are required to establish
708 ‘Non-possessory security interest’ is the preferred term used within Common Law jurisdictions.
709 Article 2255 C.Civ. provides a definition of possession: “[pjossession is the detention or 
enjoyment o f a thing or of a right which we hold or exercise by ourselves, or by another who holds 
and exercises it in our name.”
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an effective possession710. If these conditions are fulfilled, possession will be 
effective and will create legal effect for its holder. In effect, a valid possession 
creates a presumption of ownership which can lead to ownership if  not contested by
711the real owner .
The buyer with retention o f title clause cannot be a possesseur as he agreed that 
transfer of ownership would be delayed until he or she fully pay the purchase price. 
Thus, such an agreement could not lead to possession as the buyer would lack the 
intentional element required for the recognition of possession, the animus. In relation 
to other movable security, the same reasoning can be advanced. A creditor cannot be 
a possesseur but can only be a simple detenteur. This aspect of possession constitutes 
a substantial divergence with the concept retained under the Common Law as it will 
be now envisaged.
At first sight, the analysis o f the concept of property in France would not appear to 
be flexible enough to fit with the realities of the retention of title mechanism. In 
effect, if  a security is analysed as an accessory real right, the question is to determine 
whether retention of title clause, which in essence retains ownership in the goods 
(principal real right), could also be analysed as an accessory real right. Also, if the 
buyer was to resell or manufactured goods sold under retention o f title clause, the 
absolute character of the seller’s ownership can be questioned. Notwithstanding the 
difficulties raised by the strict approach to the concept of property and ownership in 
France, retention of title clauses are widely recognised and have somehow managed 
to be accommodated with property law concepts. The question is to determine 
whether the dogmatic approach to the concept of property in France could create an 
obstacle to the accommodation of the regulations underlying retention of title clauses 
in Europe. The analysis of the concept of property in England will now be 
considered.
710 Article 2261 C.Civ. provides that: “[i]n order to be allowed to prescribe, one must have a 
continuous and uninterrupted, peaceful, public and unequivocal possession, and in the capacity o f an 
owner.”
711 Article 2276 C.Civ. further provides that “[i]n matters of movables, possession is equivalent to a 
title. Nevertheless, the person who has lost or from whom a thing has been stolen, may claim it 
during three years, from the day of the loss or o f the theft, against the one in whose hands he finds it, 
subject to the remedy o f the latter against the one from whom he holds it.”
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Common Law jurisdictions and the relative character ofproperty
The Common Law concept o f property had a different historical evolution than 
within Civilian legal systems. Indeed, the development o f the concept o f property 
happened through the strong authority of sovereigns712. English property law was 
based on a feudal system. Property right did not designate the right of the owner 
because the sovereign was the sole owner. The sovereign’s subjects were the tenants. 
This structure of ownership only applied to land and did not apply to any other forms 
of property713. Consequently, it is not surprising that the concept of property, and 
especially ownership, evolved differently within Common Law jurisdictions.
Property is not associated to an absolute right but largely remains a relative 
concept714. Common Law jurisdictions did not develop any proprietary remedies for 
the owner of personal property as it happened in Civilian jurisdictions with the 
vindicacio115. The protection of property rights essentially arose through the law of 
tort by means o f damages. Concepts of possession and proprietary interests are 
fundamental within Common Law jurisdictions. Accordingly, the existence of 
different proprietary remedies in England and France could create some difficulties 
in this quest to accommodate legal differences.
Since English law does not provide for a statutory definition of ‘property’, it is 
fundamental to refer to the legal doctrine and legal dictionaries to examine the
716terminologies used within the Common Law. The Oxford Dictionary of Law 
provides that property is “[ajnything that can be owned” and, generally refers, to the 
‘right of ownership in chattels’. The definition further provides that English law
712 De Chabot, N. “La Notion de Droit de Propriete dans le Droit Anglo-Saxon et le Droit Romain" 
(1999) Geometre no 5, available at http://topo.epfl.ch/MO_cours/siteweb/NOTPROPR.htm (last 
checked 26/04/2010).
713 Bridge, M., Personal Property Law, (2000), at p. 1.
714 Milo explains for instance that “[t]hough English Law does not use the term ‘ownership’, it does 
not know of an action to protect it as civil law jurisdictions do (revindication), but uses tort law. 
Ownership might be considered a redundant concept. It is, however, a fundamental importance in 
civilian law jurisdictions. In common law, title, or right to possession, is a key concept. Furthermore, 
these are relative concepts, as opposed to the absolute concept o f ownership and other property rights 
in civil law jurisdictions. As there can only be one owner at any given moment in civil law 
jurisdictions, there very well may be several rights to possession, and the best right will prevail.” Milo 
op. cit. fn. 703, at p. 596.
715 Ibid.
716 Martin, E.A., Oxford Dictionary o f  Law, (5th ed., 2003).
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clearly distinguishes between real property which relates to land and personal
property which relates to chattel. The Common Law terminology of real property
should not be confused with the Civilian concept of real right which relates to
chattels and more generally, to movable property. In effect, as it has already been
highlighted, Civilian jurisdictions generally distinguish between immovable property
(land) and movable property (chattels). As for Civilian jurisdictions, the concept of
property does not solely encompass the object, personal and real property, it also
encompass proprietary rights, a legal relationship with the object. It is explained that:
‘“ [property’ is a word of different meanings. It may mean a thing owned (my watch 
or my house is ‘my property’); it may mean ownership itself as when I speak of my 
‘property’ in my watch may pass to the person to whom I sell the watch before I 
actually hand the watch over or it may even mean an interest in a thing less than 
ownership but nevertheless conferring certain rights, as when we speak of the 
‘property’ or ‘special property’ of a bailee in the thing bailed .. .”717
Evidently, in our everyday language, the expression of ‘property’ generally refers to 
the object which is owned. However, it is important to emphasise that property does 
not solely mean the object, it also includes “... every right and interest which a person 
has in lands and chattels, and is broad enough to include everything [interest] which 
one person can own and transfer to another.”718The term ‘property’ therefore 
encompasses both the ‘object’ and ‘right’, in other words, a legal relationship 
between the thing and an individual719.
From these definitions o f ‘property’ in Civilian and Common Law jurisdictions, it 
can already be established fundamental divergences. While Civilian jurisdictions 
understand property as a legal relationship between the owner and the thing in an 
absolute manner, English law understands property as a “ ... network of property 
relationships”720 and thus retains a more relative approach to the concept o f property. 
While Civilian jurisdictions systems essentially seek to determine who the absolute 
owner is, Common Law jurisdictions generally look for the best proprietary interest
717 Vaines, C., Et al., Personal Property, (1973), at p. 3.
718 Noyes, C.R., The Institution o f  Property: A Study o f the Development, Substance and Arrangement 
o f  the System o f  Property in Modern Anglo-American Law, (2007), at p. 359.
719 Brown explains for instance that “[i]n the legal sense...property means not the thing itself, but the 
rights which inhere in it. Ownership, or the right of property is, moreover, not a single indivisible 
concept but a collection or bundle o f rights, o f legally protected interests.” Brown, R.A., The Law o f  
Personal Property, (2nd ed. 1955), at p. 6.
720 Gray, K., Elements o f  Land Law, (1st ed. 1987), at p. 8.
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that will prevail. In effect, there might be more than one claim made in relation to a 
specific object, each entitling the holder to a proprietary interest. Common Law 
jurisdictions therefore conceive property as“ ... a bundle o f mutual rights and
791obligations which prevail between ‘subjects’ in respect o f certain ‘objects’” . In 
this sense, ‘ownership’ does not appear to be a key concept within Common Law 
jurisdictions. Rather, the Common Law tradition put more emphasis on legal
799concepts such as title, proprietary interests or right to possession .
In this sense, the definition provided by Noyes in the ‘Institution of Property’
appears to be accurate for the purpose of this analysis. It is explained that:
“[t]he term property may be defined to be the interest which can be acquired in 
external objects or things. The things themselves are not, in a true sense, property, 
but they constitute its foundation and material, and the idea of property springs out of 
the connection or control, or interest which, according to law, may be acquired in 
them, or over them. This interest may be absolute [complete], or it may be limited 
and qualified. It is absolute when a thing [object] is objectively and lawfully 
appropriated by one to his own use in exclusion of all others. It is limited or qualified 
when the control acquired falls short o f the absolute.”723
It is interesting to note at this stage the concept o f interest within the English 
definition of property. Effectively, while French law uses the term of ‘real right’, 
English law refers to the term of ‘interest’. Indeed, Civilian jurisdictions such as 
France, only recognise rights in property and not interests in property. As opposed to 
the absolute and indivisible character of ownership recognised in France, property is 
understood as a bundle of rights within Common Law jurisdictions entitling their 
holders to proprietary interests. The term ‘property’ would therefore refer to 
proprietary interests within Common Law jurisdictions, whereas emphasis is given 
on ownership right and real rights within Civilian jurisdictions. Under the Common 
Law, the owner could be defined as the individual with the best proprietary interest 
and not necessarily the individual with an absolute right of property in the Civilian 
sense.
As part of this analysis on the concept of property in Common Law jurisdictions 
such as in England, it is fundamental to highlight the importance o f Equity.
721 Ibid.
722 Milo op. cit. fn. 703, at p. 596.
723 Noyes op. cit. fn. 718, at p. 357.
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Although, English law establishes clear and specific rules regulating the creation and 
transfer o f property rights, the reference to Equity can sometimes reach different 
solutions and decide that property rights have passed. A significant example of 
equitable proprietary interests can be found with the trust. This mechanism is 
peculiar to Common Law jurisdictions and entails a trustee to hold property on 
behalf of a beneficiary. Under a trust, ownership is divided between the legal owner 
(trustee) and the beneficial owner (beneficiary) who is entitled to an equitable 
interest to the property. The former has a legal title under Common Law while the 
latter has an equitable title in Equity. In this respect, the recognition of the trust 
mechanism within Civilian jurisdictions would be difficult to implement considering 
the absolute character o f ownership and considering that Equity does not exist. 
However, it is interesting to highlight that the dogmatic approach to the concept of 
ownership has not prevented Civilian jurisdictions such as France to recently 
integrate similar mechanisms into their legal regimes724.
The Courts also had the opportunity to refer to Equity in order to support the 
recognition of the seller’s rights to trace the proceeds of resale under a retention of 
title clause. In effect, the famous Romalpa125 case recognised the existence of a 
fiduciary relationship between the contracting parties and allowed the seller to trace 
the proceeds of resale in Equity which entitled him to a property right in effect. 
Following the equitable doctrine o f tracing, originally established in Re Hallets
n -jj?
Estate , the fiduciary seller was entitled to trace the proceeds o f resale. Since then, 
the courts never found a fiduciary relationship entitling the owner to this equitable 
right o f tracing727. In France, such reasoning could not occur. In effect, subsequent 
developments will highlight that the only way the seller could recover the proceeds 
o f resale is through the mechanism of the subrogation.
724 For instance, France recently adopted the fiducie in 2007. The fiducie is defined in Article 2011 
C.Civ. as a transaction whereby one or more settlors transfer assets, rights, or sureties, or a group of  
assets, rights or sureties, present or future, to one or more trustees who, keeping them separated from 
their own patrimony, will act according to a specific purpose in the interest o f one o f more 
beneficiaries. See above fn. 582.
125 Aluminium Industry Vaassen BVv. Romalpa Aluminium Ltd. [1976] 1 WLR676.
726 [1880] 13 Ch.D 696.
727 Tatung (UK) Ltd. v. Galex Telesure Ltd. [1989] 5 BCC 325; E Pfeiffer v. Arburthnot Factors 
[1988] 1 WLR 150; Compaq Computers v. Abercorn Group [1991] BCC 484.
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Common Law jurisdictions did not retain ‘ownership’ as a key concept but put more 
emphasis on the concept of title and possessory rights. Possession is an important 
concept within Common Law jurisdictions that differ from the concept retained in 
Civilian jurisdictions. The nature o f possession within English law can be conceived 
in different ways. First, possession can be defined as the physical control that an 
individual has over a thing728. This is de facto  possession which generally does not 
lead to legal possession. In order to create ‘legal possession’, and comparably to 
France, the possessor must intend to exclude others from his control over the object. 
This is the intentional element or animus required for the recognition o f possession at 
law. De facto possession would therefore be assimilated to the French concept of 
detention where the individual exercises physical control over a thing but does not 
have the animus or the intention to act as the owner of the object. Legal possession, 
when established entitles the holder to a right to possess. For instance, a voluntarily 
bailment requires the bailee to hold property on the bailor’s behalf. In this situation, 
the bailor and bailee will both share legal possession. More precisely, the bailor is 
said to have constructive possession of the chattel as he lost physical possession of 
the asset.
From this definition, it is interesting to note significant divergences in the nature and 
purpose of possession within both legal traditions. Legal possession in England 
differs from the concept of legal possession retained in France in the sense that the 
former defines the intentional element as the action of the possessor to exclude others 
from his physical control over the thing while the latter requires the possesseur to act 
as if he was the owner o f the asset. In this sense, the Common Law generally 
considers the buyer under retention of title as a possessor while Civilian jurisdictions 
such as France will consider the buyer as a simple detenteur.
Following this analysis on the concept of property within both legal traditions, it 
would seem that the terminologies inherent to property law in Common Law appears 
to be much more flexible than in Civilian jurisdictions such as France. Common Law
728 It is explained that: “[c]ontrol in fact may be acquired by taking physical possession o f the chattel 
itself or possession o f an object which gives physical control o f the chattel, e.g. the keys to the 
warehouse in which the chattel is stored (although possession o f a key to a container or to ‘’a building 
has been variously described by the courts as giving ‘actual’, ‘constructive’ or ‘symbolic’ possession 
of the chattel contained therein.” In Sealy, L.S., Et al., Commercial Law, (2009), at p. 73.
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jurisdictions generally recognise a fragmentation of property rights so that different 
persons can have, at the same time, different property rights on the same good. In 
contrast, under Civil law, ownership is absolute and indivisible729. From the analysis 
of property law terminologies and concepts retained in France, it is evident that they 
remain very complex and would appear to be difficult to fit within modem legal 
relationships. The strict conception of ownership as an absolute, exclusive and 
perpetual right would prevent the creation and recognition of the Common Law 
equivalent of the trust within Civilian jurisdictions such as France. Nevertheless, it 
has to be observed that the Civil Law is not as dogmatic and rigid as it seems by 
allowing more and more flexibility in its jurispmdential interpretation. For instance, 
and as it has already been mentioned, it is interesting to note the recent adoption of 
the fiducie in France. Although, the indivisible character of ownership remains, it is 
showed that the strict conception of ownership as an absolute, exclusive and 
perpetual property right does not constitute an obstacle to legal reforms, especially to 
those inspired from other legal models. Thus, the fact that these jurisdictions are 
willing to adopt a more flexible approach towards their property law concepts could 
arguably facilitate the process o f harmonisation in Europe.
This comparative analysis highlighted further significant differences, particularly in 
respect o f the terminologies retained in French and English property laws. For 
instance, Civilian jurisdictions such as France generally recognise specific 
proprietary remedies such as the vindicacio that are not recognised in English law. 
An illustration o f the existing divergences between the two jurisdictions can also be 
found with Equity. In effect, Equity permitted the seller with retention o f title clause 
to trace the proceeds o f resale following the recognition o f a fiduciary relationship. 
Such reasoning could not be integrated in Civilian jurisdictions such as France 
because Equity does not exist. Accordingly, an accommodation of differences would 
appear difficult to achieve in these jurisdictions where doctrinal property law 
terminologies show substantial divergences. These differences underlying the 
concept o f property in Common Law and Civilian traditions have an immediate
729 On the concept o f ‘ownership’ in Common Law and Civilian jurisdictions, see Grenon, A. “Dans 
un Contexte d’Harmonisation et d’Economies Integrees, Quelques Reflexions au Sujet du Concept de 
Propriete en Droit Civil et en Common Law" (2005), Revue General de Droit available from 
http://www.apff.org/_site/DOCUMENTS/PDF/HARMONISATION_RECUEIL-2005/FRANCAIS/t- 
1 _aline_grenon_ff.pdf
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impact on the way securities such as retention of title clauses are analysed and 
regulated.
Following this analysis on the concept of property and other terminologies relative to 
property law in France in England, some similarities can also be highlighted. In both 
jurisdictions, proprietary rights are protected and enforceable erga omnes, which 
means that they are enforceable against the rest o f the world. Further, beyond 
doctrinal and theoretical differences in the analysis o f property law terminologies, 
both legal traditions recognise that ownership can be used to secure payment of a 
debt. In both legal systems, the transfer of property can be postponed by the creditor 
until repayment is made by the buyer. In effect, in Civilian jurisdictions such as 
France, the rule according to which the transfer of ownership is solo consensus is 
only supplementary in effect. Pursuing Article 1583 of the French Civil Code, a sale 
of good contract “ ... is complete between the parties, and ownership is acquired as 
of right by the buyer with respect to the seller, as soon as the thing and the price have 
been agreed upon, although the thing has not yet been delivered or the price paid.”
Article 1583 devotes the principle of the immediate transfer o f ownership, also 
labelled as a transfer of ownership solo consensus, which is accompanied by the 
immediate transfer of risks to the buyer730. However, these principles are not 
mandatory and are only supplementary in effect. Thus, the contracting parties are 
free to derogate to these rules and decide to subject the transfer of ownership and 
risks to other contractual conditions such as the payment o f the price. The recent 
reform of security law in France now provides a definition o f retention o f title in the 
Civil code731.
730 Article 1138 C.Civ. provides that “[a]n obligation o f delivering a thing is complete by the sole 
consent of the contracting parties. It makes the creditor the owner and places the thing at his risks 
from the time when it should have been delivered, although the handing over has not been made, 
unless the debtor has been given notice to deliver; in which case, the thing remains at the risk of the 
latter.”
731 Article 2367 C.Civ. provides that« [ojwnership o f a property may be retained as security through a 
retention o f title clause which suspends the transferring effect o f a contract until payment in full o f the 
obligation which compensates for it. Ownership so retained is the accessory o f the debt whose 
payment it secures.”
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Under English law, the principle o f the transfer of property is embodied in Section 17 
of the Sale of Goods Act 1979 (SGA) which provides that property passes when 
intended to pass. Under English law, intention of the parties is paramount in 
determining when property passes to the buyer. Thus, the parties can agree to delay 
the transfer o f property upon the fulfilment of a particular condition, such as the 
payment o f the price. Accordingly, Section 19 SGA expressly allows for the 
possibility to subject the transfer o f property to certain conditions such as the
7^ 9payment o f the purchase price . Although the content of the concept o f property 
differs, the idea of using ownership as a form of security is recognised in both 
jurisdictions. Thus, it is not surprising that the recognition of the retention of title
710
mechanism has been done without great difficulty in the EU . However, the 
Directive on Late Payments only requires Member States to recognise the validity of 
retention of title clause in its simplest form. In effect, the Directive does not provide 
any guiding principles towards the regulation of the parties’ rights and obligations. 
Yet, this is an aspect of secured credit law that needs to be considered in the context 
o f a potential harmonisation.
As it has already been highlighted, secured credit law regimes involve the regulation 
of the form and content o f property rights and should ascertain the way property 
rights can be acquired and how they can be lost734. In the context o f retention of title 
clauses, the law should clearly ascertain the nature of the buyers and seller’s rights 
before payment, and rights of the seller upon the buyer’s default. Following the 
analysis of property law terminologies in Civilian and Common Law jurisdictions, it 
will therefore be fundamental to consider the legal situation of the proprietary 
entitlements o f the seller and buyer under retention of title clauses in both
732 Section 19 SGA provides: “(l)Where there is a contract for the sale of specific goods or where 
goods are subsequently appropriated to the contract, the seller may, by the terms o f the contract or 
appropriation, reserve the right o f disposal o f the goods until certain conditions are fulfilled; and in 
such a case, notwithstanding the delivery of the goods to the buyer, or to a carrier or other bailee or 
custodier for the purpose o f transmission to the buyer, the property in the goods does not pass to the 
buyer until the conditions imposed by the seller are fulfilled. (2)Where goods are shipped, and by the 
bill o f lading the goods are deliverable to the order o f the seller or his agent, the seller is prima facie to 
be taken to reserve the right o f disposal. (3) Where the seller of goods draws on the buyer for the 
price, and transmits the bill o f exchange and bill o f lading to the buyer together to secure acceptance 
or payment o f the bill o f exchange, the buyer is bound to return the bill o f lading if  he does not honour 
the bill o f exchange, and if  he wrongfully retains the bill o f lading the property in the goods does not 
pass to him.
733 See above fn. 611.
734 See Introduction at pp 168-172.
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jurisdictions in order to determine whether an accommodation of differences is 
possible. Thus, the next section will provide a comparative analysis of the regulation 
of the parties’ proprietary rights before payment.
Comparative analysis of the regulation of the parties’ rights and obligations 
under retention of title clause
France and England recognise the right to use ownership for security purposes. A 
seller can retain ownership of the goods until full payment has been made by the 
buyer. The buyer has possession of the goods but will only become the owner once 
the goods have fully been paid for. The security mechanism itself is recognised and 
integrated in all European Member States following the Directive on Late
7 K
Payments . Nevertheless, the Directive remains largely silent on the regulation of 
the parties’ rights and obligations. This comparative analysis will therefore focus on 
the nature of the seller’s and buyer’s rights before payment in France and England.
Legal nature o f  the buyer’s rights until payment
The legal situation of the buyer depends on the legal effects that retention of title 
engenders. The question is to determine whether the buyer becomes the owner of the 
goods or whether he only gets an eventual or conditional right o f ownership over the 
goods. If the clause is suspensive, the buyer does not become the owner of the goods
n ' l f .
until he has paid for them . Therefore, it will be difficult to determine the rights to 
which the buyer is entitled over the goods until payment as the seller remains the 
legal owner of the goods. Civilian jurisdictions generally recognise the clause to be
717suspensive in effect .Within Common Law jurisdictions, the situation appears to be
735 Ibid.
736 Ghestin, J. "Reflexions d’un Civiliste sur la Clause de Reserve de Propriete " (1981) Recueil 
Dalloz Sirey (Chronique I), at p. 1.
737 See e.g. Article 1745 of the Civil code o f Quebec provides that: “[a]n instalment sale is a term sale 
by which the seller reserves ownership o f the property until full payment o f the sale price”. Article 
2367of the French Civil code provides that “Ownership of a property may be retained as security 
through a clause o f retention of title which stays the transferring effect o f a contract until payment in 
full o f the obligation which compensates for it. Ownership so retained is the accessory o f the debt 
whose payment it secures.”Further, §455 o f the German BGB stipulates that “[u]nless otherwise 
specified, where the seller of a movable retains ownership until payment o f the purchase price,
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more contrasted. England, for example, recognise the suspensive character of the 
simple retention of title clause738 and current account clause739 but not in respect of 
other complex clauses such as proceeds and manufactured clauses740. Indeed, if the 
property o f the goods is transferred, the retention of title clause will be held as a 
charge, void if  not registered. France generally analyses the right of the buyer as a 
conditional real right.
The buyer’s conditional real right in France
As it has already been highlighted in previous developments, the concept of property, 
within Civilian jurisdictions, is considered to be an absolute, exclusive and 
indivisible right. Hence, the buyer should not be legally entitled to exercise any 
rights over the unpaid goods such as reselling or manufacturing the goods without 
acting in the quality o f legal owner. However, the question arises of the advantage of 
such a security mechanism if  the buyer was not allowed to exercise any rights over 
the goods.
The right o f the buyer has been analysed in France as an eventual or conditional right 
o f property. The buyer will be entitled to a property right, ownership, on the 
realisation o f the condition, which is the payment741. Under French law, the right of 
the buyer could therefore be qualified as a conditional real right. This qualification 
however does not clarify the proprietary entitlements of the buyer over the thing 
before payment. In effect, there are situations where ownership will pass even though 
payment has not occurred.
For instance, Article 2276 of the French Civil code protects the bona fide  purchaser 
against the action en revendication of the first time seller in the case of resale by the 
first time buyer. The seller will be able to recover the proceeds of resale directly, if
ownership is transferred under the suspensive condition of full payment and if the buyer is in default 
therein the seller may withdraw from the contract.”
738 Section 19 Sale o f Goods Act 1979. See above fn. 731.
739 Armour v. Thyssen Edelstahlwerke AG  [1991] 2 AC 339.
740 See for instance Tatung (UK) Ltd v. Galex Telesure Ltd. [1989] 5 BCC 325; E Pfeiffer v. 
Arburthnot Factors [1988] 1 WLR 150; Compaq Computers v. Abercorn Group [1991] BCC 484; Re 
Peachdart Ltd. [ 1984] Ch 131.
741 Ghestin op.cit. fn. 735.
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the second time buyer has not already paid him, through the mechanism of 
subrogation1*1. If  payment has already been made, the seller will be entitled to 
compensations for damages. Ownership will therefore be transferred to the bona fide  
purchaser. This shows that the law admits, to a certain extent, the use o f the goods by 
the buyer in the quality of an owner before payment. Thus, the qualification of the 
buyer’s right as conditional real right becomes questionable considering that the 
buyer will sometimes be able to exercise the full prerogatives o f the right of 
ownership by reselling the asset.
Until payment, the buyer is not even considered to be the possesseur but a simple 
detenteur1*3,with a conditional real right. As it has already been explained above, the 
buyer cannot be considered to be a possesseur as he does not have the animus 
domini, the intention to act as the real owner. The possesseur must intend to exercise 
control over the property as if he was the real owner. Evidently, following Article 
2276 of the French Civil code, there is a presumption that a person in possession o f a 
movable is the legal owner if he or she is in good faith744. The owner who introduces 
the action en revendication has to prove the bad faith of the possesseur. However, 
under retention of title, the buyer could not invoke Article 2276 considering his lack 
of good faith. In effect, the buyer knows that he is not the legal owner of the asset 
bought under retention of title clause.
Detention, also called precarious possession, designates the situation o f an individual 
who exercises prerogatives on a movable (corpus), but who cannot have the animus 
owing to exterior reasons such as lack of good faith. Thus, the buyer purchasing 
under a retention of title clause is entitled to a conditional real right and is qualified 
as a simple detenteur under French law. The consequence is that the buyer, as the 
detenteur of the thing, should not be able to alienate the thing by transforming it, 
selling it or incorporating it in other goods. If the buyer alienates the good by 
reselling it or manufacturing it, the Civil code now provides some legal solutions.
742 Article 2372 C.Civ. See above fn. 569.
743 The detenteur holds the goods according to a contract agreed with the legal owner o f the goods. 
The possesseur holds the goods and act as if he was the real owner.
744 Cass. Civ. lere, 7 Fevrier 1962: Bull. Civ. I, No 91; 20 Oct. 1982: Ibid. I, No 298; RTD Civ. 1983. 
559, obs. Giverdon.
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The ordinance o f the 23rd March 2006, now incorporated in the Civil code, has 
reformed and codified the security law of France. In relation to retention o f title, the 
code now regulates the legal consequences of the use of the unpaid goods by the 
defaulting buyer745. Upon the buyer’s default, the seller is entitled to exercise an 
‘action en revendication ’or ‘en restitution ’ (if the clause was published)746. Upon 
the debtor’s default, the seller must introduce an action en revendication which seeks 
to recognise his right o f ownership and seeks to obtain restitution of the asset. The 
seller has three months to present his action en revendication, starting from the 
publication o f the opening of the bankruptcy or insolvency proceedings in the 
BOD ACC747. Following the reform introduced in 1994748, the optional registration of 
the contract of sale with retention of title clause offers the seller a much easier 
procedure to retrieve his property which is the action en restitution, according to 
which the seller only needs to claim the restitution of his asset without the need to 
have his right of ownership also recognised.
This procedure does not have any time limit, so that the seller can present an action 
en restitution at any time after the opening of the bankruptcy or insolvency 
proceedings. If  the restitution o f the asset is impossible749, the seller will be able to 
obtain damages following the exercise of a mere personal action. The general rule is 
that the seller will be entitled to recover his asset if it is still in kind and identifiable
745 Article 2369 C.Civ. now provides that the reservation o f title on fungible goods is effective if the 
goods are o f the same nature and o f the same quality. Article 2370 C.Civ. further provides that the 
incorporation o f a good subject to a retention of title clause to another goods can still be claimed by 
the seller if  it can be separated without damages. Article 2371 C.Civ. deals with the right to surplus. It 
provides that if the value o f the good recovered is higher than the original debt, the creditor will have 
to give the difference back to the debtor. Article 2372 C.Civ. deals with the proceeds o f resale and 
provides that the creditor will be able to take the place of the buyer if  the latest has sold the goods to a 
third party through the mechanism o f the subrogation. This mechanism will be only possible if  the 
third party has not yet paid the purchase price to the buyer so he can pay it to the seller straight away. 
This implies that the seller had notice o f the resale by the buyer.
746 Article L.621.115 o f the French Commercial Code offer the possibility to publish the clause 
(Names o f the contracting parties, description of the asset, price and the due date of repayment) at the 
Commercial Tribunal o f the location where the buyer has registered his business.
747 Bulletin Officiel des Annonces Civiles et Commerciales. It is a public register that publishes any 
information about businesses such as their creation, modification and insolvency proceedings. For 
more information, see http://www.joumal-officiel.gouv.fr/abonnements-jo-et-opoce/bodacc.html (last 
checked 26/04/2010).
748 See above fn. 566, Loi no 94-475 du 10 Juin 1994 relative a la prevention et au traitement des 
difficultes des entreprises.
749 The goods claimed must be in kind for the action en revendication and action en restitution to be 
possible. Articles 2369 to 2372 C.Civ. provide some guidelines in order to determine whether an 
action is possible.
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at the opening of the insolvency proceedings. If the asset has been incorporated in 
another asset, restitution will only be possible if the original good can be separated 
without substantial damages750. The seller is not entitled to any right of surplus and 
will have to pay the difference back to the debtor if the asset recovered is higher in 
value that the debt owed751. Finally, if the asset has been resold, the seller may be
7S9entitled to the proceeds thanks to the subrogation mechanism . Although, the 
definition of the retention of title mechanism does not in itself imply the right of the 
buyer to use, enjoy, and alienate the goods, the law implicitly recognises in some 
situations the right for the buyer to dispose of such prerogatives in light o f the rules 
mentioned above753. Accordingly, it would seem that the buyer could enjoy the 
prerogatives of the owner without holding the legal ownership. The qualification of 
the buyer’s right before payment remains unclear. The strict application of the 
absolute character of ownership within Civilian traditions would prevent the analysis 
of a divisible ownership between the buyer and the seller. Nevertheless, retention of 
title mechanisms are valid in France and the recent codification of the regulations 
underlying retention of title clauses confirmed that the dogmatic approach retained to 
the concept of property did not prevent the recognition and validity o f specific 
property-based security devices.
The reform of the law in France was unable to provide a clear analysis o f the legal 
nature of the buyer’s rights until payment but only provided legal solutions in 
situations where the buyer would use the goods before payment. The complexities of 
the terminologies relative to property law have led to some doctrinal difficulties, 
especially towards the analysis of the buyer’s legal situation before payment. The 
legislator has therefore opted for some practical solutions, failing to provide some 
conceptual legal analysis of the retention of title mechanism. This situation clearly 
shows the difficulty to adapt modem commercial legal tools to the rigid concepts of 
property law. This situation also shows that the dogmatic approach and rigid 
concepts underlying property law of Civilian jurisdictions would not constitute an 
irremediable obstacle to the modernisation of secured credit law regimes. Other
750 Article 2370 C.Civ. See above fn. 569.
751 Article 2371 C.Civ. See above fn. 569.
752 Article 2372 C.Civ. See above fn. 569.
753 See above fn. 748.
217
Civilian jurisdictions such as Germany retained a different approach towards the 
determination of the buyer’s right before payment. Under German law, the buyer is 
attributed an ‘expectation right’ also qualified as a limited real right. The right of the 
buyer is analysed as an ‘economic ownership’ as opposed to the seller’s ‘legal 
ownership’754.
Common Law jurisdictions such as England do not provide any statutory regulations 
underlying the rights and obligations of the buyer before payment. Accordingly, the 
examination of the case law will be fundamental to understand the nature of the 
buyer’s proprietary rights before payment in Common Law jurisdictions such as 
England as it will now be envisaged.
The nature of the buyer’s rights in England
The concept of property within Common Law jurisdictions is much more flexible 
and considered to be divisible in a bundle of rights. At first sight, it would seem 
reasonable to think that retention o f title should be dealt with more easily considering 
a more flexible approach to the concept of property. According to Sections 17 and 19 
of the Sale o f Goods Act 1979, the transfer of property can be subject to the payment 
of the goods by the buyer. Similarly to France, English law considers the retention of 
title clause to be suspensive in effect. The buyer will only become the owner of the 
asset once the purchase price is paid to the seller, at least in respect o f simple and 
current account retention of title clauses.
Following the previous analysis on property law terminologies within the Common 
Law, the buyer would appear to have the legal possession of the asset which is under 
his or her physical control. In relation to simple and current account retention of title 
clauses, the courts have retained a flexible approach by recognising the validity of 
such clauses. The seller can retain legal ownership of the goods delivered in spite of 
certain possessory rights given to the buyer. However, this approach was not
754 Van Erp, J.H.M.S. “Personal and Real Security” in Smits, J.M., Et al., Elgar Encyclopedia o f  
Comparative Law, (2006), at p. 522.
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followed in relation to the retention of legal ownership to the proceeds o f resale or
manufactured goods756. In the situations where the buyer does not alter the goods, the 
buyer also has a conditional proprietary right to the goods. Unfortunately for the 
seller, any clause attempting to retain title in manufacturing goods or proceeds of 
resale is generally construed as a charge, void if not registered.
Evidently, in relation to the question of whether ownership is transferred to the 
buyer, the intention of the parties is paramount. The sole fact that the buyer 
transformed or resold the goods does not automatically lead to the transfer of 
ownership to the buyer. However, the fact that the seller introduces proceeds or 
manufactured retention of title clauses in the contract of sale, may be an indication 
that the seller implicitly entitled the buyer to resell or manufacture the goods. In 
such instances where the buyer would resell or manufacture the goods, ownership 
will pass to the buyer. Such acts could not be fulfilled without the prerogatives
7S7associated to ownership that is the dominion. In Clough Mill Ltd v. Martin , the 
court held that the seller remained the legal owner o f the unused and unsold goods 
despite the right of the buyer to resell and manufacture the goods in the clause. Thus, 
the fact that the buyer is given certain proprietary rights does not automatically 
transfer title and legal ownership to the buyer758. Nevertheless, it is arguable that the 
decision of the court may have differed if the buyer did actually resell or 
manufacture the unpaid goods.
The retention of title mechanism is not the only security device where ownership of 
the goods is retained by the owner and where certain proprietary rights are 
transferred to a possessor. Contracts of bailment, lease or hire-purchase also involve 
the exercise of similar powers over the assets without transferring ownership to the 
debtor. Contracts for the hire of goods or contracts for their repair entitle the person 
to exercise certain proprietary rights on the assets without the transfer of
755 See Above fn. 405.
756 See Clough Mill v. Martin [1985] 1 WLR 111; Re Peachdart Ltd. [1984] Ch 131 but consider 
Hendy Lennox (industrial engines) Ltd. v. Grahame Puttick Ltd. [1984] 1 WLR 485 where the court 
upheld the clause retaining title in some engines which had been incorporated to other goods. The 
removal of such goods without any damage caused to the principal asset.
757 Ibid.
758 Worthington op. cit. fn. 401, at p. 13.
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ownership759. Similarly, retention o f title allows the seller to remain the owner 
despite the entitlement of the buyer to exercise certain proprietary rights over the 
unpaid goods760. A good example can be found in the case of Hendy Lennox761 which 
involved the contract for the sale of diesel engines under a simple retention o f title 
clause. The buyer later incorporated the diesel engines into a generator. In this case, 
the court upheld the clause and entitled the seller to recover one of the diesel engines
I f f )
that could be removed without any damages to the principal asset .
Considering the recognition o f certain proprietary rights entitlements to the buyer 
over the goods sold under retention of title clause, and considering that the seller 
remains the legal owner, the question emerged whether the buyer could be qualified 
as the equitable owner763. In effect, the concept of equitable proprietary rights is 
very flexible and could allow for a ‘division’ of ownership764. Although the case of 
Borden (UK) Ltd. v. Scottish Timber Products Ltd. 765 suggests that equitable title 
passed to the buyer while legal title remained with the seller, this legal analysis could 
not be preserved as it defeats the object of the retention of title clause agreement and 
defeats the intention o f the parties766. Thus, the question of the legal nature of the 
buyer’s right would also appear to be uncertain in England, as within French law.
Under English law, the legal nature of the buyer’s right before payment will thus 
largely depend upon the construction of the clause and of the interpretation of the 
intention o f the parties by the Court. The buyer may be allowed to resell and 
manufacture the goods sold under retention of title clause without the seller intending 
to transfer ownership to the buyer. If the buyer is entitled to resell or manufacture 
goods sold under retention of title clause, the buyer may become the legal owner of 
the goods, or could only remain the possessor with a conditional right o f ownership 
upon payment.
759 Ibid. at p. 14.
160Ibid. at p. 13.
761 See above fn. 755.
762 Ibid.
763 Worthington op. cit. fn. 401, at p. 15.
764 Ibid.
765 [1981] Ch.25, 35.
766 Worthington op. cit. fn. 401, at p. 16.
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Other Common Law jurisdictions such as the U.S., Canada (except Quebec) or New 
Zealand do not consider the clause to be suspensive but resolutive. The U.S. adopted 
a functional approach to the regulation of its secured credit transactions enshrined in 
Article 9 o f the UCC. Indeed, Article 9 applies to any agreement that has the purpose
ifnof creating a security over movables including retention of title . According to 
Article 9 UCC, the concept of retention of title has been explicitly converted, as it is 
now limited in its effects to a reservation of a security interest with the property 
passing to the buyer768. Therefore, the seller becomes a secured party and loses his 
previous status of owner. If the clause is resolutive, the buyer becomes the owner of
n f x \
the goods. Therefore, the buyer will be able to act accordingly over the goods . If 
the buyer does not pay the price, ownership of the goods will return to the seller. 
There will be transfer and then re-transfer of property. The transfer of property to the 
buyer subject to a security interest would simplify the difficult task of analysing the 
rights of the buyer before payment, especially in situations where the buyer resells or 
irreversibly alters the goods. The equivalent of retention o f title mechanisms in 
Article 9 UCC can be found with the purchase money security interest which has 
already been the object of extensive analysis in above developments770.
In conclusion, it would appear that none of the legal systems analysed in this 
paragraph have managed to provide a satisfactory analysis of the legal situation of 
the buyer before payment. Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that France and 
England allow for the recognition of certain proprietary rights to the buyer before 
payment without the termination of the seller’s legal ownership. However, the legal 
reasoning leading to the legal qualification of the buyer’s right differ among both 
jurisdictions. On one hand, England emphasises the importance o f the intention of
767 § 9-102 (2) UCC provides that: “[t]his Article applies to security interests created by contract 
including pledge, assignment, chattel mortgage, chattel trust, trust deed, factor's lien, equipment trust, 
conditional sale, trust receipt, other lien or title retention contract and lease or consignment intended 
as security. This Article does not apply to statutory liens except as provided in Section 9-310.”
768 § 2-401 UCC states that: “[a]ny retention or reservation by the seller o f the title (property) in goods 
shipped or delivered to the buyer is limited in effect to a reservation o f a security interest. Subject to 
these provisions and to the provisions o f the Article on Secured Transactions (Article 9), title to goods 
passes from the seller to the buyer in any manner and on any conditions explicitly agreed on by the 
parties.”
769 The buyer will be able to use, enjoy and dispose o f the goods according to his quality of legal 
owner.
770 See above, at pp. 121-125.
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the parties771 and will generally determine the substance and content of the parties’ 
rights pursuing the form of the agreement. France, on the other hand, adopts a much 
more restrictive approach and closely follows the form prescribed by the law so that 
the parties could not agree to retain title in manufacturing goods or proceeds of 
resale, especially in the light o f the absolute character o f the concept of ownership. 
Nevertheless, if  the buyer was to resell or manufacture goods, the law now 
determines situations where the action of the owner, action en revendication, will 
remain possible. If restitution is impossible, both jurisdictions recognise that the 
seller looses ownership. In England, the agreement is analysed as a charge void if
779unregistered so that the seller becomes an unsecured creditor . In France, the 
impossible revendication of the goods also means that the seller looses ownership to 
the goods and also becomes entitle to a personal action in damages against the seller. 
The retention of title clause is not re-qualified as a charge. If the buyer resold or 
manufactured the goods, so that the action en revendication is impossible, this will 
have the effect of a breach of contract entitling the seller to a personal action in 
damages.
This comparative analysis will now consider the legal situation o f the seller under 
retention o f title. Although substantial elements of answers have already been 
identified within the above developments, this section will add further observations 
in relation to the nature o f the seller’s rights under retention of title clause. The 
question is to determine whether the real nature of retention of title clause amounts to 
a security mechanism or remains ‘ownership’.
Legal nature o f  the seller’s right until payment: security (charge) or proprietary 
right?
The legal nature o f the seller’s rights will depend upon his quality of owner or 
secured creditor. As it has been explained in the above paragraphs, England and 
France have analysed retention of title to be suspensive in effect. Thus, both
771 Article 17 SGA 1979.
772 The agreement is re-qualified as a transfer of ownership accompanied by a charge back to the seller 
which requires a registration. The lack of registration will mean for the seller that the charge is void. 
He will become an unsecured creditor.
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jurisdictions recognise the legal ownership of the seller under a valid retention of title 
clause until payment.
Nevertheless, it is fundamental to note that although the seller is the owner, he still 
cannot freely dispose of the goods because of the lack of physical possession of the 
asset. In effect, and as it has been previously explained, the seller under retention of 
title bears the risk o f losing his quality of owner if  the buyer was to resell or alter 
irreversibly the goods. Further, the seller’s ownership is also limited by the 
obligation that weighs on him to transfer the property of the goods upon payment .
Within Common Law jurisdictions, the distinction has to be made between the 
American Article 9 UCC, and other PPSA regimes adopted, for instance, in Canada 
and New Zealand, and England which did not opt for the American functional 
approach within the regulation of its secured credit law regime. In the U.S. and in 
other PPSA jurisdictions, retention of title mechanism operates a legal transfer of 
ownership to the buyer. The seller loses his quality of owner and is entitled to a 
purchase money security interest774 instead. The purchase money security interest 
entitles the creditor to a preferential payment upon the debtor’s default775. This 
situation effectively simplifies the analysis of the seller’s rights before payment and 
his or her entitlements and remedies upon the debtor’s default. The conservation of 
the quality of the seller as legal owner under a retention of title clause does not 
enable such a sharp distinction between the rights and obligations of the buyer and 
those o f the seller.
Civilian jurisdictions such as France or Quebec tend to admit that retention of title is 
both a proprietary right and a security. Hence, French authors usually qualify the 
clause as a ‘propriete-surete '116. However, this legal qualification does not represent 
the unanimity amongst scholars. Some authors invoke the fact that a security can be
773 Perochon op.cit. fn. 558.
774 The PMSI entitles the creditor to a super priority if  he provides the credit to purchase a new asset 
in circumstances where the buyer is out o f available assets. Without this super priority, the first 
creditor’s security, older in time, would prevail.
775 See Chapter Three at pp. 121-125.
776 ‘propriete-surete’ can literally be translated as ‘proprietary security’ or ‘property-based security’
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qualified as such only if  the law prescribed it777. Other could not imagine that 
property could be downgraded to the qualification of ‘security’. A security, within 
French law is analysed as being an ‘accessory’ of the credit. Therefore, the legal 
question is to determine whether a proprietary right can be qualified as such. The 
Commercial court ended this doctrinal debate with a case dated 23rd January
775?2001 and decided that retention of title was ‘the accessory’ of the credit allowed to 
the buyer and therefore considers retention of title to be qualified as a security. 
Further, this jurisprudential solution was later embodied in Article 2367 of the 
French Civil Code which now provides in its second alinea that “[ojwnership so 
retained is the accessory of the debt whose payment it secures.”
Quebec also qualifies retention o f title clause as a security notwithstanding a recent 
case where the Supreme Court of Canada held that:
“[t]he reservation o f ownership must not be equated with a security within the 
meaning of the Civil Code o f Quebec. The legal relationship between the original 
buyer and the seller must be interpreted as one of ownership ... Ownership of the 
property thus remains with the seller until the term is fulfilled. Since the transfer of 
ownership takes effect only at that time, the property continues to be part of the 
seller’s patrimony. The seller retains ownership rather than a mere security interest, 
according to the definition o f an instalment sale contract adopted in art. 1745 
CCQ.”
Considering the definition of the concept of ownership as an absolute right, it is 
difficult to conceive how the seller could be qualified as a legal owner. In effect, the 
usual prerogatives associated to the absolute concept of ownership within Civilian 
jurisdictions would not appear to be available to the seller under a retention of title 
clause. In effect, the seller does not have physical possession of the goods. The seller 
does not have the usus, fructus and, most importantly, abusus so that he cannot 
alienate the thing by selling it to a third party. The seller has an obligation to transfer 
ownership to the buyer upon payment which prevents him from reselling the goods 
to a third party. Nevertheless, as the Court explained in Quebec, the legal 
relationship between the seller and the buyer under a retention of title clause is one of
777 Following the recognition o f the ‘numerus clausus ’ principle.
778 D. 2001, a.j. 702, obs. Lienhard ; JCP G 2001, 391 ou E, 755, obs. M.C.
779 See above fn. 591.
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ownership. Thus, Civil Law considers the seller as the legal owner o f the goods but 
not in its absolute sense, as prescribed within the law on property.
Following this analysis on the different terminologies adopted in Civil Law 
jurisdictions, it is quite difficult to establish a coherent analysis of the seller’s right 
before payment. The law and the case law have analysed the retention of title 
mechanism as a security, more precisely as an accessory of the credit in France. 
Nonetheless, it is also clear that the relationship between the seller and debtor is 
essentially based on ownership and property remedies rather than in terms of 
security.
In England, the analysis of the legal nature of the seller’s rights will depend upon 
how the court will interpret the clause and the intention of the parties. For example, 
complex retention of title clauses, such as proceeds or manufactured clauses, are 
generally construed as being charges, void if not registered780. In this situation, the 
seller would lose his quality of owner.
In relation to simple and all monies clause, the seller remains the legal owner of the 
goods sold under retention of title clause and can reclaim possession of the goods if 
they are still identifiable upon the buyer’s default. The matter becomes more 
complex when the clause deals with proceeds and manufactured goods. In Re Bond 
Worth Ltd.781, the seller attempted to retain equitable and beneficial ownership in the 
goods, and Slade J  held that the transaction had to be construed as a charge which 
was void for lack of registration. Slade J  analysed the transaction as an outright sale 
of the acrylan fibre to the buyer, followed by the creation of a security eo instanti, 
given back to the seller782. Following the construction of the agreement as a charge, 
the seller lost title.
780 Worthington op. cit. fn. 401.
781 [1980] Ch 228.
782 Following the case of Abbey National Building Society v. Cann [1991] 1 AC 56, HL, the reasoning 
of Slade J  was questioned, considering the rejection o f the House of Lords o f  the ‘'Scintilla temporis’ 
fiction in this conveyancing case. Nevertheless, Re Bond Worth was followed, on this specific issue, 
in Stroud Architectural Systems Ltd. v. John Laing Construction Ltd. [1994] BCC 18.
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In Borden (UK) Ltd. v. Scottish Timber Products Ltd.783, the seller who sold resin to 
the buyer under retention o f title could not claim back the resin following its 
irreversible incorporation into chipboards. The court held that the resin ceased to 
exist as soon as it was incorporated in the manufacture of the chipboard. 
Accordingly, the seller lost title to the resin at the moment when it was used in the 
manufacturing process784. The court found that the only way the seller could have 
retained title in the finished product was by way of charge, which was void for lack 
o f registration. In Hendy Lennox (Industrial Engines) Ltd. v. Grahame Puttick 
Ltd.785, however, the court entitled the seller to recover one of the engine which had 
been incorporated in a generator set but which was still identifiable and in a 
deliverable state.
This line o f authority represents an illustration of the uncertain character of the 
seller’s rights under retention o f title clause. The fate of the seller’s rights will thus 
largely depend upon how the court will construe the clause. Therefore, a sensible 
drafting o f a retention o f title clause is paramount for the protection of the seller’s 
right as legal owner. In effect, under a valid retention of title clause, it is clearly 
recognised that the seller remains the legal owner of the asset sold to the buyer. In 
this situation, the retention of title clause would therefore be qualified as an 
agreement to sell. If  the court considers that the clause amounts to a charge, then the 
seller will lose his title and will be downgraded to the status of unsecured creditor. 
Accordingly, the agreement becomes a security.
In relation to manufactured clause, Germany found a solution to assure more 
certainty to the seller with retention of title clause. According to Section 950 BGB, 
the manufacturer o f a new object will acquire title to it, despite any rights other may 
have. In principle, the buyer who uses the goods sold under retention o f title to 
manufacture new goods will gain title in the finished asset. Therefore, as in France,
783 See above fii. 764.
784 Buckley LJ  states: “[i]t was impossible for the plaintiffs to reserve any property in the
manufactured chipboard, because they never had any property in it; the property in that product 
originates in the defendants when the chipboards is manufactured. Any interest which the plaintiffs 
might have had in the chipboard must have arisen either by transfer of ownership or by some 
constructive trust or equitable charge, and, as I say, I find it impossible to spell out o f this condition 
anything o f that nature.”
785 See above fn. 755.
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the seller’s right is reduced to a mere personal right which will entitle him to sue the 
buyer for damages. However, the court allows for a derogation to the application of 
Section 950 BGB and accordingly allows retention of title clauses to stipulate that 
the buyer is manufacturing on behalf of the seller. Thus, this provision will guarantee 
the owner of the original goods to become the owner o f the new asset manufactured 
by the buyer. The buyer would only acquire title in the new object following the full
nof .
payment of the goods .
It is quite clear from this comparative analysis of both jurisdictions that the legal 
situation o f the seller remains quite ambiguous and unpredictable. The quality of 
legal owner attached to the seller largely depends upon the buyer’s behaviour. 
Generally, France will allow the seller to exercise his action en revendication as long 
as the goods are still identifiable and in a deliverable state. In England, the court will 
enable the seller to resume possession of the goods, depending on how the clause has 
been construed. Where the goods have been resold or manufactured irreversibly, 
some principles have been laid down in France contributing to the ascertainment of 
the seller’s right. General principles regulating the legal situation o f the seller in 
relation to complex retention of title clauses can also be identified from the case law 
in England. Nevertheless, the outcome of the case essentially depends upon the 
construction of the agreement and the interpretation of the parties’ intention which 
does not provide for certainty and predictability for sellers. It is thus arguable that the 
significance of contract construction in England might hinder the effectiveness of the 
approximation of substantive rules to regulate retention of title clauses.
This comparative analysis of property law concepts and retention of title clauses in 
jurisdictions of dissimilar legal traditions showed some divergences in the legal 
analysis of the parties’ rights and obligations which would render the task of 
harmonisation difficult. For example, the procedure exercised by the seller to recover 
property differs from one jurisdiction to another. France requires the seller to 
exercise an action en revendication or en restitution if the clause has been published.
786 On this point, see Milo op. cit. fn. 688, at p. 221 and Pennington, R.R. “Retention o f Title to the 
Sale o f Goods under European Law” (1978), 27(2) International Comparative Law Quarterly, at p.
227.
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Both actions would not be possible under English law. Further, English law does not 
recognise the mechanism of the subrogation if the buyer was to resell the asset sold 
under retention o f title to a third party. Similarly, France does not recognise the 
charge and French courts would not construe the retention of title as a charge if its 
real aim was to create a security. Further, France does not recognise the doctrine of 
Equity which may create some difficulties for the harmonisation of retention of title 
clause regimes.
Further difficulties in accommodating the regulations underlying retention of title in 
Europe could arise from the differences in regulating the rights and obligations of 
third parties. It has already been explained that in both jurisdictions property rights 
were enforceable erga omnes as opposed to personal rights. Property rights do affect 
third parties and, accordingly, need to ensure a high level of certainty and 
predictability for all parties. National legislations are required to strike a certain 
balance between competing interests. The difficulty of balancing the interests at
7R7stake is particularly flagrant in the context of retention of title clauses .
Retention of title clause creates proprietary rights which, in nature, are enforceable 
erga omnes, against the rest o f the world. Accordingly, a modernisation of the 
regulations underlying retention of title clauses using harmonisation as legal method 
should respect several leading principles that govern property law in European 
jurisdictions. These are, for instance, the principle of publicity of property rights and
700
the principle o f the numerus clauses mainly recognised in Civilian jurisdictions . 
These principles are fundamental for some jurisdictions in the regulation of property- 
based security devices. Accordingly, the question is to determine whether these 
principles could create some obstacles to the harmonisation of retention of title 
clauses regulations.
787 On this point see Gullifer op. cit. fn. 269.
788 Worthington op. cit. fn. 401, at p. 587.
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Comparative analysis on retention of title clauses and the protection recognised 
to third parties
The regulation o f retention of title mechanisms does not solely involve the regulation 
of the parties’ rights and obligations to the agreement. Third parties are also affected 
by such an agreement and should therefore also be considered as part of 
modernisation of secured credit law regimes endeavours. As it has already been 
highlighted, property rights are enforceable erga omnes and by way o f consequence, 
third parties have to be made aware of these rights and the assets to which they relate 
to. In relation to movable assets, there are two ways available to guarantee the 
transparency requirement. The seller can keep possession o f the assets or the seller 
can transfer possession and publish his property right. The principle of transparency 
is largely recognised both in Common Law and Civil Law jurisdictions but the 
publication of retention of title clauses does not always constitute a validity 
requirement. Another leading principle underlying property law regimes can also be 
found, especially in Civilian jurisdictions, with the numerus clausus. In effect, since 
property rights are enforceable erga omnes and can be invoked against the rest o f the 
world, some legal systems thought that the creation o f such rights should be limited 
trough the numerus clausus principle.
Principle o f  transparency
Transparency is a leading principle of property law both in Civilian and Common 
Law789. In effect, property rights are universal rights, enforceable erga omnes. 
Therefore, both jurisdictions favour the protection of third parties by imposing an 
obligation to make third parties aware of these rights through publicity. There are, 
however, some exceptions to this general principle. In France and England, retention
789 Since the famous Twyne’s case already long established that secret interests in property were 
fraudulent and had to be declared void. The Twyne’s case already understood the problem of  
ostensible ownership in the absence o f publication of property rights. Douglas G. Baird presented the 
facts as follwed “In 1600, a Hampshire farmer named Pierce conveyed his sheep to his creditor Twyne 
to satisfy a preexisting debt. Twyne, however, allowed Pierce to remain in possession of the sheep, to 
shear them, and to mark them as his own. When a sheriff tried to seize the sheep under a writ o f  
execution on behalf o f another creditor, Twyne forcibly resisted, maintaining that the sheep were his. 
Edward Coke, then attorney general, brought a criminal action against Twyne in the Star Chamber. 
That court held that because the transfer to Twyne was secret it was fraudulent and therefore void.” In 
Baird op. cit. fn. 178.
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of title clauses create proprietary rights but do not need any registration to be valid. 
The lack o f registration requirements for the validity of retention of title clause is 
characteristic o f the flexibility o f this security device. As it has already been 
mentioned, it would appear that in relation to retention of title clauses, a balance has 
to be achieved between the requirement of transparency and the requirements of 
modem commerce.
It has already been highlighted that what currently makes the retention of title 
mechanism attractive within most European legal regimes is the lack of registration 
requirement. In effect, this formality is often seen as time and money consuming for 
sellers who only wish to pursue their business transactions as fast and as securely as 
possible. On the other hand, it has been argued that the lack of publication in respect 
o f retention o f title clauses could be misleading for third parties, especially towards 
the fictitious wealth o f the debtor. Again, it would seem that a balance has to be 
achieved between the requirement of transparency towards third party and the needs 
o f modem commerce that should avoid the imposition o f burdensome formalities.
French law has dealt with this difficulty by offering an optional registration 
mechanism for sellers to publish their retention of title clause. This mechanism has 
been introduced by the law of 1994790. The incentive for the seller is that registration 
will entitle him to a simpler procedure than the action en revendication upon the 
debtor’s default. In effect, the seller will not have to prove his quality of owner as 
required under the action en revendication. He will simply ask for the restitution of 
the goods which can be settled amicably with the buyer or which can be settled in 
court. Further, the publication o f the retention of title clause prevents the application 
of Article 2276 of the Civil code which usually recognises the valid transfer of 
ownership to the bona fide  purchaser. In effect, it is arguable that the publication of 
the clause would prevent the recognition of the good faith of third parties as they 
became aware o f the existence of such property rights through the publication.
790 See above fn. 566, Loi no 94-475 du 10 Juin 1994 relative a la prevention et au traitement des 
difficultes des entreprises.
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England does not require any registration for simple and all monies retention of title 
clauses. Nonetheless, the Law Commission791 recently suggested that retention of 
title clauses should be registered and reshaped according to the purchase money 
security interests as prescribed in Article 9 of the UCC. However, this proposal has 
substantially been criticised. It has already been emphasised that the imposition of a 
registration requirement would weaken the position o f the seller as he would now 
need to conform to the notice filing requirement in relation to simple and current
7Q9account clauses which is not the case under the current English regime . On the 
other hand, it is arguable that this situation would provide more transparency for 
third parties and provide more predictability and certainty towards the seller’s rights 
upon the debtor’s default.
The question of whether retention of title should be registered remains a policy 
question which outcomes may be difficult to compromise on. The retention of title 
clause mechanisms is widely used by traders within their economic activities. In 
respect of smaller trade, this requirement could appear to be quite burdensome and 
costly, especially in the context of the sale of small value assets such as the sale of 
consumer goods793 or certain stock items. On the other hand, it could be argued that 
high value piece of equipments should be subject to publication if  sold under a 
retention of title clause as they could substantially mislead third parties towards the 
debtor’s wealth. Further, these kinds of assets are likely to remain under the 
possession of the buyer for longer which could increase the risk of the buyer 
defaulting upon repayment or increase the risk of the buyer to resell the assets to 
third parties. The necessity to register movable securities in respect of high value 
mobile equipment such as space assets have recently been recognised internationally 
with the enactment of the Convention on Interests in Mobile Equipment (Cape Town 
2001)794.
791 The Law commission Consultation Paper on Registration o f Security Interests, No 164 (CP 164). 
2002.
792 The question o f the adoption of the PMSI and the question o f the registration o f retention of title 
clause in England have already been considered in Chapter Two and Chapter Three.
793Article 9 UCC considered the burdensome character of registration requirements in relation to 
consumer goods. §9-309(1) UCC provides that a purchase-money security interest in consumer goods 
is perfected solely upon attachment. Therefore suppliers of consumer goods enjoy an automatic 
perfection, i.e., without any requirement o f registration.
794 See above fn. 103.
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The question of the registration of retention of title has to be balanced between the 
requirements for transparency in relation to the creation of property rights and the 
requirements o f modem commerce. In the context of retention of title clauses, the 
nature o f the assets sold would seem to play a major part in such a decision. The 
accommodation o f differences relating to the question of whether to publish retention 
of title clauses would appear uncertain. This is a policy based question which 
outcomes will vary among jurisdictions, and which outcomes may be difficult to 
accommodate. Further difficulties could arguably occur with the principle of the 
numerus clausus.
The numerus clausus principle
The numerus clausus principle substantially restricts property rights by delimiting 
which property rights can be created and how property rights can be acquired. It is 
explained that:
“[t]he numerus clausus probably arose in the 19th Century in German jurisprudence, 
under the influence o f Von Savigny. The principle means that the legal system which 
adheres to it has a closed number of real rights and a closed number o f ways to 
acquire these rights.”795
This principle means that:
“ ... only the recognized rights may be created and, secondly, that the content of the 
real right may only be determined between the parties within the limitations of the 
real rights.”796
Other Civilian jurisdictions such as France did not develop this doctrine in great 
details but still recognise a limitation in the creation of real rights. Considering the 
peculiar nature of property rights in Civilian jurisdictions, analysed as absolute rights 
and enforceable erga omnes, as opposed to personal rights which are only relative 
rights and only enforceable towards contractual parties, the law generally limits the
7Q7 •creation o f property rights with the concept of the numerus clausus . Accordingly,
795 Worthington op. cit. fn. 401, at p. 593.
796 Ibid. at p. 594.
797 Terre, F., Et al., Droit Civil, Les Obligations, (1999), at p. 2.
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property rights are generally limited to only include ownership, mortgage, hypothec, 
servitude or usufruct798.
In light of this analysis on the accommodation of differences underlying retention of 
title clauses in Europe, it is important to ascertain that the numerus clausus does not 
appear to constitute a substantial obstacle to legal reforms. The numerus clausus is 
not an absolute doctrine. Following the freedom of contract enjoyed by the parties, 
the case law had the occasion to validate the creation of certain property rights 
established by contracting parties. For instance, the parties are free to limit the 
transfer of property and subject it to specific condition such as payment o f the price 
as it is the case under a retention of title clause. An interesting illustration can be 
found in Germany where the court created a new real right, thus derogating to the 
general principle of the numerus clausus. Under a retention of title clause, the court 
had the occasion to recognise the existence of some kind o f property right to the 
buyer (Anwartschaftsrecht)199. Nevertheless, the German Supreme Court (BGH) did 
not add this proprietary right to the existing list o f proprietary rights (numerus 
clausus) but clearly acknowledged its existence in many decisions800.
Despite the limits generated by the recognition of the numerus clausus doctrine in 
Civilian jurisdictions, some jurisdictions recently introduced further exceptions to the 
limitation of property rights through legal reform. It is interesting to mention the
o n  i
recognition of a Civil trust under German law (Treuhand) and the recent 
recognition o f the fiducie802 under French law. O f course, the principle o f indivisible 
and absolute ownership right would prevent the adoption of a Common Law based 
trust. The fiducie arrangement functions as a transfer o f property with an affectation 
o f the assets to a separate patrimony. This mechanism does not relate to sale o f goods
798 Van Erp, S.J.H.M. “Comparative Property Law” in Reimann, M., Et al., The Oxford Handbook o f  
Comparative Law, (OUP, 2006), at p. 1053.
799 Milo explains that “[bjefore the buyer has met the condition, usually the full payment o f the
purchase price, the buyer already has a kind o f property right, called an Anwartschaftsrecht, which is,
compared to ownership (Eigentum), often described as a wesensgleiches Minus.” Milo op. cit. fn. 703, 
at p. 597.
800 See BGHZ 30, 374, 77 and BGHZ 34, 122,124 cited in Milo ibid., at p. 597.
801 Van Erp op. cit. fn. 798, at p. 1055.
802 See above at p. 159.
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transactions but belongs to secured transactions803. The fiducie uses ownership for 
security purposes with the exclusive aim to provide the creditor with a preferential 
payment upon the debtor’s default. The recognition of the fiducie has proved to 
introduce a significant modernisation of French secured lending legislation with a 
definite aim to harmonise its law with other jurisdictions.
Although the doctrine o f the numerus clausus constitutes a leading principle of 
property law in Civilian jurisdictions, it has to be observed that recent developments 
in the law o f secured credit have become more accommodating. Essentially, for the 
purpose o f this analysis on the harmonisation as legal method to reform secured 
credit law regimes in Europe, it is important to highlight that the numerus clausus 
does not constitute a barrier to the recognition of new property right such as the 
rights resulting from retention of title mechanism. Obviously, the principle of the 
numerus clausus does provide for more certainty, predictability and protection for 
third parties. However, it is important to mention that the numerus clausus is only a 
general principal which is followed with more flexibility by Civilian jurisdictions. In 
other words, the recognition of this general principle should not be an obstacle to the 
creation o f new rights needed for the development o f commerce. A balance should 
thus be achieved between the need to restrict the freedom of the parties to create new 
property rights and the need to enhance modem commerce.
In light o f this comparative analysis on the regulations underlying the retention of 
title clause in England and France, an accommodation of difference would appear 
quite uncertain. The comparative analysis of all national retention of title clauses 
regulations o f every European jurisdiction would probably lead to further substantial 
difficulties in accommodating differences804.Most importantly, it has to be 
emphasised that this comparative analysis showed that both jurisdictions do not 
really provide for satisfactory regimes to regulate retention of title clauses, especially 
in light o f the requirement o f modem commerce as defined in Chapter Two. Thus, it 
is arguable that the accommodation of differences, within national regimes that do
803 Similar to the retention o f title mechanism, the fiducie uses ownership for security purposes. 
However, the fiducie does not belong to sale o f goods transactions but still operates a transfer o f title 
for security purposes. Thus, as for the retention of title clauses, the fiducie is a property-based security 
device.
804 On an analysis o f retention o f title mechanisms in Europe, see Davies op. cit. fn. 398.
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not provide for a satisfactory degree of legal certainty and predictability, could 
jeopardise the use of harmonisation as successful legal method to modernise secured 
credit law regimes.
CONCLUSION
The question of whether harmonisation could successfully be used as legal method to 
modernise secured credit law regimes in Europe remains doubtful. It is to be 
concluded that such endeavours would appear quite uncertain in light o f the 
conclusions drawn from this comparative study on retention of title clause legal 
regimes in Europe.
It has been emphasised that the concept of harmonisation should be distinguished 
from the concept of legal unification. Harmonisation is understood, in this analysis, 
as the means to reconcile and coordinate divergences of various national legal 
regimes with the aim to approximate and modernise the law. Legal unification, in 
contrast, involves the creation of a supra national legal instrument independently 
from national legal regimes. Accordingly, it is explained that harmonisation will be 
successful if  the accommodation of differences amongst various national secured 
credit law regimes is possible and also leads to substantial modernisation of the law 
as defined in Chapter Two. It is demonstrated that such task may be difficult to 
achieve, especially in the context of jurisdictions of different legal cultures such as 
Civilian and Common Law jurisdictions.
Harmonisation of law was considered in the context of the EU because this is one of 
the main methods used by the European legislator to reform and approximate the 
law, especially through the use of European Directives. In this respect, the EU 
Directive on Late Payment805, which attempted to harmonise retention of title clauses 
was an interesting example to consider for the purpose of this study on whether 
harmonisation could be successful as legal method to modernise secured credit law 
regimes in European jurisdictions. It is argued that the Directive did not go far 
enough in its endeavours to approximate and modernise the regulations underlying
805 See above fh. 611.
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retention o f title clauses in the EU. Accordingly, the question emerged of whether 
harmonisation o f secured credit law regimes, particularly retention o f title clauses 
regulations could have gone further in the quest to approximate and modernise the 
law.
It is recognised that the harmonisation of necessary national laws for the 
establishment and good functioning of the European single market should be an 
ineluctable responsibility for the EU. In relation to secured credit law regimes, it is 
argued that harmonisation and modernisation of the law should be encouraged so as 
to support the good functioning of the single market. If harmonisation and 
modernisation of secured credit law regimes are desirable in the EU, the competence 
o f the EU to legislate in the sphere of secured credit law regimes had to be 
considered. Considering that this area of law would also lead the Community to 
interfere with national contract law, insolvency law and property law, it is recognised 
that the Community would only have the powers to harmonise targeted areas of 
secured credit and property law, rather than the whole secured credit law system. 
Further, a comprehensive harmonisation of secured credit law regimes would involve 
delicate policy issues which outcomes may differ amongst the various European 
jurisdictions and which outcomes may be too difficult to reconcile.
The second part of this examination on legal harmonisation thus attempted to 
determine whether an accommodation of legal divergences in relation to retention of 
title legal regimes could, if at all, be reached in European jurisdictions. The 
identification of current divergences amongst all EU jurisdictions was restricted to 
France and England.
It is explained that retention of title clauses are property-based security devices 
which are mainly regulated through national property law. Thus, this comparative 
analysis first considered the baseline concepts underlying property law in France and 
England. Although both jurisdictions recognise the power of the seller to use 
ownership for security purposes, there are substantial divergences in the definition 
and concept of ‘property’ itself that seem too difficult to accommodate. Accordingly,
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it is concluded that an accommodation of property law concepts appear uncertain 
between France and England.
The nature of the buyer’s and seller’s rights before payment was then considered 
through a comparative law analysis between France and England. Substantial 
divergences were identified that may be difficult to compromise on. France and 
England recognise the right o f the seller to retain ownership to the good until 
payment is made. Simple retention of title clauses are accepted in both jurisdictions 
and the EU Directive on Late Payment confirmed that there were no difficulties for 
Member States to compromise on this point. Things become more complex when the 
buyer resells or manufactures the goods before payment. If  the buyer becomes 
insolvent, a French seller may still be able to exercise an action en revendication or 
en restitution under certain conditions as provided by the dispositions of the Civil 
code. The recent added dispositions in the Civil code entitle the seller to recover the 
proceeds of resale if these are still in the hands of the buyer through the mechanism 
of the subrogation. Further, the French seller will be able to exercise his action en 
revendication or en restitution if the goods have been manufactured but can still be 
separated without substantial damages to the main unit. If the seller cannot exercise 
his action en revendication or en restitution, then the seller is entitled to a personal 
action against the buyer following a breach of the contract.
In contrast, English law apprehends these difficulties from a different angle. The 
case law in England generally laid guidelines towards the determination of the legal 
situation o f the seller where the buyer would resell or manufacture the goods. 
Accordingly, an English seller could also recover goods that have been manufactured 
if they can be separated without substantial damages from the main unit. Further, an 
English seller was able to trace the proceeds of resale in Equity following the 
existence of a fiduciary relationship between the buyer and the seller. However, the 
above development highlighted that on many occasions, the court qualified the 
clause as a charge, which was void for lack of registration. In this situation, the seller 
becomes an unsecured creditor. Under English law, the outcome of the case will 
depend upon how the court will construe the agreement. In contrast, French law 
adopts a much more restrictive approach and closely follows the form and solutions
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prescribed by the law. Compromise on these differences would thus appear quite 
uncertain between the two jurisdictions. Further, it is arguable that in light of the 
uncertainties towards the proprietary entitlements of the buyer and the seller, an 
accommodation o f differences would not seem to succeed in providing a modem 
legislation to regulate retention of title clauses.
Such comparative analysis also showed some similarities in the regulations 
underlying retention of title. Both jurisdictions analyse the right of the seller as a 
proprietary right, which entitled him or her to either an action en revendication or 
action in restitution or under the English law to the transfer back of possession of the 
goods to his legal owner. Although England does not recognise proprietary remedies 
such as the vindicatio, the seller can also recover his goods in priority to other 
creditors. Things become more complex where goods have been resold or 
manufactured irreversibly. In England, it will depend upon how the court will 
construe the agreement. In France, it will depend upon whether the action en 
revendication is still possible or not, following the dispositions of the Civil code. The 
fate o f the seller thus remains uncertain in both jurisdictions where the buyer resells 
or manufactures the goods. A compromise would appear quite difficult and would 
not seem to succeed in the modernisation of retention o f title clauses.
In relation to the protection afforded to third parties, leading principles of property 
law are recognised in both jurisdictions such as the transparency principle or the 
numerus clausus principle (Civilian jurisdictions). Registration of retention of title 
clauses is not a compulsory requirement in both jurisdictions. France only provides 
an option to sellers if  they wish to register their retention of title clauses. The 
accommodation of differences relating to the question of whether to publish retention 
of title clauses would appear uncertain. This is a policy based question which 
outcomes will vary among jurisdictions, and which outcomes may be difficult to 
accommodate. Further difficulties were highlighted through the analysis of the 
numerus clausus principle. The principle of the numerus clausus is fundamental for 
certain Civilian jurisdictions. However, it has been demonstrated that it does not 
constitute an absolute principle and that the recognition and application of such a 
principle did not prevent the recognition of retention of title mechanisms and other
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security devices using property. Accordingly, this would tend to show that property 
law concepts are slowly becoming more flexible and balanced with the modem needs 
o f commercial activities.
In light of this analysis on retention of title clauses, it is arguable that an 
accommodation of divergences remains uncertain, and would not lead to successful 
modernisation of the law; especially considering current uncertainties underlying the 
regulation of manufactured and proceeds clauses in both jurisdictions. Accordingly, 
it is arguable that it would render the task of modernising the law through 
harmonisation that is through accommodating and reconciling differences, 
ineffective. Nevertheless, this analysis should not remain vain. This comparative 
analysis highlighted that European property law regimes seem to become more and 
more flexible to accommodate new commercial needs. Although the baseline 
concepts and leading principles o f property law seem very rigid and dogmatic, 
particularly in Civilian jurisdictions, the trend has recently been to adopt a much 
more flexible approach. For example, it has been shown that the numerus clausus 
principle was not an obstacle to the creation of new category o f real rights such as 
those created under a retention of title clause. These examples show that theoretical 
concepts of property law are not incompatible with the requirement o f modem 
security law regimes.
Modem commerce recently highlighted the necessity for property law concepts to 
become more flexible. Naturally, these principles and rules should be respected but 
an appropriate balance should be achieved that will comply with the new 
requirements of modem commercial transactions. In this respect, the harmonisation 
of security law regimes could become possible, based on a modem, broader and 
more flexible view of European property law regimes.
A flexible approach towards property law regimes is even more needed considering 
the recent emergence of new property assets. The above analysis on the legal aspects 
of modem security law regimes already highlighted the difficulties underlying the
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creation of security in new assets such as intellectual property assets806. In the future, 
new types of assets might emerge and the law of property will have to be flexible 
enough to accommodate them within its general principles. This demonstration does 
not posit that a comprehensive reconciliation of property law regimes of both legal 
traditions will be feasible. The comparative analysis of the property law 
terminologies and fundamental concepts of property law have shown great disparities 
between legal traditions which would render a full conciliation quite uncertain. 
Indeed, national property law differs dramatically according to each legal tradition 
and even each jurisdiction. Each national property law in Europe represents a view of 
the Cathedral, in reference to the well known analogy made by Calabresi and 
Melamed in their Article on property and liability rules807. The task of reformers is 
therefore not to conciliate every property law regimes of Europe but to notice their 
similarities, their leading principles which will in time contribute to the 
reconciliation o f differences. With the recognition of similar legal principles, 
jurisdictions from different legal traditions will in time encourage the 
accommodation of their differences owing to more flexibility in their approach.
The question o f whether modernisation could be successful using harmonisation as 
legal method is uncertain. If  harmonisation is understood as a reconciliation of 
differences, then, successful modernisation can be doubted. In effect, a reconciliation 
of different ‘ineffective’ laws does not make much sense. It has been shown that both 
France and England do not really provide for satisfactory regimes for the regulation 
of retention o f title clauses. Such regimes especially remain highly uncertain towards 
the proprietary entitlements of the seller and buyer until payment. It might well be 
that states should adopt a new legislation that will provide for a modem secured 
credit law regime. Therefore reform through the adoption of uniform legislations 
such as conventions, model laws and other restatements might be the answer for a 
successful modernisation o f national secured credit law regimes.
In the EU, it would also appear to constitute the new approach to legal reform and 
modernisation of the law. The recent introduction of the Common Frame of
806 See Chapter Two.
807 Calabresi, G., Et al. “Property Rules, Liability Rules and inalienability: One View o f the 
Cathedral” (1972) Harvard Law Review, at p. 1089.
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Reference in the EU808, ‘optional toolbox’ for traders would tend to confirm this 
position. The Common Frame of Reference in Europe has been characterised as an 
optional toolbox, a 28th legal regimes that parties of European Member States could 
choose as governing law for their transactions809. Ultimately, it is hoped that the best
O 1 A
law may survive and may serve as basis for the law of the community . In this 
perspective, the Common Frame of Reference is hoped to serve as model for legal 
reforms across Member States legal regimes and eventually replace the law of 
current twenty seven legal regimes.
8°8 prepared by the Study Group on a European Civil Code and the Research Group on EC 
Private Law Available from http://www.law-net.eu (last checked 26/04/2010). On 26th April 2010, the 
Commission took the decision to set up the Expert Group on a Common Frame o f Reference in the 
field o f European Contract Law which is currently considering the feasibility o f a user friendly 
instrument o f European Contract Law for consumers and businesses. On 1st July 2010, the European 
Commission published a Green Paper on policy options fo r progress towards a European Contract 
Law for consumers and businesses. See
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/news/consulting_public/news_consulting_0052_en.htm (last checked 
10/03/2011) Depending on the evaluation o f the results o f the consultation, the Commission could 
propose further action by 2012.
809 The CFR will also include a Book IX on Proprietary Security Rights in movable assets. See 
Eidenmiiller, op. cit. fn. 665.
810 See Smits op. cit. fn. 262, at p. 2 where the author states: “... I previously defended that the best 
way o f unification of law in Europe would be through a competition o f  legal rules. In transplanting 
legal rules from one country to another on a “market of legal culture”, the best legal rule may survive. 
This does not automatically imply that any rule glorifies: in some instances, diversity o f law may be 
just as good as uniformity as long as there is a free movement o f legal rules, at least creating the 
possibility o f legal change.”
241
CHAPTER FIVE
UNIFICATION OF LAW AS LEGAL METHOD TO MODERNISE 
SECURED CREDIT LAW REGIMES
INTRODUCTION
The diversity and archaism of current secured credit law regimes generate too many
uncertainties and insecurity for the commercial community which confirm the need
811to recognise more modem secured transactions laws . If legal transplantation and 
legal harmonisation have not demonstrated a great likelihood of success as legal 
methods to approximate and modernise secured credit law regimes, legal unification 
may offer greater prospects of success. Unification of law is sometimes used 
interchangeably with the expression of harmonisation. However, it has already been 
highlighted that this analysis clearly distinguishes between harmonisation and 
unification o f laws812. While harmonisation essentially seeks to accommodate and 
reconcile legal differences among secured credit law regimes of two or more 
jurisdictions, legal unification fundamentally involves the adoption of a supra 
national legal instrument purportedly embodying the best solution available to 
regulate a designated area of law. The following developments will attempt to 
determine to what extent legal unification could constitute an adequate legal method 
to modernise and approximate secured credit laws.
Legal unification involves the creation of the best legal solution independently from 
existing national legislations together with, to a certain extent, an effort to respect 
national legal traditions. Although, the creation of supra national legal instruments 
are the results o f international entities efforts and not the products of national 
draftsmen, it is arguable that the success of unification as legal method to modernise 
secured credit law regimes will still depend upon the degree of adhesion of states. 
International conventions will only be effective if  ratified by a sufficient number of
811 See Chapter Two.
812 See Chapter four at pp. 173-176.
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states. However, adequate ratification may be difficult to achieve in certain legal 
fields such as secured credit and property law. Accordingly, it is arguable that if  
national entities do not sufficiently recognise international legal instruments, 
unification of law endeavours may remain vain. Comparative law thus also plays a 
significant role in the preparation of unification of law projects and will be used as a 
legal tool to assess whether unification of law could be used as legal method to 
modernise secured credit law regimes.
In the field of secured credit, the past decades have witnessed the emergence o f a
O il
proliferation of international instruments regulating secured transactions . A recent 
illustration of the use of unification as legal method to modernise secured credit law 
can be found with the enactment o f the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Secured 
Transactions814. Other international initiatives also include the Cape Town 
Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipments and associated 
Protocols815, the EBRD Model Law on Secured Transactions816 and the Organization
813 On legal unification see, David op. cit. fn. 276; Graveson, R.H. “The International Unification of  
Law” (1968) 16 American Law Journal o f  Comparative Law, at p. 4; Nadelmann, K.H. “Uniform 
Legislations Versus International Conventions Revisited” (1968) 16 American Journal o f  
Comparative Law, at p. 28; Hobhouse, J.S. “International Conventions and Commercial Law: The 
Pursuit o f Uniformity” (1990) 106 Law Quarterly Review, at p. 530; Goode op. cit. fn. 262; Rosett 
op. cit. fn. 607; Evans, M.E. “Uniform Law: A Bridge Too Far?” (1994) 3 Tulane Journal o f  
International and Comparative Law, at p. 145; Bonell, J., An International Restatement o f  Contract 
Law, (2nd ed., 1997); Goode op. cit. fn. 618; Wool, J. “Rethinking the Notion o f Uniformity in the 
Drafting o f International Commercial Law: A Preliminary Proposal for the Development of a Policy- 
Based Unification Model” (1997) 2 Uniform Law Review, at p. 46; “UNIDROIT 75th Anniversary: 
Congress on Worldwide Harmonisation o f Private Law and Regional Economic Integration, 
Hypotheses, certainties and Open Questions” (2003) 8 Uniform Law Review, at p. 10; Gopalan, S. 
“The Creation o f International Commercial Law: Sovereignty Felled?” (2004) 5 San Diego 
International Law Journal, at p. 267; Brower, C.N. Et al. “The Creeping Codification o f  
Transnational Commercial Law: An Arbitrator’s Perspective” (2004-2005) 45 Virginia Journal o f  
International Law, at p. 199.
814 UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Secured Transactions (2007) and recently published a draft 
dealing with Security Interests in Intellectual Property. UNCITRAL also enacted the United Nations 
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale o f Goods (CISG, 1980) and the United Nations 
Convention on the Assignment o f Receivables in International Trade (2001). UNCITRAL also 
published legislative guides and model laws on insolvency and international payments (see 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/insolvency.html and 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/payments.html (last checked 26/04/2010).
815 Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment (Cape Town, 2001); Protocol to the 
Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment on Matters Specific to Aircraft Equipment 
(Cape Town, 2001) and the Luxembourg Protocol to the Convention on International Interests in 
Mobile Equipment on Matters Specific to Railway Rolling Stock (Luxembourg, 2007). Other 
UNIDROIT Conventions include the Convention Relating to a Uniform Law on the International Sale 
o f Goods (The Hague, 1964); the Convention Relating to a Uniform Law on the Formation of  
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (The Hague, 1964); the International Convention on 
Travel Contracts (Brussels, 1970); the Convention Providing a Uniform Law on the Form o f an
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817of American States (OAS) Model Inter-American Law on Secured Transactions . 
Considering the broad variety o f legal instruments aiming at modernising and 
unifying the law, the question emerged to determine whether a specific type o f legal 
unification instrument could be indentified to constitute an adequate legal method to 
achieve a successful modernisation o f secured credit law regimes.
Legal unification can take different forms and can generally be classified into two 
broad categories; hard law instruments such as international conventions and soft law 
instruments such as restatements, legislative guides or model laws, each offering 
different degrees of flexibility toward the adoption and recognition of international 
legal standards818. International conventions, when ratified, have a binding nature. 
Although, international conventions should provide great prospect of success 
towards the modernisation o f secured credit law with the aim to achieve an 
approximation o f laws, it will only be effective if ratified by a sufficient number of 
states. Unfortunately, the reality shows that international conventions often remain 
dead letters following a lack o f sufficient ratification. By opposition, model laws and 
restatements would offer much more flexibility to interested states in the way they 
remain free to opt and select some of their proposals as model for reform on a 
voluntarily basis. Nonetheless, it is important to highlight that model laws and 
restatements bear the risk of not achieving a similar degree of approximation than
International Will (Washington, D.C., 1973); the Convention on Agency in the International Sale of  
Goods (Geneva, 1983); the UNIDROIT Convention on International Financial Leasing (Ottawa, 
1988); the UNIDROIT Convention on International Factoring (Ottawa, 1988) and the UNIDROIT 
Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects (Rome, 1995). UNIDROIT also enacted 
the UNIDROIT Principles o f International Commercial Contracts (2004).
816 Text available at: http://www.ebrd.com/pubs/legal/secured.htm (last checked 26/04/2010).
8,7 Text available at: http://natlaw.com/seminar/docl2.pdf (last checked 26/04/2010).
818 On the relationship between hard law and soft law see for instance Chinkin, C.M. "The Challenge 
o f Soft Law: Development and Change in International Law" (1989) 38 International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly, at p. 850; Lipson, C. “Why Are Some International Agreements 
Informal” (1991) 45(4) International Organization, at p. 495; Boyle, A. "Some Reflections on the 
Relationship o f  Treaties and Soft Law" (1999) 48(4) International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 
at p. 901; Abbott, K.W., Et al. “Hard Law and Soft Law in International Governance” (2000) 54 
International Organizations, at p. 421; Shaffer, G., Et al. “How Hard and Soft Law Interact in 
International Regulatory Governance: Alternatives, Complements and Antagonists” (2008) Society o f  
International Economic Law (SIEL) Inaugural Conference 2008 Paper, available at SSRN: 
http://ssm.com/abstract=l 156867 (last checked 26/04/2010); Gopalan, S. “A Demandeur-Centric 
Approach to Regime Design in Transnational Commercial Law” (2008), 39 Georgetown Journal o f  
International Law, available at http://ssm.com/abstract=l 105225 (last checked 26/04/2010); Guzman, 
A.T., Et al. “Explaining Soft Law” (2009) Berkeley Program in Law and Economics, available at 
http://escholarship.org/uc/item/7796m4sc (last checked 26/04/2010); Gersen, J. E., Et al. “Soft Law” 
Stanford Law Review, Forthcoming, University o f  Chicago, Public Law and Legal Theory Working 
Paper No. 213, available at http://ssm.com/abstract=l 113537 (last checked 26/04/2010).
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with international conventions. Although model laws and restatements do not require 
any ratification, they would still require a certain level of states recognition and 
compliance to be successfully used as legal methods to modernise and approximate 
secured transactions law regimes. Nevertheless, soft law legal instruments such as 
restatements or model laws may be more likely to succeed as legal methods to 
modernise and approximate the law of secured credit than international conventions 
due to more flexibility. Accordingly, this analysis on legal unification will further 
seek to investigate whether the use of soft law legal instruments is more likely to 
succeed in its endeavours to achieve an approximation and modernisation of the law 
of secured credit. A significant illustration can be found with the UNCITRAL 
Legislative Guide on Secured Transactions. The UNICTRAL Legislative Guide is 
not legally binding but could serve as a set of legislative guidelines in order to assist 
jurisdictions to modernise and reform their laws. This begs the question of whether 
the recent enactment of the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Secured Transactions 
will be successful in modernising and approximating the law o f secured credit among 
jurisdictions from different legal backgrounds.
This analysis will first provide an analysis of the legal instruments of unification and 
will attempt to determine whether a specific legal instrument could be identified to 
succeed in modernising secured credit law regimes in the light o f an approximation 
of law. Following the assumption that soft law instruments may be more likely to 
succeed in modernising the law, this examination will further provide a more 
pragmatic analysis and assessment of unification as legal method for law reform, 
especially through the analysis of the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Secured 
Transactions.
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INSTRUMENTS OF UNIFICATION
Goode identifies at least nine instruments by which unification of the law may be 
achieved:
“ ... (1) a multilateral Convention without a Uniform Law as such; (2) a multilateral 
Convention embodying a Uniform Law; (3) a set of bilateral Treaties; (4) 
Community legislation -  Typically , a Directive; (5) a Model Law; (6) a codification 
o f custom and usage promulgated by an international non-governmental 
organization; (7) international trade terms promulgated by such an organization; (8) 
model contracts and general contractual conditions; (9) restatements by scholars and 
other experts.”819
Although all these instruments aim at the unification of the law through the 
enactment o f a supra national legal rule, they generally offer different degree of 
flexibility to the interested states. International conventions have generally been the 
preferred method used to achieve unification of the law at the international level 
notwithstanding their restrictive nature, but model laws, restatements and other soft 
law instruments have recently become the panacea for successful international 
unification owing to more flexibility.
Considering the wide range of legal instruments of unification, the question 
addressed in the following sections is whether a specific type of legal unification 
instrument could be indentified to constitute an adequate legal method to achieve a 
successful modernisation o f secured credit law regimes. This study will thus examine 
whether international conventions (for an illustration o f hard law instruments) and/or 
model laws and restatements (for an illustration of soft law instruments), could 
theoretically be successful in modernising secured credit law regimes.
International conventions
International conventions have long been the preferred method to achieve unification 
of the law at the international level mainly because of their binding nature820. Abbott 
recognises that:
819 Goode op. cit. fn. 249, at p. 54.
820Shaffer states: “[h]ard law instruments allow states to commit themselves more credibly to 
international agreements. Hard law instruments make state commitments more credible because they
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“[b]y using hard law to order their relations, international actors reduce transactions 
costs, strengthen the credibility of their commitments, expand their available political
o9 1
strategies, and resolve problems of incomplete contracting.”
International conventions generally consist in the enactment o f dispositions aiming at 
the unification of conflict of law rules or in the enactment o f dispositions embodying 
a substantive law regime. Major examples of international conventions include the 
1883 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property822, the 1929 Warsaw 
Convention on International Carriage by Air , the 1930 Uniform Law for Bills of 
Exchange and Promissory Notes824, the 1931 Uniform Law for Cheques825, and, after 
the Second World War, the CMR826, the ULIS827, and the CISG828.
In the field o f secured credit law regimes, the possibility to opt for the unification of 
conflict of law rules would not have been entirely satisfactory considering the 
existing divergences and incompatibilities within national legal regimes829. For 
instance, the Cape Town Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipments
increase the cost o f reneging, whether on account of legal sanctions or on account o f the costs to a 
state’s reputation where it is found to have acted in violation of its legal commitments. Hard law 
treaties are more credible because they can have direct legal effects in national jurisdictions (being 
“self-executing”), or they can require domestic legal enactment. Where treaty obligations are 
implemented through domestic legislation, they create new tools that mobilize domestic actors, 
increasing the audience costs o f a violation and thus making their commitments more credible. Hard 
law instruments solve problems of incomplete contracting by creating mechanisms for the 
interpretation and elaboration o f legal commitments over time. Hard law instruments better permit 
states to monitor and enforce their commitments, including through the use o f dispute settlement 
bodies such as court.” Shaffer op. cit. fn. 818.
821 Abbott op. cit. fn. 818, at p. 422.
822 Paris, 20th March 1883 (as last revised at Stockholm on 14 July 1967, and as amended on 28
September 1979) available at www.wipo.int/clea/en/details.jsp?code=WO020 (last checked 
26/04/2010).
823 Convention for the Unification of Certain rules Relating to International Carriage by Air (Warsaw, 
12 October 1929, as amended as the Hague, 1955), available at
www.jus.uio.no/lm/air.carriage.warsaw.convention.1929/doc.html (last checked 26/04/2010).
824 Convention providing a Uniform Law for Bills o f Exchange and Promissory Notes (Geneva, 7 June 
1930), available at
www.jus.uio.no/lm/bills.of.exchange.and.promissory.notes.convention. 1930/doc.html (last checked 
26/04/2010).
825 Convention on the Unification o f the Law Relating to Cheques (Geneva, 19 March 1931).
826 The United Nations Convention on the Contract for the International Carriage o f Goods by Road
(CMR) (Geneva, 19 May 1956), available at
http://www.jus.uio.no/lm/un.cmr.road.carriage.contract.convention.1956/doc.html
827 The UNIDROIT Convention Relating to a Uniform Law on the International Sale o f Goods (The 
Hague, July 1st, 1964), available at http://www.unidroit.org/english/conventions/c-ulis.htm (last 
checked 26/04/2010).
828 The United Nations Convention on contracts for the International Sale o f Goods (1980) (CISG), 
available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/treaty.html
829 See Chapter Two at pp. 71-76.
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and associated protocols830opted for a uniform regime regulating the creation and 
recognition o f an international interest in high value mobile equipment and did not 
opt for a regime aiming at unifying conflict of law rules831.
International conventions provide for a strong level of uniformity o f the law through 
the draft o f a unique supra national legal instrument that once ratified by states, are 
legally binding. International conventions could constitute a successful method to 
modernise and approximate secured credit law regimes by providing this high level 
o f uniformity upon the achievement of a high ratio of ratifications. Evidently, such 
efforts would require a strong consensus among all participating states on the 
question of secured credit. The attempt to reach such consensus is however 
uncertain. Assuming that a consensus was reachable in the field of secured credit, it 
is also arguable that the use of an international convention to modernise and 
approximate the law would only be successful if  the level o f uniformity is 
subsequently preserved through uniform and consistent interpretation across
• • • 832participating states courts .
830 See above fn. 814.
831 On this point see Espinola, S.A. “Le Financement de Biens d’Equipement Serait Facilite Par Une 
Nouvelle Convention Internationale” (1997) 52(8) Journal OACI, at p. 9; Fleisig, H. W. “The 
Proposed UNIDROIT Convention on Mobile Equipment: Economic Consequences and Issues”(1999) 
4 Uniform Law Review, at p. 253; Cuming, R.C.C. “The draft UNIDROIT Convention on 
International Interests in Mobile Equipment” (1998) 30 Uniform Commercial Code Law Journal, at p. 
365; De La Pena, N. “Reforming the Legal Framework for Security Interests in Mobile Property” 
(1999) 4 Uniform Law Review, at p. 347; Foex, B. “La Reserve de Propriete Dans TAvant-projet de 
Convention d’UNIDROIT: un Point de Vue Suisse” (1999) 4 Uniform Law Review, at p. 409 ; 
Cuming op. cit. fn. 237; Davies, I. R., Security Interests in Mobile Equipment, (2002); Goode op. cit. 
fn. 252; Deschamps, M. “Les Regies de Priorite de la Convention et du Protocol du Cap”(2002) 7 
Uniform Law Review, at p. 17; Davies, I. R. “The New Lex Mercatoria: International Interests in 
Mobile Equipment” (2003) 52 International Comparative Law Quarterly, at p. 151; Goode, R.M. 
“The “Cape Town Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment” in Hartkamp, A.S., Et 
al., Towards a European Civil Code, (2004), Chapter 41 at p. 757; Honnbier, B. Et al. “The 
Convention o f Cape Town: The Creation of International Interests in Mobile Equipments” (2004) 
12(1) European Review o f  Private Law, at p. 3; Saunders, A., Et al. “Innovation in International Law 
and Global Finance: Estimating the Financial Impact of the Cape Town Convention” (2006) NYU  
Working Paper No FIN 06.001, available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 1293636 (last checked 26/04/2010).
832 On the assessment o f international conventions as successful instruments o f unification at the 
international level, see Kronke “International Uniform Commercial Law Conventions: Advantages, 
Disadvantages, Criteria For Choice” op. cit. fn. 262.
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The process o f ratification and amendments
It is arguable that if  a high ratio of ratifications together with the maintenance of 
uniform interpretations can be reached, international conventions could constitute an 
adequate legal method to modernise secured credit law regimes. The success of a 
supra national legal instrument, such as an international convention, would thus 
require its drafters to consider the existing differences among national legal regimes 
in order to ensure maximum state ratifications. International legislative efforts should 
attempt to establish the best available solution that will also be consistent with 
national legislations. This compromise can be difficult to reach, especially in the 
field o f secured credit. Accordingly, it is to be observed that if  the level of 
ratification is low, international conventions bear the risk o f remaining dead letters.
The sole conclusion of an international convention only constitutes an indication of 
potential adhesion of states and will only become legally binding if officially ratified 
by states. As Goode already highlighted:
“[t]he treaty collections are littered with conventions that have never come into 
force, for want of the number o f required ratifications, or have been eschewed by the 
major trading States. There are several reasons for this: failure to establish from 
potential interest groups at the outset that there is a serious problem which the 
proposed convention will help to resolve; hostility from powerful pressure groups; 
lack o f sufficient interest of, or pressure on, governments to induce them to burden 
still further an already over-crowded legislative timetable; mutual hold-backs, each 
State waiting to see what others will do, so that in the end none of them does 
anything.”833
For instance, the Convention relating to Uniform Law on International Sale of Goods 
(ULIS) 1964 has only been ratified by five countries834, so as the Convention relating 
to Uniform Law on the Formation of Contracts for the International Sale of Goods 
(ULFIS) 1964835. Notwithstanding the lack of reception o f these two Hague Sales 
Conventions, it is still recognised that it was the only conceivable legislative option 
to enact uniform rules on international sales contracts . The UNIDROIT 
Convention on International Finance Leasing 1988 has been ratified by ten
833 Goode op. cit. fn. 635, at p. 232.
834 See http://www.unidroit.org/english/implement/i-64ulis.pdf (last checked 26/04/2010).
835 See http://www.unidroit.org/english/implement/i-64ulf.pdf (last checked 26/04/2010).
836 Bonell, M.J. “The UNIDROIT Principles o f International Commercial Contracts and the 
Harmonization of International Sales Law” (2002) 36 Revue Juridique Themis, at p. 340.
249
countries837 and the UNIDROIT Convention on International Factoring 1988 has 
only been ratified by seven countries838. The Cape Town Convention on International 
Interests in Mobile Equipment was much more successful and has been ratified by 
thirty-two countries. Nonetheless, the later Convention only restricts its application 
to the regulation of an international security interest created in a particular class of 
assets, high value mobile equipment.
The success o f an international convention to effectively modernise secured credit 
law regimes will depend upon the level of ratifications operated by states. In the field 
of secured credit, the ratification o f an international convention that would provide 
for a comprehensive regime to regulate secured transactions appears unlikely. A 
comprehensive regime that would regulate secured transactions would require 
international drafters to also interfere with property law, contract law and insolvency 
law. These areas o f laws highly differ from one jurisdiction to another, which would 
render the task o f unifying the law of secured credit and the task o f reaching a high 
ratio o f ratifications unlikely.
International conventions are not the product of national draftsmen but their 
adoptions still require a certain consensus among participating states. Thus, it is not 
surprising that states representatives will usually attempt to promote their own laws 
to be exported to other jurisdictions. In the field of secured credit, the Cape Town 
Convention is clearly rooted in the American Article 9 UCC which has generally 
been assimilated as the most efficient and modem form of secured credit law 
regime839. It has already been demonstrated that the importation of an Article 9 UCC 
type regime was not entirely feasible in other jurisdictions, especially in those 
jurisdictions that belong to different legal traditions840. Considering the vast amount
837 See http://www.unidroit.org/english/implement/i-88-l.pdf (last checked 26/04/2010).
838 See http://www.unidroit.org/english/implement/i-88-f.pdf (last checked 26/04/2010).
839 Other International initiatives such as the EBRD Model Law on Secured Transactions or the 
UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Secured Transactions were also modelled, to a certain extent, on 
the American regime embodied in Article 9 UCC. The analysis o f the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide 
will show that it has generally favoured the adoption o f a universal security but, with the possibility 
for States to preserve a separate regime for retention o f title clauses.
840 See Chapter Three
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of divergences in national secured credit law regimes841, the substantive unification 
of secured credit law regimes using an international convention would bear the risk 
of states introducing some opt-outs provisions or simply not proceeding to its 
ratification at all842. The possibility for states to derogate to the main text o f the 
convention would clearly undermine the unification o f law efforts and would 
therefore also compromise a successful modernisation o f the law843. For example, 
Article 39 of the Cape Town Convention on International Interests in Mobile 
Equipment provides that each participating states can decide that certain rights and 
interests will have priority over international interests by introducing specific 
declarations.
These difficulties particularly highlight the reason why international conventions 
usually have a limited scope and only cover a specific area of law. It is generally 
recognised that international conventions remain rather fragmentary in their nature 
and most of them only concern one specific area of commercial law such as one 
special type of contract or one specific legal regime. Even the very well-known 
United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods contains 
legal gaps as for example on the validity of the international contract in question or 
about the repercussions of State control over the import and export of certain 
goods844.
Similarly, the Cape Town Convention on International Interests in Mobile 
Equipment845 only deals with the creation of an international security interest in a
841 Chapter Three and Chapter Four have highlighted substantial divergences in property law concepts 
and fundamental policy issues between jurisdictions that belong to different legal traditions.
842 See on this point Vogenauer, S., Commentary on the UNIDROIT Principles o f International 
Commercial Contracts (PICC), (OUP, 2009), Introduction Para. 2, at p. 3.
843 Wool op. cit. fn. 813, at p. 49 where the author states that: “[fjirst, compromise wording, often 
open-textured and general in nature, will be drafted in an attempt to, if  possible, avoid or, if  not, 
obscure the policy issue. Secondly, the rules of a convention may simply defer to categories of  
(generally, rather than precisely, described) national law. Thirdly, the convention may include a range 
of rules contemplating its own partial or complete inapplicability. Fourthly, the convention may 
include provisions, frequently prepared in the very final stages of the process, permitting reservations 
on points o f policy. These provisions are often prepared in some haste, typically in an effort to 
accommodate the objection o f one or more outspoken participants, rather than as proposed below, as 
part o f a deliberate and systematic approach to certain questions o f policy. Fifthly, the text o f the 
convention may simply avoid important commercial subjects for fear o f policy confrontations.”
844 Bonell op. cit. fn. 813, at p. 11, referring to H.Kotz, ‘Rechtsvereinheitlichung’.
845 Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment (Cape Town, 2001).
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specific class o f assets. The regime embodied in the Cape Town Convention is 
essentially based on Article 9 UCC846 enabling creditors to create an international 
global security interest in high value mobile equipment together with the recognition
O A f J
of the notice filing and a first to file priority rule. The international interest so 
created does not replace a security introduced under the law of a Member State as 
they can validly coexist. Nonetheless, if  the international interest is validly
oaq
registered, it will have priority over the national security . Previous developments 
have highlighted the difficulties underlying an attempt to reach a consensus on the 
question o f secured credit, especially considering the existing differences between 
legal systems849. Thus, on this occasion the choice to solely unify an aspect of
Of A
secured financing without requiring states to modify their national legislations 
proved to be a success.
In this respect, the Cape Town Convention on International Interests in Mobile
Of I
Equipment and Associated Protocols constitutes a significant achievement for the 
unification o f the law o f secured credit in respect o f these specific types of assets. 
The choice o f an international convention to modernise the law o f secured credit was 
fundamental. As it has already been highlighted international conventions are
846 See Chapter Two at p.71.
847 The Cape Town Convention has introduced an international register (CTIR) in respect o f security 
created in aircraft equipments. Information is available from:
https://www.intemationalregistry.aero/irWeb/pageflows/workAJserDocumentation/DownloadUserDo 
cumentationController.jpf?language=English (last checked 26/04/2010).
848 Goode “The Cape Town Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment” op. cit. fn. 
831, Chapter 41 at p. 758.
849 Goode states that: “[f]irst, there are wide differences in philosophy and legal culture concerning the 
extent to which security should be recognized at all and the conditions necessary for the validity o f a 
security interest. Common law jurisdictions, which are generally sympathetic to the concept o f party 
autonomy and self-help, have a liberal attitude towards security. This attitude allows security interests 
to be taken with a minimum o f formality over both present and future assets to secure existing and 
future indebtedness. In addition, they allow universal security rather than require specific security. By 
contrast, Civil law jurisdictions have been more cautious in their approach to non possessory security 
and have been anxious about the “false wealth” which such practices are perceived as permitting. So 
in these jurisdictions, one finds, in varying degrees, requirements of specificity and individualization 
o f collateral, the need for a new post-acquisition act of transfer to give in rem effects to security in 
after-acquired property, requirements of notice to the debtor as a condition o f the validity (not merely 
priority) o f an assignment o f debts, and restrictions on self help remedies such as possession and sale 
o f the collateral” Goode op. cit. fn. 120, at p. 48.
850 This aspect o f secured credit law was for many jurisdictions left unregulated (For example in 
France) which facilitated the adoption and ratification of the Convention.
851 The Protocol to the Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment on Matters Specific 
to Aircraft Equipment (Cape town 2001) and the Luxembourg Protocol to the Convention on 
International Interests in Mobile Equipment on Matters Specific to Railway Rolling Stock 
(Luxembourg 2007) but not yet in force.
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binding and the Cape Town Convention therefore provides for an effective 
enforcement of international interests created in movable equipment. Such 
enforcement mechanism would not be guaranteed with soft law legal instruments 
such as under the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Secured Transactions unless its 
dispositions were adopted within national legal reforms.
If the creation of an international convention on secured credit appears to be quite 
uncertain considering the lack of international consensus on property law issues and 
other fundamental policy choices, the unification of targeted aspect of secured credit 
law regimes would appear to have attracted enough adhesion from states to render 
the use of international convention a successful method to modernise secured credit 
law regimes. Nonetheless, the decision to opt for a series o f separate conventions to 
regulate the creation of an international security interest relative to specific types of 
assets could jeopardise the economic benefits of the proposed new scheme to more 
than a limited variety of assets852. In effect, it is arguable that a successful 
modernisation based on the use of international convention would not be entirely 
satisfactory unless it could be extended to other categories o f assets. Again, as it has 
already been extensively explained, an imminent comprehensive unification of 
secured credit law regimes appears to be uncertain considering the wide divergences 
among national regulatory regimes.
Another potential issue with the use of international conventions as vehicles to 
modernise and unify secured credit laws is the question o f amendments. In effect, 
there is a strong argument that international conventions would render the law to 
become static, rigid and not flexible following burdensome amendments 
procedures . Consequently, as the commercial and business community practices 
are constantly evolving, some international commercial law instruments are no
852 Stanford, M J. “Broader or a Narrower Band o f Beneficiaries for the Proposed New International 
Regimen: Some Reflections on the Merits o f the Convention/Protocol Structures in Facilitating the 
Former” (1999) 4 Uniform Law Review, at p. 248.
853Bonell op. cit. fn. 813, at p. 12. See also Diamond, A.L. “Conventions and Their Revision” in 
Sauveplanne, J.G., Unification and Comparative Law in Theory and Practice, (1984), at p. 45 where 
the author states: “[t]he inflexibility of many international conventions may be too heavy a price to 
pay. The need to revise the law arises constantly, and international procedures sometimes slow the 
process of necessary law reform to an unacceptable extent.”
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longer satisfactory and some will become inadequate in the future854. This is 
particularly noticeable with secured credit law regimes where technologies have led 
to the emergence of new class of assets that the law cannot ignore any longer. The 
law must be flexible enough to easily integrate new dispositions, which might not be
QC C
easily achieved with the use of international conventions .
An international convention could potentially constitute a successful method to 
modernise secured credit law regimes as it has been shown with the Cape Town 
Convention. Nonetheless, a successful modernisation of secured credit law regimes 
using an international convention should also ensure a uniform interpretation of the 
convention by States.
Difficulties related to the interpretation o f international conventions
International conventions could successfully modernise secured credit law regimes 
but could fail in their endeavours to approximate the law if not interpreted uniformly. 
It is explained that:
“[t]he principal objective of an international convention is to achieve uniformity of 
legal rules within the various States party to it. However, even when outward 
uniformity is achieved following the adoption of a single authoritative text, uniform 
application o f the agreed rules is by no means guaranteed, as in practice different 
countries almost inevitably come to put different interpretations upon the same 
enacted words.”856
International conventions can leave a certain margin of appreciation when interpreted 
by domestic jurisdictions. This is an important issue that could substantially 
jeopardise the success o f international convention used as legal method to unify 
secured credit law regimes. In the Civilian and Common Law traditions, 
interpretation of international legislations can lead to very different conclusions as 
jurisdictions use dissimilar interpretation tools857. Consequently, if there is a conflict
854 Bonell op. cit. fn. 813, at p. 12.
855 Chapter Two particularly highlighted the difficulties encountered by creditors willing to create a 
security in intellectual property assets. With the significant development o f technologies, new types of 
assets are likely to emerge in the near future and it is fundamental that secured credit law regimes are
flexible enough to adapt and deal with these new classes of assets.
856 Munday, R.J.C. “The Uniform Interpretation of International Conventions” (1978) 27 International 
and Comparative Law Quarterly, at p. 450.
857 See Chapter Three at pp. 102-106.
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of interpretation on a legal problem of commercial law that is not explained in an 
international convention, there could be a legal gap in the settlement o f the dispute. 
The comparative analysis on the concept of accessio in France and England
oco
demonstrated that interpretation of a similar concept can differ .
Naturally, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provide for important
O C Q
precisions of the legal status o f international conventions and their interpretations . 
Furthermore, it is to be observed that national courts have generally be quite 
responsive to the recognition of similar and consistent interpretations of international 
conventions and even considered analysing the travaux preparatories in their 
interpreting task. In Common Law jurisdictions such as England, courts have been 
willing to follow a uniform approach to the interpretation o f international
Q / 'A
conventions . In Civil jurisdictions, such as France, specific legislative 
recommendations can be found in the Civil code clarifying the way international 
conventions should be interpreted861. Judges need to understand the convention as a
859 See The Vienna Convention on the Law o f Treaties, Section 3, Article 31 on the interpretation of 
treaties. Text is Available at
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/l_l_1969.pdf (last checked 
26/04/2010).
860 Lord Diplock stated in Fothergill v. Monarch Airlines Ltd., [1981] AC 251 at 281-82 that: “[t]he 
language of that convention [the Warsaw Convention on the International Air Carriage o f 1929, as 
amended by the Hague Protocol 1955, and as scheduled, in its amended form, to the UK Carriage by 
Air Act 1961] that has been adopted at the international conference to express the common intention 
o f the majority o f the states represented there is meant to be understood in the same sense by the 
courts of all those states which ratify or accede to the Convention. Their national styles o f legislative 
draughtsmanship will vary considerably as between one another. So will the approach o f their 
judiciaries to the interpretation o f written laws and to the extent to which recourse may be had to 
travaux preparatoires, doctrine and jurisprudence as extraneous aids to the interpretation o f the 
legislative text. The language o f an international convention has not been chosen by an English 
parliamentary draftsman... It is addressed to a much wider and more varied judicial audience than is 
an act of parliament that deals with purely domestic law. It should be interpreted, as Lord Wilberforce 
put in James Buchanan & Co. Ltd. v. Babco Forwarding and Shipping (UK) Ltd., [1978] AC 141, 
152, ‘unconstrained by technical rules o f English law or by English legal precedent, but on broad 
principles of general acceptation” Gopalan op. cit. fn. 813, at p. 297. On the application of 
international private law in England, see Chuah, J.C.T. Et al., States Conventions on Private 
International Law, (2nd ed., 2005).
861 Article 1156 to 1164 C.Civ. provide some guidelines towards the interpretation o f international 
conventions. Article 1156 C.Civ. : “[o]ne must in agreements seek what the common intention o f the 
contracting parties was, rather than pay attention to the literal meaning o f the terms.” Article 1157 
C.Civ. provides that: “[w]here a clause admits o f two meanings, one shall rather understand it in the 
one with which it may have some effect, than in the meaning with which it could not produce any.” 
Article 1158 C.Civ. : “[t]erms which admit o f two meanings shall be taken in the meaning which best 
suits the subject matter o f the contract.” Article 1159 C.Civ. : “[w]hat is ambiguous shall be 
interpreted by what is in use in the region where the contract was made.” Article 1160 C.Civ.: “[t]erms 
which are customary shall be supplemented in the contract, even though they are not expressed there.” 
Article 1161 C.Civ. ‘‘[a]ll the clauses o f an agreement are to be interpreted with reference to one
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whole, taking into account its objectives in their task of interpretation. If some of the 
convention’s provisions are not clear, judges can also refer to the travaux 
preparatoires preceding the enactment of the convention. Further, judges can also 
refer to foreign case law to use as guidelines to interpret obscure aspects of
Of/y
international conventions .
Despite, extensive theoretical guidelines on the interpretation of international 
conventions, it has been extensively shown, that in the field o f secured credit, 
property law concepts highly differ from one jurisdiction to another, especially in the 
context of different legal traditions. Thus, it could be unnatural for a civil lawyer to 
understand and interpret a convention using the concept of ‘security interest’ 
considering that Civilian jurisdictions do not recognise interests in property but only 
rights in property863. In that respect, it is interesting to note that the UNCITRAL 
Legislative Guide on Secured Transactions did not preserve the American Article 9 
UCC terminology o f ‘security interest’ but adopted the term o f ‘security right’864.
International conventions do achieve a great degree of approximation if  they are 
ratified and interpreted uniformly by states members. In the field o f secured 
transactions, previous developments have highlighted the difficulties underlying the 
feasibility of reaching a consensus in this area of law. The success of the Cape 
Town’s Convention has shown that unification in the field is feasible only in respect 
of certain aspects of secured credit. In this respect, it is arguable that the fragmentary 
character of international conventions would bear the risk of undermining their 
benefits towards a broader range of financial transactions.
another by giving to each one the meaning which results from the whole instrument.” Article 1162 
C.Civ. : “[i]n case o f doubt, an agreement shall be interpreted against the one who has stipulated, and 
in favour o f the one who has contracted the obligation.” Article 1163 C.Civ.: “[hjowever general the 
terms in which an agreement is phrased may be, it shall include only the things upon which the parties 
appear to have intended to contract.” Article 1164 C.Civ: “[wjhere in a contract one case was 
expressed for explaining the obligation, it shall not be deemed that it was thereby intended to reduce 
the scope of the agreement which extends as o f right to cases not expressed.”
862 Pontavice, E. “Interpretation des Conventions Maritimes Internationales en Droit Franpais" (1990) 
42 Revue Internationale de Droit Compare, at p. 725.
863 See Chapter Three and Chapter Four.
864 Terminologies issues have been extensively analysed in the travaux preparatoires o f the 
UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Secured Transactions, as it will be demonstrated in subsequent 
development.
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As it has already been highlighted by the Secretary General o f the United Nations in 
1977:
“It would seem that international legislation in the form of a convention providing 
uniform rules o f substantive and conflicts law is not appropriate in this case. As 
against international sales or international transportation or the international 
circulation of negotiable instruments, transnational incidence of security interests is 
as yet relatively moderate. It would probably be difficult to obtain sufficient 
government support for an international conference dealing with the relatively 
technical topic o f security interests; and even if  the text of an international instrument 
could be agreed upon, national parliaments would probably be slow and perhaps
o z r  c
even reluctant to ratify such a text.”
Nevertheless, the use of international conventions as legal methods to modernise 
Commercial law should not be disregarded and overlooked as the Cape Town 
Convention successfully demonstrated. Following the identification o f several limits 
underlying the use of international conventions as legal method to reform and 
modernise secured credit law regimes and, considering the lack of consensus on the 
unification o f associated areas of law such as property law concepts, international 
reformers have been tempted to use more flexible instruments of unification, such as 
model laws and restatements.
865 Report o f the Secretary-General: Study on Security Interests, U.N. Doc A/CN.9/131 available at 
www.uncitral.org. Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that these comments were made 
notwithstanding the introduction o f proposals for the harmonisation o f secured credit law regimes 
introduced by UNIDROIT in 1968 and by the Service de Recherches Juridiques Comparatives o f the 
Centre National Recherche Scientifique o f Paris in 1972. On this point see Gopalan “op. cit. fn. 813, 
at p. 271, at footnote 17.
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Model laws and restatements
Soft law international legal instruments 866 have recently become the panacea for the 
unification and modernisation of private law. Soft law instruments can cover a wide 
range o f legal instruments and include model laws, restatements, legislative guides, 
international trade terms such as those produced by the International Chamber of 
Commerce, or international Contracts Terms. As opposed to international 
conventions, states are not the sole actors in the making of ‘soft law’ legal 
instruments. Private law scholars, academics, and organisations representing 
businesses and industries now also take part in the adoption of international legal 
standards.
The use of soft law legal instruments has been the object of significant debates 
among academics. It has been argued that the increase in the use of soft law “... 
might destabilize the whole international normative system and turn into an 
instrument that can no longer serve its purpose.”867 Others have argued that soft law
O / 'O
is desirable as it would constitute a step towards the recognition of hard law . 
Partisans o f the use o f soft legal instruments generally recognise that it would lower 
contracting costs by avoiding the lengthy negotiation process required with 
international conventions. The non-binding nature of soft law instruments would 
allow more flexibility in dealing with legal and cultural diversity. Further, these 
instruments would provide more flexibility in the amendment process which would
866 For a description o f the features o f soft law instruments see Berger op. cit. fn. 262, at p. 885 where 
the author states that: “[t]heir usefulness results to a large extent from the mere fact that they exist and 
that they are formulated like black letter law without being “law” in the proper sense. Their use as a 
standard reference point, their time saving effect as a means to substitute profound comparative 
analysis, depends on the comparative persuasiveness of every single rule or principle contained in the 
Restatement. This aspect is particularly relevant in those areas where the drafters o f the Restatements 
have not merely selected the best solution from the legal system compared but have ‘invented’ new 
rules.” Further, “[s]oft law instruments are easier and less costly to negotiate. Soft law instruments 
impose lower “sovereignty costs” on States in sensitive areas. Soft law instruments provide greater 
flexibility for states to cope with uncertainty and leam overtime. Soft law instruments allow states to 
be more ambitious and engage in “deeper” cooperation than they would if they had to worry about 
enforcement. Soft law instruments cope better with diversity. Soft law instruments are available to 
non-state actors, including international secretariats, sub-state public actors such as administrative 
agencies and business associations and non-govemmental organizations.”Shaffer op. cit. fn. 818.
867 Weil, P. “Towards Relative Normativity in International Law?” (1983) 77(3) The American 
Journal o f  International Law, at p. 423.
868 Reinicke, W.H., Et al. “Interdependence, Globalization, and Sovereignty: The Role o f Non- 
Binding International Legal Accords” in Shelton, D., Commitment and Compliance. The Role o f  Non- 
Binding Norms in the International Legal System, (OUP, 2000), at p. 75.
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ease and speed the adaptation to modem commercial and financial environment. By 
avoiding the ratification and cumbersome amendment process, soft law instruments 
would be quicker and simpler to draft. Further, the use o f these instruments of 
unification would enable the private sector to participate more actively in the law 
making process. Finally, it is arguable that soft law instruments could be used as a 
step forward to the recognition of legally binding instruments869.
These instruments of unification have particularly been used in the United States of 
America. The American Law Institute extensively used restatements and model laws 
as legal methods to clarify, modernise, and improve the law . The success of 
restatements and models laws as legal method to reform and approximate the law 
aroused significant interest from other international entities. The success o f the 
American Uniform Commercial Code, and particularly of Article 9 in relation to 
secured transactions, to spread uniformity and modem legislations across the
871American States clearly inspired many international entities to set similar legal
879instruments to be used in other jurisdictions . In effect, recent international 
approximation and modernisation projects have essentially taken the form of soft law 
legal instruments such as restatements and model laws. For instance, UNCITRAL 
recently enacted a Legislative Guide on Secured Transactions873which constitutes 
one of the major initiatives in the field of secured transactions. It is important to 
highlight that previous initiatives conducted by UNCITRAL have been successful in
869 Trubek, D.M., Et al. ‘“ Soft Law,’ ‘Hard Law,’ and European Integration: Towards a Theory of  
Hybridity” (2005), Jean Monnet Working Paper available at
http://www.law.wisc.edu/facstaff/trubek/HybridityPaperApril2005.pdf (last checked 26/04/2010), at 
pp. 15-16.
870 See e.g., the endeavours run by the American Law Institute.
871 Vogenauer op. cit. fn. 842, Para. 12, at p. 5, where the author states that : “... In view o f the 
difficulties encountered with the types o f instruments mentioned in the previous paragraphs, there is 
an increasing support for another non-legislative means of harmonization: “restatements” o f private 
law at an international level. The idea was apparently first mooted in the 1960’s in the context of 
European private law. Soon it was promoted for international uniform law in general. The vision was 
modelled on the United States Restatements of the law, sets of rules which are prepared and 
periodically revised by academics and practitioners under the auspices o f the American Law Institute 
and which codify in systematic manner a variety o f areas of law that are traditionally dealt with by 
state common law, rather than by legislation. It was hoped that such non official and non-binding 
instruments would present the relevant rules in a uniform structure and uniform terminology and that 
they might thus serve as a first step towards later legislative harmonization.”
872 At the international level, the EBRD Model Law on Secured Transactions and UNCITRAL 
Legislative Guide on Secured Transactions constitute some o f the major initiatives for the 
approximation and modernisation o f secured transactions regimes.
873 Available at http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/payments/Guide_securedtrans.html 
(last checked 26/04/2010).
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approximating and modernising the law by using soft law legal instruments such as 
models laws and restatements as legal methods. The successful UNCITRAL Model 
Law on International Commercial Arbitration (1985 as amended in 2006) has served 
as a model for legislative reforms in many jurisdictions such as Canada, Germany or
o n  a
Australia . The UNCITRAL Model Law on Procurement of Goods, Construction 
and Services (1994) has also served as a model for legislation particularly in many 
new emerging economies such as jurisdictions from Africa and jurisdictions from the
o n e
former Soviet Union . Finally, the Model Law on Electronic Commerce has also 
successfully served as model for legislative reforms in many jurisdictions such as
o n e
China, India and the United States . These examples clearly illustrate the success of
874 Legislation based on the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration as 
adopted in 1985 has been enacted in Armenia (2006), Australia (1991), Austria (2005), Azerbaijan
(1999), Bahrain. (1994), Bangladesh (2001), Belarus (1999), Bulgaria (2002), Cambodia (2006), 
Canada (1986), Chile (2004), China (the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (1996) and the 
Macao Special Administrative Region (1998)), Croatia (2001), Cyprus, Denmark (2005), Dominican 
Republic (2008), Egypt (1996), Estonia (2006), Germany (1998), Greece (1999), Guatemala (1995), 
Honduras (2000), Hungary (1994), India (1996), Iran (Islamic Republic of) (1997), Ireland (1998), 
Japan (2003), Jordan (2001), Kenya (1995), Lithuania (1996), Madagascar (1998), Malta (1995), 
Mauritius (2008), Mexico (1993), New Zealand (1996, 2007*), Nicaragua (2005), Nigeria (1990), 
Norway (2004), Oman (1997), Paraguay (2002), Peru (1996, 2008*), the Philippines (2004), Poland
(2005), the Republic o f Korea (1999), the Russian Federation (1993), Serbia (2006), Singapore 
(2001), Slovenia (2008*), Spain (2003), Sri Lanka (1995), Thailand (2002), the former Yugoslav 
Republic o f Macedonia (2006), Tunisia (1993), Turkey (2001), Uganda (2000), Ukraine (1994), the 
United Kingdom o f Great Britain and Northern Ireland (Scotland (1990) and Bermuda, an overseas 
territory o f the United Kingdom), the United States of America (the States of California (1996), 
Connecticut (2000), Illinois (1998), Louisiana (2006), Oregon and Texas), Venezuela (Bolivarian 
Republic of) (1998), Zambia (2000) and Zimbabwe (1996).
875 Legislative texts based on or largely inspired by the UNCITRAL Model Law on Procurement of 
Goods, Construction and Services have been adopted in various countries including Afghanistan
(2006), Albania, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Croatia, Estonia, Gambia (2001), Ghana, Guyana, 
Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Madagascar, Malawi (2003), Mauritius, Moldova, Mongolia, Nepal, 
Nigeria (2007), Poland, Romania, Rwanda, Slovakia, Tanzania, Uganda, Uzbekistan and Zambia.
876 Legislation implementing provisions of the Model Law has been adopted in Australia (1999), 
Brunei Darussalam (2000), Cape Verde (2003), China (2004), Colombia* (1999), Dominican 
Republic* (2002), Ecuador* (2002), France (2000), Guatemala (2008), India* (2000), Ireland (2000), 
Jordan (2001), Mauritius (2000), Mexico (2000), New Zealand (2002), Pakistan (2002), Panama*
(2001), Philippines (2000), Republic o f Korea (1999), Singapore (1998), Slovenia (2000), South 
Africa* (2002), Sri Lanka (2006), Thailand (2002), United Arab Emirates (2006), Venezuela (2001) 
and Viet Nam (2005).
The Model Law has also been adopted in the Bailiwick of Guernsey (2000), the Bailiwick o f Jersey
(2000) and the Isle o f Man (2000), all Crown Dependencies o f the United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland; in Bermuda (1999), Cayman Islands (2000), and the Turks and Caicos Islands
(2000), overseas territories o f the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland; and in the 
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region o f China (2000).
Uniform legislation influenced by the Model Law and the principles on which it is based has been 
prepared in the United States (Uniform Electronic Transactions Act, adopted in 1999 by the National 
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Law) and enacted by the States o f Alabama (2001), 
Alaska (2004), Arizona (2000), Arkansas (2001), California (1999), Colorado (2002), Connecticut
(2002), Delaware (2000),District o f Columbia (2001), Florida (2000), Hawaii (2000), Idaho (2000), 
Indiana (2000), Iowa (2000), Kansas (2000), Kentucky (2000), Louisiana (2001), Maine (2000),
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soft law legal instruments such as model laws and restatements to be used as legal 
methods to modernise and approximate the law in specific areas of commercial law.
Other international initiatives enacted in the form of model laws and restatements 
also proved to be a success. The successful UNIDROIT Principles on International 
Commercial Contracts877(PICC thereafter) are also preserved in the form of a
878restatement rather than in the form of a convention . The UNIDROIT Principles 
provide neutral legal principles governing international contractual relationships 
which are not essentially based on any particular existing legal system. Nevertheless, 
and as for the harmonisation process, it is important to emphasise that the enactment 
of soft law legal instruments, such as model laws and restatements, still involve 
comparative law efforts879 that will permit to determine, analyse, and eliminate
Maryland (2000), Massachusetts (2003), Michigan (2000), Minnesota (2000), Mississippi (2001), 
Missouri (2003), Montana (2001), Nebraska (2000), Nevada (2001), New Hampshire (2001), New 
Jersey (2000), New Mexico (2001), North Carolina (2000), North Dakota (2001), Ohio (2000), 
Oklahoma (2000), Oregon (2001), Pennsylvania (1999), Rhode Island (2000),South Carolina (2004), 
South Dakota (2000), Tennessee (2001), Texas (2001), Utah (2000), Vermont (2003), Virginia
(2000), West Virginia (2001), Wisconsin (2004) and Wyoming (2001). The State o f Illinois had 
already enacted the Model Law in 1998.
Uniform legislation influenced by the Model Law and the principles on which it is based has also been 
prepared in: Canada (Uniform Electronic Commerce Act, adopted in 1999 by the Uniform Law 
Conference o f Canada) and enacted in a number of Provinces and Territories, including Alberta
(2001), British Columbia (2001), Manitoba (2000), New Brunswick (2001), Newfoundland and 
Labrador (2001), Nova Scotia (2000), Nunavut (2004), Ontario (2001), Prince Edward Island (2001), 
Saskatchewan (2000) and Yukon (2000).
Legislation influenced by the Model Law and the principles on which it is based has also been 
adopted in: the Province of Quebec (2001).
877 On the success o f the PICC, see Brodermann, E. “The Growing Importance o f the UNIDROIT 
Principles in Europe -  A Review in Light o f Market Needs, the Role o f Law and the 2005 Rome I 
Proposal” (2006) 11 Uniform Law Review, at p. 749.
878 UNIDROIT Governing Council at its 73rd session in 1994, took note o f a Secretariat memorandum 
stating that: “... attempts to realize those [i.e. the statutory] aims ... have assumed two principal forms, 
on the one hand the preparation of uniform laws, a term which should be understood in a broad sense 
and therefore as encompassing for example the Principles of International Commercial Contracts, and 
on the other, dissemination and information concerning uniform law coupled with study o f the 
methodology o f the unification process so as to ensure that the benefits it is capable o f offering to the 
international community as a whole can be maximized to the best possible advantage.” Governing 
Council, 73rd Session, Rome, 9-14 May 1994, Agenda Item 9, Secretariat Memorandum, UNIDROIT 
1994, C.D. (73) 9 (Original: English).
879 Vogenauer op. cit. fn. 842, Para. 13, at p. 5 where the author states that “... the restatements are, in 
legal terms, nothing more than declarations by private bodies o f scholars who have no democratic or 
other legitimacy to engage in law making. This is particularly important as the restatements are in fact 
not simply restating the law in the sense o f merely reproducing existing rules and usages: a pure 
restatement o f contract rules from different legal systems on a given issue in a single provision is only 
possible if these rules produce similar outcomes -  as is frequently the case between the contract laws 
of the states o f the USA. Where such a commodity does not exist-as it is frequently the case between 
the contract laws o f the different jurisdictions of the world- the elaboration o f a single rule on the issue
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current differences between legal regimes of countries from different legal 
backgrounds880. Such preparatory work will ensure that the restatement or model law 
will be accepted and referred to by a maximum of countries for law reform
OO I
purposes or, by contracting parties to govern their international contracts. In effect, 
it is interesting to note that national courts have already applied the principles (PICC) 
to interpret and resolve conflicts arising in international contracts . Further, it is
in question necessarily involves policy decisions and departures from the existing law in at least one 
o f these jurisdictions and therefore promotes changes in the law.”
880 Gopalan op. cit. fn. 813, at p. 310.
88] See the Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on 
European Contract Law, Response o f COMBAR, Para. 10, available at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/consumers/cons_int/safe_shop/fair_bus_pract/cont_law/comments/4.4.pdf 
(last checked 26/04/2010). The Commission states that: "... In our view, the work o f the Commission 
on European Contract Law, and the Study Group on a European Civil Code is valuable, and should be 
supported. A 'Restatement' o f contract law, which is what we would expect to be the end result, 
though not in itself binding, may be expected to 'harden' into law, for example by influencing the 
judicial process. At the least, where a provision of national contract law diverges from those as state in 
the principles, courts may be encouraged to consider whether such divergence is in fact justified by 
reference to conditions obtaining in the country concerned.") Also, Gopalan observed that “... In less 
than two decades the Principles have attained a modicum o f success in attracting the attention o f  
courts, arbitral tribunals, and national legislatures. Its status as the embodiment o f the current state o f  
the art o f international contract law motivated national legislators to refer to it in the process o f  
enacting new legislation. For example, the drafting of the Russian Civil Code, the Estonian Law o f  
Obligations, and the Civil Code o f the Republic o f Lithuania, all witnessed reference to the 
Principles.” Gopalan op. cit. fn. 818, at p. 358.
882 See on this point, Bonell op. cit. fn. 836, at p. 305 and Gopalan op. cit. fn. 818, at p. 359 where the 
author states that: “[cjourts have referred to the Principles in several countries, including the U.S. In 
Ministry O f Defense and Support fo r  the Armed Forces o f  the Islamic Republic o f  Iran v. Cubic 
Defense Systems, Inc., one o f the questions before the court was whether the arbitral tribunal's 
application o f the UNIDROIT Principles was a ground for vacatur of the award under article V (l)(c) 
o f the New York Convention on the recognition and enforcement o f foreign arbitral awards. The 
defendant argued that such use o f the Principles exceeded the scope of the Terms o f Reference. The 
court was unimpressed: "[t]he reference to the UNIDROIT Principles does not exceed the scope o f the 
Terms o f Reference .... The Tribunal's reference to and application of the UNIDROIT Principles and 
principles such as good faith and fair dealing do not violate Article V (l)(c).” In Great Hill Equity 
Partners II LP  v. Novator One LP, the question was whether certain statements made during pre- 
contractual negotiations could be used to construe the agreement. The court referred to the 
UNIDROIT Principles alongside the CISG for the proposition that all relevant circumstances must be 
considered in construing the intention of the parties. A similar question arose in The Square Mile 
Partnership Limited v. Fitzmaurice McCall Limited, and the court once again referred to article 4.3 of  
the Principles in addition to scholarly commentary. In Econet Satellite Services Ltd  v. Vee Networks 
Ltd, the parties had a clause in the contract stating that it shall be "interpreted in accordance with the 
UNIDROIT Principles o f  International Commercial Contracts o f the International Institute for the 
Unification o f Private Laws [1994] as then in force, applied mutatis mutandis to the extent not 
inconsistent therewith." There was no objection to this by the Queen's Bench. In an Argentinean case 
in 2004, despite no reference to the UNIDROIT Principles in the contract, which was between a bank 
and its customer concerning a credit card issued by the former, the court explicitly referred to article 
2.4 o f the Principles as an exemplar o f "modem law." There are six Australian cases listed on the 
Unilex database that have referred to the Principles. In Hughes Aircraft Systems International v. 
Airservices Australia, the court noted that the Anglo-Australian law on the duty o f fair dealing was 
indecisive, but that "[i]t has been propounded as a fundamental principle to be honoured in 
international commercial contracts" by the UNIDROIT Principles o f International Commercial 
Contracts in Article 1.7, and held that "recognition [of the duty] in our own contract law is now
262
also important to note that more than hundred and fifty arbitral awards referring to 
the PICC have also been published especially in relation to the Sale of Goods but 
also in relation to contracts on works and services, distribution licences, aircraft 
maintenance, shareholder agreements, partnership agreements, merger and takeover
001
agreements . Modernisation of the law, in that sense would not solely occur 
through national legal reforms but would also occur through its recognition within 
national courts as governing legislation to regulate contractual relationships. Thus, 
states do not any longer constitute the sole actors in the law making process. States 
sovereignty in this context has lost some of its impact and significance at the 
international level.
At Regional level, a similar view was adopted within the EU and the Principles of 
European contract law (PECL thereafter) which recognise ‘restatement’ as the 
appropriate legal method to achieve European integration885. For instance, the PECL 
has already served as model for reform of the German law o f obligations, the 
Scottish contract law886 and contract law in France887. It is believed that the PECL
warranted. This decision was cited with approval by the Supreme Court o f New South Wales in 
Alcatel Australia Ltd. v. Scarcella & Ors. In Aiton v. Transfield, the dispute was about the proper 
construction o f a clause in the agreement which provided that: "[t]he Purchaser [Transfield] and 
Supplier [Aiton] shall make diligent and good faith efforts to resolve all [disputes." The court noted 
that the: "... interest generated by international instruments such as the UNIDROIT Principles of 
International Commercial Contracts ... which specifically refer to a requirement o f 'good faith' in 
contracts" and held that the clause was enforceable.”
883 Kronke, H. “The UN Sales Convention , the UNIDROIT Contract Principles and the Way Beyond” 
(2005) at p. 5, UNCITRAL publications available at
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/CISG25/Kronke.pdf (last checked 05/03/2010).
884 http://www.jus.uio.no/lm/eu.contract.principles.1998/doc.html (last checked 26/04/2010).
885 The Commission on European Contract Law and Study Group on a European Civil Code 
recognised the necessity for a restatement o f law. It is explained that: “[b]oth Groups are o f the view 
that the further development o f European private law will depend decisively on the promotion and 
further elaboration o f a restatement. A thorough-going legal comparison, consolidated in the form of  
principles expressed as legal rules with commentary and annotation, is an indispensable foundation 
for further European integration. In particular, it is only in undertaking to construct a restatement of 
private law in the Member States that the actual extent o f legal diversity and any corresponding need 
for legal harmonisation can be fully determined. Only a restatement is capable o f making visible the 
existence of legal values and principles which are already shared, bringing to light national 
peculiarities and developing a common terminology for jurists which overcomes jurisdictional 
boundaries.”, Para. 61, at p. 33 available at
http://www.sgecc.net/media/downloads/stellungnahme_kommission_5_final 1 .pdf (last checked 
26/04/2010).
886 Ibid. Para. 74, at p. 37.
887 Avant-Projet de Reforme du Droit des Obligations (Articles 1101 a 1386 du Code Civil) et du 
Droit de la Prescription (Articles 2234 a 2281 du Code civil) Rapport a Monsieur Pascal Clement 
Garde des Sceaux, Ministre de la Justice 22 Septembre 2005, Projet Catala. 
http://lesrapports.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/BRP/054000622/0000.pdf (last checked, 05/03/2010).
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could successfully lead to the harmonisation and modernisation of the law. It is 
explained that the:
PECL plays a central role in this process. As a comparative reference point and 
as the “ratio scripta” of European contract law, they provide the medium through 
which the development of a European doctrine of precedents may be developed. 
Even though, they do not constitute binding law in the proper sense, the PECL’s 
specific quality, being formulated as black letter rules makes them an ideal reference 
point for the Europeanization o f the case law of the courts of the EU Members 
countries.”888
It is arguable that international legal instruments, such as model laws and 
restatements, could be seen as a step towards the recognition of binding legal 
instruments. Soft law instruments could be conceived as a way to convey information 
to states and legal reformers about the policy choices and legal regimes recognised at 
the international level. Ultimately, soft law instruments could influence legal 
reformers at national level without the need to enact binding legal instruments in the 
form of international conventions.
Restatements or model laws do not consist in the re-enactment of one particular
national legal regime in the form of a binding supranational legal instrument. Rather,
they involve the voluntary recognition of legal principles supposedly embodying the
best available legal solution established following substantial comparative analysis.
As the European Commission already formulated in respect of the PECL:
“[t]he preparation of a restatement can only be achieved by an impartial formulation 
of principles in the light o f detailed comparative law research, transcending existing 
legal diversity by a dispassionate development of the most appropriate rules for a 
Community wide private law. Any other method would be entirely inappropriate. In 
particular, it would be unacceptable to adopt an individual national code as a starting 
point and merely tweak it here and there at the margins.”889
The use of soft law legal instruments such as restatements and models laws can 
avoid some o f the difficulties underlying endless negotiations prior to the enactment 
o f conventions890. For instance, the CISG took over ten years to draft891.
The ‘Loi n° 2008-561 du 17 Juin 2008 portant reforme de la prescription en matiere civile’ already 
reformed the dispositions in the Civil code relative to the limitation o f civil actions by lapse o f  time 
(prescription).
888 Berger op. cit. fn. 262.
889 See above fn. 884, at p. 34.
890Famsworth provides that: “[t]he advantages and disadvantages o f harmonization by way of 
restatement are obvious. Restatements avoid the tortuous negotiation and ratification process of 
international treaties and they can be flexibly adapted to the changing conditions o f international
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Nevertheless, the draft o f soft law legal instruments could also require some time as 
the success of model laws or restatements as legal method for reform would also 
require significant comparative law efforts prior to their enactments.
Soft law legal instruments are not binding and, thus, do not require any ratification, 
but states are offered the choice to adopt and modify some o f their provisions or to 
disregard them completely . Another purpose of restatements and models laws is 
that they can encourage party autonomy by offering the opportunity for the parties to 
elect the legal regime as the governing law for their contractual relationships. This is 
a substantial advantage of using these legal instruments as legal methods to 
modernise the law at the international level. Naturally, soft law instruments can also 
serve as model legislations for national legal reforms as it has just been 
demonstrated.
Owing to more flexibility, the use o f soft law instruments would appear to offer 
better prospects to successfully reform and modernise the law than with international 
conventions. Nevertheless, it is arguable that the high degree o f flexibility offered by 
model laws and restatements is obtained at the expense o f the successful 
achievement of complete unification of the law. In effect, the nature of model laws 
and restatements does not impose any ratification amongst potential participating 
States of the dispositions to be adopted. States remain free to adopt, modify and 
reject altogether the dispositions of a model law. However, it has already been 
highlighted that model laws and restatements have generally been quite successful in 
their quest to achieve an approximation and modernisation o f the law without the 
need to bear the restrictive binding nature of international conventions.
International agencies understand that conventions are limited in their prospects to 
successfully achieve a modernisation and unification o f secured credit laws 
following their restrictive nature. Furthermore, it has already been highlighted that a 
comprehensive unification of secured credit law regimes is unlikely. By avoiding the
commercial practice” in Farnsworth, E.A. “Closing Remarks” (1992) 40 American Journal o f  
Comparative Law, at p. 699.
891 United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale o f Goods (CISG).
892 Vogenauer op. cit. fn. 842, Introduction, Para. 9, at p. 4.
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difficulties underlying the adoption of international conventions and by providing 
more flexibility for states to adhere to their provisions and, more flexibility to adapt 
to modem commercial transactions893, it is arguable that model laws and 
restatements would stand better chance to achieve a modernisation and 
approximation o f secured credit law regimes.
The use o f soft law legal instruments, such as restatements or model laws, as legal 
methods to modernise and approximate the law of secured credit could potentially be 
successful as it has been suggested in this development. In this respect, the next 
section will attempt to assess whether the use of soft law in the forms o f model laws 
and restatements may be more likely to succeed in modernising and approximating 
the law o f secured credit through the analysis of a concrete example. A significant 
illustration can be found with the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Secured 
transactions894. The UNICTRAL Legislative Guide is not legally binding but could 
serve as a set o f legislative guidelines in order to assist jurisdictions to modernise and 
reform their laws in the future. This begs the question of whether the recent 
enactment of the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Secured Transactions could 
constitute a successful legal method to modernise and approximate the law of 
secured credit among jurisdictions from different legal backgrounds.
MODERNISATION OF SECURED CREDIT LAW REGIMES AND THE 
UNCITRAL LEGISLATIVE GUIDE ON SECURED TRANSACTIONS
In the year 2000, UNCITRAL considered the question of future possible work on the 
question o f the unification in the field of secured credit law. The idea of the 
establishment o f a legislative guide on secured lending was opportune in the context 
of growing national reforms. A first version was examined during the New York
893 See Gopalan op. cit. fn. 135, at p. 310 where the author states that: “[t]his is a vehicle for 
harmonization that has assumed tremendous importance following the successful reception o f the 
UNIDROIT Principles o f International Commercial Contracts. Without a doubt, the tremendous 
flexibility offered by restatements has contributed to their recent allure. Parties can adopt them on a 
voluntary basis, and they serve many important functions. For example, the UNIDROIT Principles of 
International Commercial Contracts as viewed as “neutral” contract law principles in that they reflect 
a balance o f interests and have not been formulated by any government.”
894 Similar initiative is run with the CFR at the European level with the proposition to enact a Part ix 
on secured transactions in the restatement.
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session in May 2002. The final version of the Legislative Guide on Secured 
Transactions was adopted within the fortieth session run by the Commission in
O Q C
December 2007 . During the same session, the Commission entrusted the same 
working group to prepare an annex to the Guide relating to security rights in
OQZ
intellectual property . It is hoped that national legal reformers will use this 
Legislative Guide as a model for reform of their secured credit law regimes897. The 
use of the Guide could thus potentially be successful as legal method to approximate 
and modernise secured credit law regimes.
UNCITRAL opted for a legislative guide as legal method to modernise and 
approximate secured credit law regimes. As for other soft law instruments such as 
model laws and restatements, this legal method appeared to be more flexible and less 
restrictive than the use of international conventions. The Legislative Guide is based
895 See www.uncitral.org.
896 See www.uncitral.org. Chapter Two already highlighted the existing difficulties underlying the 
creation of a security in intellectual property assets at the international level.
897 See Rocks, S.M., Et al. “International Commercial Law: 2007 Developments” (2008) 63 Business 
Lawyer, at p. 1375 where the author provides a summary of the Legislative Guide: “.... The Guide is 
designed for States (Nations) that wish to develop further their law governing secured transactions 
involving movables {i.e. personal property). It is not a treaty or a model law. Rather, like UNCITRAL 
Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law, the Guide provides guidance to States in two ways. First, it sets 
out in commentary issues and policies that States may wish to consider in adopting or reforming their 
secured transactions laws. Second, it contains recommendations (often quite specific) o f UNCITRAL 
as to the resolution of those issues and rules necessary to effectuate those policies. States that follow 
the recommendations of the Guide in enacting legislation based on it will gain the benefits o f a 
modem secured transactions regime -  a regime that is generally consistent with the policies o f Article 
9 o f the Uniform Commercial Code and the Canadian Personal Property Security Acts. If the 
recommendations of the Guide are widely followed, there will the added benefit o f  greater 
harmonization o f secured transactions laws worldwide. Moreover, enactment o f the Guide’s 
recommendations on conflict o f laws alone will produce greater predictability in cross-border 
transactions [...] Of major significance in the Guide are (i) its recognition o f the need for a 
comprehensive and functional approach to security rights, (ii) its recommendations that security rights 
in asset in bulk and in future assets be allowed, (iii) its recommendations for a notice filing system and 
a first-to-file priority rule, (iv) its recommendations for super-priority for acquisition financing 
security rights (purchase- money security interests, (v) its recommendations relating to the override of 
anti-assignment clauses in specific transactions, (vi) its recommendations relating to self-help 
enforcement, and (vii) the comprehensive conflict-of-laws recommendations. ... The Guide addresses 
security rights in personal property (movables). It also applies to “true sales” o f receivables not 
evidenced by negotiable instruments. Excluded from the Guide are security rights in real estates 
(immovables). The Guide excludes, as well, security rights in aircraft and other “high ticket” mobile 
goods to the extent subject to the Cape Town Convention. Also excluded are security rights in 
securities and financial contracts. Security rights in intellectual property are included within the scope 
of the Guide but with the caveat that its recommendations do not apply insofar as they are inconsistent 
with a State’s intellectual property regime or its intellectual property obligations. UNCITRAL has 
commenced a separate project to consider an annex to the Guide to address selected issues relating to 
security rights in intellectual property rights and may in the future consider expanding the Guide to 
address security rights in certain securities and financial contracts. ”
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on Article 9 of the American UCC which is often presented as a model of modem 
legislations on secured credit. In a context of legal reforms, it is not surprising that 
the American regime recently became the paragon of modem secured credit
QQO m
legislations . The Legislative Guide on Secured Transactions did not escape this 
general trend and, unsurprisingly, presents great similarities with Article 9 UCC. 
Nevertheless, the drafters of the Legislative Guide were aware of the difficulties for 
some jurisdictions to integrally adopt an Article 9 type regime. The difficulties of 
importing Article 9 UCC in certain jurisdictions have already been extensively 
considered899. In this respect, substantial comparative law and reconciliation efforts 
have been performed by the drafting panel of the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide.
For the purpose of this analysis on the likelihood of success of the UNCITRAL 
Legislative Guide to modernise secured credit law regimes, it is important to look at 
the travaux preparatoires and the negotiations that have animated fundamental 
debates on the recognition of a universal secured credit law regime. In effect, such an 
examination would provide an idea of the level of recognition of the Guide from 
jurisdictions that belong to different legal traditions. This development will not 
fundamentally focus on the recommendations opted by the Legislative Guide, as this 
exercise has already been done extensively900 but will be looking at the travaux 
preparatoires and negotiations prior to the enactment of the Legislative Guide.
It has already been analysed in the above developments that international 
conventions can lead to substantial obstacles and difficulties. That is why the drafters 
o f the Legislative Guide opted for a diplomatic, flexible and non compulsory legal 
instrument in the form of a legislative guide. This formal legal choice of an optional 
non binding tool could however lead to significant risks. In effect, if the Guide is not
898 Riffard, J.F. “Le Guide Legislatif de la CNUDI sur les Operations Garanties. Un Pas Decisif Vers 
un Droit des Suretes Mobilieres Harmonises » in Picod, Y., Et al., Le Droit des Suretes a L ’Epreuve 
des Reformes, (2009).
899 See Chapter Three.
900 Bazinas, S.V. “ Harmonisation o f International and Regional Trade Law: The Uncitral Experience”
(2003) 8 Uniform Law Review , at p. 53; Bazinas, S.V. “ Uncitral Draft Legislative Guide on Secured 
Transactions” 10 Uniform Law Review , at p. 141; Bazinas, S.V. “Key Policy Issues of the Uncitral 
Draft Legislative Guide on Secured Transactions” (2007), Article to be published in a book on 
security interests edited by Benedict Foex, Luc Thevenoz and Spiros V. Bazinas, to be published in 
Zurich by Schulthess; Garro, A. M. “Harmonization of Personal Property Security Law National 
Regional and Global Initiatives” (2003) 8 Uniform Law Review, at p. 357.
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recognised or adopted by potential participating states because o f conceptual and 
terminological divergences, then its adoption would fail and there would not be any 
rationale behind the enactment of this Legislative Guide.
It is arguable that the choice of a legislative guide as legal method to modernise 
secured credit law regimes is a wise choice in the sense that it offers jurisdictions 
high degree of flexibility. In effect, the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide does not 
impose any of its recommendations nor the form in which they should be 
materialised. The Legislative Guide ensures maximum compliance with the adopting 
states’ existing national legal standards in order to be easily assimilated and 
recognised at the national level901. The drafters made substantive efforts to comply 
with the different terminologies and concepts adopted within the different states 
legislations and, decided to opt for a guide as legal receptacle for their 
recommendations, which does not impose any constraints on states. The Legislative 
Guide is essentially consensual in character and, therefore, seems acceptable both for 
Common Law and Civilian jurisdictions.
This analysis already stated that some jurisdictions, particularly Civilian 
jurisdictions, were quite reticent towards the adoption of a global security based on 
an Article 9 type regime902. For example, the Commission Grimaldi, designated to 
the task of reforming French security law, was quite hostile to the integral 
transplantation of an Article 9 type as it would have involved a substantive reform of 
insolvency law regime that would not have conformed to the policy decisions 
currently adopted within the French legal system. Especially, the question of the 
adoption of a global security right was largely at stake in the French secured credit 
law reform and was also one of the main litigious questions faced by the panel in 
charge o f drafting the Legislative Guide.
901 This aspect is fundamental for the Legislative Guide. In that sense, see the introduction of the 
Legislative Guide on Secured Transactions, No 70, at p. 14 which provides that “[i]n order to be 
effective, in practice, any new secured transactions law must take into account the situations within 
which it is to operate. In particular, its provisions must be harmonized with the general legal structure 
as well as the actual role of credit institutions in the enacting State. Sometimes, this implies 
complementary changes to general legal and economic institutions; sometimes it requires State- 
specific adjustments to the details o f the secured transactions regime itself.” available at 
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/security/IntroChlCh2.pdf (last checked, 05/03/2010).
902 See Chapter Three.
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Considering that the Legislative Guide is noticeably inspired from the American 
model, the question emerges to determine how the drafters of the Guide managed to 
reconcile the different legal positions adopted by the participating states with an 
international legislation modelled on Article 9 UCC. It has already been argued in 
Chapter Three that an integral legal transplantation o f Article 9 UCC would be 
difficult to achieve both in Civilian jurisdictions such as France or Quebec and in 
Common Law jurisdictions such as England. The architects of the Legislative Guide 
were conscientious o f the fact that certain jurisdictions, particularly Civilian 
jurisdictions might have integrated different terminologies or concepts within their 
current secured credit law regimes. Nevertheless, the adoption of the functional 
approach and main legal principles governing Article 9 appeared to be a sensible 
option for the drafters o f the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide903.
The drafters understood that the recommendations issued in the Guide would not be 
implemented if they did not ‘fit’ within existing national terminologies and 
concepts904. Therefore, they chose to refer to the key concepts enacted in their 
recommendations in such a manner that it would fit and adapt to whatever national 
legal regimes from whatever legal traditions. For example, the expression 
‘encumbered assets’ rather than ‘collateral’ or, ‘security rights’ rather than ‘security 
interests’, are used as preferred terminologies in the Guide. Moreover, the Guide did 
not retain the ‘non possessory security interest’ expression but retained ‘acquisition 
security right’ instead. It is arguable that these terminologies provide more neutrality 
which will enhance better recognition by states that belong to different legal 
traditions. Further, the Guide does not prescribe any legal form to be adopted if the
903 In that sense, the Guide adopts one o f the most fundamental principles underlying Article 9 UCC, 
i.e. its functional approach. See e.g., the introduction to the Legislative Guide on Secured 
Transactions, at p. 11 available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/security/IntroChlCh2.pdf 
(last checked 26/04/2010).
904 See the introduction to the Legislative Guide on Secured Transactions, No 71, at p. 14: “... First, 
because reform o f secured transactions law will often not occur in the context o f a general reform of a 
State’s private law, the terminology by which the concepts and the rules o f the new law are described 
must be built upon existing legal institutions. So, for example, while the Guide provides detailed 
definitions o f  the concepts that should be part of a reformed secured transactions law, it takes no 
position on precise terminology or words to be used in enacting a new law. The Guide presumes that 
States will implement its recommendations by reference to existing legal architecture rather than by 
transplanting unfamiliar legal terms drawn from other jurisdictions that have no legal meaning or 
resonance. In particular, the Guide attempts to present its recommendations and their associated key 
concepts in such a manner that, whatever the legal tradition that underpins a State’s national law, that 
State can adapt and enact these recommendations.”
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guide were to be used as model for national law reform905. States can opt for 
whatever drafting options available in order to enact the recommendations. It has 
been explained above in this study that certain formal legal receptacles, such as the 
civilian form of codification, could constitute an obstacle and that is why the 
flexibility of this provision will act in favour of a successful adhesion from 
jurisdictions from different legal backgrounds906. Finally, it was fundamental for the 
drafters to keep in mind that the law of secured credit does interact with other legal 
fields such as insolvency law, property law and contract law. Consequently, it was 
important to try to keep some coherence within the Legislative Guide and preserve 
the specificity of national legislations if they were to integrate its 
recommendations907. Although, the drafters of the Guide managed to find common 
grounds on fundamental key principles to be adopted within the recommendations of 
the Legislative Guide, disaccords were also raised by the drafters during the travaux 
preparatoires.
Considering the wide diversity of legal traditions and national secured credit law 
regimes, the drafting panel of the Guide managed to reach, to a certain extent, a 
consensus. For instance, the key objectives and fundamental policies for an effective 
and efficient secured transactions regime were agreed amongst all members o f the 
research group908. In respect of the substance itself of the recommendations, the
905 Ibid, at No 72: “... there is no one model governing either the manner o f drafting o f new legislation 
or the place where these new rules will be located within the overall legal regime o f a State. So, for 
example, the Guide takes no position on whether all the recommendations it makes should be enacted 
in a single law, or whether these recommendations should be incorporated into a civil code or 
commercial code, or whether in either case they should appear in the same place. States may well 
decide to enact rules relating to conflict o f laws in a law or a book o f a civil code devoted to this 
subject. Likewise, the Guide takes no position on whether States should reform the law through an 
enactment written in the style of a civil code or in the style o f a regulatory instrument.”
906 See Chapter Three at pp. 114-118.
907 Ibid, No 73, at p. 15: “... many o f the provisions o f a secured transactions law intersect with rules 
of debtor-creditor law, banking law and practice, the regime governing insolvency and the institutions 
of civil procedure. The Guide acknowledges the need to achieve coherence o f the overall regime at 
each o f these points of intersection. For example, while it recommends in chapter VIII on the 
enforcement of a security right, that States provide for expeditious judicial proceedings to decide any 
questions relating to the rights o f grantors, secured creditors or third parties during enforcement, it 
does not aim at describing either what those proceedings should be, or what rules o f civil procedure 
should apply to them.”
908 Ibid, at pp. 8-10: “... (a) To promote low-cost credit by enhancing the availability o f secured credit; 
(b) To allow debtors to use the full value inherent in their assets to support credit; (c) To enable 
parties to obtain security rights in a simple and efficient manner; (d) To provide for equal treatment of 
diverse sources of credit and of diverse forms of secured transaction; (e) To validate non-possessory 
security rights in all type of asset; (f) To enhance certainty and transparency by providing for
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drafters generally agreed that a functional approach should be adopted in relation to 
the global security so that its scope of coverage should extend to all type of debts, 
type of assets, and parties. Also, it was generally agreed that a centralised registration 
system modelled on Article 9 UCC notice filing should be set up. Even though, the 
drafters managed to reach a certain consensus on the fundamental objectives and 
policies to be adopted, there are some legal aspects that could not be agreed on.
One o f the most important difficulties appeared in relation to acquisition security 
rights (or non possessory security interests). In effect, the issue of the regulation of 
retention o f title clauses appeared to the drafters of the Guide to be a casus belli. The 
partisans of property-based securities rejected the proposition that retention of title 
clauses should be included in the regime of a global security. Consequently, the 
legislative Guide offers an alternative909 in their recommendations on acquisition 
security rights due to lack o f consensus on this issue. The first alternative allows 
participating states to opt for the unitary approach based on Article 9 UCC. The 
Guide recommends that:
“[t]he law should provide that an acquisition security right is a security right. Thus, 
all the recommendations governing security rights, including those on creation, third- 
party effectiveness ..., registration, enforcement and the law applicable to a security 
right, apply to acquisition security rights.”910
The second alternative proposes to the interested jurisdictions to opt for a non unitary 
approach which analyses the seller’s right as a possessory right and not as a security 
right. However, the drafters considered that the adoption of such position should be 
applied in light o f the functional approach and should respect the registration 
requirements imposed to the creation of acquisition security rights911. The 
enforceability o f a retention of title in tangible goods, other that consumers goods, 
will only be effective if the seller retains possession of the goods or, if the seller
registration o f a notice in a general security rights registry; (g) To establish clear and predictable 
priority rules; (h) To facilitate efficient enforcement o f creditor’s rights; (i) To allow parties maximum 
flexibility to negotiate the terms o f their security agreement; (j) To balance the interests o f affected 
persons; (k) To harmonize secured transactions laws, including conflict-of-laws rules.”
909 See Annex I, Terminology and recommendations of the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Secured 
Transactions, Part IX on “Acquisition Financing”
available from http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/security/Annex%20Edited.pdf
910 Ibid. N° 178, at p. 51.
9uIbid. N° 188, at p. 55: “... the law should provide that the rules governing acquisition financing 
produce functionally equivalent economic results regardless of whether the creditor’s right is a 
retention-of-title right, a financial lease right or an acquisition security right”.
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provides notice through registration of his right after the buyer obtained possession
Q 1 7 •o f the assets . This mechanism appears to be quite similar to the current regime 
adopted in Quebec in relation to the hypothec and to the retention of title mechanism. 
Quebec reformed its law on secured transactions in 1994 and opted for a non unitary 
approach in relation to retention of title clauses. However, the validity of the clause 
is subject to a registration requirement as currently prescribed in the Civil code913.
Further objections were addressed to the adoption of a global security914. Some 
jurisdictions do not accept that a debtor should be allowed to grant security in all of 
his assets. Partisans of Article 9 UCC advanced that such a global security would 
enhance access to credit by expanding the pool of assets available to creditors. The 
opponents to the recognition of such a global security advanced that it would 
substantially modify the actual financing and credit techniques o f many jurisdictions 
and that such a system would ultimately lead to one unique creditor system915. 
Considering these objections to the adoption of a global security, it has been 
suggested a series of limits and exceptions. It has been proposed that the creation of 
such a global security could only be possible within businesses and enterprises 
relationships, so that natural persons would not be entitled to create such security.
This security would take the name of ‘enterprise mortgage’ and would embrace all 
the assets of a business916. The creation of this enterprise mortgage would not be 
available to natural persons who run their own business such as sole entrepreneurs. 
This did not seem to constitute a sustainable recommendation in relation to the
912 Ibid. N° 192.
913 See Chapter Three at pp. 161-164.
914 The drafting panel o f the Guide explained that: “[t]o enhance the availability o f secured credit, 
some legal systems permit the creation of a non-possessory security right in all o f the assets o f a 
debtor, including tangible and intangible, movable and immovable (although different rules may apply 
to security in immovables), and present and future assets. The most essential aspects o f such all-asset 
security are that it covers all assets of a debtor and the debtor has the right to dispose o f certain o f its 
encumbered assets (such as inventory) in the ordinary course of its business (while the security is 
extended automatically to the proceeds of the assets disposed). Under most legal systems, such a right 
to dispose o f encumbered assets without affecting the security right is acknowledged. However, in 
some legal systems, dispositions o f encumbered assets by the debtor, although authorized by the 
creditor, are regarded as irreconcilable with the idea of a security right.” See Document 
A/CN.9/WG.VI/WP.11/Add2, No 20-25, at pp. 7-8, available at
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/commission/working_groups/6Security_Interests.html (last
checked 26/04/2010).
915 Riffard op. cit. fn. 898.
916 A/CN.9/WG.VI/WP.11/Add2, at No. 23-24.
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adoption of a global security as it would have undermined the idea of a unique 
security itself. Furthermore, it has been suggested that debtors should only be 
allowed to encumber their businesses assets up to a certain percentage. This 
suggestion did not seem to convince the architects of the Guide either and the 
functional and unitary approach was kept917. For example, Recommendation Two 
clearly stipulates that:
“[sjubject to recommendations 3-7, the law should apply to all rights in movable 
assets created by agreement that secure payment or other performance of an 
obligation, regardless o f the form of the transaction, the type of the movable asset, 
the status o f the grantor or secured creditor or the nature of the secured obligation.”
The UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Secured Transactions constitutes a significant 
step forward towards an approximation of laws at the international level using a 
legislative guide as legal technique for modernisation. The Guide constitutes a 
challenge for national legal reformers on the path to reform their secured credit law 
regimes. It provides clear recommendations covering definitions and explanations on 
what should constitute a modem and efficient secured credit law regime. However, 
key issues such as the recognition of acquisition financing devices within the unitary 
regime o f a global security has not been settled which is regrettable. The success of 
the Legislative Guide as legal method to modernise secured transactions law regimes 
will thus depend upon the willingness of national legislators to reform the law 
according to these recommendations.
CONCLUSION
The above analysis demonstrated that the use of unification of law instruments as 
legal methods to modernise secured credit law regimes can be, to some extent, 
profitable. With regard to hard law legal instruments, it is argued that international 
conventions could constitute a successful method to modernise and approximate 
secured credit law regimes by reaching a high ratio of ratifications and by providing 
a consistent and uniform interpretation amongst Member States. Evidently, such 
efforts would require a strong consensus among all participating states on the 
question o f secured credit. It has been exposed that the creation of an international
917 Riffard op. cit. fn. 898, at p. 107.
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convention on secured credit appears to be quite uncertain considering the lack of 
international consensus on the question of secured credit, property law issues and 
other fundamental policy choices.
The creation of a legally binding instrument would only seem possible in relation to 
targeted areas of secured credit as evidenced with the successful Cape Town 
Convention. In this respect, it was demonstrated that the unification o f targeted 
aspects of secured credit law regimes attracted enough adhesion from states to make 
the use of international convention a successful method to modernise and 
approximate secured credit law regimes. Nonetheless, it was emphasised that the 
decision to opt for a series of separate conventions to regulate the creation o f an 
international security interest relative to specific types o f assets could jeopardise and 
restrict the economic benefits of the proposed new scheme to more than a limited 
variety of assets.
This study concluded that a successful modernisation using international convention 
as legal method would not be entirely satisfactory unless it could be extended to 
other categories of assets. Further, the success of international convention as legal 
method to modernise and approximate secured credit law regimes is arguably 
subordinated to the respect of consistent and uniform interpretation of international 
legal standards by states and national courts. Despite, extensive theoretical guidelines 
on the interpretation of international conventions, it has been shown, that in the field 
o f secured credit, property law concepts highly differ from one jurisdiction to 
another, especially in jurisdictions that belong to different legal traditions. This 
situation could arguably jeopardise the success of international convention to 
modernise secured credit law regimes in the light of an approximation of laws.
In light of the uncertainties underlying the use of international conventions as legal 
methods to modernise and approximate secured credit law regimes, international 
drafters recently opted for more flexible legal instruments embodied, for instance, in 
the form of model laws and restatements. Soft law legal instruments such as model 
laws enable the creation of a comprehensive unification o f secured credit law 
regimes in the form of non binding legal instruments. Naturally, the success o f the
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use of soft law instruments as legal methods to modernise secured transactions 
regimes will depend on whether national legislators will actually refer to them as 
basis for law reform. In this respect, the recent introduction of the UNCITRAL 
Legislative Guide on Secured Transactions introduced great hope in the successful 
modernisation and approximation o f secured credit law regimes.
This analysis on legal unification further envisaged the likelihood of success of the 
use of soft law legal instruments to modernise and approximate secured credit law 
regimes through the analysis of the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide. An analysis of 
the travaux preparatoires permitted to identify areas of accords and discords among 
the members o f the drafting panel which would be quite representative of the 
positions adopted by national entities on specific legal issues. The analysis of the 
travaux preparatoires showed that the drafting panel of the Legislative Guide 
managed to reach a certain consensus on fundamental general principles that should 
govern secured credit law regimes, but could not compromise on certain aspects such 
as the regulations o f retention of title clauses. Accordingly, it is difficult to predict at 
this stage whether the Legislative Guide will be successful as legal method to 
modernise and approximate national secured credit law regimes as it will mainly 
depend upon the degree of recognition from national entities. Nonetheless, it is 
concluded that the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Secured Transactions 
constitutes a major endeavour towards the approximation of secured credit laws at 
the international level using soft law legal instrument to modernise the law. The 
Guide constitutes a challenge for national legal reformers on the path to reform their 
secured credit law regimes. It provides clear recommendations covering definitions 
and explanations on what should constitute a modem and efficient secured credit law 
regime. The question is now to see whether national drafters will actually refer to the 
Guide as a model for legal reform.
This analysis demonstrated that the use of hard law instruments such as international 
conventions as legal methods to approximate and modernise secured credit law 
regimes remains limited but this observation cannot lead to the conclusion that they 
have been unsuccessful. Soft law and hard law legal instruments would thus both 
constitute satisfactory legal methods for reform in the way they are both playing a
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significant role in the modernisation and the convergence of secured credit law 
regimes. As Abbott explained, “[t]he choice between hard law and soft law is not a 
binary one.”918 Previous analysis on legal transplantation and harmonisation 
concluded that the likelihood of success of these methods to modernise and 
approximate secured credit law regimes also remain limited. Mainly, it is recognised 
that ‘legal culture’919 often constitutes a significant obstacle to the success o f secured 
credit law reform in the light of an approximation o f laws. If  ‘legal culture’ 
constitutes a frein to the successful modernisation of secured credit law, the question 
emerges whether the modernisation of secured credit law regimes could occur 
outside the framework of a state, independently from any local legal culture, in order 
to be successful.
Recent years clearly witnessed a substantial evolution o f international commercial 
law and witnessed the substantial denationalisation o f law. Particularly, it is to be 
observed that a wider range of formulating international agencies, other than states, 
have recently emerged using a broader range of instruments such as international 
customs and practices. Accordingly, it is arguable that if  a modernisation and 
approximation of secured credit law regimes remains uncertain from a nationalistic 
approach, that is through national legal reforms, the question needs to be addressed 
of whether modem secured credit law regimes could arise outside the framework of 
the state, and particularly, whether modem secured credit law regimes could arise 
from the recognition of an autonomous transnational commercial law which would 
operate within a distinct international legal pattern.
918 Abbott op. cit. fn. 818, at p. 422.
919 The expression ‘legal culture’ would embrace a particular legal tradition such as the Common Law 
or the Civilian tradition, specific legal concepts and terminologies, specific policy choices, languages 
and specifically the local legal environment. See Chapter Three at pp. 93-102.
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CHAPTER SIX
CONCLUSION: THE NEW TRANSNATIONAL COMMERCIAL LAW AND 
THE GRAND CHALLENGE OF LAW
INTRODUCTION
The questions of the modernisation and approximation of secured credit law regimes 
are timely, particularly, considering the current context of the internationalisation of 
commercial dealings. This analysis thus considered the feasibility o f a modernisation 
of secured credit law regimes and personal property law using approximation of laws 
methods such as legal transplantation, legal harmonisation and legal unification. The 
thesis adopts a comparative law approach, particularly, in relation to jurisdictions 
that belong to different legal backgrounds such as the Common Law and Civil Law 
traditions. It is recognised that the success of a modernisation and approximation of 
secured credit law regimes would largely be affected by the prominence of national 
legal culture in the field. This is because the law of secured credit encompasses legal 
areas which regulations remain well entrenched within the legal culture o f national 
entities. Indeed, a reform of secured credit law regimes would also require a reform 
of the laws of property, contract and bankruptcy. Particularly, property law can be 
said to be national par excellence. It reflects certain values and political choices that 
may differ among jurisdictions and which outcomes may be too difficult to amend or 
reconcile within modernisation efforts. Nevertheless, these endeavours towards the 
modernisation and approximation o f secured credit laws are not vain. Legal 
transplantation, legal harmonisation and legal unification are all contributing, to a 
certain extent, to the convergence of legal systems, but, as much as this convergence 
is to be welcomed, it is too slow to keep pace with the requirements of modem 
commerce.
A theoretical justification o f the institution of secured credit was a prerequisite to this 
analysis on the modernisation of secured credit law regimes. The theories using the 
economic analysis o f the law particularly challenged the economic efficiency of
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secured credit law regimes, without great success. It is demonstrated that a 
justification of the institution of secured credit remains an empirical question. 
Indeed, it was concluded that there are extra rational reasons leading to the decision 
o f lending and borrowing on a secured basis. Although the debate over the rationale 
o f secured credit remains inconclusive, the analysis should not remain vain. The 
theories using the economic analysis of the law provide significant developments on 
policy issues that are important to consider within any modernisation endeavours in 
the field of secured credit. Although the value of the economic analysis in the law 
making process can be enhancing, it is argued that the use of the economic analysis 
should not solely dictate the content of secured credit law regimes. In reforming and 
modernising secured credit laws, a balance should be achieved between the different 
interests at stake which outcomes should not solely depend on economic 
considerations. A major theme of this thesis was thus introduced, according to which 
the modernisation of secured credit laws should not be an economic contest. It is 
explained that other components such as the preservation of legal culture should also 
be considered and respected in the formulation o f modem secured credit law 
regimes.
Although, a justification of the institution of secured credit continues to be a topic of 
debate, particularly within the Law and Economics movement, it has been evidenced 
that the case for the modernisation and approximation of secured credit law regimes 
now represents a large consensus among academics and commercial actors. 
Following the internationalisation o f secured credit transactions and the emergence 
of new categories of assets, secured credit law regimes appear to struggle in 
maintaining a satisfactory level of certainty and predictability to commercial 
participants in their mutual dealings. An illustration of these difficulties was 
provided through the analysis of the use of intellectual property rights for security 
purposes. A comparative law analysis of different national registration mechanisms 
to validate and enforce security rights created in intellectual property assets in 
Civilian and Common Law jurisdictions demonstrated that in light of the objectives 
of a modem legislation o f secured credit, substantial reform was currently needed. It 
is argued that a modernisation of the law should adapt to new commercial needs by 
embracing a wider category o f assets. Such comparative analysis also demonstrated
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that the modernisation o f secured credit law regimes is not just peculiar to a specific 
jurisdiction or peculiar to jurisdictions that belong to certain legal traditions. It was 
further established that following the significant growth in cross-border transactions 
and following a substantial enlargement of economic markets, modem secured 
transactions law regimes should also permit creditors to create and enforce a security 
at the international level. Accordingly, the question emerged o f whether 
approximation of law methods such as legal transplantation, legal harmonisation and 
legal unification could successfully be used to modernise secured credit law regimes.
The question o f whether legal transplantation could be used as legal method to 
modernise and approximate secured credit law regimes was first considered. The 
study adopts a comparative law approach to the question of the feasibility o f legal 
transplantation in jurisdictions that belong from different legal traditions. The 
importation o f the Roman law concept of accessio in England and France was 
considered as an illustration of the legal transplantation process. It is recognised that 
this core principle o f the Roman law of property has successfully been integrated in 
the law of jurisdictions that belong to different legal traditions despite some 
divergences in its application. By analogy, it was questioned whether the concept of 
the security interest enshrined in Article 9 UCC, and often assimilated as a modem 
legislation on secured credit, could similarly be transplanted in jurisdictions that 
belong to different legal traditions. Article 9 UCC was fundamental to consider 
because it has uniformly modernised the laws of every States in America. 
Accordingly, the question o f whether the legal transplantation of Article 9 UCC 
could similarly modernise and approximate secured credit law regimes in European 
jurisdictions was considered.
The study adopts a comparative law approach by attempting to assess the feasibility 
of the legal transplant of Article 9 UCC in jurisdictions from dissimilar legal 
traditions such as England and France. It is argued that the legal transplantation of 
Article 9 UCC as legal method to modernise English and French secured credit law 
regimes is uncertain. It is emphasised that the tme obstacle to the legal 
transplantation of an Article 9 type in these jurisdictions would lie in the functional 
approach retained in the legal mle. The integration of the functional approach would
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remove the use of property-based security devices, such as retention of title 
mechanisms in both jurisdictions. Most importantly, the functional approach 
regulating a global security interest would substantially alter the fundamental 
baseline property law concepts entrenched in English and French laws. It was 
emphasised that the true obstacle to a successful legal transplantation of Article 9 as 
legal method to modernise secured credit law regime in England would lie in the 
existence of the floating charge. Indeed, it was explained that the floating charge 
already offers similar benefits than the ones offered under the security interest. The 
main difficulties identified in respect of the floating charge is the priority system 
which belongs to insolvency law regimes and not to secured credit law regimes.
The main obstacle to the success of Article 9 in France would lie in the 
incompatibility of the functional approach with the prominence of property-based 
security mechanisms. Indeed, it seems that French secured credit law regime now 
largely depends upon property-based security mechanisms, particularly since the 
introduction of the fiducie, rather than evolving towards a more functional approach 
and towards the adoption of the security interest. Such comparative analysis also 
highlighted that beyond the terminological and conceptual difficulties faced by legal 
reformers to transplant Article 9, cultural obstacles such as the willingness to 
preserve a specific legal culture would also play a large part, particularly in Civil 
Law jurisdictions. If national laws and legal cultures are to be preserved, the quest 
for the modernisation and approximation of laws through legal transplantation is 
uncertain. Although the thesis emphasises the need to protect legal culture, it is also 
clear that it should be balanced with the need for modernisation.
Legal harmonisation, which in essence involves the accommodation and reduction of 
national legal differences for law reform purposes, was then considered as potential 
successful legal method to modernise and approximate secured credit law regimes. 
Harmonisation is understood, in this analysis, as the means to reconcile and 
coordinate divergences of various national legal regimes with the aim to approximate 
and modernise the law. Harmonisation of law was considered in the context o f the 
EU because this is one of the main methods used by the European legislator to 
reform and approximate the law, especially through the use of European Directives.
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Reference was particularly made to the EU Directive on Late Payment which 
attempted to harmonise retention o f title clauses. It is explained that the success of 
the Directive has not been adequate in modernising and harmonising retention o f title 
clauses regulations. Accordingly, the question was considered of whether the 
Directive could have gone further and whether an accommodation o f legal 
divergences in relation to retention of title legal regimes could lead to successful 
modernisation of the law in European jurisdictions. The identification of current 
divergences amongst all EU jurisdictions was restricted to France and England. 
Although both jurisdictions recognise the power of the seller to use ownership for 
security purposes, there are substantial divergences in the definition and concept of 
‘property’ itself that seem too difficult to accommodate. The comparative analysis of 
the property law terminologies and fundamental concepts of property law showed 
great disparities between legal traditions which would render a full conciliation quite 
uncertain. Indeed, national property law differs dramatically according to each legal 
tradition and even each jurisdiction. Further, considering current uncertainties 
underlying the regulation of retention of title clauses in both jurisdictions, it is 
recognised that a reconciliation o f unsatisfactory legal frameworks could arguably 
render the task o f modernising the law through harmonisation ineffective.
Nonetheless, this comparative analysis has not been unfruitful as it permitted to 
highlight the trend of European property law regimes to become more and more 
flexible in accommodating new commercial needs. Although the baseline concepts 
and leading principles o f property law seem very rigid and dogmatic, particularly in 
Civilian jurisdictions, the trend has recently been to adopt a much more flexible 
approach. In this respect, it was opportune to highlight the recent adoption of the 
fiducie in France which can be assimilated to the English trust. Naturally, property 
law principles and rules should be respected but an appropriate balance should be 
achieved that will comply with the new requirements of modem commercial 
transactions. Legal reformers should therefore engage in comparative law 
endeavours and notice the similarities and leading principles underlying property law 
regimes of Europe, which will in time contribute to a conciliation of differences. 
With the recognition o f similar legal principles, jurisdictions from different legal
282
traditions will in time encourage the accommodation of their differences owing to 
more flexibility in their approach.
If a comprehensive modernisation and approximation of secured credit law regimes 
is uncertain through legal transplantation and legal harmonisation, this analysis 
further questioned whether a modernisation could be possible thanks to international 
initiatives in the field of secured credit. The use of unification o f law instruments as 
legal methods to modernise secured credit law regimes can be, to some extent, 
profitable. With regard to hard law legal instruments, it was argued that international 
conventions could constitute a successful legal method to modernise and 
approximate secured credit law regimes by reaching a high ratio of ratifications and 
by providing a consistent and uniform interpretation amongst Member States. 
Evidently, such efforts would require a strong consensus among all participating 
states on the question of secured credit. It has been exposed that the creation of an 
international convention on secured credit would be quite uncertain considering the 
lack of international consensus on the question of secured credit, property law issues 
and other fundamental policy choices. Nevertheless, it is recognised that the creation 
of a legally binding instrument is possible in relation to targeted areas of secured 
credit as evidenced with the successful Cape Town Convention. However, the 
decision to opt for a series of separate conventions to regulate the creation o f an 
international security interest relative to specific types o f assets may hinder the 
economic benefits o f the proposed new scheme to more than a limited variety of 
assets. Accordingly, this study concluded that a successful modernisation using 
international convention as legal method would not be entirely satisfactory unless it 
could be extended to other categories of assets.
Considering the uncertainties underlying the use of international conventions as legal 
methods to modernise and approximate secured credit law regimes, international 
drafters recently opted for more flexible legal instruments embodied in the forms of 
model laws and restatements. Soft law legal instruments such as model laws enable 
the creation of a comprehensive unification of secured credit law regimes in the form 
of non binding legal instruments. Naturally, the success o f soft law instruments as 
legal methods to modernise secured transactions regimes will depend on whether
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national legislators will actually refer to them as basis for law reform. In this respect, 
the recent introduction o f the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Secured 
Transactions introduced great hope for the modernisation and approximation of 
secured credit law regimes.
An analysis of the travaux preparatoires permitted to identify areas of accords and 
discords among the members of the drafting panel. Although, the UNCITRAL 
Legislative Guide on Secured Transactions constitutes a major endeavour towards 
the modernisation and approximation of secured credit laws, there are still areas that 
could not be compromised on. Thus, the Guide constitutes a challenge for national 
legal reformers on the path to reform their secured credit law regimes. The question 
is now to see whether national drafters will actually refer to the Guide as a model for 
legal reform. Despite the significant advantages of soft law legal instruments, it is 
concluded that soft law and hard law legal instruments would both constitute 
satisfactory legal methods for reform in the way they are both playing a significant 
role in the modernisation and the convergence of secured credit law regimes.
The analysis on whether legal transplantation, legal harmonisation and legal 
unification could be successful as legal methods to modernise and approximate the 
law, revealed that legal culture often generates some obstacles to the success of 
secured credit law reforms in the light of an approximation of laws. If legal culture 
constitutes a frein to the successful modernisation of secured credit law, it can be 
questioned whether the modernisation of secured credit law regimes could occur 
outside the framework o f a state within a distinct legal order, independently from any 
local legal culture. Recent years clearly witnessed a substantial evolution of 
international commercial law and witnessed a substantial denationalisation o f the 
law. Accordingly, a wider range of formulating international agencies, other than 
states, have recently emerged generating other sources of law such as international 
customs and practices. Accordingly, it is suggested that if a modernisation and 
approximation o f secured credit law regimes remains uncertain from a nationalistic 
approach, that is through national legal reforms, the question needs to be addressed 
of whether modem secured credit law regimes could arise outside the framework of 
the state, and particularly, whether modem secured credit law regimes could arise
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from the recognition of an autonomous transnational commercial law which would 
operate within a distinct international legal pattern. This chapter will attempt to 
provide some elements of answers to the question of the recognition of a 
transnational security law framework but does recognise that such possibility 
remains limited. Legitimacy and enforcement related issues may slow the move 
towards the recognition of a transnational secured credit law that would arise beyond 
the state. These limits thus restrain the analysis from providing a clear and definitive 
answer to the question of whether or not the recognition of a transnational secured 
credit law is feasible. However, the thesis does not argue that it is unachievable but 
explains that there are new challenges ahead, the Grand challenge of law.
The multiplication o f international endeavours towards the approximation and 
modernisation of commercial law gave rise to the emergence of a new body of 
commercial laws. This new body of law is often referred to as ‘transnational 
commercial law’, or the new lex mercatoria, which is generally used to “... denote 
that set of private law principles and rules, from whatever source, which governs 
international commercial transactions and is common to legal systems generally or to 
a significant number of legal systems.”920 Transnational commercial law has been 
analysed as an effect of international commerce. Following the emergence of new 
class of assets, the development of new technologies, privatisation, and the 
dismantlement of economic boundaries, modem secured credit law regulations
• 921emerged at the international level at the initiatives of private organisations . 
International commercial law has been analysed as an aspect of the phenomenon of 
internationalisation and ‘globalisation’ as Cranston defines:
“[i]n some contexts, globalisation is being used to describe a process of social 
change, a world being transformed so that there are greater contacts across national 
boundaries and growth or intensification of new networks and interdependencies. In 
other contexts it means the condition where geographical boundaries are rendered 
less relevant by the existence of these cross-border connections and arrangements. 
Globalisation gives rise to apparent paradoxes. The fact that globalisation is
920 Goode op. cit. fn. 281, at p. 4.
921 For instance, Berger argues that the modem lex mercatoria is a “... spillover o f the complex 
institutional processes connected with the phenomenon of globalisation” in Berger, K.P. “The New 
Law Merchant and the Global Market: A 21st Century View of Transnational Commercial Law” 
(2000) 3(4) International Arbitration Law Review, at p. 100.
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multidimensional makes it all the more difficult to analyse. Depending on how it is 
defined, the globalisation label may be applied to eras earlier than our own.”922
In light of the emergence o f this new corpus of commercial laws, the question 
emerged whether transnational commercial law could be the way forward towards 
the recognition o f a modem secured credit law to regulate international secured 
transactions. In other words, the question arose to determine whether it would be 
possible to identify and recognise an autonomous international legal pattern that 
would provide for a modem secured credit law regime independently from the 
framework of the state. In effect, it is arguable that if commercial participants, 
personal assets, and more generally secured transactions can cross boundaries, then 
the law regulating secured credit should also be designed within a distinct legal 
framework from the state and away from traditional conflict of law rules. It is evident 
that the statist and territorial nature of domestic legislations showed that it is often 
inadequate to fit the requirements of modem legislations on secured transactions. 
Accordingly, the question emerged to determine whether a transnational commercial 
law approach would be more appropriate than the traditional domestic law to provide 
for a modem secured transactions law. Would the nature of transnational commercial 
law be better suited to regulate international secured transactions in light of the 
requirements of modem commerce than under domestic legislations and private 
international law mles? Even where a particular national secured credit law regime 
can clearly be identified following the application of traditional conflict of law rules, 
it has been evidenced that substantial uncertainties may still arise for the commercial 
actors who may not be able to enforce their security in a foreign jurisdiction. If 
modem secured transactions law can arise from transnational commercial law, the 
next challenge will be to determine whether the recognition and enforcement o f an 
autonomous corpus o f law that would regulate international secured transactions is 
possible. The recognition o f such an autonomous transnational commercial law 
regulating secured transactions would also require the identification and recognition 
of a distinct international commercial legal pattern to operate.
922 Cranston, R. “Theorizing Transnational Commercial Law” (2007) 42 Texas International Law 
Journal, at p. 600.
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The recognition of an autonomous body of law to regulate secured transactions 
outside the framework of a state can be limited. Especially, this situation evidently 
implies the question of the legitimacy of these new non-territorial sources of law to 
become legally binding without the intervention of the state, especially in the field of 
secured credit. Although, the recognition of a distinct international commercial legal 
pattern that would enable the creation and enforcement o f security interests at the 
international level could theoretically be considered, its achievement remains 
uncertain. Particularly, the enforcement of an international autonomous regime could 
create some difficulties, especially in light of the creation of proprietary rights and 
the effects on third parties. Further, this situation would fundamentally challenge the 
adequacy of domestic law to regulate international commercial transactions.
The following developments will essentially seek to understand what the expression 
of transnational commercial law, especially applied in the field of secured credit law, 
encompasses and will also question the adequacy of national laws to govern 
international commercial secured transactions. It will be further explained to what 
extent the recognition of an autonomous body of commercial law or transnational 
commercial law to regulate international secured transactions may be better suited in 
providing more modem legislations for secured credit, than under national laws and 
private international law mles. If  transnational commercial law is the way forward, 
the question will be next to determine the new challenges for legal reformers at the 
international level to make it possible.
TRANSNATIONAL SECURED CREDIT LAW: THE WAY FORWARD?
The emergence of new sources of international law together with the development of 
substantial case law led the doctrine to talk about the appearance of a new lex 
mercatoria which already emerged in medieval times from commercial practices and 
customs of merchants923. Similarly, the recent recognition o f common commercial
923 Economists and lawyers writing about the new lex mercatoria based their position on the medieval 
lex mercatoria. On this point see Berman, H.J. “Law and Revolution: The Formation o f the Western 
Legal Tradition” (1983) Harvard University Press, at p. 333 where the author explains that: “[a]s with 
Feudal and manorial, so with mercantile law the crucial period of change was the late eleventh and the 
twelfth centuries. It was then that the basic concepts and institutions o f modem Western mercantile 
law -  lex mercatoria (“the law merchant”) - were formed, and, even more important, it was then that
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standards at the international level suggested the emergence of a new lex mercatoria 
which would be formed of an autonomous body of rules regulating international 
commercial trade. The following development will attempt to provide a definition of 
the lex mercatoria and transnational commercial law. The extent to which 
transnational commercial law would be better suited in formulating modem secured 
credit legislations than under domestic legislations will subsequently be considered.
Definitions
Originally, trade customs, embodied in the expressions of lex mercatoria or law 
merchant, were considered to constitute an autonomous source o f law used to 
regulate commercial activities. During the nineteenth century emerged the notion of 
sovereignty and the idea that law could only emerged from the state. It was also 
during this time that codification spread as an expression of this nationalisation. 
Illustrations of this movement of codification can be found with the enactment of 
civil codes in Europe such as the Napoleonic French Civil code which was 
promulgated in 1804, The Spanish Civil code (1888) or the German BGB (1900).
With the transnationalisation of international commercial dealings, a new body of 
commercial law emerged at the international level which reintroduced the concept of 
lex mercatoria. However, the reappearance of the expression ‘lex mercatoria’ in the 
last quarter of the twentieth century has been contested and is still the object of 
fervent debates924. The resurgence of this expression to designate the emergence o f a 
new autonomous international set of rules made of commercial usages and customs 
is not recognised by the whole commercial community. French Scholar Kassis does 
not recognise the existence o f such an autonomous body of law and even states that 
the lex mercatoria is an error in the evolution o f legal theories925. The question of the
mercantile law in the West first came to be viewed as an integrated, developing system, a body o f 
law.” See also Trakman, L.E. “The Law Merchant: The Evolution o f Commercial Law” (1983) 
Littleton, Colo, F.B. Rothman, at p. 39 where the author states that: “[t]he fear o f a proliferated Law 
Merchant has led to the growth o f a “new” Law Merchant, closely resembling its medieval 
forefather.”
924 Goldman, B., Frontieres du Droit et Lex Mercatoria, (Sirey, Paris, 1964) cited in Flanagan, P.M. 
“Demythologising the Law Merchant: The Impropriety of the Lex Mercatoria as a Choice o f Law” 
(2004) International Company and Commercial Law Review, at p. 297.
925 Kassis, A., Theorie Generate des Usages du Commerce, (1984), at p. 578 quoted in Beguin, J. “Le 
Developpement de la lex mercatoria Menace t-il l’Ordre Juridique International ?” (1985) 30 McGill 
Law Journal, at p. 80.
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emergence of a new lex mercatoria is part of a debate that is central for a number of 
scholars and academics926. Particularly, ambiguities are still underlying the 
definition, content, source and scope of the lex mercatoria which led this analysis to 
remain cautious towards the use of this terminology. The expression lex mercatoria 
is sometimes used interchangeably with the terminology o f transnational commercial 
law which is defined as the “... law which is not particular to or the product of any 
one legal system but represents a convergence of rules drawn from several legal
Q97systems” . Nonetheless, some academics clearly distinguish between lex 
mercatoria and transnational commercial law. It is explained that:
“The phrase “transnational commercial law” is used to describe the totality of 
principles and rules, whether customary, conventional, contractual or derived from 
any other sources, which are common to a number of legal systems, while the phrase 
“lex mercatoria” is used to indicate that part of transnational commercial law which 
is unwritten and consists of customary commercial law, customary rules o f evidence
926 On the debate on the Lex Mercatoria see Berman, H.J., Et al. “The Law o f International 
Commercial Transactions (.Lex Mercatoria)” (1978) 19 Harvard International Law Journal, at p. 221; 
Beguin op. cit. fn. 925; Highet, K. “The Enigma o f Lex Mercatoria" (1989) 63 Tulane Law Review, at 
p.613; Kahn, P. “La Lex Mercatoria: point de vue francais apres quarante ans de controversies” 
(1992) 37 McGill Law journal, at p. 413 ; Drobnig, U. “The Use o f the UNIDROIT Principles by 
National and Supra-National Courts, in: Institute o f International Business Law and Practice” (1995) 
in The UNIDROIT Principles o f  International Commercial Contracts -  A New Lex Mercatoria! (ICC 
Publ. No. 490/1, 1995), at p. 223; Berger, K.P. “The Lex Mercatoria Doctrine and the UNIDROIT 
Principles of International Commercial Contracts” (1997) 28 Georgetown Journal o f  Law and Private 
International Business, at p. 943; Freeman, P. “Lex mercatoria'. Its Emergence and Acceptance as a 
Legal Basis for the Resolution o f International Disputes” (1997) The Arbitration and Dispute 
Resolution Law Journal, at p. 289; Bonell, M.J. “UNIDROIT Principles and the Lex Mercatoria ”, in: 
Carbonneau, T.E., Lex Mercatoria and Arbitration, (2nd ed., 1998), at p. 249; Berger, K.P. “The 
Relationship between UNIDROIT Principles and Lex Mercatoria” (2000) 5 Uniform Law Review, at 
p. 153; Juenger, F. K. “The Lex Mercatoria and Private International Law”(2000) 5 Uniform Law 
Review, at p. 171; Leduc, A. “ L'emergence d'une nouvelle lex mercatoria a l'enseigne des principes 
d'UNIDROIT relatifs aux contrats du commerce international : these et antithese” (2001) 35 Revue 
Juridique Themis, at p. 429 ; Calliess, G.P. “ Lex Mercatoria: A Reflexive Law Guide To An 
Autonomous Legal System” (2001) 2 German Law Journal, at p. 17; Berger, K.P. “European Private 
Law, Lex Mercatoria and Globalisation”, in Hartkamp, A.S., Towards a European Civil Code, (3rd 
ed., 2004), at p. 43; Howarth, R.J. “Lex Mercatoria: Can General Principles o f Law Govern 
International Commercial Contracts?” (2004) 10 Canterbury Law Review, at p. 36; Dalhuisen, J.H. 
“Legal Orders and Their Manifestation: The Operation of the International Commercial and Financial 
Legal Order and Its Lex Mercatoria”(2006) 24 Berkeley Journal o f  International Law, at p. 129; Alec 
S.S. "The New Lex Mercatoria and Transnational Governance" (2006) 13 Journal o f  European Public 
Policy, at p. 627; Douglas, M. “The Lex Mercatoria and the Culture o f Transnational Industry” (2006) 
13 University o f Miami International & Comparative. Law Review, at p. 367; Hatzimihail, N. E. “The 
Many Lives - and Faces - of Lex Mercatoria: History as Genealogy in International Business Law” 
(2008) 71 Law & Contemporary Problems, at p. 169.
927 Goode, R.M. “Usage and its Reception in Transnational Commercial Law” (1997) 46 International
and Comparative Law Quarterly, at p. 2.
289
and procedures and general principles of commercial law, including international 
public policy.”928
This analysis understands the lex mercatoria to represent this corpus o f unwritten 
law that is emerging at the international level through international usages and 
customs. Accordingly, the lex mercatoria would only represent a small part of 
transnational commercial law which extends to international conventions, model 
laws and other international uniform principles. The purpose of this section is not to 
provide a comprehensive analysis of all sources and elements composing 
transnational commercial law but to attempt to identify whether a body of 
commercial law can be identified to have emerged outside the framework o f the state 
in relation to secured transactions. In the field of secured credit, transnational 
commercial law would encompass a wide range o f legal tools bom from the 
approximation o f law efforts.
In relation to secured credit law, it would include the EBRD Model Law on Secured 
Transactions (1994)929, The Organization for the Harmonization of Business Law in 
Africa’s Uniform Act Organizing Securities (1997)930, The United Nations 
Convention on the Assignment of Receivables in International Trade (2001)931, The 
Cape Town Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment (2001) and 
Associated Protocols , The Studies on Insolvency and Secured Transactions Law 
Reform in Asia and the Guide to Movables Registries prepared by the Asian 
Development Bank (2002), The Organization of American States Model Inter- 
American Law on Secured Transactions (2002)933, the UNCITRAL Legislative 
Guide on Insolvency (2004)934, The Convention on the Law Applicable to Certain 
Rights in Respect of Securities Held with an Intermediary adopted by the Hague 
Conference on Private International Law (2006)935 and the UNCITRAL Legislative
929 See http://www.ebrd.com/pubs/legal/secured.htm (last checked 26/04/2010).
930 See www.juriscope.org/infos_ohada/droit-sure/pdf-gb/presentation-surgb.pdf (last checked 
26/04/2010).
931 See www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/payments/receivables/ctc-assignment-convention-e.pdf
(last checked 26/04/2010).
932 See www.unidroit.org/english/conventions/mobile-equipment/main.htm (last checked 26/04/2010).
933 See www.oas.org/Dil/cidip-vi-securedtransactions_eng.htm (last checked 26/04/2010).
934See www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/insolvency/2004Guide.html (last checked 
26/04/2010).
935 http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.text&cid=72 (last checked 26/04/2010).
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Guide on Secured Transactions (2007). The World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund also engaged in the recognition of common legal principles and rules 
in the field of secured credit936.
Other relevant areas o f law such as contract law or insolvency have also been the 
object o f extensive unification projects such as the UNIDROIT Principles of 
International Commercial Contracts, the Principles o f European Contract Law. 
Transnational commercial law would also include international trade terms and other 
trade customs and usages, such as the INCOTERMS, and the Uniform Customs and 
Practices for Documentary Credits (UCP)937, model contracts and model standard 
contract forms, such as the International Chamber o f Commerce (thereafter ICC)
Q O O
model contracts on sales, commercial agency, and distributorship .
The ICC plays a significant role in the development of commercial usages and in the 
development of commercial arbitration. The ICC represents the world business and 
defends the global economy. The ICC has a broad scope within its activities. It deals 
with arbitration, dispute resolution in order to promote open trade and the market 
economy system, business self-regulation, fighting corruption or combating 
commercial crime939. The ICC can access every country through its committees. The 
organisation is based in Paris and has an active production of dispute resolution 
within its arbitration activity. Since 1999, there are in average five hundred cases a 
year coming before the Court940.
936 The World Bank published “Principles and Guidelines for Effective Insolvency and Creditor 
Rights Systems” (WB Principles) in 2001 which were developed in collaboration with international 
financial entities and Non-governmental organisations including the African Development Bank, 
Asian Development Bank, EBRD, Inter-American Development Bank, International Financial 
Corporation, IMF, Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, UNCITRAL, INSOL 
and the International Bar Association. On this point see Garro, A.M. “Harmonization o f Personal 
Property Security Law: National, Regional and Global Initiatives” (2003), 8 Uniform Law Review, at 
p. 357.
937 On the law of international trade, see Chuah, J.C.T., Law o f  international trade: cross border 
commercial transactions, (4th ed. 2009). On the UCP, see for e.g. Chuah, J.C.T. “Documentary 
Credits - Introduction o f the New UCP 600” (2007) 52 Student Law Review, at p. 52; Chuah, J.C.T. 
“UCP 600 - New Challenges and Issues” (2007) 13(2) Journal o f  International Maritime Law, at p. 
73.
938 See ICC, ICC Model International Sale Contract (1997); ICC, ICC Model Commercial Agency 
Contract (2nd Ed., 2002); ICC, ICC Model Distributorship Contract: Sole Importer -  Distributor (2nd 
edn, 2002).
939 See the ICC Web site, “What is ICC?”, www.iccwbo.org (last checked 05/03/2010)
940 Ibid.
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Arbitration within the ICC uses customs and practice such as the ICC Uniform 
Customs and Practices for Documentary Credits (UCP 600) in order to settle 
international commercial disputes. These are the rules used by banks in order to trade 
and finance billions o f dollars worldwide every year. In fact, the ICC’s Uniform 
Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits are almost used all over the world. 
Consequently, almost every international commercial transactions made under these 
rules will be subject to the same standard o f rules. The ICC uses standards in 
international trade such as the ICC Incoterms941 which are often included by 
international traders in their contracts. These international customs and practices, 
also referred to as the new lex mercatoria, are mainly confined to regulate 
international trade and not secured transactions.
Following the identification o f a significant body of secured credit law regulations 
and international legal standards within transnational commercial law, the next 
section will attempt to determine to what extent the recognition o f an autonomous 
body of laws to regulate international secured transactions would be better suited to 
formulate modem secured credit law regimes than under national legislations.
The adequacy of transnational commercial law to govern modern secured 
transactions
The above development identified sources and elements of transnational commercial 
law relevant to secured credit that could form an autonomous body of law. 
Instruments o f unification such as international conventions or model laws 
demonstrated that they could potentially be successful in modernising secured credit 
law regimes. However, it is to be observed that these instruments do not constitute 
the sole sources and elements of transnational commercial law as explained above. 
The development and recognition of a transnational commercial law now includes a 
broader selection of legal instruments such as contractual terms, international usages 
and practices that have been issued by a broader selection of international agencies, 
and not solely by states.
941 See http://www.iccwbo.org/incoterms/id3045/index.hftnl (last checked 05/03/2010)
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This section will highlight some of the advantages o f recognising an autonomous 
transnational commercial law at the international level as more suitable to enable the 
recognition of modem secured credit laws than under domestic legislations. Such 
comparison is assessed in light o f the requirements o f modem commerce as defined 
in Chapter Two and certainly does not aim to conclude that national legislations are 
inefficient. Naturally, domestic laws would still apply in purely domestic commercial 
transactions. Also, if  transnational commercial law was not yet available in relation 
to specific aspect of international secured credit, domestic law would still find some 
application following the application of traditional conflict of law mles.
Similarly to legal unification, the recognition of international standards would clearly 
avoid conflict of law issues and thus avoid the complexities generated by the 
existence of different legal regimes. Further, by avoiding conflict o f law issues, 
transaction costs and legal risks would also be reduced. Traditional conflicts of law 
mles do not always provide the certainty that the creation o f a security in one 
jurisdiction will be enforceable in a foreign jurisdiction. This has already been 
explained in relation to the creation of a security in movable assets which are likely 
to easily move boundaries. Accordingly, the Cape Town Convention now enables 
creditors to create and enforce their security in high value mobile equipments at the 
international level. Although international conventions largely depend upon the 
degree of ratifications of states to be successful, this example demonstrates that the 
emergence and recognition of an autonomous transnational secured credit law regime 
would similarly avoid conflict of law issues.
Further to avoiding conflict of law issues, the flexibility of transnational commercial
law would ease the formulation of international legal standards to regulate areas of
secured transactions where domestic legislations left significant legal gaps. For
instance, the Cape Town Convention filled in the legal gap in relation to the creation
and enforcement of an international security in movable equipments such as aircraft
or railway rolling stocks which option was not provided for creditors and debtors
under certain domestic legislations. The dynamic nature of transnational commercial
law would thus seem to facilitate the draft of modem secured credit legislations to fit
with the new modem commercial needs. It is also arguable that the lack of formalism
often associated to the nature of transnational commercial law would also lead to
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quicker procedures underlying the formulation of international legal standards than 
under domestic legal frameworks.
By nature, transnational commercial law is neither statist nor territorial which would 
arguably better fit with the requirements o f modem commercial transactions. The 
recognition of international legal standards would further avoid the problem of legal 
culture often encountered when attempting to reform national secured credit law 
regimes in the light of an approximation of law. Accordingly, it is arguable that the 
legal differences underlying the Common Law and Civilian traditions legal regimes 
would not constitute substantial obstacles to the modernisation efforts. The 
recognition o f an autonomous corpus o f law to regulate international secured 
transactions would thus seem to be better tuned with the requirements of modem 
international commercial transactions. This is because transnational commercial law 
generally adopts a functional approach to the formulation of international legal 
standards.
The functionalist approach designs law according to the desired objective 
overlooking, to a certain extent, cultural, social and political elements inherent to 
state values. In this perspective, it is arguable that transnational commercial law 
would be better suited to provide modem secured credit law regimes for international 
commercial participants than under domestic legislations where legal culture is often 
said to constitute a significant obstacle to the recognition of modem laws. 
Nonetheless, it is arguable that whatever the legal pattern in which secured credit law 
regimes will emerge, a legal culture, representing specific policy decisions and other 
specific interests will always be have to considered.
The draft o f secured credit law regimes will always involve the consideration of 
fundamental policy choices. Accordingly, the recognition of an autonomous 
transnational secured credit law regime would also reflect certain policy choices. The 
question is to determine who is to make these choices. Should they solely remain 
with the state or could they also be considered within a distinct international legal 
framework by non-state entities and private actors? After all, there is always the risk 
that private actors decide to promote, through the recognition of transnational
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commercial law, specific policy decisions reflecting the position of powerful 
economic jurisdictions at the international level. In the field o f secured credit, it is 
quite clear that most of existing transnational legal instruments, such as the EBRD 
Model law on Secured Transactions or the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on 
Secured Transactions and other international principles, are modelled on the Article 
9 o f the American UCC. It led some authors to talk about the use o f "... 
harmonization of law as a legal political strategy”942.
This section suggested that the achievement of modem secured credit law regimes 
would require the adoption of a more functional approach to law, which may be best 
served outside the framework of the state. However, it has also been highlighted that 
it is in the function of the state to make policy choices and take into account other 
interests than those driven by economic considerations. Accordingly, it is arguable 
that the regulation of secured credit law regimes should remain within the functions 
o f the state. The prominence of legal culture has been a major theme of this analysis 
and it is to be reasserted that even in an international context, secured credit law 
regimes remain cultural, attached to a certain legal culture, reflecting particular 
political, social, and economic policy choices.
Although the requirements of modem commerce would tend to suggest that other 
sources of law, such as those that belong to transnational commercial law, would be 
better suited to regulate secured transactions, it is argued that the law of secured 
credit remains cultural and thus attached to the legal formalism of state law. 
Assuming that an autonomous body of law could be recognised to regulate 
international secured transactions, the question emerges to determine whether a 
distinct legal pattern could also be identified at the international level, a distinct legal 
order in which transnational commercial law could operate943.
942 Cohen, E.S. “Constructing Power Through Law: Private Law Pluralism and Harmonization in the 
Global Political Economy” (2008) 15 (5) Review o f  International Political economy, at p. 770.
943 Dalhuisen, J.H., Dalhuisen on Transnational and Comparative Commercial, Financial and Trade 
Law, (3rd Ed. 2007), at p. 211.
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THE UNCERTAINTIES UNDERLYING THE RECOGNITION OF A 
TRANSNATIONAL SECURED CREDIT LAW BEYOND THE STATE
If  transnational commercial law, more specifically, transnational secured credit law 
can be successful in providing modem secured credit law, the next challenge is to 
determine how the recognition of an autonomous body of law that would regulate 
international secured transactions could be recognised and be effective. This section 
argues that the recognition of an autonomous transnational commercial law to 
regulate international secured transactions would create some difficulties related to 
the legitimacy and enforcement of these new sources of law.
The privatisation of the law making process leads to significant concern towards the
legitimacy o f this new autonomous body of law, or transnational commercial law944.
The recognition o f the autonomy and legitimacy of transnational commercial law is
still the topic of fervent debates amongst scholars and academics. It is questioned:
“Is there an anational lex mercatoria, a “global law without a state?” The debate 
seems infinite. Some argue that the rules, institutions, and procedures of international 
arbitration have now achieved a sufficient degree both of autonomy from the state 
and o f legal character that they represent such an anational law. Others respond that 
whatever law merchant may exist is really state law -  dependent on national norms 
and the freedom of contract they provide, and on the enforceability or arbitral awards 
by national courts” 945
The recognition that transnational commercial law produces autonomous sources of 
law is not unanimous. Some argue that the idea of an autonomous body of law that is 
emerging outside the framework of the state simply does not exist because it will 
always lack coercive powers and sovereignty946. Accordingly, it is argued that the lex
944 On this point see e.g., Franck, T.M. “Legitimacy in the International System” (1988) 82 American 
Journal o f  International Law, at p. 705; Zumbansen, P. “Piercing the Legal Veil: Commercial 
Arbitration and Transnational Law” (2002) 8 European Law Journal, at p. 400; Rodl, F. “Private Law 
beyond the Democratic Order - On the Legitimatory Problem of Private Law beyond the State 
Values ”(2008) 56 The American Journal o f Comparative Law, at p. 743; Basedow, J. “ State's Private 
Law and the Economy - Commercial Law as an Amalgam of Public and Private Rule-Making, The 
A ctors” (2008) 56 The American Journal o f  Comparative Law, at p. 703; Riles, A. “Anti-Network 
Private Global Governance, Legal knowledge, and the Legitimacy o f the State, The Relations ” (2008) 
56 The American Journal o f  Comparative Law, at p. 605.
945 Michaels, R. “The True Lex Mercatoria: Law Beyond the State” (2007) 14(2) Indiana Journal o f  
Global Legal Studies, at p. 447. See also Mazzacano, P. “The Lex Mercatoria as Autonomous Law” 
(2008), CLEA 2008 Meetings Paper, CLPE Research Paper No. 29/2008, available at SSRN: 
http://ssm.com/abstract=l 137629 (last checked: 20/04/2010).
946 Mazzacano ibid. at p. 1.
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mercatoria will never develop into a distinct legal order947. Others recognise the 
autonomy of the lex mercatoria and its corresponding autonomous legal order, as 
distinct from the state.
In the field o f secured credit law, it is arguable that the case for the recognition of 
legitimate and autonomous sources of law is uncertain. In effect, the regulation of 
secured credit, which also involves the regulation o f property law, remains a 
fundamental function of the state. The extent to which owners can exercise their 
property rights is restricted by state law. For example, the fundamental principle of 
the numerus clausus recognised in many Civilian jurisdictions restricts the creation 
of certain property rights. The regulation of property law remains a prerogative of the 
state, which arguably would render the recognition of an autonomous transnational 
secured credit law quite uncertain.
Assuming that a distinct autonomous transnational commercial law could regulate 
international secured transactions, a distinct international commercial legal 
framework would also need to be identified for this autonomous secured credit law to 
operate. The recognition of such distinct legal order is admitted by many legal 
academics in relation to transnational commercial law948. Some authors recognise the 
existence of such distinct legal order and talk about the ‘international commercial 
and financial order’949 that would have emerged following the phenomenon of 
internationalisation and ‘globalisation’.
Legal orders have been defined as “... participatory social structures or communities 
that spontaneously produce their own laws”950. The state can be cited as the most 
important legal order. Domestic legislations operate in their own national legal
947 Teubner, G. “Global Bukowina: Legal Pluralism in the World Society” in Teubner, G., Global Law 
Without a State, (1997), at pp. 3-28.
948 On this point see Berger op. cit. fn. 921, at p. 91 and Cranston op. cit. fn. 922, at p. 600. Dalhuisen 
explains that: “... To determine the law applicable to international commercial and financial 
transactions, the key question thus is whether there may exist or may be developing a whole pattern of  
substantive transnational law in the professional sphere as an own legal order. It is the contention o f  
this book that there is such a legal order operating in international trade and finance as a natural 
consequence o f the globalisation o f the international professional activities in these areas, and the 
freeing of the flows of persons, goods, capital and technology.” in Dalhuisen op. cit. fn. 943.
949 Ibid. at p. 134
950 Dalhuisen op. cit. fn. 943, at p. 132.
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framework with their own enforcement mechanisms. The EU also operates within a 
distinct legal framework with its own legislations and enforcement mechanisms951. 
Assuming that a relevant legal pattern could be identified, one would still need to 
determine whether the international secured transaction in question should be 
subjected to the law o f this ‘international commercial and financial order’. In other 
words, one would have to establish in which situations this autonomous secured 
credit law would supersede domestic legislations and how this autonomous secured 
credit law regime could be enforceable.
The recognition o f this autonomous body of law to successfully operate in a distinct 
legal pattern such as the one recognised by Dalhuisen, ‘the international commercial 
and financial order’, would also need to be accepted by commercial participants, 
other legal orders and international courts such as arbitrators as legally binding . In 
this respect, the New York Convention of the Recognition and Enforcement of 
Foreign Arbitral Awards953is fundamental in providing enforcement mechanisms for 
transnational commercial law. However, the enforcement of an autonomous 
transnational secured credit law is to be doubted.
It is to be observed that in the field of international trade and international contract, 
party autonomy is playing a major role in the legitimisation and enforcement of 
transnational commercial law. Commercial participants often choose transnational 
law as governing law for their transactions. In England and France, the use o f certain 
international usages to govern private dealings is open to traders as implied 
contractual terms954. General principles such as ‘pacta sunt servanda’ and party 
autonomy are recognised worldwide. The international commercial community often 
chooses transnational commercial law standards to govern international transactions 
through arbitration and reference to international usages. Could party autonomy also
951 The European Court o f Justice constitutes the judicial authority of the EU.
952Dalhuisen op. cit. fn. 943, at p. at p. 161.
953 The Convention is widely recognised as a foundation instrument o f international arbitration and 
requires courts o f contracting States to give effect to an agreement to arbitrate when seized o f an 
action in a matter covered by an arbitration agreement and also to recognise and enforce awards made 
in other States, subject to specific limited exceptions.” The text of the Convention is available at 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/NY Convention.html (Last checked 
20/04/2010).
954 See e.g., Chuah, J., Law o f  International Trade, (3rd ed. 2005), Chapter One at p. 1.
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play a major role in the recognition of an autonomous secured credit law which 
would enable the creation and recognition of an international security in personal 
property955? Again, it is arguable that the recognition and enforcement of this 
international security in personal property would generate some difficulties in 
relation to the creation o f proprietary rights and third parties. Civilian jurisdictions 
generally retain a restrictive approach to the recognition of proprietary rights through 
the numerus clausus principle. Secured transactions create proprietary rights which 
are enforceable erga omnes. Private parties cannot modify rules affecting transfer of 
property and freely create new proprietary rights. It is thus arguable that contractual 
choice of law may thus be ineffective in legitimising and enforcing transnational 
secured credit law.
It is further proposed that an international court should be created to support the 
recognition of this autonomous transnational law to operate. The idea of an 
international commercial court to support transnational commercial law has already 
been suggested by a number of academics956. Could this international court be 
competent in enforcing international security interests? In the field of secured credit 
and property laws, it would seem difficult to see how the decisions o f such a court 
would be recognised and enforceable in other legal orders, particularly national legal 
orders, unless this international court was internationally recognised by states under 
an international treaty.
The recognition of an autonomous transnational secured credit law that would 
operate within a distinct legal framework appears to be quite illusory. Particularly, 
such recognition would create significant difficulties related to the legitimacy and 
enforcement mechanisms. Beyond the theoretical difficulties of recognising an 
autonomous secured credit law regime, it is fundamental to highlight the political 
impact on the recognition of autonomous sources of international commercial law. In 
effect, the formulation of secured credit law regime reflects fundamental political 
social and economic interests that are often overlooked by functional imperatives at
955 Dalhuisen, J.H. “Customs and its Revival in Transnational Private Law” (2008) Duke Journal o f  
Comparative and International Law, at p. 354.
956 See on this point, Dalhuisen op.cit. fn. 954, at p. 35.
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the international level. These conflicts of interests will always be in the way of the
recognition o f uniform legal standards. In this respect, it is explained that:
“... we are in the midst o f a “legal arms race” as actors attempt to develop norms, 
regimes and institutions to advance their interests and projects.” 57
Accordingly, a modernisation through the recognition an autonomous secured credit 
law regime will always be limited as secured credit law remains cultural, attached to 
the economic, social and political values of the state.
CONCLUSION
Following the multiplication of international initiatives in drafting international legal 
standards in the field o f secured credit, the question emerged to determine whether 
these new sources o f law, or transnational commercial laws, could be the way 
forward towards the recognition of a modem secured credit law to regulate 
international secured transactions. In effect, this analysis evidenced that a 
modernisation and approximation of laws through national legal reforms was 
uncertain and was not keeping pace with the requirements of modem commerce. 
Accordingly, it was suggested that the law regulating secured credit could be 
designed within a distinct legal framework away from the state and away from 
traditional conflict o f law mles. However, it is to be concluded that the recognition of 
an autonomous transnational law to regulate secured transactions outside the 
framework o f the state might not be entirely desirable and feasible.
It is explained that the nature o f transnational commercial law could be better suited 
to regulate international secured credit transactions in light of the requirements of 
modem commerce than under domestic legislations and private international law 
mles. Even where a particular national secured credit law regime can clearly be 
identified following the application of traditional conflict of law mles, substantial 
uncertainties may still arise for the commercial actors who may not be able to 
enforce their security in a foreign jurisdiction. The legal formalism and territorial 
nature o f domestic legislations showed that it is often inadequate to fit with the
957 Cohen op. cit. fn. 942, at p. 770.
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requirements of modem legislations on secured transactions. The dynamic nature of 
transnational law would enable the recognition o f more modem legislations that 
would adapt faster and more effectively to modem commercial practices.
It is often advanced that the formulation of modem secured credit law regimes would 
be best achieved following a more functional approach to law, which in essence 
formulate the law according to a fixed objective and which is often driven by 
economic and efficiency considerations. The functionalist approach designs law 
according to the desired objective overlooking, to a certain extent, cultural, social 
and political elements inherent to state values. This analysis demonstrated that in 
most western jurisdictions, legal culture often constitutes an obstacle to the adoption 
o f a more functional approach to regulate secured credit law. However, it is also 
recognised that it is in the nature of national law to take into account other interests 
than those driven by economic imperatives. The formulation of secured credit law 
regimes requires considering important policy issues which outcomes should not 
solely be influenced by economic interests. This argument has been a major theme of 
this analysis and it is to be reasserted that even in an international context, secured 
credit law regimes remain cultural, attached to a certain legal culture, reflecting 
particular political, social, and economic policy choices.
Although it is arguable that the recognition of an autonomous transnational secured 
credit law would be best suited to provide modem legislations, a more functional 
approach to law might overlook other fundamental interests and policy choices that 
should also be considered in the formulation of secured credit law regimes. 
Assuming that a modem secured transactions law could arise from transnational 
commercial law, it was further questioned whether the recognition and enforcement 
of an autonomous corpus of law that would regulate international secured 
transactions could be possible. In this respect, it is explained that the recognition of 
an autonomous body of law to regulate secured transactions outside the framework 
of a state can be limited. Especially, this situation evidently implied the question of 
the legitimacy of these new non-territorial sources o f law to become legally binding 
without the intervention of the state, especially in the field of secured credit.
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The regulation o f secured credit largely affects contract, insolvency and property 
law. The regulation o f property law remains a fundamental function o f the state and 
it is difficult to consider how an autonomous transnational secured credit law regime 
could be recognised and enforceable outside the national framework. The recognition 
of an autonomous transnational secured credit law regime would require the 
identification o f a distinct legal order to operate with appropriate enforcement 
mechanisms. It has been highlighted that international commercial arbitration already 
provides for significant enforcement mechanisms through disputes resolution 
systems outside national systems, particularly in the field o f international trade. 
Nonetheless, in the field of proprietary rights, the emergence of enforcement 
mechanisms outside the framework of the state appears to be quite illusory. 
Accordingly, it is concluded that the recognition o f a distinct international 
commercial legal pattern that would enable the creation and enforcement o f security 
interests at the international level remains uncertain. Particularly, the enforcement of 
an international autonomous regime would create difficulties, especially in light of 
the creation o f proprietary rights and third parties.
Beyond the theoretical difficulties underlying the recognition of an autonomous 
transnational secured credit law regime, mainly related to the lack o f sovereignty and 
coercive powers, it is fundamental to also highlight other obstacles to the recognition 
o f legal reforms beyond the state, such as the reinforcement o f legal pluralism and 
significant conflict of interests in the field of secured credit. Secured credit law is 
cultural, attached to certain economic, social and political values. The nature of 
secured credit makes it a complex area for law reform. This analysis explained that 
secured credit law covers contract, insolvency and property law, but also 
encompasses a certain legal culture, certain policy choices and respects fundamental 
interests which make it difficult to reform, particularly in the light o f an 
approximation of law. At the same time, this analysis clearly demonstrated that 
secured credit law regimes were in great need o f modernisation and approximation.
This is the grand challenge of law; to strike a balance between the requirements of 
modem commerce and the respect of legal culture and other fundamental interests. In 
the field o f secured credit, transnational commercial law instruments are essentially
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the products of private actors which often represent the political and economic values 
o f powerful economic nations. Most of the secured credit law reform initiatives at the 
international level are based on the American Article 9 model. However, it is 
arguable that the modernisation of secured credit law regimes through legal reforms 
should not be the result o f political economic strategy. There is always the risk that 
private actors, engaged in the making of the law, will produce projects more 
influenced by political economic power than legal expertise. If the recognition of 
autonomous sources of law is the way forward, the draft o f transnational commercial 
law to regulate secured credit should ensure that all interests are equally represented.
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